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Abstract 
Having presented as a Marxist atheist for the previous thirty years, in the 
1990s the postmodern philosopher Gianni Vattimo returned to religion. This 
dissertation analyses and evaluates the kind of religion to which Vattimo has 
returned, looking in particular at how it relates to his wider philosophical 
style of ‘weak thought,’ the interpretation of our current situation as one of 
hermeneutical nihilism in which there are no longer any ‘strong 
foundations’ such as metaphysics, value-free facts and metanarratives. In 
particular I look at whether Vattimo has constructed a ‘supersessionist’ 
religious history in which Christianity is ‘better’ than Judaism, a claim 
which—if true—would not only be politically incorrect, but also 
inconsistent with weak thought in that it puts forward a metanarrative of 
progress away from ‘strong’ biblical literalism associated with Judaism 
towards the ‘spiritual’ interpretation of Scripture found in postmodernity 
today, via the ‘liberating’ messages of kenosis and caritas found in 
Christianity. I argue Vattimo has constructed a ‘weak Hegelian’ narrative 
and one which, due to his increasing reliance on the work of Thomas Kuhn, 
can be tempered by an appeal to the ‘incommensurablity’ of paradigms, 
whereby difference in content is acknowledged although one paradigm 
(such as Judaism) cannot be regarded as better than another (such as 
Christianity). To support this interpretation of Vattimo’s ‘return’ to religion 
I appeal to changes in his view of Christianity since the Millennium in 
which the ‘unilinear’ history is downplayed in favour of a Gadamerian focus 
on the importance of the Bible as the source of textual tradition. 
Nevertheless, I go on to show that while there are resources within his 
return to religion to counter its critics, the kind of ontology he takes on 
board with his appeal to Kuhn highlights the larger problem within his 
philosophy of an increasingly selective reading of his main influence, 
Heidegger. The selectivity in his reading of Heidegger pertains in the main 
to his central concept of Being as event, and I show how this has 
implications for his return to religion in relation to the ideas of 
transcendence and caritas. Having done this, I construct my own 
reimagining of Vattimo’s return to religion to keep the spirit of what he has 
done without the conceptual problems generated from his reading of 
Heidegger, using Vattimo’s idea of the defining message of the New 
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Testament as God’s newfound announcement of universal ‘friendship’ for 
all peoples to construct the idea that Philosophy and Theology have 
inexorably weakened one another through the missionary aspect of 
‘friendship’ leading the Apostles to seek out Greeks (philosophers) as well 
as fellow Jews.  
 
Note 
Section 116 of the Revised Regulations for the Award of the University’s 
Degrees of Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy by Supervised 
Research states: ‘The candidate will be free to publish material in advance 
of the thesis submission but reference will be made in the thesis to any such 
work. Copies of published material should either be bound in with the thesis 
submitted for examination, or placed in an adequately secured pocket at the 
end of the thesis.’ Therefore, I have included a CD at the back of the 
dissertation with copies of all the works I have published during the course 
of my research at Staffordshire University. Not all of these works were 
incorporated into my dissertation but I have included them in light of 
section 116 of the revised regulations. Furthermore, where I have drawn 
upon one or more of the articles at length in my dissertation I have supplied 
a footnote referencing the article of origin for the material concerned. 
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An Introduction to Vattimo’s Thought 
 
1. An outline of the research question, purpose and direction of this 
thesis  
a) A brief summary of Vattimo’s weak thought and return to 
religion 
Gianni Vattimo (b. 1936), an Italian philosopher and cultural commentator, 
was born and studied in Turin, Italy, with Pareyson, then in Heidelberg 
under Hans-Georg Gadamer. While Vattimo's philosophy very much 
reflects the proto-postmodernist influences of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Gadamer, as well as drawing inspiration from the philosopher of science, 
Kuhn, there is also a more ‘concrete’ or politically engaged side to Vattimo 
which has made him visible outside of philosophical circles, including 
supporting gay rights and being a Member of the European Parliament. 
Since the early 1980s, Vattimo has become well known for his 
philosophical style of ‘weak thought’ (pensiero debole), a term and style 
deriving from a volume of this name edited by Vattimo and Pier Aldo 
Rovatti and containing the work of a number of other philosophers (Vattimo 
and Rovatti 1983). 'Weak thought' is an attempt to understand and re-
configure traces from the history of thought in ways that accord with the 
lack of centre and foundations characteristic of the postmodern in order to 
create an ethic of ‘weakness.’ Core features of Vattimo’s style of weak 
thought are hermeneutics, nihilism and a negative assessment of 
metaphysics. The latter is regarded by Vattimo, following Heidegger, as 
‘violent’ in the sense that it reduces thought back to irreducible, fixed first 
principles. The truth claims pertaining to metaphysics no longer have their 
purchase, Vattimo believes, because we are living after the ‘death of God,’ a 
Nietzschean phrase which Vattimo interprets as meaning that the highest 
values have devaluated themselves (Vattimo 1988a: 20-21), ‘Truth’ chief 
among them. Although we are no longer impressed by ‘Truth,’ not only the 
remnants of metaphysics, but also local rationalities, appear to us as 
linguistic traces which have come to prominence due to the fabling of the 
world in the development of information and communications technology 
such as the radio, television and—above all—the internet (Vattimo 1992: 
Ch. 1). Vattimo saw nihilism as the constitutive feature of thought in 
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postmodernity, with the latter term referring to the dissolution of the modern 
idea of ‘progress,’ again, instituted by the liberation of minority voices and 
the ending of hope of a better world after the two World Wars of the 
twentieth century and the end of metanarratives at the end of the Cold War 
(Vattimo 1992: Ch.1). Hermeneutics, Vattimo believed, was the 
characteristic form of thought of postmodernity reading the signs of the 
times after the death of God, and in the 1980s and early 1990s he referred to 
it as the koine (common way of thinking) of thought at the time (Vattimo 
1991a: 283). The task of thinking proper to hermeneutics is Verwindung, 
which is a convalescence-alteration-distortion of the traces of metaphysics 
which are inescapable as, following Gadamer, ‘Being, which can be 
understood, is language’ (Gadamer 1989: 474); our horizons as Dasein are 
linguistic and are made up of linguistic messages which one interprets. We 
cannot wipe the slate clean and start afresh as this would be to repeat 
modernity and its (metaphysical) value of the new. Therefore ‘weakening’ 
traces of metaphysics from the History of Being is all we can do. The 
History of Being is made up not of solid foundations, but ‘events,’ which 
are historical openings. Currently, we are living after the event of the death 
of God, which Vattimo also understands as synonymous with what 
Heidegger called the ‘end of metaphysics.’ 
 What Vattimo did not say in his initial works on weak thought is 
how Verwindung should take place and how it can be regarded as an ethical 
imperative. For if there are ‘no facts, only interpretations,’ why not simply 
inhabit the interpretation within which one was brought up? This was the 
quandary facing Vattimo by the time he came to write his book Beyond 
Interpretation (1994; translation 1997a). Vattimo feared hermeneutics 
would turn into an ‘anything goes’ form of relativism (or what Nietzsche 
called a ‘reactive nihilism’) or, worse, into the metaphysical thesis that there 
are no facts, only interpretations because there are only interpretations in 
the metaphysical sense. Therefore, the emphasis in Beyond Interpretation 
was to find a grounding for hermeneutics which was simultaneously 
historical and ethical. Although Vattimo had used terms such as 
‘secularisation’ before (Vattimo 1985), the chapter on religion in Beyond 
Interpretation, following as it did the one on ethics, was Vattimo’s first 
concerted attempt to engage with religion as a functional, clear development 
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of weak thought. In this chapter he laid the groundwork for what would 
become known as his ‘return to religion,’ which was crystallised in his 
autobiographical book Belief (1996; translation 1999) and rounded-off in his 
Italian Academy Lectures, After Christianity (2002a). Subsequent to these 
three key books there have been numerous other collaborations and essays 
that have constituted an interesting development on his original ‘return’ for 
which, among theologians in particular, he is better known. The view of 
Christianity for which he is known I will outline now, although I have found 
that the way in which he developed his understanding of Christianity 
subsequent to After Christianity is interesting and I shall outline this in the 
course of the dissertation.1 
 Vattimo developed his ‘return to religion’ out of a handful of core 
concepts and a number of influences. At the heart of his return are the 
biblical ideas of kenosis and caritas, essentially two sides of the same 
conceptual coin. Vattimo never defines these terms but uses them 
impressionistically, as referring to intuitions Vattimo has had concerning the 
place of Christianity in the history of western ideas and also in the role he 
thinks it has had in weakening philosophical and religious ideas. Kenosis, 
which usually means the self-emptying of God in the incarnation of Christ, 
indicates an historical process of weakening, clearly dovetailing with 
Vattimo’s Heideggerian-Nietzschean ‘weak thought.’ Nevertheless, Vattimo 
already had a term to describe a long historical process of this kind, and that 
is ‘secularisation.’ Therefore, kenosis had to refer not only to the process of 
secularisation, but also to the key message which inaugurated this process. 
The content of this message is God’s friendship with his creation, having 
previously presented as a master (John 15:15). This idea of God presenting 
himself differently at different times struck a chord with Vattimo, and so 
another way in which he understands this notion of kenosis is that once one 
realises the historically diverse messages of God in which he appears in 
various ways, one cannot regard God as a simple, immutable transcendent 
first principle. As such, Vattimo has emphasised Christological passages 
such as Hebrews 1:1 more so than the obvious ‘kenotic’ ‘Christ Hymn’ of 
Philippians 2:5-11 (Vattimo 1997a: 46). Furthermore, Vattimo has made an 
identification between the immutable God the philosophers, metaphysics 
                                                 
1 Near the beginning of Part Two.  
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and the violence of the ‘natural sacred’ and ‘literalism’ in religion by 
aligning René Girard’s theological anthropology with Heidegger’s thought 
(Vattimo 1999: 38-39). To add to the historicising, Vattimo brings in the 
thought of the Medieval theologian Joachim of Fiore to indicate that thought 
is passing through an historical process from literalism and strength to 
spiritualisation and weakening. This weakening would then yield an ethic of 
caritas (charity), a biblical virtue reimagined by Vattimo to refer instead to 
the process of secularisation, the kenotic drift of nihilism as weakening 
which envelops metaphysical violence in all its forms which has reached its 
culmination in late-modernity in the death of God and end of metaphysics. 
  
b) The reception and importance of Vattimo’s return to religion 
In the following subsection I will outline the principal objections which 
have been made against Vattimo’s return to religion (Vattimo is selective in 
his reading of Scripture to the point of creating a false absolute in caritas, is 
neglectful of transcendence and is supersessionist about Christianity over 
Judaism), as well as highlighting the smaller number of positives to come 
out of it (his creative reimagining of secularisation, and its interdisciplinary 
nature).  
A common criticism of Vattimo’s return to religion, especially 
(although not exclusively) from theologians, is that Vattimo is selective in 
his reading of the Bible and, more particularly, in his understanding of 
kenosis. Numerous critics have expressed their concern that Vattimo is very 
selective when it comes to his use of Scripture (Vosman 2000: 430; 
Meganck 2015: 6, n. 8), and similarly so in his reading of Heidegger (Owen 
1994: 157), and Nietzsche (Gurciullo 2001: 22). Concerning his 
understanding of kenosis, the philosopher Erik Meganck has said ‘Vattimo’s 
very ‘selective’ reading does not do justice to the theological richness of 
kenosis’ (Meganck 2015: 6, n. 8). This is partly related to the problem of 
being selective in terms of Scripture more generally, for Vattimo reads 
kenosis in isolation from other parts of the New Testament, or picks 
seemingly unrelated texts from the Bible to interpret the idea of kenosis. 
Normally kenosis refers to Philippians 2:5-11 in which St. Paul describes 
the Son of God descending from heaven in obedience to the Father, 
divesting his power to become a human, before ascending to heaven after 
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the resurrection (later in the so-called ‘Christ Hymn’ of Philippians 2). The 
text is one of the proto-Trinitarian texts found in the New Testament. 
Vattimo does not quote the passage but cites it in Belief (Vattimo 1999: 39) 
and mentions it as an aside in a very recent text (Vattimo 2015: 183). 
Normally Vattimo does not define exactly what he means by the term 
kenosis but, as shall be shown in Part Two, uses it to make a series of 
impressions, such as it being an announcement (rather than a literal descent) 
of God to declare that he is no longer our master, but our friend (John 
15:15) by him lowering himself to our level. Elsewhere (Vattimo 1997a), 
Vattimo uses the term kenosis to mean the concatenation of openings to 
which Being pertains, which finds parallel in the many ways in which God 
has spoken to his people, latterly through his Son (referring to Hebrews 1). 
For any theologian or biblical exegete, these are extremely unorthodox ways 
of understanding kenosis, not only in relation to exegetical and theological 
traditions of the church, but also internally within the text. As some 
commentators have mentioned (Depoortere 2008a: 21), Vattimo ignores the 
second part of the Christ Hymn in which Christ becomes exalted; if the 
impressions he built up through friendship, weakness, divesting or power 
and many voices are meant—collectively, cumulatively—to reflect, and 
(paradoxically) inaugurate, the horizon in which we are thrown whereby 
transcendence no longer has any purchase for us, this is why Vattimo 
ignores the exaltation (Hart 2002: 138), the ‘parabola’ of Christ in which he 
ascends back to heaven in glory having already descended. For Vattimo has 
chosen that there can be no glory as this would be returning to (vertical) 
transcendence, which he regards as metaphysical tout court. From this 
selective reading of kenosis, there have been concerns from theologians 
such as Guarino (Guarino 2009: 144-145; Depoortere 2008a: 22) and even 
philosophers such as Meganck (Meganck 2015: 10), that there is no genuine 
exchange between philosophy and theology; weak thought reduces theology 
(including the Bible) to its own ends. Even with the way in which Vattimo 
has qualified kenosis, his reading is selective. Meganck points out that 
Vattimo has ignored the command, the mastery which Jesus states he has 
over his disciples in John 15:14 before Jesus’ announcement of friendship of 
which Vattimo is so fond in the following verse (Meganck 2014: 420). 
Vosman also notes that Vattimo is not so keen on John 15:12-13 which 
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mentions giving one’s life for one’s friends (Vosman 2000: 418). If Vattimo 
is perceived as seemingly arbitrary in his use of Scripture, he is also 
regarded as such by a number of his commentators on his elevation of 
caritas to an untouchable position: ‘the limiting of secularisation by the 
commandment of love is nothing but an arbitrary decision on the part of 
Vattimo as an individual’ (Jonkers 2000: 386). There is some dispute in 
reception of Vattimo’s thought about whether he has created a false absolute 
(Depoortere 2008a: 20; Klun 2014: 49) or a flawed postmodern categorical 
imperative (Jonkers 2000: 385). Either way, Vattimo is seen as being 
inconsistent, either for creating an absolute value when, after the death of 
God, there really should not be, or because in his view there are only 
interpretations and messages (and so one should recognise the thrownness 
of the other, weak thinker). Vattimo comes too close to the metaphysical 
position of saying that there are only messages (Meganck 2015: 6), which 
becomes problematic for establishing an ethic. This is because Vattimo’s 
position borders on tautology; a hermeneutical ethic is based on a 
recognition that hermeneutics is itself an interpretation, so how can caritas 
be untouchable (Carravetta 2010: 91. 94)? 
In his emphasis of the kenosis (‘self-emptying’) of God into a history 
of messages, Vattimo has been accused of neglecting or misconceiving 
transcendence (Antiseri 1997; Hart 2010; Jonkers 2000; Klun 2014; 
Meganck 2014; Repolschi 2010; Roldàn 2007; Ten Kate 2002; Zimmerman 
2009). Variously, these thinkers have argued that Christianity as a religion is 
inconceivable without a dimension of transcendence (Roldàn 2007; 92), or 
that transcendence is needed existentially (Antiseri 1997), ethically 
(Zimmerman 2009: 316), or for the sake of the internal consistency of 
Vattimo’s position (Meganck 2015). However, some thinkers—even 
theologians—have been grateful to Vattimo for critiquing absolute 
otherness, which has allowed Carmelo Dotolo to create a distinction 
between transcendence ‘without a name’ and the historicised transcendence 
of Christianity (Dotolo 2009: 30). It is doubtful, though, that Vattimo would 
approve of this development as he is against transcendence in all its forms 
save ‘horizontal’ transcendence which refers to the linguistic-traditional 
horizon into which we are thrown. A minority of nonetheless important 
voices have also seen Vattimo as derivative of the 1960s ‘Death of God 
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Theology’ movement, especially seeing similarities between Vattimo’s 
thought and that of Thomas J. J. Altizer, whose Nietzschean-Hegelian death 
of God involved the divesting of transcendence into immanent nihilism 
(Sciglitano 2007; Depoortere 2008a). However, I will argue that this 
understanding of Vattimo’s work is overly simple (Harris 2011). 
More troublingly, Vattimo has been accused of ‘supersessionism’ 
with regards to the value of Christianity over Judaism. Sciglitano has been 
the most vocal proponent of this accusation (Sciglitano 2007; Sciglitano 
2013), although it has been hinted at by other scholars too, notably Caputo 
(Caputo 2007). This accusation is based on the idea that, at times, Vattimo 
has allied his notion of kenosis too closely to the philosophy of history of 
thinkers such as Joachim of Fiore, a twelfth-century abbot with mystical 
tendencies. Joachim talked about three ‘ages’ pertaining to the Trinity, 
whereby the Old Testament corresponded with the ‘Age of the Father,’ New 
Testament with the ‘Age of the Son,’ and the time to come as the ‘Age of 
the Spirit.’ Vattimo’s critics see him as identifying the Old Testament not 
only with Jewish beliefs about Yahweh, but also with the ‘violent’ 
metaphysics of biblical literalism. By contrast, the ‘Age of the Son’ is the 
catalyst of emancipation from literalism, secularising to the point where we 
are now in the ‘Age of the Spirit,’ which is also the ‘Age of Interpretation.’ I 
will argue that there are resources in Vattimo’s thought to get around this 
problem (Harris 2014a). 
Along with the negative assessments of Vattimo’s return to religion, 
there have been positive evaluations, too, especially with regards to 
Vattimo’s originality in the field of the study of secularisation (Rass 2014: 
171). As such, Vattimo’s return to religion is important beyond Philosophy 
in that his positive evaluation of secularisation has relevance in both 
Theological and Religious Studies fields, as well as the interdisciplinary 
area of study, the ‘Philosophy of Religion.’ Concerning the latter, Vattimo 
has begun to have an impact in the study of secularisation, a field dominated 
by the Löwith-Blumenberg debate of 1962 (Harris 2015a). Whereas Karl 
Löwith thought that the distinctly modern value of progress was an 
illegitimate secularisation of the Christian notion of messianism, Hans 
Blumenberg thought that modernity was the result of a legitimate self-
assertion of humanity in the face of beliefs in an absent God. The latter was 
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the utterly transcendent God of Ockham’s nominalism who made it 
impossible to evaluate the extent to which the world was good or evil, for 
these concepts could mean anything to this kind of God. Along with another 
contemporary thinker, Marcel Gauchet, Vattimo’s view of secularisation as 
the essence of the Christian message—and therefore, as neither an 
illegitimate distortion of Christianity, nor a novelty from modernity—has 
helped to move the debate about secularisation on, especially as it is a 
nuanced alternative to concepts such as the ‘post-secular’ and 
‘desecularisation’ which seem only to see the world in binary terms as either 
secular or sacred (Meganck 2015: 10). Meganck in particular has 
commended Vattimo for his positive approach to secularisation in removing 
obstacles for faith, such as positivism and scientism (Meganck 2015). 
Andreas Michel (Michel 2015) has compared and contrasted Vattimo and 
Gauchet, and I have followed on from Michel arguing that Vattimo’s 
approach is the better of the two scholars’ approaches to secularisation 
(Harris 2015a), for Michel withholds judgement. Vattimo’s contributions to 
the Löwith-Blumenberg debate are discussed more in Chapter Five. 
Before moving on to the purpose and direction of the dissertation, it 
is worth pointing out that Vattimo’s return to religion has importance 
beyond the merely theoretical, by which I mean here its relevance to 
Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies. Rather, insights from 
Vattimo’s return to religion have found their way into discussions of gender 
politics, politics more broadly and discussions about intelligence gathering. 
An early book concerning Vattimo’s return to religion was Marta Frascati-
Lochhead’s Kenosis and Feminist Theology, which used Vattimo’s ‘weak 
thought’ more generally to generate criteria to critique feminist ideology, 
using Vattimo’s return to religion as a model about how this might transpire 
(Frascati-Lochhead 1998). With regard to politics more broadly, I have used 
Vattimo’s return to religion as a model by which to assess Islam, whereby I 
argued that secularisation is required before political reform (Harris 2015b). 
As for intelligence gathering, in a book chapter in the volume Ethics and the 
Future of Spying, I argue that Vattimo’s ‘strong/weak’ distinction can be 
applied to discussions pertaining to the ethical rightness and wrongness of 
spying on extremist groups, especially religious fundamentalists (Harris 
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2016). In short, Vattimo’s return to religion is an innovative and 
controversial theory with far-reaching implications.  
 
c) The purpose of this thesis 
The first reason I have for producing this thesis is to explore Vattimo’s 
return to religion in its entirety, looking closely at the relationship between 
his statements concerning Christianity and his philosophical style more 
generally. While there have been book-length treatments of Vattimo’s return 
to religion they have been from a theological perspective (Guarino 2009) or 
date from before the end of Vattimo’s writings on religion ceased (Antiseri 
1997; Dotolo 1999). As a result, they have tended to focus on the limitations 
of Vattimo’s view of Christianity for theology or have not gone further to 
look for resources within Vattimo’s work to explain or overcome the 
problems they have encountered.  
 I argue that there are simple ways to overcome some of the more 
common problems highlighted by critics of Vattimo’s theory, such as him 
creating an ‘absolute,’ being ‘heretical’ and ‘selective’ with Scripture. 
However, from my research I found that two other common objections—of 
Vattimo’s apparent ‘supersessionism’ and the lack of transcendence in his 
return to religion—were not only harder to answer, but also were 
interrelated.2 Further research and reflection told me that the way in which 
Vattimo was developing his style of weak thought had implications for his 
return to religion. Increasingly, Vattimo has been drawing his interpretation 
of Heidegger closer to a particular reading of Thomas Kuhn (one of which 
Kuhn would not have approved). While the ‘incommensurability’ of Kuhn’s 
paradigms would allow Vattimo to get around the supersessionism charge 
pertaining to the relationship between Old, New and ‘Postmodern’ 
Testaments, it involves Vattimo identifying openings of Being with human 
artefacts—religious texts—too much. Along with a change in Vattimo’s 
style of weak thought, I notice a change in the way he argues for the 
primacy of the New Testament by downplaying the role of Joachim of Fiore 
in his thought and taking a more Gadamerian approach to the Bible as the 
source of all tradition in the West for the language and influence of the 
                                                 
2 I wanted to build on answers to both of these questions which I had deal with 
provisionally in my articles on Vattimo’s thought (Harris 2011; Harris 2014a). 
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Bible have created a linguistic tradition that constitutes the horizons into 
which we are thrown. 
While Vattimo posits transcendence in ‘horizontal’ terms (of the 
linguistic horizons defined by the traditions into which we are thrown), the 
kind of transcendence that, arguably, Vattimo should be more open-minded 
about is ‘vertical’ transcendence. Normally this is taken in the sense of 
postulating an ‘above’ (metaphorically) or ‘beyond,’ but I would argue that 
this should also—due to Vattimo’s strongly Heideggerian background—
take into account what is ‘below,’ too. By this I allude to Heidegger’s 
notions of the ‘earth,’ ‘physis’ and ‘concealment.’ Through neglecting 
spatial metaphors (the kind of transcendence beyond language, to do with 
‘earth,’ for instance) in preference for emphasising the importance of history 
(and therefore, time), Vattimo closes himself off a priori to many areas of 
thought. Once again, it is worth emphasising that this is inconsistent with 
his own philosophical style of weak thought which is set up against 
dogmatism. While I show that, especially with subtle adjustments that he 
has made in his return to religion (which I identify in the first chapters of 
Part Two), Vattimo has the resources to get around many of the charges 
levelled against his ‘return to religion’—constructing an ‘unilinear’ history 
and being ‘supersessionist’ with regard to Christianity over Judaism being 
the two main ones—I show that he restricts his notion of caritas to other 
weak thinkers like himself, when actually the practical potential of his 
theory should be as a way of weakening all strong structures, not just the 
metaphysical ones inherited by those people who recognise that they are 
contingent, historical interpreters; weak thought should have resources to 
engage with strong thinkers, whether they be metaphysicians, 
fundamentalists or intellectuals who think in ways characteristic of earlier 
stages in the History of Being, such as Richard Dawkins’ thoroughgoing 
empiricism. 
Seeing potential in Vattimo’s general approach to religion in relation 
to hermeneutics, I search for avenues to be charitable to Vattimo, such as 
grounding his theory in his biography, in order to find ways to reconfigure 
Vattimo’s hermeneutical nihilism to reach out to strong thinkers. Ultimately 
I cannot defend Vattimo except by modifying his interpretation of 
Christianity to locate the possibility of generating a hermeneutical ethic in 
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the missionary basis of Christianity, that is, the so-called ‘Great 
Commission’ in Matthew 28:18-20 where Jesus asked his disciples to 
spread the Good News to ‘all the nations.’ This injunction to evangelise 
meant that syncretism took place between Christianity and other forms of 
thought, including philosophy, as is implicit in The Gospel of John and 
explicit in the second-century works of Justin Martyr and other Apologists. I 
go on to show that the mixing of the particularity of theology and the 
universality of philosophy was fatal to the absolutism of both, which played 
itself out in history which is another way of conceiving secularisation. 
Moreover, the Great Commission as a basis for weakening would yield what 
Vattimo hopes to achieve with caritas: a quasi-ethical principle of 
weakening to guide hermeneutics as it is a way of seeking friendship with 
the other – even strong thinkers—through imparting a message to them and 
receiving their interpretation of it. The purpose of the thesis, then, is to show 
how Vattimo’s basic intuitions about Christianity are sound—that there is a 
message within Christianity which has led to weakening, which can still act 
as a quasi-ethical criterion today—but that the message of friendship is 
more practical in the sense that it is about explicitly seeking-out the other 
no-matter who they are, and that this insight can cohere with Vattimo’s 
philosophy better, without having to rule out ‘vertical’ transcendence 
completely in a way inconsistent with weak thought. 
 
d) The direction of this thesis 
The Introduction will outline Vattimo’s mature philosophy of il pensiero 
debole (‘weak thought’) taken from his landmark essay, ‘Dialectics, 
Difference, Weak Thought’ and explain Vattimo’s understanding of key 
ideas taken from his principal influences: Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Gadamer and their development in his key works: The End of Modernity, 
The Transparent Society and Beyond Interpretation. This is to outline 
significant ideas in his thought which will become important when 
analysing and evaluating his return to religion in the latter chapters of Part 
One and in Part Two. 
Part One will explore the reasoning behind Vattimo’s ‘return to 
religion,’ along with the principal problems connected to it by its many 
critics. Chapter One will trace the personal, societal and theoretical 
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influences on Vattimo which brought about his ‘return to religion.’ Chapter 
Two explains how Vattimo initially conceptualised his ‘return’ in Beyond 
Interpretation, outlining key terms such as kenosis, caritas and 
secularisation as well as his first engagement with the ideas of thinkers such 
as Girard. Chapter Three shows how Vattimo’s thoughts on Christianity 
took a more autobiographical turn in Belief, his first book-length treatment 
of religion. This chapter will show how Vattimo made closer links between 
the thought of Girard and that of Heidegger, as well as outlining more about 
what Vattimo meant by kenosis. Vattimo’s collection of Italian Academy 
Lectures and other essays in After Christianity is the topic of Chapter Four, 
analysing Vattimo’s growing use of Nietzsche in his return to religion, as 
well as his reimagining of secularisation along lines hinted at by Wilhelm 
Dilthey, that Christianity effected an ‘inward turn’ which led to increasing 
subjectivism. Chapters Two—Four constitute an overview of Vattimo’s 
most widely-cited writings on religion and, as such, Chapters Five—Eight 
cover the most important implications and criticisms of his ‘return.’ 
Specifically, Chapter Five situates the ‘return’ in the wider debate on 
secularisation, Chapter Six addresses the accusations from Depoortere 
(2008a) and Sciglitano (2007) that Vattimo has been copying the death of 
God theology of Altizer. Beyond unoriginality, this accusation is important 
because there was a strong Hegelian—and therefore, metaphysical—streak 
running through Altizer’s project, and so Vattimo could be regarded as 
internally inconsistent if found ‘guilty’ of this accusation. I argue that 
Vattimo and Altizer have only superficially similar positions, and the 
differences between them—particularly on the ‘Hegelian’ debate—are 
outlined more in Chapter Seven. The significance of the issue at hand—the 
extent to which Vattimo thought Christianity superseded Judaism—is 
outlined in Chapter Eight, raising the possibility, observed in Vattimo’s 
work, that using Kuhn’s ‘paradigm concept’ would be useful to show how 
Judaism and Christianity are ‘incommensurable.’ 
Part Two will outline what I perceive to be a shift in Vattimo’s 
approach to religion after the turn of the millennium, which I use to show 
how Vattimo has gradually changed the course of his ‘return to religion’ 
from emphasising kenosis in a seemingly unilinear historical schema, to 
seeing the Bible as an epochal paradigm; this is the argument in Chapter 
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Nine. In Chapter Ten I interrogate the solution to the problem of 
supersessionism offered by this ‘turn’ in Vattimo’s return to religion. I 
argue that Vattimo’s use of Kuhn does not necessarily conflict with his 
reading of Heidegger, but that the latter is far too particular in his thought, 
ruling out transcendence. In this chapter I also outline the negative 
implication of the issues Vattimo has with transcendence to the main point 
of his return to religion, his attempt to yield an ethic for his hermeneutical 
nihilism. 
 I will then conclude by trying to develop a way in which the 
positive insights Vattimo has with regard to religion can be reconstructed to 
form a more persuasive approach to the subject. I draw upon Antonello’s 
insight that Christianity was, for Vattimo, a ‘Trojan Horse’ for religion and 
that, I argue, Christianity could have been a Trojan Horse for philosophy, 
too. I take over Vattimo’s core insight that Jesus brought a new message of 
friendship to his creation, but that the ‘weakening’ effect of Christianity 
comes from how it had to reach out to other forms of thought to fulfil the 
‘Great Commission’ (Matthew 28: 18-20) to make disciples of ‘all the 
nations.’ In order to effect the latter, the disciples had to put the gospel into 
the conceptual schemas of the people they encountered. Especially 
important were the Greek philosophers St. Paul encountered in Athens. 
Gradually, through Christianity, I argue that religion and philosophy cross-
contaminated one-another, with the particularity of the Christ-event 
weakening the universality of philosophy, with philosophy’s value of 
‘Truth’ eventually causing the downfall of religion along lines similar to 
Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘death of God.’ By this I mean that the contingency 
of religion weakened the absolutist nature of philosophy, whilst philosophy 
brought into religion the ideal of truth, which eventually undermined 
religion when it was discovered to be a lie (along lines indicated by 
Nietzsche). 
 
2. ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak thought’ 
a) Il pensiero debole 
The purpose of the rest of this Introduction is to outline the core principles 
of Vattimo’s thought in more detail, analysing their philosophical roots 
along the way. Section Two focuses on Vattimo’s initial statement of weak 
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thought from the volume of that name, ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak 
Thought.’ Key ideas found in this argument will be outlined afterwards, as 
well as relevant developments in Vattimo’s thought from this initial 
statement of his mature position as and when required. Section Three uses 
an analysis of his major work, The End of Modernity, to examine what 
Vattimo meant by nihilism, while Section Four gives the backdrop to 
Vattimo’s ‘return to religion’ by focusing on the purpose of Beyond 
Interpretation in which Vattimo expressed concern that hermeneutics was 
starting to be taken as meaning ‘anything goes.’ Along with setting the 
scene for Vattimo’s ‘return to religion,’ the point of this Introduction is to 
outline and explain the key terms Vattimo employs and the influences on his 
thought. 
In ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,’ Vattimo sets out his 
position as follows:  
Weak thought presupposes that, contrary to the heavily metaphysical 
framework beneath the problem of beginnings (starting from the first 
principles of Being), and contrary moreover to a historicist 
metaphysics (in Hegel’s sense, in which Being has no first principles 
but is rather a providential process: to think means to be up on the 
times), a third way may be possible (Vattimo 2012a: 39).  
Before I explain what Vattimo means by ‘Being’ or ‘historicist 
metaphysics,’ it is important to note what Vattimo says about the third way. 
The third way is based on ‘experience’ which is ‘largely that of the 
everyday, which is also and always historically qualified and culturally 
dense’ (Vattimo 2012a: 40). Vattimo is talking here of Heidegger’s notion 
of Dasein as a ‘thrown project,’ which in Vattimo’s eyes is one’s 
‘hermeneutical foundation,’ that is, one of interpretation based on 
thrownness into the world. This notion of Dasein will be explained 
momentarily. Hermeneutics (interpretation) works like literary and art 
criticism: ‘critical discourse and evaluation always arise from a set of 
canons constituted historically by art and taste’ (Vattimo 2012a: 40). The 
idea that our experience is constituted somehow by texts will be important 
later so is worth noting now.  
 
b) Historicist metaphysics and difference 
Before coming to look at Vattimo’s main argument in which he sets out his 
own position, it is important to outline briefly his treatment of dialectics. 
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The latter concept has its most famous proponent in Hegel, to which 
Vattimo alludes in his phrase ‘historicist metaphysics.’ Hegel proposed that 
‘absolute spirit’ manifests itself gradually in the world in a process that 
involves a rational dialectic in which spirit will in the end achieve full unity 
and self-knowledge. History works dialectically, through thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis. Through his Marxist background, Vattimo refers to the work 
of a number of early twentieth century thinkers, such as Benjamin, Bloch 
and Adorno, who have followed Marx’s dialectical materialism (the view 
that historical events are outcomes of opposing forces which have material 
needs as their underlying source of conflict) to an extent, albeit with what he 
perceives as a ‘dissolutive’ gloss tendency with regards to dialectics 
(Vattimo 2012a: 42). For thinkers such as Benjamin, not only the historical 
process but also the totality constitutes expressions of mastery, which in 
turn lead them to see traces of the past in a dissolutive way. Traces, for 
Benjamin for example, are ‘ruins that history has accumulated’ at the feet of 
the angel in Klee’s painting in Thesis 9 of his Theses on History (Vattimo 
2012a: 42). Nevertheless, Vattimo thinks that this dissolutive approach to 
dialectics represents difference in a way which is complicit with 
metaphysics as it is linked to the existential idea of ‘alienation’ (Vattimo 
2012a: 43), which is not only a yearning for totality, but also a form of 
humanism (which, following Heidegger, is also metaphysical). Nietzsche’s 
announcement of the death of God (which Vattimo takes as the end of 
metaphysics), Vattimo thinks, has exposed the desire for mastery behind 
metaphysics, for the latter—with its effects of creating feelings of certainty 
and consolation—are superfluous in the age of modern technology (Vattimo 
2012a: 43). In dissolutive forms of difference, Vattimo sees substitutes for 
metaphysical consolation, such as Bloch’s utopian thinking. Instead, 
Vattimo looks for a more ‘radical’ notion of difference in the writings on 
Heidegger. 
 
c) Being and ontological difference 
Why is it a problem for Vattimo to think of something—such as a totality or 
humanism—as metaphysical? The latter is seen as violent, for Vattimo. This 
position is not explicitly put forward in ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak 
Thought,’ but it is found in many other places throughout his work. 
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Arguably the most developed assessment on the part of Vattimo on the 
connection between metaphysics and violence is his essay, ‘Metaphysics 
and Violence,’ included in the Santiago Zabala-edited collection of essays, 
Weakening Philosophy (2007). Vattimo states that the link between 
metaphysics and violence is twofold: firstly, metaphysics constitutes a first 
principle on which ‘everything’ depends (Vattimo 2007a: 403). Secondly, 
‘once metaphysical beliefs are weakened, there is no longer anything that 
limits the conceptual nature of existence… but by the mere fact of the strong 
imposing themselves’ (Vattimo 2007a: 404). Concerning the former, the 
violence of metaphysics itself is philosophical, it is the ‘silencing of 
questions’ (Vattimo and Zabala 2002: 455). By positing objective truth 
(‘the’ truth) and by creating rational foundations which constitute the 
universal measure or standard against which knowledge is measured, 
metaphysics closes down debate. With regards to the second of the two 
reasons Vattimo provides for why metaphysics is violent, he knows that 
once metaphysics is weakened there are distinctions left between those 
stratified in society based on the traces of metaphysics, but without any 
‘strong’ reasons to reign-in the excesses of judgements passed and power 
exerted by those higher up in society on the weaker. As Martin G. Weiss 
points out (Weiss 2010: 244), violence is speech act for Vattimo. It is not 
physical violence, even though Vattimo stresses that metaphysical violence 
can lead to physical violence, such as in the Inquisition where suspected 
deviation from metaphysically-guaranteed strict orthodoxy had physically 
painful consequences. 
Metaphysics is a forgetting of ontological difference, but what is 
ontological difference and why is it more radical than negative or utopian 
thinking? Following Heidegger (Heidegger 1962: 22), ontological 
difference is the difference between Being (Sein) and beings (seinde). The 
latter are not ‘self-evident,’ to us anymore as we are aware that they appear 
to us as a ‘result of a series of ‘positions,’ occurrences…historical-cultured 
‘destined’ disclosures that, prior to the object-self-evidence of ‘entity,’ 
constitute the meaning of Being’ (Vattimo 2012a: 44). These ‘disclosures’ 
come about through ‘horizons’ being ‘constructed by a series of echoes, 
linguistic resonances, and messages coming from the past and from others’ 
(Vattimo 2012a: 44). Traditionally, metaphysics—the thinking of Being 
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throughout the history of philosophy—has understood Being in the limited 
temporal sense of stability, of coming to presence. The ontos on in the case 
of Plato, influencing Aristotle’s Prime Mover, Aquinas’ God, Leibniz’ 
monads and numerous other examples is the idea of constant presence, of 
eternity, not least for reasons as insecurity in less developed technological 
times. However, through the transmission of linguistic messages Being ‘is’ 
not, but occurs, and it constitutes the a priori temporal (not, versus the Neo-
Kantians, transcendental) horizon for Dasein. As a result, ‘True Being never 
is, but sets itself on the path and sends itself, it trans-mits itself’ (Vattimo 
2012a: 45). It was mentioned that Being ‘occurs,’ and this is related closely 
to the idea of the Ereignis (or the ‘event of appropriation’) in Vattimo’s 
interpretation of Heidegger’s thought. The very word Ereignis appears in 
‘Dialectic, Difference, Weak Thought,’ and Vattimo admits that the term 
has many different meanings and uses in Heidegger’s own significant body 
of work (Vattimo 2012a: 47).3 Being occurs and appropriates Dasein, 
allowing things to come to being. What, though, is Dasein? 
Dasein is a Heideggerian term associated most with his most famous 
work, Being and Time. From ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought’ it is 
possible to ascertain what Vattimo takes over from Heidegger with regards 
to this concept, which will then be explained. The differences between 
Vattimo’s position and Heidegger’s will then be briefly outlined. Firstly, 
Vattimo says about Dasein that ‘Dasein is thrown project—thrown time and 
time again. The foundation, the setting out, the initial sending [invio] of our 
discourse cannot but be a hermeneutical foundation’ (Vattimo 2012a: 40).4 
Vattimo mentions this again later in the essay when he says ‘The analysis of 
Dasein, of its thrownness as well as of its continually resituated and 
qualified nature, leads Heidegger to radically temporalize the a priori’ 
(Vattimo 2012a: 44). Finally, he says that ‘truth’ is the result of a ‘process 
of verification’ that only takes place within ‘the project of the world that 
constitutes us as Dasein’ (Vattimo 2012a: 50). The ‘existential analytic’ of 
Dasein is at the heart of Heidegger’s Being and Time. There have been 
                                                 
3 This is an important issue that, to do it justice, will need a larger section of its 
own so that it does not detract from the thrust of ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak 
Thought.’ 
4 The term ‘sending’ will be explained in due course in subsection ‘d’ and will be 
touched upon in passing at the end of this subsection, too, but the important thing 
to recognise here is the idea of ‘thrownness.’ 
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numerous detailed explanations of the background and argument of this 
book (such as Polt 1999), so I will not repeat what others have already 
written. In an essay entitled ‘Hermeneutical Reason/Dialectical Reason,’ 
included in the collection The Adventure of Difference, Vattimo explains 
that Heidegger in Being and Time thought of hermeneutics pertaining to 
Dasein along the lines of ‘authenticity/fallenness.’ However, ‘In his 
subsequent works the affirmation of the Being-language nexus is always 
linked with the problem of metaphysics as a historical presentation of 
Being, a presentation that involves an unconcealing/concealing…[which] 
belongs above all to Being’ (Vattimo 1993a: 28). Being and language are 
more directly linked to historical destining in works after Being and Time; 
Vattimo is overstating his case somewhat as the notion of ‘Ge-schick’ 
(destining) can be found in Being and Time (Heidegger 1962: 436), even if 
it is not so developed here (especially along the lines that the focus is 
gradually shifted away from Dasein to the history of Being in Heidegger’s 
thought). It is important to note that Vattimo here wrote that this notion of 
concealing/unconcealing (particularly the idea of concealment) prevented 
Heidegger from doing what Gadamer later did, which was to identify Being 
with language.5 Later, in another essay within The Adventure of Difference 
entitled ‘The Decline of the Subject and the Problem of Testimony,’ 
Vattimo writes: ‘According to Being and Time Dasein is to be found 
always, already, primordially, in authenticity. In the ontological perspective 
that is later developed, this means that truth arises and is disclosed always 
and only in a setting of non-truth, of epoché, of suspension and 
concealment’ (Vattimo 1993a: 49). After the so-called ‘Kehre’ (turn) in 
Heidegger’s thought, common opinion (the ‘They’) becomes less important 
now than historical destining. For Heidegger after the Kehre, authenticity is 
not now a matter of personal choice or responsibility, but a modification of 
this world through the transformation of one epoch of Being into another 
(Vattimo 1993a: 50). 
How does this historical destining transpire? In ‘Dialectic, 
Difference, Weak Thought,’ Vattimo explains how Heidegger’s thought 
developed in the 1930s to place more emphasis on ‘the relationship between 
                                                 
5 Which I will come on to in the next subsection. This issue will come up again and 
be of importance in Part Two when I explain how Vattimo’s use of Kuhn and 
Gadamer link to his understanding of Christianity. 
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being and language’ (Vattimo 2012a: 45). Vattimo spells it out when he 
states that:  
What is more radical about Heidegger is the fact that his discovery of 
the linguistic character of being’s occurrence carries over into his 
concept of Being itself. Being now ends up stripped of the strong 
traits attributed to it by metaphysics. Being that can occur does not 
have the same traits as metaphysical Being with the simple addition 
of ‘eventuality.’ It offers itself to thought in a radically different way 
(Vattimo 2012a: 45). 
Liberation can occur through remembering ontological difference as 
occurrence, by thinking being as a ‘reappropriation that no longer deals with 
Being as stability’ (Vattimo 2012a: 45). The latter notion refers to Being 
‘eventuating,’ but how does this relate to language? I will look at the 
importance of language for Vattimo first, tracing how he has taken elements 
of his understanding from Heidegger: 
A historical world—a given order and ‘meaning’ of beings and of 
man among them—is always born through the institution of 
language. The sign-meaning relationship can occur solely within an 
already instituted opening because the establishment of linguistic 
conventions always comes after the birth of language, which in its 
origin is never a sign but the becoming world of the world. The 
eschatological character of openness onto the future is worked out by 
virtue of the artwork’s founding a language and a world (Vattimo 
2008: 121). 
These words of Vattimo’s are taken from his book Art’s Claim to Truth, and 
they refer to the idea of Being ‘happening’ through language. I have briefly 
alluded to the idea in Heidegger’s thought that Being ‘occurs’ through 
openings through which things come to presence. For Vattimo, things come 
to presence through ‘the birth of language’ which he sees as having its 
origin in artwork. Before looking at the links to Heidegger’s work, three 
things need to be said here: 1. The role of ‘art’ and the ‘artwork’ will be 
discussed in more depth later in the Introduction; 2. Vattimo distinguishes 
between more and less influential works of art, and even in this text from 
1967 (revised in 1985), he sees the Bible as having a privileged role in the 
history of the West in terms of founding a world and a language (Vattimo 
2008: 121); 3. There is a subtle distinction here between the ‘birth of 
language’ and the ‘establishment of linguistic conventions.’ Much later in 
Vattimo’s thought (Vattimo 2012b; Vattimo 2013), albeit hinted at in The 
End of Modernity (Vattimo 1988a: Ch. 6), Vattimo makes the link between 
Heidegger’s notion of the event and the paradigm concept in Thomas 
Kuhn’s thought, that is, the occurrence of the ‘birth of language’ is the 
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scientific revolution and the working out of convention is ‘normal science.’6 
The specifically Heideggerian roots of Vattimo’s identification of Being 
with language can be found in Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism,’ in which 
he said ‘language is the house of Being’ (Heidegger 1993: 161). Davis puts 
it slightly differently, that ‘language demarcates the parameters of a realm 
wherein humans can meaningfully dwell’ (Davis 2010: 10). How does 
language demarcate the parameters of the dwelling realm for humans? In the 
essay ‘The Turning,’ Heidegger writes, ‘Language is the primal dimension 
within which man’s essence is first able to correspond at all to Being and its 
claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being. This primal corresponding, 
expressly carried out, is thinking. Through thinking, we first learn to dwell 
in the realm in which there comes to pass the restorative surmounting of the 
destining of Being’ (Heidegger 1977: 41). Man ‘ek-sists’ by dwelling in 
language which is the house of Being, as Being corresponds to the essence 
of man by pervading language (Heidegger 1993: 161). The mention of 
ecstatic temporality is important here, as is the idea that man is ‘guarding’ 
language, and therefore Being. One can relate it to what Heidegger writes 
elsewhere about man being the ‘shepherd’ of Being (Heidegger 1993: 159). 
Taking the ‘guarding/shepherding’ references and the allusion to ecstatic 
temporality together, one can link what Heidegger says about language in 
relation to Dasein to the notions of ‘transmission’ of messages and 
Andenken, the thoughtful remembrance of traces of Being which Dasein 
inherits through language in such a way that it relates these traces to their 
own projectuality.7  
 At this point, it is worth noting the impact Hans-Georg Gadamer 
made on Vattimo’s thought, something he seems keen to downplay. Jean 
Grondin puts it as follows: with the Nietzschean axiom adopted by Vattimo, 
‘There are no facts, only interpretations,’ Gadamer would rephrase it ‘There 
are only facts through interpretations’ (Grondin 2007: 207). For Gadamer, 
‘there are no facts without a certain language that expresses them. But he is 
adamant that it is the Sache, the thing itself (or the ‘facts’), that comes to 
                                                 
6 The working-out of this ill-fitting Kuhnian-Heideggerianism in Vattimo’s more 
recent thought will be discussed later in the dissertation, and the import of these 
identifications for his interpretation of Christianity in Part Two. 
7 The ideas of ‘transmission’ and ‘Andenken’ will be looked at in more detail in 
due course. 
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light through this linguistic unfolding’ (Grondin 2007: 208). In Gadamer’s 
own words:  
From the relation of language to world follows its unique factualness 
(Sachlichkeit). It is a matter of fact (Sachverhalte) that comes into 
language. That a thing behaves (eine Sache verhalt sich) in various 
ways permits to recognize its independent otherness, which 
presupposes a real distance between the speaker and the thing 
(Gadamer 1989: 445). 
Interpretations are of things, but not external to them. Grondin mentions that 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics derives from the performing arts, and to interpret a 
play, for instance, is ‘to play out the work itself’ (Grondin 2007: 208). For 
Vattimo, this notion of a ‘work itself’ is insufficiently nihilistic. Therefore, 
with Gadamer’s famous sentence ‘Being, that can be understood, is 
language’ (Gadamer 1989: 474), Vattimo ‘puts the emphasis on language, 
which ends up absorbing Being in what can be called a linguistic ontology’ 
(Grondin 2007: 211). When Vattimo was translating Truth and Method into 
Italian, he made some interesting philosophical choices with this sentence of 
Gadamer’s. Ashley Woodward notes that ‘Vattimo chose to translate this 
phrase maintaining the commas of the original German omitted in the 
English translation, so that the phrase is effectively: ‘Being, that can be 
understood, is language.’ This choice allows a reading which radically 
identifies Being with language’ (Woodward 2008: 181). For Vattimo, ‘there 
is nothing left of Being as such,’ and Being that can be understood is 
absorbed into language. Therefore, when Gadamer says that ‘man’s being-
in-the-world is primordially linguistic… hermeneutic experience is verbal in 
nature’ (Gadamer 1989: 443), for Vattimo this is all there is, for there is not 
a ‘Sache’ which is worked out through interpretation (for there are nothing 
but interpretations for Vattimo). 
 Arguably the clearest exposition of the linguistic nature of Being 
found in Vattimo’s work is located in the ‘Dialogue’ between Vattimo, 
Rorty, and Zabala in The Future of Religion. In an extended contribution 
from Vattimo in this exchange, he exclaims: 
When we think that (1) ‘Being’ is an event of the Logos, (2) the 
Logos is ‘dialogue,’ and (3) dialogue is the sum of inter-subjective 
discourse; then our ontological worry is to be able to ‘found’ Being, 
not to try to find something that is already there, but construing 
something that holds, that resists in time (Vattimo, Rorty, Zabala 
2006: 66).  
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In using the term 'Logos,' a term with a varied etymological and 
philosophical background in ancient Greek thought, Vattimo is again 
consciously drawing upon the work of Gadamer. 'As the place of total 
mediation,' Vattimo writes, 'language is precisely this kind of reason and 
this Logos that lives in the collective belonging to a web of living tradition 
or an ethos' (Vattimo 1988a: 133). Vattimo's use of Logos in this 
Gadamerian context emphasises the social role of language, that tradition is 
part of the collective consciousness. A living tradition is also one in which 
interpretation is not merely a passive receiving of tradition, but a dynamic 
inheritance within an interpretative family, that the collective consciousness 
is working out new truths through the worn garments of the traditions that 
have been passed down. With new interpretative events goes new generation 
of Being.  
 The Logos is not meant to be understood in an objective way as the 
rational Logos of ontotheology. While the primacy of language ‘has a kind 
of metaphysical pre-eminence’ (Vattimo 2008: 148), it is because we are 
each thrown into a horizon that is a linguistic tradition; we can understand 
other people because they use language, too. In The Future of Religion, 
Vattimo writes, ‘Being is nothing but the Logos interpreted as dialogue, 
(Gespräch) as the actual discussion among people’ (Vattimo, Rorty, Zabala 
2006: 58). Language, shaped through the tradition which is the heritage into 
which we are thrown, is Gadamer’s way of resolving the Heideggerian 
problem of the way in which we can conceive of our pre-understanding as 
Dasein without resorting to a Kantian a priori. As such, language is 
required not only for experience, but also as the possibility of thought. Both 
interlocutors will have language in common behind their own particular 
horizons, and ‘the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is 
actually the achievement of language’ (Gadamer 1989: 378). When 
interlocutors engage in dialogue (or, as Vattimo prefers to say, a 
conversation), an ‘event’ of interpretation occurs, generating new Being. 
The continuity of one’s own horizon is broken by the novelty of the other. 
More than a simple exchange of ideas occurs, but a ‘fusion of horizons,’ ‘in 
which the two interlocutors recognize each other not as they were before but 
as discovered anew, enriched and deepened in their being’ (Vattimo 2008: 
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133; emphasis Vattimo’s). What is important to recognise is that truth is not 
found, but created in a community.  
 
d) Thinking Being weakly 
If Being is no longer to be thought of as stable and objectively present, how 
are its traces thought today? The coming to consciousness of Being as 
unstable, as groundless does not lead merely to a liberation of difference 
(what Nietzsche called the liberation of metaphor): ‘the illusions of 
dialectics are not simply abandoned in favor of difference’ (Vattimo 2012a: 
45). This is where Vattimo introduces the notion of Verwindung into his 
thought as ‘The dialectical heritage through which difference is declined’ 
(Vattimo 2012a: 46). Before Verwindung is explained, it is important to 
understand what is meant by ‘dialectical heritage.’ Here Vattimo draws 
upon three related terms: Überlieferung, Ge-schick and Andenken (Vattimo 
2012a: 46). As already alluded to, the former term refers to transmission, 
and is mainly a term Vattimo gets from Gadamer. This term is important as 
it is the link between openings that allows traces of tradition to link between 
past and present. In Truth and Method, Gadamer writes, ‘Understanding is 
to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of 
tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly 
mediated’ (Gadamer 1989: 290). The mediating, in Vattimo’s interpretation 
of Gadamer and Heidegger, takes place through the language games in 
which Dasein is involved which in turn are framed in accordance with the 
sending (Ge-schick) of the age, which in the case of late-modernity is living 
after the death of God. In The End of Modernity, Vattimo explicitly states 
that the ‘hermeneutic constitution of Dasein’ has a ‘nihilistic character’ due 
to being founded in an epoch in which man rolls from the centre towards X, 
in other words in which Being ‘tends to identify itself with nothingness’ 
(Vattimo 1988a: 121). For Vattimo ‘tradition’ in terms of Überlieferung 
(transmission) means ‘linguistic messages’ which has its importance 
because ‘Being, as a horizon of disclosure in which things appear, can arise 
only as a trace of past words or as an announcement that has been handed 
down to us’ (Vattimo 1988a: 120). Traces of tradition have an ‘effective 
history’ (Wirkungsgeschicte) which encompasses not only their power 
today, but also the way in which tradition has been interpreted in the past 
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(Gadamer 1989: 282-283). This is particularly important when one 
considers the case of the Bible, not least when I will come to look at 
Vattimo’s use of the stages of history and ‘ways’ of interpreting scripture 
according to his reading of the medieval theologian Joachim of Fiore. 
Wirkungsgeschichte, together with the idea of Dasein responding to a series 
of announcements which constitute the horizon of disclosure in which 
things appear, will be significant when I come to look at the case of the 
Bible in Vattimo’s thought. 
Andenken is recollective thought, ‘it never renders Being present but 
always recalls it as already ‘gone’’ (Vattimo 2012a: 47). Being is not a 
presence, but recalls that which has been passed on. This, Vattimo points 
out, means that dealing with metaphysical concepts is unavoidable but that 
one must ‘twist’ them. If ‘transmission’ brings inherited traces of words and 
concepts from past openings to mind which have an ‘effective history,’ 
Andenken is recollective thought by which one aims to think Being in its 
history by meditating on its eventual nature. As Peter Warnek writes, ‘the 
history of Being can only be thought of by way of meditative recollection 
(besinnnliches Andenken), and it is inevitably distorted when it is subjected 
to any kind of pragmatic planning or calculative control’ (Warnek 2010: 
165). Remembrance is thinking which is also a thanking (Heidegger’s play 
on ‘denken’ and ‘danken’), and it is intimately related to his understanding 
of poetry.8 Nevertheless, it can be said that Andenken is a meditative, 
recollective thought at the end of metaphysics in which one is grateful for 
the traditions into which one has been thrown and one responds accordingly, 
not engaging in attempts to replicate or renew metaphysical thought, but in 
letting Being be, to come to disclosure in hermeneutical, interpretative 
thought which takes the traces of tradition which constitute Dasein’s 
horizon and thinking forward in ecstatic projectuality. Vattimo sees 
Heidegger’s philosophical project after Being and Time as representing 
Andenken: ‘It is by retracing the history of metaphysics as the forgetting of 
Being that Dasein decides for its own death and in this way founds itself as 
a hermeneutic totality whose foundation consists of a lack of foundation’ 
(Vattimo 1988a: 119). One can see this, for instance, in the way that 
Heidegger was able to go back to the pre-Socratics in his philosophical 
                                                 
8 This will be looked at in more detail in the section on ‘Art’ in this Introduction. 
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thinking. Indeed, as Vattimo wants to get beyond the language of 
‘authenticity’ and ‘fallenness’ of Being and Time, he wrote that he sees 
Andenken as the way to think after the end of metaphysics rather than 
anticipatory resoluteness (Vattimo 1986: 451). 
As for Ge-schick (‘sending,’ or ‘destining’), this refers to how Being 
is sent in an epoch. Although how one thinks depends upon whether one 
thinks and speaks as ‘they’ speak or instead authentically in Being and 
Time, after the ‘turn’ (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought in the 1930s he places 
more emphasis on Logos being ‘destined’ by the epoch into which one is 
thrown. For example, in the essay ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ 
Heidegger talks about the incommensurability of historical destinings 
(Heidegger 1977: 117), and that ‘Metaphysics grounds an age, in that 
through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specification 
comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is 
essentially formed’ (Heidegger 1977: 115). In this essay, Heidegger 
contrasts the modern way of thinking of Being as a ‘world picture’ (a 
representation of something brought before oneself as an object of 
calculation) (Heidegger 1977: 132-135), compared with earlier sendings of 
Being as the ens creatum in the Middle Ages (Heidegger 1977: 130), or as 
‘that which is’ for the Greek man (albeit the notion of the image as eidos is 
a dormant idea placed in concealment in the thought of Plato, later to be 
brought into unconcealment in the modern epoch) (Heidegger 1977: 131). In 
other words, historical irruptions take the place of the more ‘a priori’ 
structures found in the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time (Heidegger 
1963: 272). In addition to the notion that Dasein is the primary locus of the 
true through disclosedness based upon the existential analytic of Being and 
Time, this idea of truth as historically-destined openings is very important to 
Vattimo as shall be shown in his arguments concerning secularisation and 
that thought in the epoch after the death of God is fundamentally different to 
before.9  
 Now that ‘dialectical heritage’ has been explained through looking at 
Andenken, Ge-schick and Überlieferung, it is now time to look at 
Verwindung. In the words of Giovanna Borradori in her exposition of 
Vattimo: Verwindung is ‘Andenken (to recollect), which allows one to look 
                                                 
9 More will be said in due course about ‘events,’ particularly the difficulty in 
distinguishing between ‘events’ and ‘the Ereignis.’ 
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at the tradition from the point of view of the Ge-schick, destiny or historical 
destination’ (Borradori 1988: 44). Vattimo contrasts Verwindung with an 
Überwindung (overcoming) of modernity or an Aufhebung (dialectical 
overcoming in the Hegelian sense). To leave metaphysics behind altogether 
would be to create a new foundation, whether ‘locally’ or as some sort of 
new global epistemological foundation, one would be repeating the 
metaphysical tendency to create foundations. Therefore, rather than a 
dialectical overcoming, Vattimo thinks interpretation should be a 
Verwindung. This term, little-used by Heidegger, refers to a 'convalescence-
alteration,' a 'distortion' which is also a 'resignation' (Vattimo 1988a: 172). 
Verwindung means many things for Vattimo, such as being resigned to 
tradition, yet also distorting or ‘twisting’ it and—as a result—getting better 
from it as a form of ‘convalescence.’  
 If metaphysics is not to be overcome, but ‘twisted,’ what does this 
really mean and how does it happen? Lexically, Verwindung: 
is a convalescence (in the sense of ‘eine Krankheit verwinden’: to 
heal, to be cured of an illness) and a distorting (although this is a 
rather marginal meaning linked to ‘winden,’ meaning ‘to twist,’ and 
to the sense of a deviant alteration which the prefix ‘ver—’ also 
possesses). The notion of ‘convalescence’ is linked to another 
meaning as well, that of ‘resignation’…Besides these meanings of 
the term, there is that of ‘distortion’ to consider as well (Vattimo 
1988a: 172-173). 
This notion of Verwindung is related to nihilism as our ‘sole opportunity.’ 
Vattimo follows Nietzsche in referring to an ‘accomplished nihilism,’ one 
which aims at creating one’s own values after the highest values have been 
dissolved. The opportunity of accomplished nihilism is limited by language, 
and this is where Verwindung comes in: ‘Tradition is the transmitting of 
linguistic messages that constitute the horizon within which Dasein is 
thrown as an historically determined project: and tradition derives its 
importance from the fact that Being, as a horizon of disclosure in which 
things appear, can arise only as a trace of past words’ (Vattimo 1988a: 120).  
What do metaphysical concepts become once they are recollected 
and twisted? How should we react to them? Vattimo, recalling Benjamin’s 
‘ruins,’ calls the traces of metaphysical heritage of ‘monuments,’ and the 
attitude towards them being ‘pietas,’ which should evoke an attitude of 
nostalgia, but ‘primarily mortality, finitude, and passing away’ (Vattimo 
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2012a: 47).10 It is worth noting that Vattimo sees monuments as transmitting 
the form of messages in works of art (in a largely unspecified sense, but 
working best with poetry). In successive generations these monuments not 
only carry and bear, but also lose, interpretations as these generations come 
and go (Vattimo 1988a: 74). The main implication of pietas is the 
recognition that ‘the transcendental…is nothing less than transience’ 
(Vattimo 2012a: 47). Objects are only such because they appear in the open 
region as described in Being and Time’s existential analytic, and the 
metaphysical characteristics which used to strongly pertain to these objects 
have been passed down through tradition according to historical destinings 
of Being of which we are now aware due to Ereignis, the event of 
appropriation (Vattimo 2012: 47). Interestingly, in ‘Dialectics, Difference, 
Weak Thought,’ Vattimo sees in pietas the possibility of an ethic based not 
on imperatives, but on ‘deeds’ (Vattimo 2012a: 50). He only discusses it in 
a handful of places and only cryptically. In The End of Modernity, he brings 
up pietas in the context of discussing the consequences of the recognition 
that all there is happens to be a history of ‘sendings’ (or ‘destinings’); would 
this not lead to thoroughgoing, destructive relativism? ‘This historicism,’ 
writes Vattimo, ‘is nevertheless tempered and verwunden by an awareness 
that the history of such overtures is not ‘only’ the history of errors…but 
rather is Being itself’ (Vattimo 1988a: 175). Likening this attitude to 
Nietzsche’s man of ‘good temperament,’ Vattimo states that ‘The word that 
best defines this approach to the past and to everything that is transmitted to 
us (even in the present) is pietas’ (Vattimo 1988a: 176-177). Pietas as an 
ethic never really materialised in Vattimo’s thought, perhaps because it is so 
vaguely expressed in ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought’ and The End 
of Modernity. Nevertheless, this remark by Vattimo shows how even early 
on in weak thought he held the desire that his ‘programme’ of philosophy 
should yield an ethic, something to which he returned in his writings on 
Christianity which will be the object of ‘Part One.’ 
 
e) Truth 
The transience of Being and contingent presencing of beings does not mean 
that truth has to be jettisoned altogether. Vattimo recalls Heidegger’s 
                                                 
10 These ‘monuments’ will be discussed further below in the context of looking at 
the ‘fourfold’ (Heidegger’s imagery concerning earth, world, humans and gods). 
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distinction in §44 of Being and Time between truth as correspondence and 
the openings which allow one to make judgements about correspondence. In 
this section Heidegger distinguishes between the ‘traditional’ conception of 
truth (in the Thomistic sense of adequatio between idea and thing) and a 
more fundamental one. Properly speaking, Dasein is primarily true and only 
secondarily there is truth as Being-uncovering (aletheia). The latter is an 
existentiale, and is a characteristic of Dasein and is set out in the existential 
analytic. What is uncovered depends upon the care structure of Dasein, 
based on how it is thrown into the world, whether it is fallen or authentic, 
and its project, which is more primordial than a relationship between idea 
and a thing: ‘The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the 
existential-ontological foundations of uncovering’ (Heidegger 1962: 263). 
The primordial uncovering is articulated in discourse as a relationship which 
is both ready-at-hand which can either be fallen (talking about something 
that has been uncovered in derivative ways) or authentic. Nevertheless, the 
traditional concept Logos (assertion) does obtain when one talks about that 
which has been uncovered as present-at-hand, as an object. Heidegger is 
emphatic that truth can only occur because Dasein is primarily true, that 
there was no truth—not even Newton’s laws—before Dasein (Heidegger 
1962: 269). At its heart, Vattimo’s philosophical style depends upon this 
understanding of truth, albeit with a significant modification. In The 
Adventure of Difference, a collection of essays that documents the changes 
in Vattimo’s thought working towards its mature style in il pensiero debole, 
Vattimo writes: ‘According to Being and Time Dasein is to be found 
always, already, primordially, in authenticity. In the ontological perspective 
that is later developed, this means that truth arises and is disclosed always 
and only in a setting of non-truth, of epoché, of suspension and 
concealment’ (Vattimo 1993a: 49). In other words, Vattimo thinks the Ge-
schick of the epoch into which one is thrown is more decisive for what 
counts as truth and is called true than being ‘authentic’ or ‘fallen.’ 
 The sending alone does not determine how one is able to make 
judgements pertaining to truth or falsity completely. There are also ‘forms 
of life’ to consider, too. With regard to making judgements about 
correspondence, Vattimo likens these open regions to Wittgenstein’s 
language games. There is correspondence within each ‘form of life,’ but 
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none of these forms of life inhere in some underlying substratum (Vattimo 
2012a: 49). With these forms of life, with their rules and monuments passed 
down through tradition and sendings, Vattimo sees truth as being 
‘rhetorical,’ of an aesthetic sense to truth in which one tries to persuade 
people from within—and between—forms of life (Vattimo 2012a: 50). This 
is a consistently held view of Vattimo’s, for in a much later work—A 
Farewell to Truth—he writes, ‘The relation of thought to the truth of Being, 
to the original aperture of truth, to the milieu into which Dasein is thrown, is 
in no sense a cognizance, a theoretical acquisition. Rather, it is what 
Wittgenstein would call the sharing of a “form of life”’ (Vattimo 2011: 
xxxi). Vattimo is at pains to say this does not entail any kind of 
irrationalism, but that the form of life involves ‘assuming the heritage of the 
tradition into which we are thrown as a horizon of possibility’ (Vattimo 
2011: xxxii). 
Later, Vattimo downplays the aesthetic and rhetorical elements of 
persuasion and reconfigures the latter notion by wedding it to ideas of 
consensus and conversation. Vattimo does not foreground his debt to 
Gadamer, but the latter thinker’s views on a fusion of horizons underlies 
Vattimo’s ideas on truth, at least in his more recent writings. Truth, for 
Vattimo is neither correspondence, nor coherence, but consensus created 
through conversation based on an opening.11 Although Vattimo rejects 
‘vertical’ transcendence, of the ‘Wholly Other,’ he accepts the necessity of 
this kind of ‘horizontal transcendence’ (Vattimo and Dotolo 2009: 17), of 
the salvific possibility of the event coming from without historically in order 
to bring people beyond their own horizon by fusing them closer together. 
The fusion re-establishes the continuity of the horizon, which is similar and 
yet different after the dialogue. Of course, in the postmodern age of world 
pictures, is continuity even possible (or desirable)? Perhaps this is why, 
influenced by his pupil Santiago Zabala (Zabala 2009: 79) and a debt to 
Rorty, more recently Vattimo has chosen to use ‘conversation’ rather than 
‘dialogue.’ The latter term in philosophy is reminiscent of the Socratic 
dialogues in which truth is presupposed from the outset, and continuity is 
more of an aim than convergence (Vattimo and Zabala 2011: 25-26). 
Moreover, dialogue may not be possible with some people because they 
                                                 
11 ‘Opening’ is a notion which shall be explained later. 
35 
 
only want to talk, not listen: apparent dialogue would be a monologue. By 
contrast, Vattimo and Zabala argue that conversation occurs when truth is 
not presupposed from the beginning (Vattimo and Zabala 2011: 25-26). 
Where there is no epistemic centre and no shared, universal Grund, there are 
competing traditions with their own claims to truth. Here Vattimo’s primary 
understanding of truth comes through, and that is of ‘friendship’ and the 
practice of ‘persuasion.’ Vattimo’s notion of friendship (which shall be 
interwoven with the idea of caritas in his return to religion), is linked to his 
reading of Gadamer. Nowhere is this clearer than in The Future of Religion, 
in which he explicitly links a discussion of friendship, in which he reverses 
Aristotle’s dictum ‘amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas,’ to a mention of 
Gadamer’s concept of the ‘fusion of horizons.’ Vattimo declares that ‘no 
experience of truth can exist without some kind of participation in a 
community, and not necessarily the closed community…[but in] the 
ongoing construction of communities that coincide in a ‘fusion of horizons’’ 
(Vattimo 2006a: 51). Truth is fashioned through dialogue/conversation, 
resulting in the generation of new Being and a new horizon for the 
interlocutors, a conversation which is only possible through friendship, that 
is, the recognition of the provisional nature of their own traditions (existing 
horizons) and a willingness to listen to the other. There are philosophical 
reasons for keeping truth and friendship together in keeping with Vattimo’s 
broader programme: ‘keeping the two things [truth and friendship] separate 
would mean accepting two regimes, and accepting the idea that objective, 
adequative, scientific truth may well be immoral and savage’ (Vattimo 
2010a: 98). One may disagree with Vattimo, that if there are ‘no facts, only 
interpretations,’ is it the case then that it is not true that ‘2+2 = 4’? While 
mathematics of this kind is not disputed by Vattimo, it is not an issue for 
just about anyone except a handful of theoretical mathematicians. Drawing 
upon an anecdote of Brecht’s, Vattimo in The Responsibility of the 
Philosopher states that ‘If someone gets up in front of a crowd of strikers to 
inform them that two plus two makes four, he’ll get jeered. Plainly that’s not 
the kind of truth that’s needed’ (Vattimo 2010a: 98). Truth becomes an issue 
where it is most disputed, and this is why friendship and persuasion are of 
paramount importance for Vattimo. Even with addition, there could be 
dispute for it is an operation defined by a set of rules and the rules can be set 
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otherwise as with non-Euclidean geometries. There is an element of 
pragmatism in Vattimo’s thought here, a sign of the influence of Richard 
Rorty. In a multicultural, multi-ethnic society in the late-modern West, truth 
cannot be found, but has to be agreed by consensus achieved through 
dialogue. This can only occur, though, if an attitude of friendship obtains 
before, during and after dialogue, for without friendship one or more 
partners in the dialogue (if it happens at all) might wish to impose their own 
interpreted tradition on the other. Therefore, Vattimo writes that, ‘In all 
fields, including science, truth itself is becoming an affair of consensus, 
listening, participation in a shared enterprise, rather than one-to-one 
correspondence with the pure hard objectivity of things’ (Vattimo 2004: 35). 
 
3. The End of Modernity 
a) European Nihilism 
So far I have outlined Vattimo’s views on dialectics, metaphysics 
ontological difference, weak thought and Vattimo’s views on truth and 
friendship. Perhaps surprisingly given his reputation as a hermeneutical 
nihilist, there is no direct discussion of ‘nihilism’ in his essay ‘Dialectics, 
Difference, Weak Thought.’ This is more than made up for in arguably 
Vattimo’s most important book, The End of Modernity, published two years 
after the essay. Why does Vattimo’s thought have to be nihilistic? Partly it 
is an inevitable consequence of him taking the death of God and end of 
metaphysics seriously, as they both entail that ‘Truth’ (with a capital ‘T’) is 
no longer compelling, that there are no more absolute values and that there 
are no facts, only interpretations. More importantly, a nihilist position 
safeguards against mysticism, hidden substrata and the possibility of any 
kind of ‘return’ of metaphysics, especially when he makes the move that 
‘the new’ in any foundational sense would be to repeat the worn-out, 
weakened logic of the metaphysics of modernity. In this section, ‘The End 
of Modernity,’ I will be exploring the themes of this important book, with 
reference in addition to other works of Vattimo’s, mainly from this period, 
especially The Transparent Society. These themes are nihilism and the 
relationship between hermeneutics, modernity and postmodernity. 
It has been mentioned that Vattimo has said that we are living after 
the death of God, where the need for absolute truth seems superfluous. In 
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The End of Modernity, Vattimo elaborates on what this means. The opening 
chapter in the work is ‘An Apology for Nihilism,’ and he proceeds by 
elaborating on the meaning of nihilism for us—which is our ‘sole 
opportunity’ (Vattimo 1988a: 19)—and how his understanding of nihilism is 
a fusion between the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Vattimo’s 
position on the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche can be found 
in the article ‘Nietzsche and Heidegger,’ originally found in the Stanford 
Italian Review (Vattimo 1986), then incorporated into the collection 
Nietzsche in Italy (Harrison 1988), later re-translated and included in 
Vattimo’s Dialogue with Nietzsche as ‘Nietzsche: Heidegger’s Interpreter’ 
(Vattimo 2006b, Ch. 13; Valgenti 2011: 162). In this essay, Vattimo makes 
it clear at the outset that he does not take a philological approach to 
Nietzsche as others have done that; instead he pursues theoretical themes in 
his reading of him (Vattimo 2006b: 181). Vattimo’s starting point is the 
relationship between Nietzsche’s writings and the present (Vattimo 2006b: 
181). The ‘Nietzsche renaissance’ in the middle of the twentieth century 
owes a lot, Vattimo thinks, to the interest in the ‘late Heidegger’ works, 
including his lectures on Nietzsche, which came into the consciousness of 
philosophers and theoreticians in general in the 1950s (Vattimo 2006b: 
181). Nietzsche’s thought is decisive for Heidegger, in Vattimo’s opinion, 
so much so that ‘in addition to the explicit positions taken by Heidegger in 
his interpretation of Nietzsche, Nietzsche himself opens the door to an 
understanding of the meaning of Heidegger’s philosophy. Thus we may 
speak not just of Heidegger, Nietzsche’s interpreter, but also of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger’s interpreter’ (Vattimo 2006b: 182). Clearly here Vattimo is 
drawing upon his notion that the History of Being is constituted by 
conversations between texts, past and present. That Nietzsche can ‘interpret’ 
Heidegger’s work, paradoxically, means that he does not have to present as 
the Nietzsche of Heidegger’s work, but can be used to ‘betray’ Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s work ‘in order to stay true to his most authentic 
intentions’ (Vattimo 2006b: 182). 
 Reading Heidegger through Nietzsche against Heidegger 
includes avoiding the latter’s view that Nietzsche was the last in a long line 
of metaphysicians, such as Descartes and Hegel (Vattimo 2006b: 182-183). 
Although Heidegger realised that the turning point came with Nietzsche in 
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the History of Being, the overriding impression from Heidegger’s works is 
that Nietzsche was the metaphysician of the will to power. Vattimo notes 
that Dilthey, slightly earlier than Heidegger, saw more clearly than the latter 
that, by grouping him among ‘philosophical writers’ such as Tolstoy and 
Emerson, Nietzsche was not a metaphysician, but a thinker in a more poetic, 
subjectivist sense (Vattimo 2006b: 184-185). This is not to say that 
Nietzsche’s thought was simply literature, but that it was not metaphysics 
either. Instead, Vattimo sees in Nietzsche’s thought a ‘memorial banquet’ of 
different stages in the History of Being (Vattimo 2006b: 186), of being 
aware that one is dreaming and that the different courses (to use the banquet 
semantic field) from Being’s history constitute the necessity of thought; as 
Nietzsche said, one cannot get rid of God until we have got rid of grammar. 
Vattimo likens this approach to Heidegger’s notion of Andenken, something 
Heidegger did not appreciate because he did not realise how nihilistic his 
thought really was insofar as, like Nietzsche’s thought, he regarded Being as 
event (Vattimo 2006b: 186). Andenken is rememoration of that which 
cannot merely be represented, and it is Nietzsche’s ‘banquet’-style emphasis 
on masking which informs this understanding of rethinking the History of 
Being, of stopping it simply ‘re-presenting’ or laying new foundations 
(Vattimo 2006b: 188-189). Therefore, while Heidegger puts Nietzsche into 
perspective in the History of Being that a philological reconstruction of his 
texts would not be able to do, using Nietzsche to interpret Heidegger can 
shed light on Heidegger’s work itself (Vattimo 2006b: 187). 
 Vattimo’s Nietzsche is taken largely—but not entirely—from 
Heidegger’s reading of him, concentrating mainly on the unpublished 
works. In this chapter, Vattimo proceeds this way by quoting Nietzsche’s 
Will to Power, that nihilism is ‘the situation in which ‘man rolls from the 
centre toward X’’ (Vattimo 1988a: 19). That is, nihilism is a decentering 
process which is ongoing. Vattimo also says that Nietzsche’s nihilism is 
identical to ‘the kind of nihilism defined by Heidegger, namely the process 
in which…‘there is nothing left’ of Being of such…the forgetting of Being 
by humanity’ (Vattimo 1988a: 19). Vattimo is quite clear that nihilism 
concerns Being first and foremost and is not a psychological thesis (Vattimo 
1988a: 20). ‘For Nietzsche,’ writes Vattimo, ‘the entire process of nihilism 
can be summarized by the death of God, or by the ‘devaluation of the 
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highest values’’ (Vattimo 1988a: 20). These two ideas of Nietzsche’s will 
be outlined in accordance with their interpretation by Vattimo, before 
looking more at how Vattimo reads Heidegger on the end of metaphysics. 
Finally, there will be some discussion on what Vattimo means when he says 
that, Nietzsche and Heidegger combined entails that ‘Nihilism is thus the 
reduction of Being to exchange-value’ (Vattimo 1988a: 21). 
 To analyse the Vattimian reading of Nietzsche’s ‘death of God,’ I 
will start by recounting what he has to say in The End of Modernity. For 
Vattimo’s Nietzsche,  
God dies precisely because knowledge no longer needs to arrive at 
ultimate causes, humanity no longer needs to believe in an immortal 
soul etc. Even if God dies because he must be negated in the name of 
the same imperative demand for truth that was always considered 
one of his own laws, the meaning of an imperative demand for truth 
itself is lost together with him (Vattimo 1988a: 24). 
In this passage there are three points to pick out: 
i) Humanity no longer needs God, 
ii) God died at the hand of his own command for truth, 
iii) The force of the imperative for truth dies with God. 
These three points are interrelated and summarise Vattimo’s position on the 
death of God. The connection between ‘God’ and ‘Truth’ can be found in 
The Gay Science. Nietzsche writes in Book Five, ‘we godless anti-
metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-
year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is 
truth’ (Nietzsche 2001: 201). In an essay entitled ‘Art and Identity: On the 
Relevance of Nietzsche’s Aesthetics’ (1974) included in the collection of 
his writing on Nietzsche’s thought, Dialogue with Nietzsche, Vattimo 
writes: ‘excess is the movement that Nietzsche resumes in the proposition 
‘God is dead’ and the concept of nihilism: God is dead as a result of the 
extreme degree of refinement reached by religiosity, and the same holds 
good for all supreme values, like truth itself’ (Vattimo 2006b: 113). The 
more fervently Christians followed their God, the more they killed him, to 
the point where they did not seek God at all. Vattimo takes this from On the 
Genealogy of Morals, in which Nietzsche writes ‘honest atheism’ is ‘the 
outcome of a two-thousand-year training in truthfulness, which finally 
forbids itself the lie of belief in God’ (Nietzsche 1996: 134). In Vattimo’s 
words, God dies ‘on account of the religiosity of humans and their love of 
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truth’ (Vattimo 2006b: 113). God commanded humans not to lie and 
Christianity has interpreted this as highlighting the value of truth. Ultimately 
this has led to the pursuit of scientific discovery in the name of truth, 
albeit—importantly, as shall become clear in the first part of this study—via 
the ‘turn to the subject’ in the philosophy of history when Kant realised that 
the a priori forms of time, space and the categories of the mind constitute 
experience (Vattimo 1999: 30). As reality is ever more delimited by the 
scientific method, and technology as the fruit of scientific discovery is able 
to search space, sea and sky, one finds that God is nowhere and he is a ‘lie.’ 
God, therefore, self-consumes. A variation on this ‘self-consumption’ notion 
is given in The End of Modernity where Vattimo links the death of God to 
the ‘chemical analysis’ given by Nietzsche at the very beginning of Human, 
All Too Human (Vattimo 1988a: 166). On this view there are no opposites 
(rational and irrational, for example), as the metaphysicians would have one 
believe, but that historical philosophy would discern that ‘the most glorious 
colours are derived from base’ (Nietzsche 1996: 12). This chemical analysis 
dissolves ‘higher’ values such as ‘truth’ to find their pre-sublimated origins 
in human contingencies. The specific highest value of truth has its origin in 
insecurity, of the nearness of death leading ancient humans to look for 
something unchanging. 
In Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo links the death of God to the idea 
of the ‘true’ (or ‘real’) world becoming a ‘fable,’ a section in Nietzsche’s 
work Twilight of the Idols (Vattimo 1997a: 7). In the section called ‘How 
the ‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth’ (‘fable’ is Vattimo’s own, 
probably preferable, translation of the German ‘fabel’), Nietzsche describes 
how the ‘real world’ moves from an external, unchanging impersonal basis 
to that which is in the knowing subject, finally disappearing completely. 
Nietzsche starts with the eternal Platonic forms. With the rise of 
Christianity, the ‘real’ world is promised to the virtuous, faithful believer (as 
the kingdom of heaven). In the Enlightenment era, the real world is no 
longer promised, but is seen as a ‘thing in itself,’ or a Kantian noumenal 
realm necessary for guaranteeing experience which, ever since Descartes at 
the beginning of modernity, has retreated ever further into the subject. 
Empiricism comes to find no use for the noumenal world as ‘thinking 
becomes aware that what is actually real is, as the positivists assert, a 
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‘positive’ fact, a given established by science. Establishing, however, is 
precisely the act of the human subject’ (Vattimo 1999: 30). As a result, 
science and technology produce the world. Not only have we done away 
with the real, but also the ‘apparent’ (‘empirical,’ ‘phenomenal’) world, too 
(Nietzsche 1990a: 50-51).  
The fabulisation of the world is taken by Vattimo to mean the 
devaluation of the highest values. Here a link can be made between 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche and Vattimo’s reading of Heidegger. In 
the third of Heidegger’s lecture series on Nietzsche he discusses this 
passage of Nietzsche’s (Heidegger III 1991: 33). Heidegger states that 
Nietzsche brings up terms such as ‘truth,’ ‘value,’ ‘real world,’ ‘apparent 
world’ and ‘twists’ (reminiscent of Vattimo’s use of the term Verwindung) 
them from their context in the history of philosophy to accord with his own 
concerns regarding ‘life-enhancement,’ as can be seen, for example, in 
Beyond Good and Evil §4: ‘The falseness of a judgement is to us not 
necessarily an objection to a judgement…The question is to what extent it is 
life-advancing, life-preserving’ (Nietzsche 1990b: 35). Traditionally, ‘truth,’ 
for instance, has been regarded as value-estimating in the sense of judging 
something to be correct, as with Aquinas’ notion of adequatio between 
eidos and res. By seeing even fabulisation as life-enhancing, Heidegger sees 
Nietzsche as valuing ‘Becoming’ over ‘Being.’ Whereas the latter is 
associated with permanence and stasis, Nietzsche saw the world in a state of 
flux, that the world is nothing but competing ‘perspectives’ (which Vattimo 
reads as ‘interpretations’). Vattimo is fond of quoting one of Nietzsche’s 
fragments published posthumously in The Will to Power, that ‘there are no 
facts, only interpretations’ and that this itself is ‘an interpretation’ (if it were 
not, both Vattimo and Nietzsche would be contradicting themselves) 
(Vattimo 1997a: 12, 105; quoting Nietzsche 1967: 267). This nihilistic 
conclusion to the fabling of the world goes against Heidegger’s own, for the 
forgetting of Being continues under Nietzsche in his notion of the will to 
power by reducing Being to value, of the secure conditions needed for the 
subject to enhance their life in a world of becoming. Heidegger thinks we do 
not have to reject the idea of the apparent world, but reinterpret it 
(Heidegger I 1991: 209). Heidegger reads Nietzsche as rejecting Platonism, 
but does this mean having to reject the opposite of the ‘real’ world, too?  
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Why could the sensible world not be reinterpreted, instead of rejected 
outright? Rejecting both realms remains within the logic of Platonism, 
leaving in place a duality and accepting or rejecting both over against the 
nothing (Heidegger I 1991: 209).  
What, though, is meant by ‘life-enhancing’ and what does this have 
to do with the end of metaphysics and nihilism in Vattimo’s reading of 
Heidegger? Vattimo is wary of seeing Nietzsche as having relevance 
primarily for aesthetics or literary studies. For example, Vattimo sees 
Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche as representative of the ‘French’ school of 
interpreting his work which is more ‘aesthetistic’ than Vattimo’s own 
political concerns (Vattimo 2006b: 197-199). By contrast, Vattimo develops 
the ontological reading of Nietzsche found in Heidegger’s work, albeit 
along more overtly political lines. Although Vattimo does draw upon 
aesthetics in his reading of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, the political 
(particularly the notion of ‘emancipation,’ which will be discussed in due 
course) is never far away from the ontological. The two principal places in 
Heidegger’s work where he discusses this topic of ‘life-enhancement’ in 
relation to the will are in his lectures on Nietzsche and in his essay, ‘The 
Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead”.’ 
In his fourth volume on Nietzsche, Heidegger thought that in modern 
metaphysics, the question ‘what is the being?’ had been transformed into 
one about fundamental truth, therefore exchanging certitude about salvation 
and revelation for certitude based on the self (Heidegger IV 1991: 97). This 
can be traced back to Descartes’ Cogito. While ‘cogito ergo sum’ is the 
most famous and well-known version of Descartes’ foundational formula 
for certain knowledge, in some passages he uses ‘percipere’ (to take 
possession of/represent/that which he can master) (Heidegger IV 1991: 104; 
Descartes 2013: 50). To be human involves being able to permanently 
represent things in an open field in the certitude towards which one is 
brought. If a res cogitans represents and takes possession of something, the 
other side of this duality, res extensa, is mathematical in nature and is 
related back to (and is the consequence of) the first principle of the certainty 
of representation implicit in the Cogito. In the history of metaphysics, this 
gives rise to machine technology (Heidegger IV 1991: 116-117). In 
Descartes’ work, ‘subject’ now becomes the proper noun for man, and 
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everything else becomes an object; Being for him is representedness in 
secure representation (Heidegger IV 1991: 120). ‘Security’ comes from the 
metaphysical need for certitude, which manifests itself in rational 
calculation and planning in the world of techno-science which is the 
culmination of metaphysics. Before this, though, certainty comes to be a 
condition through Kant’s transcendental development of the Cartesian 
Cogito. In Descartes one has the ‘point of view’ as being related both to 
‘mastery’ and ‘certainty.’ One can relate this to machenshaft (machination), 
a term Heidegger used in the 1930s-1940s as a precursor to Ge-Stell 
(enframing). In the Nietzsche lectures and Contributions to Philosophy, 
Heidegger relates machination to technology and, therefore, to metaphysics. 
From the latter, Heidegger writes, ‘The step taken by Descartes is…the 
decisive one, whereby machination comes into sovereignty as a transformed 
truth (correctness), i.e., as certainty’ (Heidegger 2012: 104). With Descartes 
beings have their Being only insofar as they are objects, by which 
Heidegger thought Descartes meant objects of representations held in 
certainty by a thinking thing. With Kant, the ‘point of view’ becomes a 
‘condition’ for truth in the transcendental sense. Kant, though, still held onto 
a noumenal, of the ‘thing-in-itself’ that was unknowable. By contrast, 
inverting Plato (Heidegger I 1991: 154), the start of metaphysics, Heidegger 
interprets Nietzsche as holding that there was nothing but becoming. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger also thought that Nietzsche posited a subject who 
had to live in this becoming. As such, the subject needed to engage with the 
flux of becoming as follows: 
To be able to be as life, life needs the constant fixity of a ‘belief’, but 
this ‘belief’ calls for holding something to be constant and fixed, 
taking something as ‘in being.’ Since life posits values, yet is at the 
same time concerned about its own securing of permanence, a 
valuation must belong to life in which it takes something as constant 
and fixed; that is, as in being that is, as true (Heidegger III 1991: 62-
63). 
A ‘point of view’ in the Cartesian sense, combined with the Kantian 
‘condition,’ becomes a ‘condition of life’ in the sense of a representing as a 
value. All life is becoming, but the becoming of a subject is the will to 
power. If the will wills its will, it posits values that it holds fast with the 
certainty characteristic of the history of metaphysics. In Nietzsche’s 
philosophy this is expressed in the ‘doctrine’ of the ‘eternal recurrence.’ As 
Nietzsche held that becoming is all that there is, this is, for Heidegger, the 
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mere reversal of Plato’s eternal forms. The eternal recurrence is putting 
one’s ‘stamp’ of Being onto becoming (Heidegger I 1994: 19), in order to 
fix the values that enable one to live a life as the Ubermensch (Heidegger 
IV 1994: 9, 82). The reduction of Being to a value is, for Heidegger, the 
ultimate forgetting of Being and the culmination of metaphysics, which 
contrasts with the ‘French’ reading of the eternal recurrence which is not 
metaphysical at all but is ‘A principle that differentiates [fait la différence] 
between the ontological candidates for return. A principle that announces, 
therefore, contrary to what its name indicates, neither the return of the 
identical, nor the return of all things’ (Malabou 2010: 22). For instance, 
Deleuze writes: ‘If eternal return is a wheel, then it must be endowed with 
a violent centrifugal movement which expels…everything which cannot 
pass the test’ (Deleuze 1994: 55).  
Vattimo has struggled to deal with the eternal recurrence in his 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought. It figured more prominently in his 
earlier work on Nietzsche but its prominence has dropped in favour of 
concentrating on the announcement of nihilism through the death of God. 
Most representative of Vattimo’s early work on Nietzsche is Il soggetto e 
la maschera (1974). In this work, the inner life of man is in tension with an 
outer life in which ‘Socratic’ ratio (reason) has been manifesting itself 
through history in the form of metaphysics, themes Vattimo borrows from 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1872). Vattimo sees the Dionysiac will 
as being restrained by Socratic rationality. Art is a creative free space 
outside of the laws of metaphysics and, as such, is archetypal of the will to 
power. Vattimo also takes from Heidegger his view of metaphysics as 
calculating, rationalising, and aiming at appropriation. The term Vattimo 
gives to metaphysics is ‘violence,’ for it silences questioning by reducing 
debate back to unwavering first principles—a ‘Grund’ or ‘arche.’ The 
search for certainty is, ultimately, Vattimo believes, to stave off fear of the 
unknown, of death, and of change. Concerning this fear, Vattimo sees 
metaphysics also as a history of ‘masking’ its origins in human insecurity, 
with even ‘unmasking’ itself being a further masking. Although Robert 
Valgenti thinks Nietzsche never uses ‘mask’ overly much (Valgenti 2011: 
153), Douglas Burnham has shown in his Nietzsche Dictionary that ‘The 
notion of mask, wearing a disguise, or playing a role are all significant 
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components of N[ietzsche’s] thought concerning society and social 
behaviours’ (Burnham 2015: 211). With interest in Nietzsche’s 
genealogical ‘middle period’ (from the second Untimely Meditation to The 
Gay Science: Vattimo 2002a: 87), Vattimo thought the Nietzschean figure 
of the Overman would expose the symbolism and logic of fear behind the 
mask. The Overman would then make an emancipating decision for the 
eternal recurrence to be free for the multiplicity of images and ways of life 
opened up by not fearing temporality, reconciling inner and outer: ‘La 
decisione eternizzante come decisione liberatrice è la sola capace di 
creare un essere nuova, che non soffra piú come noi, e che sappia vivere la 
grande avventura della scienza e della tecnica fuori dagli schemi del 
dominio, i quali bloccano scienza e tecnica’ (Vattimo 1974: 347). 
Influenced by Marxism, Vattimo thought this individual would not only be 
free from metaphysical-religious violence, but also liberal-capitalist 
domination, too. However, in the period of his writing about weak thought, 
Vattimo has said little about the eternal recurrence. One essay—
‘‘Verwindung,’ Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy’—mentions 
that the end of modernity (an idea I shall explain further below in the 
section on ‘ontology of actuality’) involves the eternal recurrence whereby 
it reveals modernity as the epoch in which the ‘new’ was the highest value 
(Vattimo 1987: 9). Vattimo does not develop this idea much in the essay, 
but one can relate it to themes explored in The End of Modernity and The 
Transparent Society, such as the ‘routinisation of the new’ in Arnold 
Gehlen’s idea of post-histoire. Gehlen puts forward the view that 
developments (or, ‘progress’) in technology is now required in order for 
the consumer-capitalist West to stand still. Moreover, progress becomes 
devalued through imputing to the penultimate the value of being the 
‘ultimate,’ ‘best,’ or ‘perfect’ ‘driving machine,’ for example (Vattimo 
1988a: 101-104). The ‘eternally new’ devalues the value of novelty, 
revealing modernity and its values for what they are, expressions of the 
will to power which—in Vattimo’s Heideggerian eyes—are metaphysical. 
 In his essay ‘The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead”,’ Heidegger 
states that the death of God in Nietzsche’s philosophy is reducing God to 
the highest values posited by the will to power (Heidegger 1977: 66, 103-
105). ‘Value’ for Heidegger means ‘perspective,’ or 
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‘enhancement/preservation’ conditions for life (Heidegger 1977: 72). 
Heidegger says that a value values inasmuch as it counts, by which it posits 
insofar as it aims. However, gradually ‘aim’ has changed from ‘eidos’ 
(idea) to ‘perceptio’ (perception), and this setting forth (or ‘representing’) 
has impetus (nisus) which is a springing-forth (Heidegger 1977: 72). 
Heidegger sees Nietzsche identifying ‘Becoming’ (and Being) with the 
‘will to power,’ with the former shaping itself ‘into centers of the will to 
power particularized in time’ (Heidegger 1977: 74). The ‘will to power is 
revealed as that which posts that point-of-view’ (Heidegger 1977: 74), so 
values are only expressions of this internal principle aiming for the 
preservation-enhancement of life. How are we now in a state of nihilism 
and living after the death of God, and what does this have to do with the 
will to power? Heidegger writes: 
The doing away with that which is in itself, i.e., the killing of God, is 
accomplished in the making secure of a constant reserve by means of 
which man makes secure for himself material, bodily, psychic, and 
spiritual resources, and this for the sake of his own security, which 
will dominion over whatever is—as the potentially objective—in 
order to correspond to the Being of whatever is, to the will to power 
(Heidegger 1977: 107). 
The key moment in the history of metaphysics is when Descartes changed 
the Aristotelian hypokeimenon into a self-conscious subjectum, while 
retaining the metaphysical yearning for the absolute in the form of 
certainty. This threw everything over against the subject as an object. As a 
result, ‘certainty’ is taken away from the supra-sensory and laid flat on the 
plain of immanence. Gradually, the subject does not represent objects, 
which are mutable, but something certain, which are the values which 
spring from within—the will to power—and are capable of being taken 
under command: ‘because the will can will only from out of its disposal 
over something steadily constant, truth is a necessary value precisely out of 
the essence of the will to power, for that will’ (Heidegger 1977: 85). 
Rather than being content explaining our current state as one of nihilism, 
Heidegger sees Nietzsche as having attempted to push on through the 
devaluation of the highest values with an attempt for ‘new value-positing’ 
(Heidegger 1977: 95), particularly with regards to art, which enables the 
will to move beyond itself but from itself and for itself through expressing 
its value in the form of a creative appropriation in a secure representation 
of its will (Heidegger 1977: 85-86). The danger Heidegger sees is that of 
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the will securing objects through its artistic representation so that 
everything (the ‘earth’) will be taken up in this way through technology, so 
that ‘The world changes into object’ (Heidegger 1977: 100), so that there is 
no other way to think Being than as value (subject or object of) (Heidegger 
1977: 104). Through seeking to secure everything, Nietzsche’s notion of 
the will to power remains within metaphysics whilst still heralding the 
philosophy of nihilism.  
How do ‘art’ and ‘technology’ result in metaphysical 
objectification and—ultimately—nihilism? More clues can be found 
elsewhere among Heidegger’s essays. In the essay ‘The Age of the World 
Picture,’ Heidegger says that ‘Value is the objectification of needs as 
goals, wrought by a representing self-establishing within the world as 
picture’ (Heidegger 1977: 142). Representing replaces the substantial 
objectivity of an object, and is instead a will, a mastery, a ‘making stand-
over against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters’ (Heidegger 
1977: 150). Heidegger makes the link between this change in the subject-
object relationship wrought by Descartes and reaching its apex in 
Nietzsche, and technology: ‘In the planetary imperialism of 
technologically organised man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, 
from which point it will descend to the level of organised uniformity and 
there firmly establish itself’ (Heidegger 1977: 152). In an essay entitled 
‘The Will to Power as Art,’ one which Vattimo states as being key to his 
move towards his later thought (Vattimo 1993a: 4), he writes the 
following: 
In the end of metaphysics as technology, the nexus between 
metaphysics, domination and will, which had hitherto remained 
hidden, becomes explicit. The system of total concatenation of 
causes and effects, prefigured by metaphysics in its ‘vision’ of the 
world and actualized by technology, is the expression of a will to 
dominate. Hence the Nietzschean will to power is simply the most 
coherent culmination of the history of Western metaphysics (Vattimo 
1993a: 86). 
Willing, valuing and representing: these activities of the subject culminate 
in the Ge-Stell, in the end of metaphysics in the modern world of 
technology. This is Vattimo’s understanding of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the relationship between the will to power, technology and the 
culmination of metaphysics. It was for this reason chiefly that Heidegger 
regarded Nietzsche as a metaphysician and why he took a dim view of 
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technology as ‘the unfolding of the will to power as technocracy’ (Vattimo 
1993a: 87). In the essay, ‘Dialectics and Difference,’ Vattimo writes that, 
‘The technical world described as Ge-Stell is the world of planned 
production, served by knowledge as representation, and in which man is 
repeatedly interpellated in an ordering process imposing on him a 
continuous pursuit of things to serve as reserves of resources’ (Vattimo 
1993a: 169). Before we look at what is meant by ‘representation’ in 
Vattimo’s thought contrasted with Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
use of the word ‘representation,’ and how this links to the will to power and 
Vattimo’s philosophy more broadly, it is important to look at the meaning of 
the term ‘Ge-Stell.’ 
In his reading of Heidegger, Vattimo follows him in seeing 
metaphysics reaching its point of culmination in modern technology. Before 
looking at Vattimo’s specifically nihilistic reading of Heidegger on 
technology, it is necessary to outline Heidegger’s thoughts on the issue. In 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (Heidegger 1977) and Identity and 
Difference, Heidegger states that the essence of technology is not something 
technological: it is not merely instrumental, but also a way of revealing. The 
idea of ‘revealing’ comes from Heidegger’s phenomenological rejection of 
Kant divorcing how things appear to us from how they really are; Heidegger 
thought they are connected, and the appearance of something in our 
consciousness is how it is revealed to us, how it is brought into 
unconcealment. Every unconcealment also conceals, however, as our 
knowledge of beings is always fragmentary; there is always more to the 
essence of a thing than is revealed to us. Technology’s role in 
unconcealment for Heidegger is evident in the interest he pays to the ancient 
Greek etymology of techné, which emphasises technology’s role in 
‘opening up’ and ‘revealing.’ Techné is the form of knowledge appropriate 
to poeisis, a Greek term for a form of (poetic) activity which is a bringing-
forth from unconcealment, whether an artisan brings-forth a chalice which 
was previously a potential chalice, or whether blossom brings itself into 
bloom.  
Primitive technology allowed nature to reveal itself ‘poetically,’ 
such as a farmer watching crops grow and harvesting them or a windmill 
converting the energy generated by the wind when it blew, in line with 
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Aristotle’s definition of techné in his Physics, as completing and 
supplementing nature (Aristotle 1966: 199a16). This view of primitive 
technology assumes a final cause (telos) for natural things, a view at odds 
with Nietzsche’s view that ‘purpose is lacking’ (Nietzsche 1990a: 65). 
Nonetheless, industrial technology, on the other hand, ‘challenges’ nature 
by placing an unreasonable demand on it, forcing it to produce what is 
required of it by humans. For example, with man-made hydroelectricity 
dams the mode of revealing is a ‘challenging forth,’ the way in which the 
river reveals itself is no longer the same. Rather than the Rhine appearing 
poetically as water flowing as a feature of a larger landscape, modern 
technology has made it become an energy resource. Equally, tourism cannot 
see the Rhine as an object of nature, but rather merely as a source of 
income. All nature is challenged in this way. Humans are also challenged, 
for they are reduced to the level of objects used for production. For 
example, human resources departments can be viewed as regarding humans 
as resources for production. A human waiting to go to work is, in this 
industrial society, like an aeroplane on a runway, having little value being 
brought-forth themselves, but only for something else; essentially both are 
‘standing reserve,’ valuable only when employed and at the mercy of a 
system which uses and manipulates them as and when required. The term 
for this type of revealing which is a challenging on a global scale is Ge-Stell 
(enframing). Ge-Stell is the culmination of metaphysics because it involves 
the total planning of everything in perfectly ordered relationships of cause 
and effect, all capable of unlimited manipulation. What is missing from this 
recounting of Heidegger’s position on the Ge-Stell is the notion of 
‘representation.’ This is due to the particular interpretation Vattimo has 
made of Heidegger’s thought by linking it to information and 
communications technology, which shall be discussed momentarily. 
Living after Heidegger, Vattimo interprets the Ge-Stell in 
information technological terms: ‘It is not in the world of machines and 
engines that humanity and being can shed the mantles of subject and object, 
but in the world of generalized communication. Here the entity dissolves in 
the images distributed by the information media’ (Vattimo 1992: 116-117). 
In the play of images and messages attained through media such as 
television, radio and the internet, the difference between subject and object 
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dissolves. For instance, one may doubt that someone’s online profile is 
‘real.’ Moreover, how could one ever verify its claim to representing 
reality? What is being hinted at in Vattimo’s talk of the ‘mantles of subject 
and object’ being ‘shed’ is what is referred to by both Vattimo and 
Heidegger as the ‘Ereignis,’ or the ‘event of appropriation.’ The particular 
passage in Heidegger’s work that appeals to Vattimo is one from Identity 
and Difference: ‘The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within 
itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, 
achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics 
has endowed them’ (Heidegger 1969: 37). The ‘prelude’ to the Ereignis is 
the Ge-Stell (Heidegger 1969: 36). In the Ereignis which results from Ge-
Stell, metaphysical designations such as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ disappear as 
everything is challenged-forth. In the Enlightenment era, the rational 
Cartesian ‘thinking thing’ is not only the subject, but also the foundation of 
knowledge.  This anthropocentrism continued in different ways through the 
construction of unilinear narratives surrounding progress and science. The 
Ge-Stell challenges the distinction between humans and Being as they are 
all reduced to causal determined standing-reserve, with this universal 
manipulation revealed in the Ereignis, what Vattimo, following Heidegger 
in Identity and Difference (Heidegger 1969: 38), calls the ‘event of 
appropriation.’ In the Ereignis, humanity and Being (traditionally 
considered as that which grounds the rule of reason) lose their metaphysical 
properties of subject and object. As a result, Being is shown not as a 
foundation or a thing, but as an ‘exchange value’: as ‘language and...the 
tradition constituted by the transmission and interpretation of messages’ 
(Vattimo 1988a: 26). 
What Vattimo seems to neglect at first sight, on this view, is that 
according to modern metaphysics a picture is a representation which is 
represented by a subject (Heidegger 1991c: 220-221). However, if the 
Ereignis strips both subject and object of their metaphysical qualities, then 
how can there be ‘pictures’ left? Indeed, in The Transparent Society, 
Vattimo states that this is why Heidegger thought that we are now living in 
the age of the world image created by science, not the world view of 
sovereign human beings (Vattimo 1992: 15-16). Here it is worth 
acknowledging that Vattimo uses the update he consciously made of 
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Heidegger’s Ge-Stell to make a link between this notion and the essay ‘The 
Age of the World Picture.’ Vattimo goes on to say: ‘The images of the 
world we receive from the media and the human sciences, albeit on different 
levels, are not simply different interpretations of a ‘reality’ that is ‘given’ 
regardless, but rather constitute the very objectivity of the world’ (Vattimo 
1992: 24-25). According to Heidegger in the essay ‘The Age of the World 
Picture,’ the world picture ‘does not mean a ‘picture of the world’ but the 
world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now 
taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent 
that it is set up by man’ (Heidegger 1977: 129-130). The links to Ge-Stell 
are clear, even if Heidegger’s notion of the world picture seems to place 
more emphasis on the agency of the human being as the ‘representing’ and 
‘setting’ subject. The reduction of the world to a world picture gives rise to 
a shadow: 
Everyday opinion sees in the shadow only the lack of light…In 
truth…the shadow is the manifest, though impenetrable, testimony to 
the concealed emitting of light. In keeping with this concept of 
shadow, we experience the incalculable as that which, withdrawn 
from representation, is nevertheless manifest in whatever is, pointing 
to Being, which remains concealed (Heidegger 1977: 154). 
‘The polemical thrust of Heidegger’s Weltbild essay,’ says Karyn Ball in her 
essay on the metaphor of ‘shadow’ in Heidegger’s essay, ‘is to emphasize 
the unthought that is simultaneously produced and obscured by the growing 
dominance of a mathematical orientation geared toward calculation’ (Ball 
2005: 121-122). Vogt thinks that Vattimo’s twist on the notion of the world 
picture is to hold that the shadow ‘has to be grasped as [the] immanent and 
nihilistic consequence in form of a proliferation of conflicting images of the 
world’ (Vogt 2010: 228) given by communications technology, the apex of 
technology and therefore of metaphysics.  
The irreducible plurality of images and messages enabled through 
technology (especially the internet) in the society of mass communication 
weakens the principle of reality; there is no longer a world picture and 
merely a shadow of the unthought, but ‘a Babel of conflicting images’ 
(Vattimo 1997a: 26). The result of the first flashing up of Ereignis in the 
Ge-Stell through the dissolution of reality in a play of images is the 
culmination of metaphysics. ‘Culmination’ is to be understood both in the 
sense of the apex and dissolution of metaphysics. Information and 
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communications technology, which challenges not only the world and 
humanity, but also mechanical machines themselves, allows for an 
unprecedented level of calculability and manipulation, thereby fulfilling the 
goal of metaphysics. Nevertheless, as Vattimo has shown in his 
understanding of the Heideggerian notion of Weltbild, reality dissolves in a 
play of images; from a Heideggerian view, this is the end of metaphysics 
and it is nihilism, the reduction of Being to value. ‘It is modern science,’ 
writes Vattimo in Beyond Interpretation, ‘heir and completion of 
metaphysics, that turns the world into a place where there are no longer 
facts, only interpretations’ (Vattimo 1997a: 26). There are no ‘facts’ left, 
only a play of interpretations for there is not a real world, nor an apparent 
one, but only images and traces of being as language inherited through 
tradition. That the world is a multiplicity of conflicting images is a 
postmodern and Nietzschean interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, one that 
reads his essay in a very particular way. As shall become apparent in the 
section on the fourfold below, it is far from obvious that Heidegger would 
have agreed with Vattimo’s interpretation. While this does not matter to 
Vattimo, especially with his notion of Verwindung, it should be important to 
his readers, not least due to the implications of Vattimo’s radical 
immanentism for issues pertaining to religion and ethics.  
 In the historically-determined project after the end of metaphysics 
and the death of God, Being is reduced to the nihilism of exchange-value 
(Vattimo 1988a: 21). One way of understanding the ‘exchange value’ of 
Being is that it is like a ‘worn coin,’ like it is common currency in the 
community (Barbiero 1992: 166). Nevertheless, as Ashley Woodward 
points out, Vattimo in using this phrase is deliberately bringing-together 
Marx’s terminology with Heidegger’s philosophy of technology (Woodward 
2009: 88). Out of Marx’s different ways of construing an object’s value, 
‘exchange-value’ refers to the value of one thing relative to another (‘one x 
is worth two ys’) (Marx 1906: 43). Woodward writes that: ‘Considered as 
the wholesale conversion of all values into exchange-value, capitalism is 
nihilistic insofar as it has an ungrounding effect: metaphysical claims to 
natural essences or secure foundations are swept away in the flux of 
absolute exchange’ (Woodward 2009: 91). After the end of metaphysics, 
everything has its own exchange-value. There is a clear link here between 
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‘exchange value’ and the Ge-Stell and consequent Ereignis, for information 
and communications technology drive late-modern capitalism, especially 
through the stock market; Vattimo himself makes this explicit link in The 
End of Modernity (Vattimo 1988a: 26). Another phrase Vattimo uses to 
show the inescapable presence of the metaphysical tradition is ‘the ontology 
of decline,’ that we are living in ‘the Occident’ which is ‘the land of sunset 
(and hence, of Being).’ This nostalgia is a resignation in the sense that one 
cannot escape metaphysics without creating a new foundation and thus 
succumbing to the sort of authoritarianism one wishes to escape. Both 
‘exchange value’ and ‘ontology of decline’ betray a very different attitude 
towards images generated by information and communications technology 
than, say, Baudrillard, for whom simulacra are images that had no original, 
which never conceal as there no truth to conceal (Baudrillard 1994: 1). For 
Vattimo, images from information and communications technology are 
worn out coins, or better (conflating both the ‘worn coin’ and ‘exchange-
value’ metaphors), ‘worn out goods.’ It is not necessarily that they are either 
simulacra or copies of originals which still somehow exist, but they are 
worn out originals, that the ‘originals’ were messages that have now been 
worn out through overuse. Think of Vattimo’s messages like an old tapestry 
that is pulled about in different directions and has new threads added to it.  
What I believe Vattimo needs is to show how Christianity came so 
close to Platonistic metaphysics and how they combined to form a general 
principle of weakening. As I show in Part One, Vattimo thinks he has 
achieved this through his notions of kenosis and caritas. I will go on to 
indicate why these notions are problematic in his thought. Thinking ahead, I 
would like to suggest that my own reading of Vattimo which I put forward 
in the Conclusion is a better solution than the one offered by Vattimo, and it 
is based on the ‘missionary/evangelical’ nature of Christianity which led 
what was at root a Jewish sect with its own personal God to become 
Hellenised in its encounter with the Gentiles through Paul’s mission. 
Following John Gray (Gray 2002), I would argue that Christianity 
introduced ‘Truth’ into religion, which ultimately did damage not only to 
philosophy, but also to religion. In other words, the fabulisation of the world 
occurred through an inaugural event in the history of humankind—the 
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Christ-event, but not in the way either Nietzsche or Vattimo has conceived 
of it.  
Vattimo sees nihilism as something that is neither possible, nor 
desirable, to overcome. Indeed, Ashley Woodward has written that ‘The 
most unique contribution Vattimo makes to the discourse of nihilism 
consists in a positive revaluation of nihilism; in his thought, nihilism is no 
longer posed as a problem that must be solved but as a solution to the 
problems of modernity, which becomes possible as we enter postmodernity’ 
(Woodward 2009: 102). Over the course of the next two subsections it 
should become clearer why Woodward holds this view of Vattimo. The 
latter’s largely positive view of nihilism constitutes a significant difference 
between Heidegger and Vattimo, as well as highlighting selectivity in the 
way in which Vattimo reads Nietzsche. It would appear that Nietzsche 
thought nihilism was a stage in the development of European thought that 
was to be overcome. As part of his work, he created a typology of different 
kinds of nihilism. Nietzsche did not think that the fabulisation of the world 
was anything to lament, for in ‘Broad daylight’ and the ‘return of 
cheerfulness and bons sens,’ Plato ‘blushes for shame’ and ‘all free spirits 
run riot’ (Nietzsche 1990a: 50-51). Yet Nietzsche’s own attitude towards, 
and understanding, of nihilism was complex, sometimes using it as a term of 
abuse, such as when he attacked Flaubert for expressing that one can only 
think and write when sitting down (neglecting walking thought, apparently) 
(Nietzsche 1990a: 36). 
 Vattimo has talked about the positive nature of nihilism in different 
ways, but most emphatically he has referred to it as our ‘sole opportunity’ 
(Vattimo 1988a: 19). He unpacks what he means by this opportunity later in 
The End of Modernity (Vattimo 1988a: 28). Here, he distinguishes between 
two ways of understanding nihilism in a positive way: 1. Politically and 
performatively; 2. theoretically. Concerning the former, Vattimo means the 
process of secularisation, a notion that would come to mean something far 
more specific and theological-sounding in his return to religion. At this 
point, he refers to this process as one in which through mass culture and 
media one finds there is a ‘loss of roots,’ making the world seem ever less 
real. Theoretically, Vattimo sees the meaning of history as being dissolved 
in the play of interpretations, with history now being reappropriated by 
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those who make it. The latter argument gets better developed by Vattimo in 
his analysis of modernity compared with postmodernity in his book The 
Transparent Society, and it will be dealt with more directly in the discussion 
of his notion of ‘ontology of actuality’ later in this Introduction. 
It would be rash to say Vattimo was in favour of all forms of 
nihilism, for the latter concept is far from univocal, and Vattimo follows 
Nietzsche in distinguishing between at least two further senses of the term 
nihilism, which in fact was a title of an essay of Vattimo’s (1989) included 
in his Dialogue with Nietzsche. Nietzsche, Vattimo thinks, distinguished 
between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ nihilism. Passive nihilism is also called 
‘reactive’ nihilism. Passive/reactive nihilism aims ‘to conceal the void at the 
core of everything that was esteemed as Being, value, fixed structure…[it] 
refuses to admit that neither objective meanings and values nor given 
structures of Being exist—and that therefore they have to be actively 
created’ (Vattimo 2006b: 135). Active nihilism has two senses for 
Nietzsche. One is to take up the creation of new values, the other is to 
ensure that the old values perish. Concerning the latter meaning, Vattimo is 
unsure of its logic: ‘It would after all be possible simply to await the 
inevitable annihilation of values and structures’ (Vattimo 2006b: 135). 
Furthermore, Vattimo drew upon Nietzsche’s distinction between 
‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ nihilism. The latter denoted any attempt to 
leave the condition of nihilism without having revaluated all values, 
whereas complete nihilism includes the revaluating (Nietzsche 1967: 19). 
Ashley Woodward has shown how the possibility of a revaluation of values 
and an escape from nihilism (to a ‘complete’ nihilism) is impossible for 
Vattimo due to the phenomenon of the end of modernity in which a new 
start would not only repeat the logic of modernity which is itself 
metaphysical, but also cannot be achieved because of the liberation of 
metaphors after the death of God: ‘For Vattimo, Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
nihilism is coextensive with complete nihilism, and does not constitute a 
stage beyond it’ (Woodward 2002: 63). In The End of Modernity, Vattimo 
says that Nietzsche in The Gay Science, with his concepts of the death of 
God and the eternal recurrence, signals ‘the end of the era of overcoming, 
namely that epoch of Being conceived under the sign of the novum’ 
(Vattimo 1988a: 168). By the latter, Vattimo is referring to ‘the essence of 
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modernity as the epoch in which Being is reduced to the novum,’ that is, the 
value of the new. Vattimo puts this idea more clearly in the opening of The 
Transparent Society, in which he says that ‘modernity is the epoch in which 
simply being modern became a decisive value in itself’ (Vattimo 1992: 1). 
In The Transparent Society, Vattimo goes to show the link between 
postmodernism, communications technology and the end of metaphysics; 
the plurality of opinions disseminated by radio, television (and, since the 
book was written, the internet) decentre reality, devalue the new by making 
it routine and weaken strong structures by always having an alternative 
viewpoint presented (Vattimo 1992: 7, 116-117). Arguably if Heidegger had 
experienced the end of modernity in the society of generalised 
communication that has facilitated the liberation of metaphors, he may well 
have read Nietzsche differently.  
Vattimo’s nihilism and rejection of a ‘complete’ nihilism can be 
clarified by contrasting it with Derrida’s approach in his essay ‘The Ends of 
Man.’ In discussing Heidegger and the end of metaphysics, Derrida puts 
forward two different models of new beginnings. Using a somewhat 
confused and confusing metaphor of an edifice (or house) on the ground to 
represent the structure of metaphysics on its foundations (or most 
fundamental assumptions), Derrida puts forward two strategies. The first is 
to accept the foundations and change the structure. This strategy ‘risks 
ceaselessly confirming, consolidating…that which one allegedly 
deconstructs’ (Derrida 1972: 135). By retreating to the history of 
metaphysics for resources to construct a new edifice—perhaps such as the 
watered-down Epicureanism of the consumer-capitalist society, or the 
second-rate Stoicism of austerity measures—one confirms the past rather 
than rejecting it. However, the second strategy is also doomed to failure as 
‘the simple practice of language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the 
oldest ground’ (Derrida 1972: 135), for even if one wished to get outside the 
house, ‘language is the house of Being’ (as Heidegger said) and therefore 
one cannot escape language, a theme also explored by Vattimo along more 
Gadamerian lines. If the history of metaphysics is the history of Being, as 
Vattimo argues, one can see Derrida’s two options as, in Richard Zaner’s 
words, ‘part and parcel with traditional metaphysics…both remain 
essentially straightforward and dogmatic’ (Zaner 1972: 388). ‘Derrida 
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warns,’ writes Alan Schrift, ‘that we must refrain from choosing one 
strategy rather than the other. The two strategies supplement one 
another…we must choose both at once…To do so is to effect a change of 
style in philosophical writing’ (Schrift 1988: 92). Derrida does this by 
referring to the ambiguity in the writing of Nietzsche, who contrasted the 
‘last man,’ who represents everything mediocre after the death of God, and 
the ‘overman.’ The ‘last man’ will seek comfort and pleasure, 
unconvincingly exclaiming that he has found happiness. The ‘last man’ has 
not fully engaged with the implications of the death of God. By contrast, the 
Übermensch will engage with ‘active forgetting’ (Derrida 1972: 136) of 
Being of the sort mentioned in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. 
Vattimo would regard this as being too optimistic as even the Übermensch, 
through language, is caught up in tradition, the nexus of messages ‘that 
constitute the horizon within which Dasein is thrown as an historically 
determined project….Being, as a horizon of disclosure in which things 
appear, can arise only as a trace of past words’ (Vattimo 1988: 120). 
Vattimo would regard the subjective choice between the two ‘ends’ of man 
Derrida detected in Nietzsche’s work as a decision between passive or 
reactive nihilism on the one hand (the ‘last man’) or a restatement of 
Derrida’s second strategy, that is, one naively bound to fail as one cannot 
radically get beyond metaphysics without then falling back into the first 
strategy, of creating a new foundation. The latter, with its value of the new, 
is back within the logic of modernity, which Vattimo deems metaphysical. 
Instead, Vattimo’s notion of Verwindung, as shall be shown in due course, is 
neither a passive acceptance of existing strong (metaphysical and political) 
structures, nor a radical attempt to get beyond them. Unlike Derrida’s two 
‘strategies,’ Vattimo’s nihilism is neither an attempt to create a new 
foundation while keeping the same edifice, nor an attempt to build a new 
structure atop of the same foundation, even if it is one in which the ‘bricks’ 
are taken from the history of metaphysics. Thinking as Andenken-
Verwindung does not wish to create new foundations, but acknowledges that 
the existing foundations have lost their strength. Equally, it does not desire 
to construct a new edifice, but to rearrange the bricks and other structural 
parts to weaken the overall whole, and this transpires through the 
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hermeneutic practice of conversation, a notion that shall be discussed further 
in analysing Vattimo’s notion of caritas. 
 
b) Art, openings and the event 
I have already discussed Vattimo’s most important use of the notion of the 
‘event’ in his philosophy, in the context of the Ge-Stell and the first 
flashing-up of Ereignis. For Vattimo, the latter is the event that allows us to 
become conscious of our own historical contingency. Nevertheless, he is 
aware that although the event of appropriation functions in this illuminating 
way, it makes us aware that Being has always eventuated. What, then, are 
the other sites of events? I will take this question as an opportunity to 
discuss further the notion of the ‘event’ in Vattimo’s philosophy, including 
recent developments which will be of importance for when I discuss 
Vattimo’s ‘return to religion.’ 
 In Nihilism and Emancipation, Vattimo writes that in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’ (1936), Heidegger ‘hazarded a sort of catalogue of the 
privileged places of truth’s occurrence’ (Vattimo 2004: 12), such as ‘art, 
religion, philosophy, morality’ (Vattimo 2004: 13). Vattimo (and Gadamer, 
it seems, from a conversation Vattimo relates having had with him (Vattimo 
2004: 14)) has lamented that Heidegger did not pursue the sheer range of 
sites for openings of truth to occur, and that he ‘confined himself to the 
aperture that takes place in poetry’ (Vattimo 2004: 13). Vattimo notes that 
Heidegger was not entirely consistent in reducing the site of openings to 
poetry, for how else would Vattimo derive his reading of the link between 
the Ereignis and the Ge-Stell from Identity and Difference? For all he has 
lamented the restriction Heidegger placed on himself in restricting the site 
of openings to poetry, Vattimo in recent years has done much the same. In 
the interview entitled ‘Philosophy as Ontology of Actuality,’ Vattimo said 
that ‘‘Weak thought,’ in this sense, springs from the recognition that, in our 
actual experience of the world, we are never directly concerned with facts 
but with texts and words. We must thus acknowledge, with Heidegger, that 
‘language is the house of being’’ (Vattimo 2009: 332). Despite the 
importance of ‘images’ in communications technology, language itself 
seems to be the site of Being’s disclosure for Dasein in Vattimo’s 
philosophy. Vattimo uses sleight of hand to move between ‘images’ in 
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referring to the Ge-Stell to ‘interpretations’ (which are linguistic), as can be 
found, for instance, in his discussion of the Ge-Stell in The Transparent 
Society (Vattimo 1992: 117). Vattimo may feel justified in doing this if he is 
following Heidegger’s ‘The Age of the World Picture’ in that ‘picture’ 
means to see how something stands before us (Heidegger 1977: 129), a 
representing which in the modern sending of Being means ‘to force it back 
into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm’ (Heidegger 1977: 
131), and this appropriative notion of representing is a valuing which then 
brings us back to interpreting. So, after all, Vattimo wants to keep the 
analysis of works of art as openings where Being eventuates, he restricts and 
reduces the artistic to the linguistic, more specifically to the poetical.  
 
4. Beyond Interpretation 
a) Hermeneutics as a sending and the ‘ontology of actuality’ 
If texts are so important to Vattimo, why still talk of Being? Along these 
lines, some philosophers take the end of metaphysics to constitute a total 
departure from ontology for they feel it is too closely associated with 
metaphysical foundationalism. In Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo mentions 
that some philosophers have stopped speaking of Being altogether, naming 
Derrida as one such philosopher. For Vattimo, ‘the decision to stop speaking 
of Being seems to imply an unconscious metaphysical claim; as if one were 
to read the Nietzschean announcement of the death of God as on a plane 
with an announcement of his non-existence’ (Vattimo 1997a: 12). As 
Vattimo sees the history of Being as explaining the provenance of 
hermeneutics, retaining talk of Being is important. Moreover, as will 
become clear in the sections below on Verwindung, the language of traces of 
Being delimits experience; talk of Being is inescapable in one way or 
another, but what is important is our attitude towards it, as was indicated by 
Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of morning.’ What Vattimo means by this is that it 
is a ‘kind of thought that is oriented towards proximity rather than towards 
the origin or foundation…a way of thinking about error’ (Vattimo 1988a: 
169). It is being able to bear the weight of the past, to take world history as 
one’s own in a cheerful way, showing the influence of Nietzsche’s Human 
All too Human (Vattimo 2002b: 79- 82) in which Nietzsche describes 
‘wanderers’ and ‘philosophers’ at the dawn of the day with pure light 
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shining on their faces, ‘so cheerful and transfigured’ (Nietzsche 1996: 203-
204). 
Vattimo’s other problem with this approach is that a non-ontological 
approach to knowledge locates the origin of knowledge once again in 
beings, pertaining to their own realms. This issue is essentially one of 
relativism, that jettisoning talk of Being altogether in light of recognising 
the devaluation of all highest values due to the death of God belies the 
‘unintentional metaphysical presupposition that explains the appearance of 
relativistic irrationalism’ (Vattimo 1997a: 12). A mere concatenation of 
openings could be considered as thoroughgoing relativism, especially if they 
are taken in the sense of incommensurable paradigms. This is a suspicion 
harboured by critics of weak thought, even recently such as Jean Grondin 
(Grondin 2010: 107). In other words, Vattimo is aware of the relativist 
objection to weak thought and wants to deal with it directly. Religious, 
political, and ethnic groups will plan and organise their own different realms 
so that an authority similar to that associated with metaphysical Being in the 
past is postulated of beings. It could lead to a stale relativism in which local 
epistemologies or groups are incapable of external criticism. Individuals 
within these groups might retreat ever further into their realm and, to 
paraphrase Vattimo’s expression, make a metaphysic out of their finitude 
(Vattimo 2004: 42-43) by rigidifying their own contingent position to make 
the in-group ‘right’ and everybody else ‘wrong.’ Even worse, relativism 
itself could appear like a metaphysical principle. There is a clear link 
between this interpretation of relativism and understanding hermeneutics as 
a meta-theory of interpretation. The project of Vattimo’s book Beyond 
Interpretation was to sound caution on how to understand hermeneutics.  
In the 1980s Vattimo stated that hermeneutics was the philosophical 
koine of our time. The ‘koine’ of postmodern intellectual life means that 
Vattimo saw in a wide range of thinkers, some of whom are often thought to 
be conflicting in their aims, ideas and influences, that from the 1980s 
onwards hermeneutics became the prelevant and predominant way of 
philosophising through family resemblance (Vattimo 1991a: 283-285). In 
Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo writes, ‘not only are Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Ricoeur and Pareyson hermeneutic thinkers, but so are Habermas and Apel, 
Rorty and Charles Taylor, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas’ 
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(Vattimo 1997a: 1). Moreover, Vattimo thinks Nietzsche and Heidegger are 
saying the ‘same’ things in different ways, the one balancing and correcting 
the other in Vattimo’s interpretation as both heralding the end of 
metaphysics (the ordered, calculated attempt to found and organise reality 
on the basis of first principles), the event of nihilism and the move from the 
dominance of the monologue to the plurality of voices in dialogue at the 
dawn of postmodernity. By the time of Beyond Interpretation (1994), 
however, the risk of seeing hermeneutics in this way had become apparent 
to Vattimo. On this view, hermeneutics could be misunderstood as a ‘wholly 
metaphysical claim (often implicit and unrecognised) to be a finally true 
description of the (permanent) ‘interpretative structure’ of human existence’ 
(Vattimo 1997a: 6). To prevent this kind of misunderstanding of 
hermeneutics, he historicises it by seeing hermeneutics ‘as the response to a 
history of Being interpreted as the occurrence of nihilism’ (Vattimo 1997a: 
8). ‘If hermeneutics were only the discovery of the fact that there are 
different perspectives on the ‘world’…the conception of truth as the 
objective mirroring of how things are…would be confirmed’ (Vattimo 
1997a: 8). That a correspondence theory of truth is secondary is often 
argued for, that one can only recognise that a word corresponds to an object 
because one has a prior understanding of the difference between oneself and 
that object. However, such a meta-theory of interpretation should recognise 
its historicity and as a result eliminate ‘the final metaphysical equivocality 
that stands as a threat to it’ (Vattimo, 1997a: 9). Vattimo’s own 
interpretation of the history of being as the self-consumption of metaphysics 
and the resulting dissolution of Being into exchange-value, that is, of 
modernity as nihilism, is just that: an interpretation. This is all Vattimo 
claims it to be (Vattimo 1997a: 9-10), but he states that this is the best way 
to read the signs of the times, of understanding the irreducible plurality of 
interpretations in the society of mass communication and that the need for 
highest values is no longer felt. 
Concerning reading the ‘signs of the times,’ Vattimo ingeniously 
combines an analysis of postmodernity as the end of modernity—which he 
develops in the book of that name, along with later works such as The 
Transparent Society and Nihilism and Emancipation—with his nihilistic 
ontology. Thinking which accords with the postmodern epoch after the 
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death of God is one which is an ‘ontology of actuality,’ a term Vattimo 
borrows from Foucault, but uses it in a different way as an alternative to 
philosophy inquiring after truth by looking at ‘who we are today’ (Risser 
2010: 169). For Vattimo the use of the phrase is to be taken ‘in its most 
literal sense’ and that ‘to mean a discourse that attempts to clarify what 
Being signifies in the present situation’ (Vattimo 2004: 3-4). Vattimo 
acknowledges that both ‘Being’ and ‘the present situation’ are hard to grasp, 
elaborating that the latter is ‘the concrete historical situation of users of 
language’ (Vattimo 2004: 4). The notion of the ontology of actuality is a 
result of, and depends on, Vattimo’s understanding of Being as event as the 
epochal and contingent sense of Being: ‘Because there is no way to grasp 
Being as something stable apart from its event,’ Vattimo states, ‘a theory of 
present existence is a theory that has no other source of information or 
legitimation apart from the present condition’ (Vattimo 2004: 8). Vattimo 
sees this as a ‘slide’ from philosophy to sociology. 
 First of all, what is our situation today? Here it is worth spending 
some time outlining Vattimo’s views on postmodernity in relation to 
modernity. Vattimo contends that the postmodern experience in the West 
today is one of the end of history. By this he means that it no longer has a 
unilinear character, that there no longer is a coherent narrative which is 
bought-into in the West. The typical modern narrative was one of 
‘progress,’ whether this be to do with scientific and technological 
innovation, or increasing freedom, or even a Marxist interpretation of 
history. Secondly, this narrative is characterised by ‘coherence,’ and 
therefore it lacks fragmentation. For this coherence to hang together it must 
view the past in terms of cause and effect, seeing that which has happened 
before as determining the present and therefore the future. According to 
Vattimo, history loses its unilinear character in three principal ways: 
theoretically, demographically, and through the rise of the society of 
generalised communication. For the first point, concerning the loss of a 
theoretical unilinear notion of history, Vattimo turns to the philosophy of 
history of Walter Benjamin, especially his 1938 essay ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,’ in which he puts forward the notion that unilinear 
history is a product of class conflict. The powerful—kings, emperors, 
nobles—make history, an opportunity denied to the poor. Vattimo 
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acknowledges here that Benjamin was speaking in a then nascent tradition, 
already begun by Marx and Nietzsche, of seeing history as constructed, that 
it was not impartial but interested, and this included unilinear history, too. 
Given the selective, power-laden nature of unilinear history, it would be 
mistaken, Vattimo surmises, to think there is only one true history. Such a 
realisation has profound implications for the idea of progress, for if there is 
not one ‘history,’ but many histories, then there is no one clear logic to 
history. This implication applies equally to sacred eschatology, as much as 
to its secularised cousin: Marxist hopes of world revolution and the 
realisation of the classless society.  
 Demographically, in modern Europe where the unilinear notion of 
history has flourished mass immigration has led to greater awareness of 
other histories. The rebellion of previously ruled peoples is a common 
theme in history. What prevents the rebellion of people following the death 
of Alexander, or the fall of Rome, or in the Reformation, or after the defeat 
of Napoleon from being postmodern is that they were not rebelling in the 
age of mass communication, or living in the shadows of World Wars I and 
II. This relates to the third factor Vattimo provides for the dissolution of the 
notion of unilinear history, the society of mass communication. Of course, a 
hallmark of the Reformation is the importance of the printed word. 
Nevertheless, it still did not give anywhere as much capability to express, 
and preserve, an alternative viewpoint to as many people as exists today 
with radio, television and—mostly significantly—the internet. The advent 
of the society of mass communication is the other major factor in the end of 
history and the start of the postmodern. What Vattimo proposes is: ‘(a) that 
the mass media play a decisive role in the birth of a postmodern society; (b) 
that they do not make this postmodern more ‘transparent’, but more 
complex, even chaotic; and finally (c) that it is in precisely this relative 
‘chaos’ that our hopes for emancipation lie’ (Vattimo 1992: 4). 
The Transparent Society, where Vattimo outlined his ideas on the 
end of history most clearly, was written just before the introduction of the 
internet for consumers, but what Vattimo has to say about mass 
communication applies even more strongly now in light of the effects of 
widespread internet use in the West. If alternative television and radio 
stations gave voice to more groups, Twitter, Facebook, blogs and forums go 
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beyond giving expression to groups, allowing any individual with access to 
technology a way to express their worldview. One does not need radio or 
television broadcasting equipment anymore, but only a computer or, 
increasingly, a mobile phone. This view of the effect of the culture of mass 
communication is in contrast, as Vattimo realises, with the views of Adorno, 
Horkheimer, and Orwell on the subject, for these three thinkers predicted 
that homogenisation of society would be the result. Although Vattimo does 
not believe in facts, only interpretations, he takes great pains to show that 
his diagnosis of the situation of late modernity is a good interpretation, one 
that in his view makes the best possible sense of the plurality he sees around 
him. As an aside, it is worth noting that Vattimo has changed his opinion on 
the liberating function of a plurality of images/representations. In Not Being 
God, Vattimo notes that he consciously changed direction in the preparation 
of the second edition of his 1989 book The Transparent Society. The chapter 
he added, ‘The Limits of Derealisation,’ talks about the uniformity of the 
world under a sole empire, the United States. While image and reality are 
becoming, or have become, indistinguishable, it is unlikely that the image 
given to me has not been filtered by the powers that be for control, a theme 
Vattimo acknowledges he finds in Adorno’s works (Vattimo and Paterlini 
2009: 156). This notion of control through technology has also featured in 
his more overtly political works from recent years, since his return to 
religion, especially Ecce comu (2007). The author(s) of media control in 
Ecce comu are not only the United States, but also Berlusconi in Vattimo’s 
own country. Expressing his concern about control in the media, Vattimo 
sees it as a possibility for those who own the media in a country to control 
the outcome of elections by causing the ‘immobility’ of the electorate who 
move within an information ‘bubble’ that the media outlets own (Vattimo 
2007b: 48). 
What has postmodernity got to do with the ontology of actuality? 
There is a theme common to both which Vattimo develops in the opening 
chapter of Nihilism and Emancipation. In this chapter Vattimo argues that 
the Ge-Stell has created a need, and an opportunity, for an ontology of 
actuality to provide a sense of unity over the fragmentation of experience. 
The Ge-Stell, in Vattimo’s reading, is the culmination of metaphysics in the 
society of generalised communication, as the age of the world pictures. The 
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proliferation of images corresponds to the fragmentation of knowledge and 
language through the increased specialisations in science facilitated by 
technology. This is our sending of Being, one of irreducible plurality 
without centre. In the fragmentation of experience after the Ge-Stell, the 
past metaphysical need for a first principle becomes a need for a notion of 
Being ‘to allow us to refashion a unitary significance for our experience in 
the epoch of fragmentation’ (Vattimo 2004: 9). The ontology of actuality 
reveals within the aperture of Being proper to modernity, a new aperture 
that could unify a sense of existence beyond the specialisation and 
fragmentation (through the media, the internet and mobile technology in 
particular) of the late/post-modern epoch (Vattimo 2004: 12). Where can we 
find the traits of the new aperture? It cannot be stable, for the Ereignis 
revealed that Being is not a presence. Indeed, this is what allows the Ge-
Stell to be the site of this new sending of Being as the latter no longer has to 
be a Grund. Vattimo sees in the Ge-Stell/Ereignis a site of Being which 
reveals it as having a tendency for weakening, not only for 
specialisation/fragmentation, but also in the syncretism and de-centred 
nature of life through late-modern technology. Reading the signs of the 
times, the most plausible interpretation of Being, of the ‘way things are’ 
today is to see it in terms of weakening and therefore to hermeneutics as 
there are no facts, only interpretations. 
 Why, though, develop an ontology of actuality? ‘The demand for an 
‘ontology of actuality,’’ Vattimo writes, ‘and the sociologism that arose in 
response, should be understood as a reaction to the menace of the ‘total 
organisation’ of society that was beginning to take shape early in the 
twentieth century’ (Vattimo 2004: 9). The process of rationalisation 
achieved by the culmination of the Ge-Stell by organising and individuating 
society fragments meaning ‘actually lived out by everyone’ (Vattimo 2004: 
9). At the end of metaphysics, it is not possible to criticise the current 
situation. Gavin Hyman draws conclusions from Vattimo’s ontology of 
actuality, that ‘if philosophy is not exactly synonymous with a simple 
description of the present situation—it does after all claim to interpret it—it 
must nonetheless be consistent with, and not at odds with, the present 
situation’ (Hyman 2007: 126). To judge against the present situation would 
be to invoke a transcendent principle and therefore to return to metaphysics. 
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Rather, what the ontology of actuality sets out to achieve is ‘the possibility 
of a reconstruction of the unitary sense of existence beyond the 
specialisation and fragmentation proper to modernity’ (Vattimo 2004: 12). 
By a ‘giving-form to widely felt sentiments about the meaning of being 
alive’ (Vattimo 2004: 87) in a society, Vattimo’s ontology of actuality bears 
a resemblance to Hegel’s ‘spirit of the age,’ something he recognises but 
nevertheless disavows. The ontology of actuality is not an expression of an 
age, but an interpretation which nevertheless aims to persuade. This 
persuasion does not use threats or flattery (Vattimo 2010a: 69), but works to 
give form through dialogue to irreducible plurality of voices characteristic 
of late-modernity. As an ontology of actuality, Vattimo makes judgements 
based on what is, such as stating that democracy is the philosophy of the age 
as ‘the legitimacy of liberal democracy is hardly contested any longer by 
anyone’ (Vattimo 2004: 85), showing another link between him and Rorty, 
especially the latter’s ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’ (Rorty 
1988). Imposing form on the fragmentation of individuals in society also 
creates the ‘possibility of connecting the multiple notions of being as a 
necessary condition for clarifying what being means in the present situation’ 
(Risser 2010: 170). Tradition, traces of Being, can fall into the hands of 
technicians, experts, who will, if allowed, interpret them for others. 
Moreover, if fragmentation is not given any form, individuals can retreat 
into their own realms and harden differences in a relativistic way by using a 
type of authoritarianism associated with metaphysical thought. The ontology 
of actuality aims to avoid either of these negative consequences of the loss 
of foundations at the end of metaphysics.   
Vattimo’s notion of the ‘ontology of actuality’ makes one wonder 
whether his ontology really does take difference into account, for although 
he refers to ‘forms of life’ and local rationalities along broadly 
Wittgensteinian lines, he tends to speak as though the best interpretation of 
late-modernity is one of nihilism, branding people as either belonging to 
hermeneutics or as strong thinkers (‘reactive nihilists’). It is possible to see 
this through the way in which he uses one of his favourite phrases from 
Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, which he renders ‘there are no facts, only 
interpretations, and of course this too is an interpretation’ (Vattimo 1997a: 
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6; see Nietzsche 1967: 267). Franca D’Agostini has analysed Vattimo’s 
reasoning: 
From the perspective of weak thought, we then have three theses 
arrayed in reflexive steps: 
V0 = ‘everything is interpretation” 
followed immediately by: 
V1= ‘V0 is also an interpretation’ 
and finally by the admission, the typical starting point of weak 
thought, that 
V2 = ‘we must inevitably think this self-refuting game’ (D’Agostini 
2010: 4). 
D’Agostini thinks that V0 pertains to the unaccomplished nihilist, but V1 is 
the position of the complete nihilist. V0 alone could lead to the kind of 
meta-theory of interpretation Vattimo wishes to avoid, for it is a reactive fall 
back into the glorification of simulacra put forward by thinkers such as 
Deleuze. ‘V2 is actually a description of facts, like V0,’ D’Agostini admits, 
but ‘the facts in question are no longer the simple facts of knowledge and 
experience, but rather historico-linguistic events’ (D’Agostini 2010: 5), 
involving a form of compulsion (one can think of the anesthetisation of 
experience mentioned in GV2a) to think in accordance with the ‘sending’ of 
Being into which we are thrown in the late-modern. As D’Agostini writes 
elsewhere, ‘nihilism is neither properly a choice nor a point of view. It is not 
a point of view, because it is instead the property and nature of the entire 
world…We are somehow forced to be nihilist. This is what Vattimo 
expresses by saying that nihilism ‘is a destiny’’ (D’Agostini 2011: 36). 
However, Valgenti holds this argument shows that ‘this is precisely the 
point where Vattimo’s philosophical commitments seem blurred,’ and that 
the level of compulsion in V2 relating back to V0 ‘carries with it a 
responsibility more akin to a moral imperative than a descriptive one’ 
(Valgenti 2010: 65). Valgenti thinks that Vattimo does not invoke criteria of 
interpretation (Valgenti 2010: 67), but I would argue that he does, not only 
with pietas (which was not sufficiently developed), but also with charity 
which gradually became ‘caritas.’ Pietas has already been mentioned, but 
now it is time to look briefly at ‘charity,’ before the latter term is analysed 
more in Part One when I look at it in its proper context of Vattimo’s return 
to religion. 
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b) Charity 
Vattimo does in fact develop a moral/ethical stance to prevent an ‘anything 
goes’ relativism, and also to ground hermeneutics in a history of weakening, 
and this circumvents D’Agostini’s criticisms of weak thought. She still 
holds on to the notion of truth in a ‘strong’ sense, whereas Vattimo sees 
truth as an opening which is historical, something which is clear in 
Vattimo’s mature work and no more so than in Beyond Interpretation. 
Summarising the arguments of the book, the Second Appendix of Beyond 
Interpretation aims to avoid an unchanging foundation or a merely aesthetic 
choice based on taste or preference through Vattimo showing how 
hermeneutics relies on a history of philosophy as the inheritance sent to it as 
the end of metaphysics and the occurrence of nihilism. Hermeneutics is a 
response to a message, an articulation of belonging to a tradition (Vattimo 
1997a: 108). This tradition is not meant to be one among others, for this 
would leave the possibility of Being outside of tradition/history, beyond our 
interpretations of it, but the history of Being is the only tradition we have. 
The history of Being is not one among others as it is of emancipation from 
strong structures, leading to a principle of ‘weakening’ that Vattimo has 
variously termed ‘pietas,’ ‘friendship,’ or ‘caritas.’ With the latter term, 
Vattimo has linked it back to an attempt to ground the hermeneutical 
plurality of late modernity on an archetype of Being that is historically and 
linguistically plural in the form of the way in which a sacred text interprets 
itself anew, such as the way in which the New Testament writers reimagined 
texts from the Old (rather than in the metaphysical, substantial Aristotelian 
sense) (Vattimo 1997a: 48). Beginning with Beyond Interpretation, and then 
through later books such as Belief and After Christianity, Vattimo has 
developed a ‘return’ to Christianity in the ontological sense in which he 
performs a Verwindung on the Christian message, something I will look at 
in depth in Part One. 
The developments in Vattimo’s philosophy in his return to religion 
have surprised many of Vattimo’s contemporaries for a variety of reasons. 
For Peter Carravetta, talk of ‘emancipation’ seems Hegelian, reinstating the 
metanarratives of modernity he had previously thought discredited 
(Carravetta 2010: 89). Moreover, Vattimo’s programme in the return 
seemed not only to appeal to the notion of Being as eventual, but also to 
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ground hermeneutics historically through tradition. As Silvia Benso has 
pointed out, this stresses continuity, not rupture (Benso 2010: 214), which 
could be interpreted as going against the view that sendings are radically 
contingent ‘ruptures’ (Chiurazzi 2010: 18). There have also been criticisms 
of Vattimo’s attempts to derive an ethic from this continuity. Some have 
thought that an attempt to derive an ethic from a hermeneutical nihilist 
position is impossible (Welsch 2007: 100), whereas other thinkers have 
thought that Vattimo has been trying to create an absolute with ‘caritas’ 
where he has no right to do so (Depoortere 2008: 20).  
 
5. ‘Left’ Heideggerianism, sendings and metaphysics as the history 
of Being 
a) Left and Right Heideggerianism 
It could be argued that not only is Vattimo inconsistent in developing a 
seemingly absolute ethic of charity, but also arbitrary in how he has read 
Heidegger, for must the ‘ontology of actuality’ lead inexorably to 
hermeneutical nihilism? This is an important question for my argument, for 
I will go on to show that Vattimo’s reading of Heidegger is partial, with 
important consequences both for Vattimo’s return to religion and his 
philosophy more broadly. In choosing to draw upon ontology for his 
hermeneutical philosophy, Vattimo had a decision to make in how he read 
Heidegger, not least in whether he followed Heidegger in regarding 
Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. Heidegger lectured on Nietzsche from 
1935, culminating in published works on him. Heidegger saw in Nietzsche’s 
work a tension between the death of God as the end of Platonism 
(metaphysics) and the devaluation of the highest values on the one hand, 
and the aim to create a ‘revaluation of all values’ on the other. In Mendieta’s 
words: ‘in Heidegger’s reading, this deep ambiguity about nihilism shows 
that Nietzsche still remains within the grasp of metaphysics, because 
‘fulfilled’ nihilism is still a positing of Being as a value, as that which is 
posited by man and for man’ (Mendieta 2010: 156). As shall be shown later, 
both Heidegger and Vattimo (following Heidegger) see humanism as 
synonymous with metaphysics.  
 Heidegger accuses Nietzsche of thinking within metaphysical 
categories, yet ‘a similar charge could be levelled against Heidegger’ on the 
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basis of what he writes about Nietzsche’s madman at the end of his essay 
from 1943, ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’ (Mendieta 2010: 157): ‘In 
what respect is this man mad? He is ‘de-ranged.’ For he is dis-lodged from 
the level of man hitherto, where the ideals of the suprasensory world, which 
have become unreal, are passed off for real while yet their opposite is 
realizing itself’ (Heidegger 1977: 111). The distinction Heidegger is making 
is one between ‘reason’ (which is metaphysical and ‘sane’) and ‘thinking.’ 
Sanity is a box, limiting thought and possibilities of ways to be. The ‘sane’ 
people left in the marketplace have killed God because they are incapable of 
seeking him now due to being caught up with being rational. By contrast, 
the madman seeks, cries out after God due to 'thinking'; insofar as he is not 
rational, he thinks. ‘This conclusion,’ writes Mendieta, ‘is astonishing, and 
turns on its feet Nietzsche’s parable. It is the madman who calls us to faith, 
by evoking a form of thinking that is beyond the jealous and intolerant 
nihilism of a reason that fears threats to its opinions’ (Mendieta 2010: 157). 
 The position of Heidegger at the end of this essay on Nietzsche can 
be described as him having ‘nostalgia’ for Being. Some interpreters of 
Heidegger have read his ‘propheticism and crypto-fideism’ (Mendieta 2010: 
164, n. 30) as intimating a return of Being, of leaving room for a God 
outside of tradition and language (see Macquarrie 2009). For Vattimo talk 
of a return to God is complicated. Nevertheless, what is clear is that he does 
not want ‘thinking’ to be equated with nostalgia for a return of metaphysics 
in some form or seeing God as a being beyond Being of any kind: 
Vattimo urges us to inoculate Heidegger’s metaphysical nostalgia for 
Being with Nietzsche’s nihilism. For Vattimo, Heidegger, as he in 
turn argued against Nietzsche, is still caught in the grip of 
metaphysics, in as much as he thinks that Being can be a giving and 
granting, the Ereignis, that irrupts from without. For Vattimo, 
Heidegger should have stopped at the giving and granting that take 
place in the tradition (Mendieta 2010: 158).  
It has already been mentioned that Heidegger thought that the Selbst 
‘destines’ or ‘gives’ (Geschicke) in different epochs through irruptive 
events. What Vattimo did not want is for the ‘Selbst’ in Heidegger’s thought 
to be identified with anything metaphysical. The language of 'Being' can 
sometimes verge upon it being personified (D'Arcais 2007: 263). As a 
result, ‘Vattimo has sought to secularize Heidegger, as Gadamer sought to 
urbanize him’ (Mendieta 2010: 163 n. 30). Comparing Vattimo with 
Mendieta is instructive, though, for the latter conceived of the Ereignis too 
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much as an event irrupting from without (Mendieta 2010: 158), as if Being 
could ‘be’ apart from Dasein. At least Vattimo’s ‘left’ reading of the notion 
of the event allows him to avoid this, staying more strictly to Heidegger’s 
view that Being needs Dasein to appear and that Dasein can only think 
through Being in which the horizon of disclosure is always already the 
linguistic traditions into which we are thrown and reciprocally transmit 
through interpretation. Indeed, it is the contribution of Gadamer that enables 
Vattimo to develop a ‘Left’ Heideggerianism, a term which Vattimo uses 
himself (Vattimo and Girard 2010: 77). ‘Left’ and ‘right’ do not refer to 
political persuasions in this context. Rather, they function much like ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ designate schools of followers who interpreted Hegel in different 
ways. ‘Right’ Heideggerians interpret passages such as the end of 
‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’ to anticipate a return of Being, of some 
continuation of metaphysics or a ‘beyond’ external to the immanent and 
secular world.  
The ‘left’ position rejects a ‘return of Being.’ Instead, what Vattimo 
proposes is ‘the history of Being as the story of a ‘long goodbye,’ of an 
interminable weakening of Being’ (Vattimo 1997a: 13). In doing so, 
Vattimo thinks that he is being ‘faithful’ to Heidegger’s notion of 
ontological difference spelled out in Being and Time: ‘‘Being’ cannot 
indeed be conceived as an entity’ (Heidegger 1962: 23), nor can it be seen 
as a ‘class’ or ‘genus,’ ‘yet it pertains to every entity’ (Heidegger 1962: 62). 
Therefore, Vattimo cannot see Being as being made ‘present again’ 
(Vattimo 1997a: 13), that is, of Being as a being which is present. Even if 
one imagines the possibility of Being as transcending language or 
understanding, Vattimo still considers this ‘rightist’ interpretation of Being 
as forgetting ontological difference, of reducing Being to a being. In short, 
Vattimo thinks one should remember Being in the light of hermeneutical 
nihilism, of the event of the death of God and the reduction of Being to 
exchange value. This distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ readings of 
Heidegger is not only important for understanding Vattimo’s philosophy in 
general, but also it will prove to be of great significance for providing the 
backdrop to his philosophy of religion. ‘Left’ Heideggerians see the end of 
metaphysics as the late modern world as one in which both metaphysics and 
secularisation have culminated, in which there is nothing left of Being as 
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such, and in which the highest values have been devalued into ‘exchange 
value’ in an interminable decline. There are other options Vattimo could 
have taken, however, that find a middle ground between his ‘Left’ 
Heideggerianism and the vertical transcendence of a ‘rightist’ return to 
Being, and this third way will be explored when I discuss Vattimo’s ‘Left’ 
Heideggerianism in conjunction with his return to religion in Part Two. 
 
b) Left Heideggerianism, the end of metaphysics and the end of 
Humanism 
Vattimo’s weak thought aims to twist and be healed from the traditions it 
encounters through a hermeneutical process. As such, it is a way of dealing 
with the post-metaphysical situation, one which is aware of the horizon of 
the postmodern which is living after the death of God. In The End of 
Modernity, Vattimo shares the joke that in the contemporary world ‘God is 
dead, but man isn’t doing so well himself’ (Vattimo 1988a: 31). Indeed, 
Vattimo surmises that ‘humanism is in crisis because God is dead’ (Vattimo 
1988a: 32). Vattimo draws the death of God and the crisis in humanism 
together in order to contrast his approach to the contemporary situation of 
nihilism with ‘reappropriative’ or ‘reactionary’ intellectual movements, 
such as existentialism, which aim to keep humans as foundational and 
central, thus avoiding the dislocation of the postmodern described by 
Nietzsche in man rolling ‘from the centre toward X.’  Movements such as 
existentialism in the first half of the twentieth century acknowledged the 
devaluation of humankind through the practices of science, technology and 
politics, but nevertheless upheld the central place of the human subject 
theoretically along broadly traditional lines. Existentialism and other 
movements, such as Expressionism in art and the apocalyptic thought of 
thinkers such as Spengler do not take into account the close connection 
between metaphysics, humanism, and technology. 
To make this identification, Vattimo draws heavily upon 
Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1946). According to Vattimo’s 
interpretation of Heidegger’s argument in this text, humanism is 
metaphysical: ‘There is no humanism without the bringing into play of a 
metaphysics in which the human subject determines a role for itself which is 
necessarily central and exclusive’ (Vattimo 1988a: 32). Early in modernity 
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one finds human rationality is designated as the ground of all knowledge 
(Descartes and Kant). Then human progress is reified into the value of the 
new. Ironically, it is the progress of science and technology that self-
consume the value of the human being by not only dislocating it from the 
centre in a practical way, but also dissolving the notion of subjectivity 
entirely. The triumph of rationalism is the triumph of technology, but this is 
nothing other than the culmination of metaphysics as the attempt to order 
the world in regulative, predictable relations of cause and effect. Since at 
least early modernity, the human subject has been regarded as the seat of 
rationality, such as the Cartesian res intellectum. There is a further 
identification in this triumvirate of ideas, and that is the way in which 
Descartes conceived of the human subject as a ‘res’ in which subjectivity 
was reduced to consciousness itself. The subject was a ‘thinking thing’ 
identified as a clear and distinct idea, that is, as ‘evidence,’ as Vattimo puts 
it (Vattimo 1988a: 42). In other words, ‘the reasons for Heidegger’s (and 
Nietzsche’s) anti-humanism become ever clearer: the subject, conceived of 
by humanism as self-consciousness, is simply the correlative of 
metaphysical Being which is defined in terms of objectivity, that is, in terms 
of clarity, stability, and unshakable certainty’ (Vattimo 1988a: 42). As such, 
the subject conceived in this humanistic way eliminates what is truly 
subjective about Dasein, that is, its historicity and interpretative nature. 
  In conceiving of the human being as Dasein, there is a danger that 
Heidegger’s thought is ‘reappropriative,’ too. Indeed, his work from Being 
and Time in particular has been of highly significant interest to 
existentialists afterwards, such as Sartre. To conceive of Dasein as an 
interpreting thing could lead to a reappropriation of the human subject in 
order to place it in a central role vis a vis the world. Heidegger has been 
criticised for privileging the human subject (Welsch 2007: 95), and the 
‘thrownness’ of human existence in Being and Time ‘still risked being 
understood as Kantian transcendentalism’ (Marramao 2007: 78). Perhaps 
Heidegger realised this danger, especially with concepts such as 
‘authenticity’ and a decision towards death, which tend, according to 
Vattimo, to figure ever less in his later work. In Vattimo’s words, 
The intensity with which Heidegger explores in his late works the 
notion of Ereignis and the related concepts of Ver-eignen, Ent-
eignen, and Über-eignen, can be explained as more than just a 
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concern for the nature of Being as an event which is not simply-
present; rather, it is an effort to free his original concept of 
Eigentlichkeit, or ‘authenticity,’ from any suggestion of potential 
reappropriation, which would still be metaphysical and humanistic 
(Vattimo 1988a: 44). 
Being is eventual, opening a series of horizons of disclosure for, and 
through Dasein in different epochs from a non-transcendent ‘Selbst’ which 
permits thought and language. Being needs Dasein as an opening, whereas 
Dasein needs Being to think at all. 
Some philosophers, such as Welsch (Welsch 2007: 95) still criticise 
the later Heidegger’s formulations of the relationship between Being and 
human beings as privileging humanity, for only humans act as the 
‘shepherd’ of Being, as Heidegger puts it in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
(Heidegger 1993: 167). However, on the later Heidegger’s view, Being is 
not under the control of humans, but humans are reliant upon the sending of 
Being through its unconcealment. ‘We can neither reappropriate humanism, 
nor leave it behind,’ says Prosman in his exposition of Vattimo’s thought 
(Prosman 2011: 186). Rather, Vattimo aims to create a Verwindung of 
humanism, vividly described by him as a ‘crash diet for the subject’ which 
would allow ‘the subject to listen to the call of Being that no longer arises in 
the peremptory tone of the Grund’ (Vattimo 1988a: 47). Vattimo does not 
spend a long time in The End of Modernity explaining how the Verwindung 
would take place or what kind of weakened subject would be left at the end 
of the twisting and weakening. He alludes to the Nietzschean image of 
‘many souls’ replacing the notion of there being only one soul in the 
Cartesian sense (Vattimo 1988a: 41). At the very end of his chapter on 
humanism in The End of Modernity Vattimo also mentions enigmatically 
that the ‘twisted-healed’ subject ‘dissolves its presence-absence into the 
network offered by a society increasingly transformed into an extremely 
sensitive organism of communication’ (Vattimo 1988a: 47). As enigmatic as 
it seems, it is important to relate this ‘crash-diet’ subject back to the 
ontology of actuality which is essentially nihilistic and hermeneutical. With 
regard to the latter, at the level of interpretation, Being is reduced to 
‘exchange value,’ to ‘common currency’ in which traditions are received 
and reinterpreted to generate further Being. There is both, then, the horizon 
into which we are thrown which affects how we will interpret the traditions 
we receive and the traditions themselves which are traces of Being from 
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past epochs. The recognition that this is all there is brings a realisation that 
there is weak ontology, and this is the upshot of Vattimo’s ‘left’ 
Heideggerianism. It is this ‘left’ Heideggerianism which led Vattimo back 
to religion in the late 1980s and 1990s. To this ‘return to religion,’ we will 
now turn.  
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Part One: Vattimo’s Return to Religion and Thoughts on 
Christianity 
 
Chapter One: Vattimo’s Return to Religion 
a) Introduction 
On the face of it, Vattimo has created a philosophical style, although not a 
‘system’ (Snyder 1988: liv), which can get along without reference to 
religion. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of Vattimo’s writings in the 
last twenty years have been devoted to religion and religious themes, 
particularly the idea of kenosis. In Part One I will look at Vattimo’s return to 
religion and the principal objections to it. Vattimo’s return to religion in his 
writings was gradual, getting a brief mention in the mid-late nineteen-
eighties, but appearing in full form in the nineteen-nineties. What, then, can 
explain Vattimo’s perceived need to draw upon the religious in his writings? 
Three main reasons present themselves: the personal, the societal, and the 
theoretical.  
 
b) Personal 
‘None of us in our western culture,’ writes Vattimo, ‘begins from zero with 
the question of religious faith’ (Vattimo 1999: 21). Vattimo’s own personal 
return, then, ‘is precisely the return of a thematic…that has engaged me in 
the past’ (Vattimo 1999: 21). What this ‘thematic’ is and means—and 
Vattimo recognises this is a vague term to use—can be inferred from 
Vattimo’s own intellectual journey.  
‘Vattimo’s intellectual journey traces a circle,’ writes Depoortere, 
‘[s]tarting from religion, the fervent Catholicism of his youth, he moved to 
politics and philosophy…[which] resulted in disillusion which was reflected 
upon philosophically’ (Depoortere 2008a: 3). This philosophical reflection 
‘eventually resulted in his return to religion’ (Depoortere 2008a: 3). 
Religion entered into Vattimo’s life through education; two sisters who 
lived near the boy Vattimo suggested he went to the oratory (Vattimo and 
Paterlini 2009: 42). At first Vattimo went for friendship and games, but he 
got drawn into Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action), the community life, and 
Mass. Vattimo saw his religion as ‘interwoven with [his] philosophical and 
political commitment,’ so that when he ‘lost contact with Italian politics, 
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boom, it [his faith] was all over’ (Vattimo and Paterlini 2007: 27). When 
Vattimo won the Humboldt Fellowship in his mid-twenties, Vattimo went to 
study in Germany, lost regular contact with Italian politics and thus his faith 
dwindled, too, implying how much his faith had in fact been attributable to 
cultural factors. Nevertheless, the thematic of this early faith led Vattimo to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, he contends. ‘I am aware,’ Vattimo writes, ‘that I 
have a preference for Nietzsche and Heidegger… seems to be above all in 
harmony with a specifically Christian religious substratum that has 
remained a living part of me’ (Vattimo 1999: 33). Vattimo’s own ‘return’ to 
religion is more of a recovery. Paradoxically, though, this faith had never 
left him, although he thought for a long time that it had, for it had 
manifested itself through his own particular interpretations of, and 
preferences for, Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
What was it that triggered Vattimo’s recovery of religion, of his 
realisation that the thematic of religion, the trace of a faith in his life, had 
influenced him in the way that it had? Personally, contingent factors within 
his own life, mostly to do with his advancing years, have played their part in 
his recovery of religion. Vattimo admits that his return ‘is related to the 
experience of death—of people dear to me’ (Vattimo 1999: 22). Related to 
this point is ‘the question of religion,’ Vattimo writes, poses itself ‘at a 
certain time of life [and] has to do with the physiology of maturity and of 
getting old’ (Vattimo 1999: 22). Vattimo considers the Kantian postulates of 
practical reason of God and immortality, wondering whether there is an 
afterlife (Vattimo 1999: 22-23). Additionally, Vattimo mentions both 
personal and social disillusionment where ‘projects…[to] which I had been 
deeply committed were shattered in a wholly contingent way’ (Vattimo 
1999: 24). Here Vattimo is alluding, for instance, to the political causes he 
had been involved in. More broadly, this point about disenchantment is 
related to a ‘discrepancy between fact and meaning…which he describes in 
terms of post-revolutionary disillusionment’ (Depoortere 2008a: 9).  
 
c) Societal 
This disillusionment, Vattimo thinks, is more than a personal issue, but is, 
as Depoortere summarises it, the Zeitgeist of the late-modern, that 
‘contemporary society has encountered the limits of human reason and 
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progress’ (Depoortere 2008a: 9). The personal is related to the social as 
follows: 
Yet even the historical circumstances bringing back the problem of 
faith share a trait in common with the physiology of ageing: in both 
cases the problem of God is posed in relation to the encounter with a 
limit as the occurrence of a defeat: we believed that we could realize 
justice on earth, but now reckon that it is no longer possible and turn 
our hopes to God (Vattimo 1999: 24).    
Vattimo poses the question whether one only turns to God ‘where one 
clashes against something utterly unpleasant’ (Vattimo 1999: 24-25). The 
examples Vattimo provides of ‘pressing problems confronting late-modern 
humanity’ include those ‘in bioethics, from genetic manipulation to ecology, 
and problems concerning the explosion of violence in the new conditions of 
existence within mass society’ (Vattimo 1999: 25). Vattimo is not 
comfortable with this idea that God emerges when humans encounter 
adversity. Thinking about God this way is, Vattimo suggests, an inheritance 
from natural religion, of seeing God as a ‘threatening power of nature,’ 
associated with earthquakes and thunder, which led primitive humans ‘to 
conceive transcendence as the opposite of every rationality’ (Vattimo 1999: 
25). Vattimo’s argument here is curious, for he moves from late-modern 
concerns in areas such as bioethics, with the threatening power of human 
technology, to the violent God of natural religion. Recourse to the divine in 
the face of the march of science and technology is looking for a divine 
standard over and against human reason, but this is not to do with divine 
threats except insofar as scientists may abrogate divine commands. Rather, 
it is to do with principles such as the ‘sanctity of life.’  
In addition to the limits of, and fears concerning, human reason, 
Vattimo sees society as being more interested in religion due to political 
reasons. The political reasons ‘may be traced back to the decisive role 
played by Pope Wojtyla in the erosion and dissolution of the east European 
communist regimes’ (Vattimo 1999: 26; Vattimo 2002a: 84). The influence 
and relevance of the pope is also matched, Vattimo thinks, in the ‘increasing 
political importance of Islamic religious hierarchies’ (Vattimo 1999: 26). 
Vattimo discusses whether or not the increased political importance of 
religion is a cause or effect of a return to religion, or is a symptom of other 
circumstances. The emergence of Islamic political hierarchies, for instance, 
could be seen as a symptom of the epoch of the end of colonialism, or the 
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result of the petrol ‘war’ with the West in the 1970s (Vattimo 1999: 27). 
These societal-cultural considerations interest Vattimo, but are not decisive 
for his argument, as he himself realises. 
 
d) Theoretical 
Vattimo makes very interesting autobiographical reflections, and these shall 
be looked at more in Part Two in the light of philosophical considerations. 
First and foremost, however, Vattimo is a philosopher. Therefore, Vattimo 
himself looks for philosophical reasons for his recovery of religion, for what 
made him realise that the thematic of his faith had been influencing him all 
along and is relevant for an analysis of the condition of the late-modern. 
Intellectually, Vattimo says ‘[t]here are many overlapping reasons’ (Vattimo 
and Paterlini 2007: 149) for this return, although in his quasi-autobiography, 
Not Being God, Vattimo only gives two clear reasons. The first reason is his 
interpretation of Heidegger, his ‘leftist’ interpretation of his thought, 
something which has been outlined already in the Introduction. The second 
reason Vattimo gives is chancing upon the theological anthropology of René 
Girard, an influence on his thought that shall be covered in due course.  
 
e) Two returns, cultural and philosophical 
In Belief, Vattimo makes the threefold distinction above, of a personal 
return, societal return, and a philosophical return. Later, in After Christianity 
Chapter Six, Vattimo mentions a twofold return, culturally and 
philosophically. The former, ‘cultural,’ return bears similarity to the societal 
return in Belief. Factors involved in the cultural return include the role of the 
pope in the breakdown of the Soviet Union and worries about bioethics 
leading people back in search of a moral anchor, as well as the search for a 
social identity in an increasingly pluralistic West. Philosophically, Vattimo 
is mainly concerned in After Christianity with the death of metanarratives, 
in particular Positivism, with its rejection of religion on scientific-rational 
principles. The decline of Positivism opens the door for a secular space in 
which a return to religion can occur in philosophical thought.  
Ingeniously, Vattimo connects the two returns. Vattimo has 
observed a problem with the cultural return to religion, for it can result in 
aggressive, separatist relativism (reactive nihilism). A return to religion can 
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be an example of a hardened local identity, other examples being nationalist 
or ethnic identities. In the face of ever-increasing cultural pluralism in the 
West, particular groups can retreat into their cultural identities and then use 
the postmodern argument that there are no facts, only interpretations as a 
way to make themselves immune from criticism. Indeed, this is part of the 
problem of viewing hermeneutics as a meta-theory, which is why for a long 
time now Vattimo has been trying to ground hermeneutics historically and 
with some sort of ethical backdrop. The philosophical return to religion can, 
Vattimo thinks, temper the cultural return insofar as one can see both returns 
as effects of the same process, one of weakening. The peremptoriness, the 
thread, of weakening 'can operate as an internal criterion that reveals itself 
in modernity as the logic for the dissolution of metaphysics, to which 
critical thought is committed to conform itself' (Vattimo 2002a: 91). For 
reasons that shall become clear over the course of the following chapters, 
this thread of weakening is a transcription of the incarnation, the kenosis of 
God, a course of history driven toward emancipation by diminishing strong 
structures. 
 
f) Relevant texts 
Three expositions of Vattimo’s thoughts on Christianity from his ‘return’ 
will be outlined and analysed in turn, starting with his earliest extended 
treatment of kenosis in Beyond Interpretation from 1994 (translated 1997a), 
moving on to Belief and After Christianity. The reason for choosing three 
and not more is partly due to space, but largely due to the importance of 
these texts. According to Nancy K. Frankenberry in her contribution to the 
Santiago Zabala edited collection of texts on themes in Vattimo’s 
philosophy entitled Weakening Philosophy, ‘the main elements of Vattimo’s 
account unfold from his Beyond Interpretation and The End of Modernity to 
his recent works Belief and After Christianity’ (Frankenberry 2007: 275). 
The End of Modernity looks at Vattimo’s understanding of secularisation, as 
do other texts of his written in the 1980s, but this work has less emphasis on 
Christianity compared to the other three books mentioned by Frankenberry 
and shall only be mentioned in relation to the other texts, particularly 
Beyond Interpretation for it built on the theme of ‘secularisation’ explored 
in The End of Modernity. These three works constitute the core and 
81 
 
development of Vattimo’s position on Christianity from its infancy in 
Beyond Interpretation, through semi-autobiography in Belief, to an 
accomplished lecture series in After Christianity. The short, but important, 
essay ‘The Trace of the Trace’ will be included where appropriate to 
elaborate on positions being discussed in chapters three and four. To a 
significant extent Vattimo’s later work on Christianity, in books such as The 
Future of Religion, Christianity Truth and Weakening Faith, and A Farewell 
to Truth, are elaborations and retellings of some of the themes and ideas 
outlined in the following three works. Where appropriate, there will be 
allusions to these later works in the first three chapters. Nevertheless, as 
Vattimo’s understanding of Heidegger’s notion of ‘event’ has developed in 
recent years, he has also articulated his vision of Christianity differently, 
too; this will be the focus of Part Two. Before the end of Part Two, I will 
look at some of the main debates surrounding Vattimo’s interpretation of 
Christianity, particularly the question of history and the charge of 
‘supersessionism.’  
 
Chapter Two: Beyond Interpretation 
a) The project of Beyond Interpretation 
Near the end of the 1980s Vattimo was referring to hermeneutics as the 
‘koine’ or ‘dominant trope’ of philosophy in late-modernity. Although 
Vattimo still believed this was the case in the 1990s, ‘because of 
this…hermeneutics may have lost its originary philosophical significance’ 
(Carravetta 2010: 84). In Beyond Interpretation Vattimo argues that 
hermeneutics is more than a generic meta-theory of interpretation, for ‘[i]n 
contemporary philosophy, hermeneutics has begun to acquire an 
‘ecumenical’ form so vague and generic that, in my view, it is losing much 
of its meaning’ (Vattimo 1997a: ix). More troublingly, Vattimo thought 
hermeneutics was verging on being portrayed as a metaphysical theory, that 
there are no facts, only interpretations: ‘In fact if hermeneutics is not to be 
accepted as a comfortable meta-theory of the universality of interpretative 
phenomena, as a sort of view from nowhere of the perennial conflict, or 
play, of interpretations,’ Vattimo writes, ‘the (only, I believe) alternative is 
to think the philosophy of interpretation as the final stage in a series of 
events…as the conclusion of a history we feel unable to tell (interpret) 
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except in the terms of nihilism that we find for the first time in Nietzsche’ 
(Vattimo 1997a: 8). For Vattimo, hermeneutics is the sending of Being in 
late-modernity, that we are in the age of interpretation, but to legitimate this 
understanding of our situation we need to refer to the history of Being, 
seeing this history of Being as a series of events. 
On the surface of things, Vattimo should not have had to look very 
far for the answer to his problem of ‘legitimating’ hermeneutics historically, 
thereby offering a less ‘violent’ and more credible alternative than regarding 
hermeneutics as a general theory of interpretation. Vattimo already has three 
historical ‘accounts’ of the history of Being as self-consumptive in the 
metaphor of the death of God, the narrative of the fabulisation of the world, 
and metaphysics as the history of Being culminating in the Ge-Stell/first 
flashing-up of Ereignis. Indeed, in the first chapter of Beyond Interpretation 
where Vattimo is presenting his concern over the lapse of hermeneutics into 
metaphysics he does mention these histories.  
 
b) Emancipation and charity 
Why, then, does Vattimo draw upon religious concepts? Vattimo moves 
from trying to ground hermeneutics historically to religious concepts via the 
notions of ‘emancipation’ and ‘charity.’ Concerning the former concept, 
Vattimo argues against relativism and reactive nihilism by stating that one 
should consider nihilism and the play of interpretation as an opportunity: 
‘Instead of reacting to the dissolution of the principle of reality by 
attempting to recuperate a sense of identity and belonging that are at once 
reassuring and punitive, it is a matter of grasping nihilism as a chance…of 
emancipation’ (Vattimo 1997a: 40). Hermeneutical nihilism can be an 
opportunity to free ourselves from authoritarianism and from adhering to 
strong structures and hardened identities. With this opportunity for 
emancipation, though, goes responsibility to negotiate one’s way through 
the play of interpretations by recognising that other people are doing so, too: 
Thinking that no longer understands itself as the recognition and 
acceptance of an objective authoritarian foundation will develop a 
new sense of responsibility as ready and able, literally, to respond to 
others whom, insofar as it is not founded on the eternal structure of 
Being, its knows to be its ‘provenance’ (Vattimo 1997a: 40). 
Here there is a reference to what Vattimo has since developed more 
explicitly as his theory of truth, the notion of truth as friendship: ‘Amica 
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veritas, sed magis amicus Plato, perhaps. Is it chance that some 
philosophers…speak today about a principle of charity?’ (Vattimo 1997a: 
40). This important passage brings together Vattimo’s thinking on nihilism, 
hermeneutics, truth and ethics. Immediately Vattimo acknowledges that 
there will be objections to engaging with the principle of charity, not least 
because it could appear like a metaphysical principle. Vattimo situates 
charity within the Christian tradition of the West, even though other 
philosophers such as Donald Davidson had been developing the principle of 
charity in recent times already and broadly independently of this tradition. 
On the basis of the principle of charity, Vattimo sees it as necessary to 
engage with religion. While also being discussed in the context of 
interpretation, Davidson’s use of the ‘principle of charity’ is quite different 
from Vattimo’s. Firstly, this principle is similar to Vattimo’s own use of 
‘charity’ in that it describes an approach to interpretation that is working 
towards agreement. However, this agreement concerns the notions of 
‘belief’ and ‘meaning.’ When trying to interpret what someone is saying, 
‘one cannot assign meanings to a speaker's utterances without knowing what 
the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing 
what the speaker's utterances mean’ (Malpas 2014). Therefore, one needs to 
create agreement between ‘belief’ and ‘meaning’ by postulating that there is 
an external cause for the belief that provides meaning for it. Moreover, the 
principle of charity involves an injunction to converge between one’s own 
beliefs and those of the person whose utterance is trying to interpret. 
‘Attributions of belief and assignments of meaning,’ writes Jeff Malpas in 
describing Davidson’s theory, ‘must be consistent with one another and with 
the speaker's overall behaviour; they must also be consistent with the 
evidence afforded by our knowledge of the speaker's environment’ (Malpas 
2014). The latter part of this statement highlights the importance of drawing 
upon one’s own beliefs to interpret those of others. One can see why this 
would appeal to Vattimo, for the latter’s Heideggerian philosophy involves 
the recognition of one’s own thrownness and thus the importance of 
recognising that one cannot interpret anything without bringing one’s own 
worldview to bear. Nevertheless, unlike Vattimo, Davidson places more 
emphasis on the importance of correspondence between perception and the 
object of perception which is the cause of beliefs, and therefore of meaning.  
84 
 
 
c) Secularisation and kenosis  
Vattimo wanted to draw upon religion in order both to ground hermeneutics 
historically in the tradition of the West to prevent it from being regarded as 
a meta-theory of interpretation, and also to develop an ethic of charity for 
hermeneutics to provide a criterion of, and for, interpretation. Even before 
Beyond Interpretation Vattimo had begun to develop a theory of 
secularisation which he would go on to use to link Christianity with 
hermeneutics. In four texts in particular before Beyond Interpretation 
Vattimo begin to write about secularisation. The first place where Vattimo 
discusses secularisation is the article ‘Myth and the Fate of Secularisation.’ 
Here, the thought of René Girard is drawn upon in a way that Vattimo will 
use later in his work and which shall be discussed below. In short, ‘Christ 
shows that the sacred is violence’ (Vattimo 1985: 35), opening up the 
possibility of a new history. Modern Europe is an heir to this past not so 
much in the form of an overcoming, but as a Verwindung, weakening reason 
and the polarities of rational and irrational to leave room for hermeneutical 
plurality. Traces of Christianity are inherited and twisted through 
secularisation. The links between Girard, Verwindung, and hermeneutical 
pluralism are as yet not fully realised in Vattimo’s thought at this stage. The 
second place is The End of Modernity. Principally here Vattimo links 
secularisation to Arnold Gehlen’s notion of post-histoire: faith in the 
progress of science and technology is the secularisation of the Christian 
hope for salvation in the progress of the kingdom of heaven (Vattimo 
1988a: 7-8, 100-103). The third place is Vattimo’s essay ‘Metaphysics, 
Violence, Secularization.’ Here, Vattimo compares and contrasts his 
philosophy with that of Levinas. In short, for Vattimo secularization is 
another way of referring to Verwindung: ‘In its ‘theoretical’ and, 
inseparably, its ‘epochal’ aspects (Ge-Stell), the Verwindung of metaphysics 
is nothing other than secularization’ (Vattimo 1988b: 61). The essay 
mentions the ‘continuity’ of the biblical message through its interpretations 
and translations (Vattimo 1988b: 60). The fourth text which helps set the 
scene for Beyond Interpretation is The Transparent Society. Here Vattimo 
relates secularisation to the phrase from Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, of 
continuing to dream knowing that one is dreaming. Again, the link to 
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Verwindung is clear; one cannot regard certain beliefs as true anymore (such 
as Plato’s forms) but one cannot fully escape them as they are traces of 
tradition that limit thought (Denken is Andenken), yet through knowing that 
one is dreaming one can weaken them. With reference to Christianity, 
Vattimo supplies, among other examples, that of Max Weber, who knew 
that modern capitalism is the secularisation, the ‘transformation,’ of the 
Protestant work ethic. 
 All four of these texts emphasise that secularisation involves 
continuity, not rupture. ‘Modern European culture is thus linked to its own 
religious past not only by a relation of overcoming and emancipation,’ 
writes Vattimo, ‘but also, and inseparably, by a relation of conservation-
distortion-evacuation: progress is in a sense nostalgic by nature’ (Vattimo 
1992: 42). By emphasising continuity even through transformation, Vattimo 
moves away from what Marta Frascati-Lochhead described as the ‘reactive’ 
and ‘triumphalist’ ways of thinking secularisation (Frascati-Lochhead 1998: 
151-152). The former sees secularisation as the loss of a centre and of God, 
whereas the latter sees secularisation as a liberation from God through 
finding a more authentic way of existing. Beyond Interpretation builds on 
the understanding of secularisation as continuity, as Verwindung, that he 
had built up over the course of these texts and others. What Vattimo adds in 
Beyond Interpretation is a deep link between secularisation and 
hermeneutics by drawing upon the Christian notion of the incarnation. 
Already Vattimo’s concept of Verwindung commits him to seeing continuity 
instead of rupture, for overcoming Christianity completely would not only 
be impossible, but also would be to repeat modernity by placing down new 
foundations. 
During modernity hermeneutics was initially tied to specific 
branches of hermeneutics, particularly biblical hermeneutics after Luther’s 
‘sola scriptura.’ Hermeneutics followed the Enlightenment in becoming 
ever more rationalistic, with Schleiermacher positing that interpretation had 
to aim for objective fidelity. It was with Heidegger that hermeneutics 
changed, particularly with his notion of Dasein as a thrown project. This 
jettisoning of the requirement for interpretation to be a valid conformity 
between terms and their referents ‘undermines the rationalist, empiricist, 
positivist and even idealist and Marxist negations of the possibility of 
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religious experience’ (Vattimo 1997a: 45). Such interpretative and creative 
freedom is permitted by the emancipatory effects of post-Heideggerian 
hermeneutics on religion, but while hermeneutics is liberating, the way in 
which it functions here is described by Vattimo as ‘negative.’ Hermeneutics 
‘frees reason from its slavery to the scientistic ideal of objectivity, only to 
pave the way to a philosophy of culture whose limits (and meaning) cannot 
ultimately be determined’ (Vattimo 1997a: 45). 
Vattimo searches around for a way of looking at hermeneutics in 
order to ground its liberation of interpretative plurality more positively. To 
this end, Vattimo compares and contrasts two western ‘archetypal’ 
expressions pertaining to plurality: Aristotle’s to on léghetai pollachôs 
(‘Being is said in many ways’), and St Paul’s ‘multifariam multisque modis 
olim loquens Deus patribus in prophetis’ (Hebrews 1:1) (Vattimo 1997a: 
46). The context of the phrase from Aristotle is his idea of substance, 
whereas the context for St Paul’s statement is the incarnation of the son of 
God, understood by Vattimo to be kenosis, a theological phrase that usually 
refers to God’s self-emptying in the incarnation. The sense of self-emptying 
in incarnation as kenosis is implied in Beyond Interpretation, although I get 
the sense that Vattimo had an intuition about the relationship between weak 
thought and Christianity which he had yet to crystallise in his work. The 
quote from Hebrews indicates hermeneutical plurality, that God has 
communicated differently at various times, weakening the idea of a simple, 
impassable, eternal God (which becomes more of an explicit concern for 
him in Belief), as well as ‘contaminating’ Aristotelian metaphysics (Vattimo 
1997a: 47). While Vattimo had mentioned secularisation and Christianity 
before Beyond Interpretation, the introduction of the term kenosis was 
something new in his philosophy, save for a brief allusion to the term in an 
interview in 1989 (Vattimo 1989: 402). In Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo 
relates St Paul’s expression to the phrase from Aristotle as the nihilistic 
ontology he is trying to ‘discern in hermeneutics is rather than outcome of a 
‘contamination’ of Aristotelian pluralism by Pauline ‘historicism’’ (Vattimo 
1997a: 47), for Aristotle’s expression by itself, even without a reference to 
substance, ‘remains an objectivistic-metaphysical thesis (the Being is said in 
many ways because, and only because, it is in many ways)’ (Vattimo 1997a: 
47). The contradiction within Aristotle’s phrase is resolved by placing the 
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statement within a history of weakening of strong structures, along the lines 
indicated by St Paul. The incarnation is referred to by Vattimo as a ‘key 
event’ which confers meaning ‘on the many preceding and succeeding 
events’ (Vattimo 1997a: 46). The historicising effect of the Pauline notion 
of the incarnation on Aristotle’s understanding of the plurivocity of Being is 
to create a nihilistic ontology without hierarchy. 
Secularisation is ‘a festival of interpretative plurality’ (Guarino 
2009: 20). Relating this to kenosis, it is ‘the gradual realization in history of 
the kenotic self-abasement of God’ (Guarino 2009: 20). It is interesting that 
Guarino, as a Catholic Professor of Systematic Theology, picks up on the 
language of the ‘self-abasement’ of God, for in Beyond Interpretation this 
theme is relatively undeveloped (Vattimo 1997a: 48). Self-abasement, 
humbling and the incarnation in any traditional sense associated with 
Philippians 2:7, the ‘standard’ kenotic text, is conspicuously absent here. 
Instead, Hebrews 1:1 is offered as an archetype of interpretative plurality. 
Secularisation is thus a plural view of reality passed on as a message 
working its way through history. Vattimo does not do a lot to show how 
hermeneutics is ‘the fruit’ of secularisation which itself is the ‘application’ 
of the Christian revelation of kenosis and caritas (charity) (Vattimo 1997a: 
52). Reading between the lines, one can see the ‘contamination’ of the 
Aristotelian understanding of Being by Pauline historicism as inaugurating a 
principle of ‘weakening’ through historicising which we can see again with 
Heidegger’s historicising Being through his conceiving of it as epochal. 
Throughout history one can see this weakening in action, for instance 
through the secularising of transcendent hopes with the kingdom of God, 
becoming secularised in rationalist hopes for progress, then losing its 
teleology altogether at the end of modernity. Moreover, the weakening of 
the medieval worldview, both scripturally and in eschatological 
expectations, led both to the increasing rationalisation of hermeneutics 
through Spinoza and Schleiermacher, and to the development of science, 
technology and positivism (respectively), which ended up self-consuming in 
the end of modernity and the Ge-Stell, leading to the play of interpretations 
in hermeneutics.  
Vattimo realises that many people, Christians and non-Christians 
alike, may be sceptical about his interpretation of Christianity as a stimulus 
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to weakening strong, violent structures. Therefore, Vattimo draws upon the 
work of the philosophical anthropologist René Girard to support his 
hypothesis. Girard’s ideas are given a brief outline by Vattimo. Natural 
religions are founded upon the need to make victims to keep order in 
society. The mimetic drive in humans to desire what the other has escalates 
until violence threatens to consume society. A sacrificial scapegoat is killed 
to prevent the society’s destruction. Over time this becomes ever more 
ritualised and ‘assumes a sacral and divine character’ (Vattimo 1997a: 50). 
Girard sees the Old and New Testaments as intended to reveal the victimary 
mechanism, the person of Jesus being put to death because of his message 
of love, revealing this mechanism. Vattimo’s way of tying-in Girard to his 
account of the incarnation is somewhat tendentious, for he argues that the 
message of Jesus, his love and this unmasking of the violence of the 
scapegoat mechanism, could only have been divine (Vattimo 1997a: 50-51). 
Nevertheless, insofar as de-sacralisation is secularisation, and if the sacred 
is violent, Vattimo’s reading of Girard is still evidence for the uniqueness of 
Christianity as the stimulus for the principle of weakening that has resulted 
in hermeneutical nihilism in late-modernity. 
 
d) Caritas  
Kenosis is not only the stimulus, but also the process of weakening, referred 
to by Vattimo as ‘secularisation’ (the transmission of the kenotic message) 
which is carried on by the ‘Spirit,’ schematised by Vattimo through the 
Trinitarian historicism of Joachim of Fiore. Joachim, a twelfth-century 
abbot from Calabria (a place of personal significance also to Vattimo, for he 
lived there for a while) divided history into three ‘stases’ or epochs: that of 
the Father, the Son, and of the Spirit. The ‘Age of the Father,’ 
commensurable with the Old Testament, is one of the letter and authority, 
that of the Son (from the time of Jesus to the present day) is one of filial 
obedience with the rise of the Church, the final age to come is that of the 
Spirit and this is of increasing lightening and weakening of bonds in 
newfound spiritual maturity. Joachim identified the Spirit with a barefoot 
monastic order, which leant itself to being interpreted with the Franciscans 
in mind. According to one way of reading Vattimo’s interpretation of 
Joachim (Sciglitano 2013), the ages of the Father (Old Testament) and Son 
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(New Testament and rise of the Church) are surpassed by the ‘Age of the 
Spirit.’ In the latter, ‘the ‘spiritual’ sense of the scriptures is increasingly in 
evidence, with charity taking the place of discipline’ (Vattimo 1997a: 49). 
Vattimo does not follow Joachim’s ideas strictly, but uses his conception of 
history as a broad framework against which to position his own 
understanding of kenosis. Within this framework Vattimo also places 
Schleiermacher’s hope for everyone to be the author of their own Bible, and 
Novalis’ aesthetic and anti-disciplinarian conception of Christianity 
(Vattimo 1997a: 49). Vattimo sees the link he has found between the 
religious tradition of the West and hermeneutics as beneficial for many 
reasons, such as encouraging thinking about the centrality of interpretation, 
liberating readers from myth of objectivity, and that the ‘spiritual’ reading 
of Scripture in this broadly Joachimist framework may enable believers to 
overcome ecclesiastical discipline (Vattimo 1997a: 49-50). 
 Some commentators on Vattimo’s work, such as Carravetta, have 
criticised Vattimo for his seemingly arbitrary selection of caritas as the key 
Christian virtue (Carravetta 2010: 89). However, the anti-disciplinarian 
character of the ‘Age of the Spirit,’ along with the message of love taken 
from the gospel as well as from Girard’s theory, go some way to explaining 
Vattimo’s choice of caritas (‘charity’) as the limit for secularisation; this 
question will be dealt with in Part Two. Caritas here is not understood in 
any standardly theological way, but it is divine love insofar as it is the 
criterion for secularisation based on the kenotic model, that is, of 
weakening. Caritas is therefore the ‘criterion that permits the distinction of 
secularization from phenomena that confine themselves to applying the 
Christian tradition, often in a distorted fashion, yet which are themselves 
outside or indeed in opposition to it’ (Vattimo 1997a: 51). By ‘outside’ or 
‘in opposition’ to the Christian tradition in relation to the measure of caritas 
and secularisation means any interpretation or interpretative act which is 
‘strong’ and metaphysical. 
 
e) Vattimo’s argument: summarising and drawing the implications  
By exploring a paradox at the heart of hermeneutics, Vattimo gets closer to 
linking together nihilism, hermeneutics, kenosis, and secularisation.  The 
paradox is that the Enlightenment origins of hermeneutics concerned 
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demythologising and rationalistic interpretation, yet the whole notion of 
objectivity has been exposed as a myth in contemporary hermeneutic 
philosophy, leaving the public space open for a plurality of interpretations, 
in other words, for hermeneutics itself. Vattimo sees a parallel between this 
paradox and the Christian tradition: ‘nihilism is too much ‘like’ kenosis for 
one to see this likeness as simply a coincidence’ (Vattimo 1997a: 52). The 
nihilistic origins of hermeneutics are in fact found in the message of kenosis, 
of the weakening of strong structures in the message of historical plurivocity 
which contaminated Aristotelian plurivocity. This message was passed 
down, culminating in the secularisation of modernity which removed the 
transcendent realm and emphasised rationalisation to the point at which it 
self-consumed, leaving the way open for hermeneutics as the koine of 
philosophy and the play of interpretations constituting reality. The ethical 
dimension can be taken from the corollary of kenosis for choice, and that is 
weakening. Caritas is the spiritual-ethical dimension of kenosis. In the ‘Age 
of the Spirit,’ in Vattimo’s reading of Joachim of Fiore, discipline gives way 
to charity, much in the same way that Jesus’ message of love overturned the 
violence of the natural sacred in Vattimo’s other, Girard-influenced, account 
of how the incarnation is a stimulus for weakening, for de-sacralisation. 
 
Chapter Three: Belief 
a) The project of Belief 
Belief is a very different kind of book from Beyond Interpretation. Written a 
few years later in 1996 (translated 1999), Belief is an intensely personal, 
largely first-person account of his return to religion. It is not divided up 
neatly into chapters, but consists of a series of loosely related subheadings. 
The first twelve pages and two subheadings deal with reasons explaining his 
return to religion, at first personal and cultural, then philosophical. These 
reasons were explained in Chapter One. In short, they were largely about 
getting old, seeing his friends grow ill and die for ‘personal’ reasons, seeing 
religion re-emerge on the global stage in the decline of Communism and in 
the Iranian Revolution for ‘cultural’ and ‘societal’ reasons, and seeing the 
end of modernity as clearing a space theoretically for a return to religion. 
Although Vattimo sees Nietzschean-Heideggerian hermeneutic nihilism as 
the best interpretation of the late-modern, a surprise comes when he states 
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that ‘my preference for the Heideggerian ‘solution’ to contemporary 
philosophical problems is conditioned, and profoundly inspired by the 
Christian inheritance’ culturally, and therefore in his life (Vattimo 1999: 
32). The rest of the book is essentially an unpacking of this statement.  
 
b) Secularisation and incarnation 
In Belief Vattimo again develops his idea of secularisation, which he sees as 
‘the constitutive trait of an authentic religious experience’ (Vattimo 1999: 
21). The theme of Verwindung is still present here, for secularisation is a 
moving away from a sacred core which ‘nevertheless remains active even in 
its ‘fallen’ version, reduced to purely worldly terms’ (Vattimo 1999: 22). 
The history of Being as a history of weakening is a ‘transcription’ of the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God (Vattimo 1999: 36). 
The Son of God, for Vattimo, is weakening, secularisation and incarnation. 
It is to the thought of René Girard that Vattimo turns to explain this 
transcription. Although Girard was mentioned and drawn upon by Vattimo 
to support his understandings of kenosis and secularisation in Beyond 
Interpretation, his ideas have a much more central role to play here. 
Girard’s ideas explain in a more technical sense what it means for 
secularisation to move away from a ‘sacral’ core, for secularisation, for 
Vattimo, is here literally de-sacralisation. 
 If Vattimo was to show how Heidegger’s philosophy is the 
transcription of the Christian message, he needed to tie-in Girard closer to 
the German philosopher’s thought. Therefore, Vattimo distinguished 
‘religion’ from the ‘Christian faith.’ The former is a very human 
phenomenon of creating a divinity based out of human inclinations and wish 
fulfilment, the sort of cultural practice which lends itself to ‘the powerful 
critique inaugurated by Feuerbach and then carried on by Marx’ (Vattimo 
1999: 38). When divinities are created, they often carry within them the 
psychological burden of a thirst for revenge. Here is where Girard comes in. 
After having outlined Girard’s ideas on the natural sacred, Vattimo expands 
Girard’s concept of the ‘natural sacred’ to include this kind of vengeful 
deity. The latter has all the traditional attributes of the onto-theological, 
metaphysical God, such as omnipotence, absoluteness, eternity and 
transcendence. This move allows Vattimo to make a link between 
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‘secularisation—the progressive dissolution of the natural sacred’ (Vattimo 
1999: 50) and Heidegger’s notion of metaphysics as the history of the 
weakening of Being. 
If there is identification between secularisation and Heideggerian 
weak ontology, how does secularisation originate? At first sight there seem 
to be mixed messages coming from Vattimo. For Vattimo, ‘what seems 
decisive in Girard’s theses…is the idea of the incarnation as the dissolution 
of the sacred as violence’ (Vattimo 1999: 38), that secularisation began with 
the incarnation of Christ (see also Vattimo 1999: 48). However, Vattimo 
also writes that secularisation is a ‘positive effect of Jesus’ teaching’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 41). So for Vattimo, what is the origin of secularisation: the 
incarnation of Christ or the message of Jesus? From Vattimo’s philosophy it 
should be clear that he would not believe in a literal incarnation in the 
‘dogmatic’ sense for this would be metaphysical (Vattimo 1997a: 47). 
Therefore, in Belief Vattimo says for kenotic weakening there is the 
message of the incarnation and Jesus’ teachings to take into account, rather 
than simply the interpretative plurality of Hebrews 1 which was the main 
argument of kenosis in Beyond Interpretation. 
Vattimo admits, there are ‘gaps’ in his argument (Vattimo 1999: 45), 
but the most important point is to link the person of Jesus Christ to the 
reduction of violence, putting the de-sacralising secularisation process in 
motion. Returning to Girard, Vattimo sees Girard’s Christ as coming to 
reveal the nexus between violence and the sacred. In Vattimo’s account in 
Belief, he mentions just that it is an incarnation that reveals; there is no 
elaboration on how the incarnation reveals (Vattimo 1999: 37). Turning to 
kenosis, Vattimo states that it is God’s ‘abasement to the level of humanity’ 
which indicates a distinctive vocation for weakening in the post-
metaphysical God (Vattimo 1999: 39). Later, Vattimo elaborates a little on 
this ‘abasement,’ for it ‘undermines the ‘natural’ features of divinity’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 47). Again, this cannot be a literal kenosis, so what is this 
message? One would like to say, akin to Beyond Interpretation, that it is the 
message of God historicising himself in messages which dissolves the 
‘naturally religious,’ metaphysical features ascribed to him. This argument 
is not explicitly spelled out and developed, perhaps because for Vattimo it 
was so obvious it did not need stating. Indeed, in the Postscript to Belief 
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Vattimo states that ‘through the act of incarnation God, according to all the 
senses of kenosis, has made possible a historical engagement’ (Vattimo 
1999: 96). ‘All the senses’ implies this obviousness of the importance of the 
historical in the notion of kenosis. Conceived this way, the way in which 
kenosis works as the stimulus for secularisation is not so far removed from 
the sense in Beyond Interpretation, that is, of historicising that which is 
rigidly immutable: in Beyond Interpretation it is Aristotelian ‘Being,’ in 
Belief it is the God of the natural religions. The two senses are then 
combined through Vattimo’s reading of Girard, of Heidegger’s weak 
ontology being a ‘transcription’ of the kenotic message, by linking the 
‘violence’ of the natural sacred with the violence of metaphysics. Vattimo 
expands Girard’s concept of the ‘natural sacred’ to include this kind of 
vengeful deity. The latter has all the traditional attributes of the onto-
theological, metaphysical God, such as omnipotence, absoluteness, eternity 
and transcendence. This move allows Vattimo to make a link between 
‘secularization—the progressive dissolution of the natural sacred’ (Vattimo 
1999: 50) and Heidegger’s notion of metaphysics as the history of the 
weakening of Being. Vattimo has even gone so far as to say that his reading 
of Girard has helped him ‘complete’ Heidegger (Vattimo 2010b: 78). Even 
if this is going too far, in Vattimo’s mind there is a clear parallel between 
the two thinkers, as is clear from his statement that ‘[f]or both Girard and 
Heidegger, the emancipatory meaning of history—the salvation that takes 
place in it—is related to a self-consumption of the violence that 
characterises natural religion or, in Heidegger—the metaphysical oblivion 
of Being’ (Vattimo 2010b: 85). 
There is more to Vattimo’s notion of kenosis, however, than merely 
historicising the divine. What also has to be taken into account is not only 
the message of Jesus, but also Jesus’ message of ‘the friendliness of God 
towards his creatures’ (Vattimo 1999: 95). The message of friendliness 
constitutes also the relationship between the Old and New Testaments, that 
of ‘you heard it was said…but I tell you…’ (the ‘Antitheses’ in the Sermon 
on the Mount in the Gospel of Matthew) and ‘I no longer call you servants 
but friends’ (John 15:15; see Vattimo 1999: 49 for both of these quotations). 
‘The guiding thread of Jesus’ interpretation of the Old Testament,’ writes 
Vattimo, ‘is the new and more profound relation of charity established 
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between God and humanity, and consequently between human beings 
themselves’ (Vattimo 1999: 49). Here again the message of charity comes to 
the fore. Vattimo sums up the meaning of the incarnation in a way which 
emphasises both the message of Jesus and Jesus’ message: ‘The 
interpretation given by Jesus Christ of Old Testament prophecies, or (better) 
the interpretation which he himself is, reveals its true and only meaning: 
God’s love for his creatures’ (Vattimo 1999: 64). In other words, kenosis is 
something ontological, it is a revealing of Being in its weakness which we 
can recognise today because it is a message with an effective history—
secularisation—which has come to fruition today: ‘my interpretation of 
Heidegger’s thought as ‘weak ontology’ or weakening can be thought of as 
a rediscovery of Christianity and as the outcome of its permanent action’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 35). According to Girard’s thesis which Vattimo takes over 
and modifies, it is the Judaeo-Christian tradition that seeks to reveal the 
violence of the natural sacred through his message of God’s love for, and 
friendship with, the world. As such, in Antonello’s words Christianity acts 
like a ‘Trojan horse,’ that it must ‘temporarily clothe itself as an institutional 
religion’ in order to ‘destructure’ all the ‘archaic religions’ (Antonello 2006: 
8). Antonello’s own vision of the Vattimian Christological schema also goes 
some way to explain why Christianity historically appears to strengthen 
thought and metaphysics at times, not weaken it. 
Throughout the Bible there are plenty of sayings that call for 
obedience in a master-servant-style relationship. One can think of the calls 
for obedience to the one God in the Decalogue (Exodus 20) as a prime 
example. Even if Vattimo appeals to the ‘antithetical’ character of the New 
Testament (‘it was said…but I say to you…’—see Matthew 5), or the 
Joachimist conception of the three ages, this reading presumes some 
exegetical model he has to legitimate himself independently in more detail 
and with greater persuasiveness than he has done. Even if one accepts that it 
is the New Testament message with which we should be concerned, God is 
still referred to as a ‘master’ here, too. The Greek word ‘despotes’ is often 
used to refer in the New Testament to masters of slaves (1 Timothy 6:1). 
This word is also applied to God (Acts 4:24). Therefore, against Vattimo, 
the stance of the New Testament is not unequivocal on this issue of the 
‘hierarchy’ of values. In Vattimo’s defence, one has to take into account the 
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consciously ‘circular’ nature of his enterprise. His reading of the New 
Testament comes from the sending of Being as the death of God and the end 
of metaphysics, so when recovering Christianity he will read it in a weak 
way. The twist in Vattimo’s thought is that it must have been Christianity 
that set the stimulus for secularisation in the first place. 
Vattimo is able to link Christianity to weak ontology through 
Girard’s work in relation to the message of the New Testament. However, 
Vattimo admits that he goes ‘just a little bit beyond Girard’ in his use of his 
concept of the natural sacred (Vattimo 1999: 38). Already in Beyond 
Interpretation Vattimo writes that ‘Girard…does not seek to extend his 
thesis into a genuine theory of secularization as the authentic destiny of 
Christianity…Yet there are good reasons for such an extension’ (Vattimo 
1997a: 51). There are at least three significant ways in which the views of 
Vattimo and Girard, for all they appear similar, are very different. The best 
place to look for this difference is a series of essays and debates between 
them collected in the Pierpaolo Antonello edited book Christianity, Truth 
and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue (2006). The three principal reasons are 
the dangers of the exposition of the victimary mechanism, the question of 
the ‘sacrifice’ of Jesus on the cross, and the epistemological question of 
whether there are only interpretations or whether there are facts, too. 
However, although each of these three points of difference will be outlined, 
it should become apparent that, to a significant extent, these points of 
difference are merely differences. A larger problem which is not considered 
in the book edited by Antonello is how Vattimo understands ‘violence’ in 
Girard’s work and in Heidegger’s history of the weakening of Being. 
 The first difference, pointed out by Antonello in his Introduction to 
the joint effort by Vattimo and Girard, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening 
Faith, is on the issue of accounting for ‘the recurrence of violence even in 
the Christian ages’ (Antonello 2006: 12). Vattimo blames the violence on 
the distortion of the Christian message by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, in 
particular through him using Wilhelm Dilthey’s understanding of the history 
of philosophy which ‘suggested that the tendency of the Church to 
‘misunderstand’ the meaning of revelation…sprang from the supplement 
role of early Christianity in the late-ancient world, after the fall of the 
Roman Empire,’ that ‘in the vacuum of civil institutions Popes and bishops 
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were the only authorities capable of assuring a minimal basis of sociability’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 53). As such, the Church tends to make absolute ‘contingent 
historical horizons, which are claimed to be inseparable from the truth of 
revelation’ (Vattimo 1999: 53). In other words, Vattimo reads Dilthey as 
implying that the Church prevented the message of weakening from being 
manifested more quickly through its adoption of Greek metaphysics, which 
is perhaps another way of looking at the ‘contamination’ of Greek 
metaphysics by its being ‘historicised’ and ‘weakened’ by the message of 
the kenosis of God. By contrast, Girard thinks that ‘the Christian 
message…stripped mankind of those sacral protections that had been put in 
place to protect it against its own violence’ (Antonello 2006: 13). 
Christianity can therefore be seen as being ‘creatively liberating,’ but it also 
leaves room for destruction by revealing the true nature of the mechanism 
which prevented the unleashing of mimetic violence, all against all. This 
‘creativity’ manifests itself in different ‘containment structures to forestall 
the apocalyptic event’ of the culmination of mimetic violence (Antonello 
2006: 13). Antonello mentions examples of this kind of ‘secularised forms 
of transcendence’ such as democracy and mass media spectacle. Against 
this, Antonello says that ‘Vattimo…rejects any apocalyptic perspective, 
foreseeing a progressive liberation…from any need for limits of any sort’ 
(Antonello 2006: 14). In his estimation of the difference between Vattimo 
and Girard, Antonello overstates his case somewhat. Vattimo certainly does 
not want any metaphysical or authoritarian-institutional limit, and does see 
history as a progressive emancipation from strong structures. However, 
Vattimo does see one limit to prevent violence and that is caritas as a 
formal principle guiding interpretation.   
The second difference between Vattimo and Girard concerns the 
issue of sacrifice in the death of Jesus. Girard admits in his book Things 
Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (1978) that he consciously 
refrained from describing the death of Jesus as a sacrifice. This was a 
deliberate decision due to research he had conducted onto blood sacrifices in 
non-Christian religions. Girard was ‘impressed’ with the ‘discontinuity’ 
between these blood sacrifices and the death of Jesus on the cross to the 
extent that in his book he was not prepared to identify the latter with the 
former. As such, Vattimo follows suit, for it was Things Hidden that made 
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such a great impression on him: ‘Jesus’ incarnation did not take place to 
supply the father with a victim adequate to his wrath’ (Vattimo 1999: 37); 
Jesus ‘comes to be put to death not because he is the perfect victim, as has 
always been understood’ (Vattimo 1997a: 50). Girard changed his mind, he 
said, after having read the work of Raymund Schwager, that ‘The 
attachment of orthodox theologians to certain traditional words, such as 
‘sacrifice,’ even if it still needs to be explored, is never without reason’ 
(Girard, 2006: 93). 
The third point of difference between Vattimo and Girard is 
epistemological and, to an extent, methodological. With these two thinkers 
one has to remember that one is a philosopher and the other is an 
anthropologist. Moreover, Girard is a more conservative thinker than 
Vattimo anyway, as he is ready to admit. Girard thinks not only that there 
are interpretations, but also that there are facts. Furthermore, Girard does 
not think that the Nietzschean phrase that there are ‘no facts, only 
interpretations’ can provide a ‘functional theory of interpretation. To have 
nothing but interpretation is the same as having none’ (Girard 2006: 94). 
Girard simply is not a nihilist, nor does he think that transcendence has to be 
violent in a metaphysical way. Rather, in Depoortere’s phrasing, Girard’s 
solution to thinking Christianity in modernity is to regard God not in his 
radical immanence, but in his ‘transcendence of love’ (Depoortere 2008a: 
61). On the other hand, Girard is an anthropologist and makes 
anthropological claims, that they are ‘facts,’ such as that ‘all human 
societies are afflicted with some kind of malfunction’ that results in violence 
(Girard 2006: 105). One such claim concerns the essentially violent state of 
human beings in nature: ‘When we realize that Girard sees any type of 
human culture as originally violent, this stands in sharp contrast to Vattimo’ 
(Prosman 2011: 200). Theoretically, at least, Vattimo considers a non-
violent society as possible, not least because he does not believe in 
anthropological facts. This leads on to the other fact of significance to 
Girard in this context concerns the status of the unmasking of the natural 
sacred effected by the revelation of Jesus Christ. For Girard, it is important 
that we know about the natural sacred, keeping it in mind in order to prevent 
an apocalypse. For Vattimo, it is not enough to posit: 
a scientific, nonvictimary knowledge of human nature. I know that 
this is not Girard’s intention, but as a matter of fact, even the 
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redemptive power of Jesus seems to reside, for him, in a pure and 
simple theoretical unmasking of the violent essence of the natural 
notion of the sacred (Vattimo 2006b: 86). 
For Vattimo, knowledge of the natural sacred is not only impossible in a 
factual fashion, but would also be irrelevant were it not wedded to a history 
of weakening, for the important matter for Vattimo is to be able to ground 
and commit to a practise of weakening in the present through orienting 
interpretation towards further weakening of strong structures in accordance 
with caritas as the sole hermeneutical criterion.  
The above three points constitute differences between the two 
thinkers, but ones which are not fatal to Vattimo drawing upon Girard’s 
ideas. On the issue of ‘facts’ and ‘interpretations,’ Vattimo is going to 
transcribe Girard’s ‘factual’ findings into a hermeneutical tool because he is 
a hermeneutical nihilist. All one has to do is to think of Girard’s insights not 
so much as facts about human nature, but as ways of understanding the 
uniqueness of Christianity (which is, after all, a matter of faith for Vattimo) 
vis a vis the naturally violent ‘archaic’ religions. The issue of the ‘sacrifice’ 
of Jesus will not trouble Vattimo too much, for he is not interested in ‘facts’; 
Girard’s original proclamation that Jesus’ death was not a sacrifice ‘spoke’ 
to him and seemed persuasive in a way that the ‘traditional’ reading of his 
death, to which Girard has returned, does not. As for the different ways in 
which Vattimo and Girard think that the unmasking of the victimary 
mechanism and the natural sacred play out, here again is a theoretical 
difference; Girard is an academic, whereas Vattimo has a self-consciously 
ethico-political vocation within philosophy. Antonello describes Girard as a 
‘thinker who has, in contrast [to Vattimo] made little use of his own 
anthropological theory to interpret contemporary social and political reality’ 
(Antonello 2006: 4).  
Even if these three other issues are resolvable, there is another issue 
with Vattimo’s reading of Girard which is not a point of difference between 
the two thinkers, but is a question of how he interprets the latter’s concept of 
the natural sacred, specifically in relation to the similarity he draws with 
Heidegger’s notion of the ontology of weakening. Vattimo is able to see 
Heidegger’s thought as a transcription of Girard’s thinking on the natural 
sacred largely because he sees a parallel between the natural sacred and 
metaphysical violence. According to Martin G. Weiss, Vattimo thinks 
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violence ‘is identified with the kind of speech that allows no contradiction’ 
(Weiss 2010: 244), a concept which bears similarity to Lyotard’s notion of 
the ‘differend,’ of a failure between interlocutors to create a common 
standard of judgement which leads the victim’s judgement to be recognised 
(for example, Aboriginal Australian’s claims to land being dismissed as they 
offer a standard of ownership not recognised under Australian law) 
(Woodward 2015). This is metaphysical violence, reducing what can be said 
to objective knowledge and foundational first principles. However, the type 
of violence described by Girard is physical, the actual killing of a person. 
Physical violence may follow from a metaphysically grounded view of 
reality, such as the Inquisition. However, violence may also result from 
anarchy, instinct, or for any number of other reasons. The identification 
between the natural sacred and metaphysics is important for Vattimo as he 
wants to develop de-sacralisation into his history of secularisation as a 
religious parallel (or stimulus to) an ontology of decline. By at least 
questioning a key premise in this identification, Vattimo’s understanding of 
the history of philosophy and religion is itself weakened.    
 
c) Salvation 
Vattimo realises that he has made choices in his understanding of the 
fulfilment of Christianity as secularisation. Firstly, he has chosen that 
Christianity should not aim to enshrine itself in dogma and doctrine, as it 
has done in the past and continues, in some quarters, to do still today: 
‘Revelation does not speak of an objective truth, but of an ongoing 
salvation’ (Vattimo 1999: 48). Rather, Christianity is fulfilled in weakening. 
The lay state, autonomy in morals, the reduction of the temporal power of 
the popes—these are examples of the kind of weakening Vattimo is talking 
about, the realisation of kenosis, ‘undermining the ‘natural’ features of 
divinity’ (Vattimo 1999: 47). There is an anti-authoritarian strand running 
through Vattimo’s work here, identifying the use of authority by figures 
such as John Paul II with ‘metaphysics.’ Contrasting such authoritarianism 
with the revelation of kenosis, Vattimo closely links the ‘history of 
salvation’ with ‘the history of interpretation’ (Vattimo 1999: 49). 
Interpretation here does not mean the correct application of teachings that 
one has heard, but the realisation of the message of kenosis. The latter has 
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the same relationship as Jesus’ words had to the Old Testament, the 
‘Antitheses’ of Matthew 5 (‘you heard it was said…but I tell you…’). Here 
again, Vattimo draws upon John 15:15, of the message of salvation in 
kenosis being that humans are now called not to be God’s servants, but 
friends—the ‘bizarre’ and ‘threatening’ facets pertaining to the natural 
sacred are dissolved in receiving this message. One could make a link 
between Christ taking the form of a servant in Philippians 2:6-8 and God 
calling us to be friends, not servants; it is almost as though God has lowered 
himself to the level of the servant and that we are fellow servants of his. The 
implication is that there is no privileged truth (whether divine or of 
Humanism—we, too, are servants) and therefore views of humanity and of 
God are caught-up in exchange-value, the nihilistic vocation of 
hermeneutics as the result of the inheritance of this Christian message. As 
Vattimo has chosen that the Christian revelation is ongoing salvation and 
not the application of evangelical teaching, ‘secularisation—the progressive 
dissolution of the natural sacred—is the very essence of Christianity’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 50), in a very specific sense. In other words, the process of 
secularisation is a kenotic process, with its guiding thread and limit as 
charity, caritas (Vattimo 1999: 64). Salvation comes through desacralising 
interpretation, ever-weakening strong authoritarian structures. 
 
d) Caritas and Secularisation 
Today, there is a contrast between searching for faith and finding the 
Church of the pope, and discovering the ‘doctrine of salvation’ in the form 
of kenotic Christianity as put forward by Vattimo. The ecclesiastical 
hierarchy will demand that one adheres to an outmoded, metaphysical 
conception of human nature and the personal and social ethics that are built 
upon this anthropology. Vattimo contrasts this with what he refers to as the 
‘limit’ for secularisation, the notion of caritas, which is a ‘critical principle’ 
derived from the incarnation understood as kenosis (Vattimo 1999: 62-63). 
With secularisation, it is not as though any and all phenomena encountered 
in late-modernity can be judged to be the fruit of secularised Christianity. 
Some, such as the realist ethics of the Catholic Church proscribing 
homosexual relationships and women priests, are not, in Vattimo’s eyes, in 
harmony with the Christian message of weakening. 
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 Vattimo sees a ‘parallelism between a theology of secularisation and 
an ontology of weakening’ (Vattimo 1999: 63). A weak ontology is a ‘long 
farewell to the strong structures of Being,’ a process without end. If the 
process were to end, then nihilism would be a state of nothingness, which 
paradoxically would be to return to the notion of presence. This is why 
Vattimo thinks one ‘can only conceive nihilism as history’ (Vattimo 1999: 
63). Vattimo sees a ‘Christian inspiration’ in nihilism, with the latter being a 
‘transcription’ of the biblical message. ‘If one thinks of nihilism as an 
infinite history in terms of the religious ‘text’ that is its basis and 
interpretation,’ writes Vattimo, ‘it will speak of kenosis as guided, limited 
and endowed with meaning, by God’s love’ (Vattimo 1999: 64). Although 
Vattimo speaks of love (caritas) as the ‘limit’ of secularisation, it is also the 
power of the driving force behind it, the process of the message of kenosis 
working its way through history. At the heart of the New Testament 
message, in Vattimo’s eyes, is love, a view which is widely shared, not least 
by the biblical text itself, for love is declared by Jesus to be the ‘greatest 
commandment’ (Matthew 22; see also 1 Corinthians 13). Love is the 
criterion by which secularisation is ‘examined’ (Vattimo 1999: 64).  
Critics of Vattimo have questioned whether he is consistent if love 
cannot be secularised (Jonkers 2000: 386), with love taking on the 
appearance at least of ‘something absolute’ in Vattimo’s philosophy 
(Depoortere 2008a: 20). However, Vattimo is quick to state that caritas is 
‘not really ultimate’ as it is not a ‘metaphysical principle’ (Vattimo 1999: 
64). Rather, it is a ‘formal’ principle much like Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative (Vattimo 1999: 66), which is perhaps surprising given that the 
latter was grounded in universal reason and that Vattimo thinks that 
postmodernism has shattered the idea of there being universal reason due to 
the liberation of local rationalities through information and communications 
technology. While this issue will be discussed more later, it is worth briefly 
mentioning the difference between a ‘metaphysical principle’ and a ‘formal 
principle.’ The former has some substantive content, such as in Natural 
Moral Law, where there is metaphysical, teleological content about the 
purposes of human beings based on the eternal law in the mind of God 
which is revealed, supposedly, both in the Bible and through nature. A 
formal principle gives more of a way to decide how to proceed. Kant’s 
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Categorical Imperative was ingenious in that it was both a formal and 
metaphysical principle, something which Vattimo seems keen to downplay. 
The formal principle was contingent on the metaphysical principle of 
universal rationality constraining what one could will without contradiction. 
Caritas differs from a metaphysical principle as it is not referring to a 
presence, but it also differs from the categorical imperative as it is the power 
behind a message, of God’s kenosis. This message is the ‘interpretation’ 
which is ‘Jesus Christ,’ that of ‘God’s love for his creatures’ (Vattimo 1999: 
64). Christ is reduced to a message, and the message is of God’s love. From 
this one may infer that kenosis and caritas are one and the same, looked at 
from different perspectives. The latter is the ethical dimension of the former. 
Moreover, kenosis (the message of God’s becoming historical in his 
friendship for humankind) inaugurates secularisation which is then carried 
on with ‘spiritual’ power (if one thinks of Joachim’s age of the Spirit) which 
is caritas; the history of salvation is the history of this unmasking 
inaugurated by kenosis and limited by caritas (Vattimo 1999: 66).Vattimo 
sees Christ as the unmasker of the myths of Christian revelation, 
presumably referring to the miraculous and supernatural outdated features of 
the biblical narrative, although Vattimo does not state so explicitly here, yet 
he does refer to ‘metaphysical prejudices.’ 
  
e) The kind of Christianity recovered12 
Caritas has important implications for the type of Christianity one recovers. 
Vattimo asks the question whether he can still call God ‘Father,’ or whether 
the Lord’s Prayer has any meaning for him. After careful consideration, he 
states that these things still have purchase for him, but only because of his 
‘own biography,’ that he was brought up with these traditions (Vattimo 
1999: 77-78). Concerning the phrase ‘God the Father,’ Vattimo’s argument 
is a little troubling here, for he alludes to Schleiermacher’s notion of a 
‘feeling of dependence’ justifying the term ‘Father.’ This is the ‘kernel’ that, 
in Vattimo’s view, ‘cannot be an object of reduction or demythification’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 78). What is beyond reduction: caritas, or dependence? 
Vattimo ties himself in knots here, trying to ground this feeling on an 
awareness that weak ontology is dependent on ‘an initiative that is not 
                                                 
12 This subsection owes a lot to my article on the topic of God the Father in 
Vattimo’s understanding of Christianity for The Heythrop Journal (Harris 2013a). 
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mine,’ begun long ago (Vattimo 1999: 78); later in his works he makes it 
clear that is the biblical tradition upon which he is dependent, taking his 
work down a more clearly linguistic line he begins to explore in more detail 
in After Christianity, even though he revisits ‘dependence’ in particular in 
The Future of Religion (Vattimo 2004: 77).13 Returning to Belief, Vattimo 
does not have to try so hard to justify his choice, his feeling that God is a 
Father, and he alludes to it anyway, and that is his provenance. If Being is 
nothing but language, the Italian Catholic form of life in which he was 
brought up would have referred to God as a Father.  
Vattimo relates caritas to his own life, to being able to remember the 
traditions that he has inherited: ‘I do not feel the need to free myself from 
the traces…of my Catholic upbringing’ (Vattimo 1999: 81). These traces 
have helped Vattimo throughout his life, from motivating him, acting as his 
conscience, and orienting him in the world. Vattimo contrasts the political 
and moral forms of Catholicism he inherited with the ‘apocalyptic’ form of 
Christianity that he sees as widely popular today. The latter is essentially the 
‘tragic’ Christianity mentioned earlier in this chapter, although Vattimo 
goes into more detail here in Belief. An important feature of this 
tragic/apocalyptic Christianity is that an event is looked for which devalues 
conventional world history, where there is a distinction made between 
salvation history and world history. Vattimo acknowledges that this kind of 
Christianity is also ‘an effect of the end of metaphysics’ (Vattimo 1999: 82), 
such as that the ideal of objective knowledge has dissolved due to 
philosophical criticism. God is not, on this view, an objective presence, but 
‘his transcendence is nonetheless reaffirmed’ (Vattimo 1999: 82). This God, 
the ‘wholly other,’ is evoked when terrible crises occur that throw 
conventional wisdom into jeopardy, such as the Holocaust. Vattimo does 
not so much argue against this existential, tragic form of Christianity, as 
state that it is ‘regressive,’ returning to a form of theology more associated 
with the Old Testament, the kind of theology which makes it difficult to 
conceive of an imminence, an incarnation. Somewhat unfairly (Baird 2007), 
Vattimo states that for Derrida, Levinas et al, ‘there is no real difference 
between historical times; since every historical moment is immediately 
related to eternity’ (Vattimo 1999: 84). Indeed, there is little ‘salvation 
                                                 
13 I shall return to these questions in Chapter Nine, section ‘b.’ 
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history’ to be found in the view of tragic Christianity. Nevertheless, this by 
itself does not make it wrong. Could it not be that Vattimo’s biography 
makes him choose the historical, moral and political over and against the 
existentialist, tragic and apocalyptic? Vattimo implies as much when he says 
‘I concede that my upbringing has been less mystical than moral (and, 
perhaps, political)’ (Vattimo 1999: 81). Ironically, although he mentions the 
mystical here, he does not pursue its links with the idea of Being. In the 
Postscriptum to Belief, Vattimo acknowledges, on reflection and in virtue of 
the comments of his early readers of his manuscript, that he was perhaps too 
hasty in ‘reduc[ing] the theology of ‘the wholly other’ to a tragicism which 
merely reproduces the naturalistic conception of divinity as a mysterious 
and capricious Being impervious to reason’ (Vattimo 1999: 95).  
 There is one more promising argument that Vattimo introduces for 
disregarding tragic thought, and that is the interpretation of the Bible. If one 
opts for the ‘leap of faith,’ embracing total alterity, what does one do with 
difficult passages of the Bible, such as ‘If your eye offends you, pluck it out 
and throw it away from you?’ One could take it literally, but nobody does. 
Should one choose, then, to interpret it allegorically and on what basis does 
one select some passages for this treatment, and not others? This distinction, 
Vattimo contends, would have to be decided on ‘the presupposition of a 
metaphysical rationality that is proclaimed to be natural or, more often, by 
delegating the decision to the authority of the Church’ (Vattimo 1999: 85). 
In other words, tragic Christianity has metaphysical and/or authoritarian 
baggage, the sort of which can be avoided if Vattimo’s approach to 
secularisation, with its notions of kenosis and caritas, is adopted instead. 
However, Vattimo’s views both on ‘otherness’ and God the Father have 
important implications for his return to religion and philosophy more 
generally, for in Part Two the issue of transcendence will be discussed more 
and near the end of Part One the question of what Vattimo means by ‘God 
the Father’ will have implications for whether he views Christianity as 
‘superseding’ Judaism. 
 
f) Belief? 
A final point needs considering, and that is the extent to which the foregoing 
in the analysis of Belief describes a return to ‘religion.’ Belief, as has been 
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stated already, unlike Beyond Interpretation which claims nothing more 
than dealing with hermeneutics, is a book concerned with Vattimo’s own 
personal return to religion. The central thesis of Belief is that secularisation 
is the fruit, and essence, of the Christian, kenotic message of weakening, a 
gradual weakening of strong metaphysical-sacral structures in history. 
Vattimo’s focus has been, then, on religion as a message, or a message to 
weaken the religious—Christianity is the sheep in wolf’s clothing. In his 
focus on a message, Vattimo neglects both ‘beliefs’ and ‘practices.’ 
Although Vattimo calls his book Belief (or ‘I believe that I believe,’ or some 
variant on this difficult to translate Italian phrase—see Miles 2007: 304), 
there is little to do with believing, a point brought up first by Rorty in The 
Future of Religion, then by Frankenberry in an essay in the Zabala-edited 
collection of essays on Vattimo, Weakening Philosophy. Rorty states that ‘if 
a belief is true, everybody ought to share it. But Vattimo does not think that 
all human beings ought to be theists’ (Rorty 2006: 34). Frankenberry makes 
even clearer than Rorty why ‘belief’ is an inadequate description of 
Vattimo’s return, perhaps not to religion, but to religious categories, as it 
turns out. ‘If the propositional attitude ‘believing’ entails holding as true,’ 
Frankenberry writes, ‘Vattimo’s strategy is to remove religion from the 
epistemic realm altogether’ (Frankenberry 2007: 293 n. 15). Even more, if 
Christianity is the stimulus to weakening, ‘Christianity is more ‘true’ than 
all the other religions precisely on account of the fact that there is a sense in 
which is it is not a religion’ (Vattimo 2006: 52). Jesus Christ has, for 
Vattimo, set him free of idols (Vattimo 2006: 53). Although Vattimo talks 
of ‘truths’ in the weakened sense of traces piously remembered and twisted, 
he certainly wants to remove truth with a capital ‘T,’ and so the 
universalising tendencies of belief to which Frankenberry is referring; the 
issue of ‘universalising’ is only dealt with by Vattimo in a later work, After 
Christianity, as shall be shown. Rather than describing his return in terms of 
‘belief,’ Frankenberry thinks instead that ‘His narrative could be called a 
History of How the West was Weaned—first from God, and then from other 
quasi-divine authorities such as Science, or Nature, or History’ 
(Frankenberry 2007: 279). 
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Chapter Four: After Christianity 
a) The project of After Christianity 
Unlike Beyond Interpretation and Belief, After Christianity, the third of the 
most important books of Vattimo’s return to religion, is comprised of ten 
loosely connected chapters, some of which, such as Chapter Five, had been 
published earlier. The book is part of the Italian Academy Lectures series. 
Not all of the book will be dealt with in this critically analytical summary 
(the final chapter on Heidegger’s relationship with Christianity is better 
suited to a study squarely on Heidegger), but the main points of difference 
will be outlined. 
 
b) The centrality of Nietzsche and ‘the death of God’ 
i) Belief and After Christianity 
Arguably the most significant difference between Vattimo’s writing 
concerning the return to religion (or, more specifically, Christianity) in 
Belief and that in his next major work, After Christianity, is the greater 
emphasis in the latter text on Nietzsche, especially his notion of the death of 
God. The extent to which this is a stylistic matter or a substantial 
development in his thought is a moot point. That the centrality of Nietzsche 
differs from the chapter on Religion in Beyond Interpretation needs little 
argument, for neither Nietzsche nor ‘the death of God’ turn up at all bar one 
brief allusion to Nietzsche despising humanitarianism (Vattimo 1997a: 51), 
even though, of course, the philosophical framework in which Vattimo is 
writing is that of hermeneutical nihilism which owes a large debt to 
Nietzsche. Nevertheless, the similarities and differences between After 
Christianity and Belief require more elaboration given that Nietzsche is 
mentioned in the latter work, albeit only on a few occasions (Vattimo 1999: 
29, 32-33, 39). 
 A key issue on the question of the extent to which Vattimo’s 
changes in After Christianity are stylistic or substantial is whether when 
Vattimo outlines the broadly Heideggerian scheme of ‘weakening’ in Belief 
he is in fact influenced by Nietzsche, and if so, in what sense, for while 
Vattimo can talk about the ‘nihilism’ of Heidegger, this is not a ‘standard’ 
reading of his work. Vattimo is candid about his interpretation of these 
thinkers, that he reads Nietzsche through Heidegger, and Heidegger through 
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Nietzsche. Specifically, in After Christianity, Vattimo argues that ‘the 
Nietzschean announcement of the death of God and the Heideggerian 
announcement…of the end of metaphysics can provide the general 
framework for characterising late-modern experience’ (Vattimo 2002a: 12). 
More strongly still, ‘[i]n Heidegger’s thought, the event of ‘the end of 
metaphysics’ has basically the same meaning of the death of God’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 13). Even though Vattimo is more emphatic of the connection 
between these two notions in After Christianity, it may well be reasonable to 
read back this strong connection between them into Belief, where Vattimo 
mentions ‘the end of metaphysics’ (Vattimo 1999: 29). Indeed, Vattimo 
even states that ‘The dissolution of metaphysics is also the end of this image 
of God [as an objective being], the death of God of which Nietzsche spoke’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 39). Therefore, the connection is present in Belief, although 
presented at greater length in After Christianity, as if Vattimo had begun 
warming to his theme. Much will rest, then, on whether the links between 
Nietzsche’s ideas and Christianity in After Christianity are substantially 
different to the Nietzschean-Heideggerian hermeneutical-ontological 
framework of a history of weakening presented in Belief. Are the arguments 
in After Christianity merely those in Belief phrased in a different way, or are 
they suggesting substantially different connections between Nietzsche’s 
thought and Christianity? Greater focus on Nietzsche develops the points 
made in Beyond Interpretation and Belief, as well as leading towards an 
explanation of secularisation and the death of God along Nietzschean lines, 
that is, in terms of a chemical analysis, leading to a view of history which 
can—surprisingly—appear Hegelian when combined with insights from 
Joachim of Fiore and Wilhelm Dilthey, and this will be the subject of debate 
later in Part One. 
 Vattimo uses Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’ to express ideas he has put 
forward elsewhere in different terms. Starting in the Introduction to After 
Christianity, Vattimo mentions that the death of God is ‘not an atheistic 
thesis,’ for to claim the non-existence of God would be to uphold a 
metaphysical principle (Vattimo 2002a: 3). This is a very similar line of 
argument to that found in Belief, where under the subheading 
‘Secularisation: The Limit of Charity,’ Vattimo states that nihilism is not a 
‘nothingness,’ for this ‘would be an objectively laid out presence,’ merely 
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repeating metaphysics, not weakening it further (Vattimo 1999: 63). Instead, 
nihilism can only be conceived as a history. In After Christianity, Vattimo 
states that the death of God ‘means nothing else than the fact that there is no 
ultimate foundation’ (Vattimo 2002a: 3), even if one wonders what Vattimo 
means by ‘fact’ here (he would probably defend himself by stating it is the 
best interpretation of the situation of late-modernity). Aside from these brief 
discussions of Nietzschean themes in the Introduction of After Christianity, 
it is better to discuss the similarity and difference between the use Vattimo 
makes of Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘death of God’ within the specific 
arguments of the chapters of After Christianity, especially the first and 
eighth chapters. 
 
ii) Chapter One of After Christianity 
For Vattimo, the death of God in Nietzsche’s work is, like the end of 
metaphysics in Heidegger’s thought, the end of the moral God, the ‘founder 
and guarantor of the objective world order’ (Vattimo 2002a: 13). By ‘end’ 
Vattimo does not think Nietzsche meant ‘overcome’ or ‘disproved,’ but ‘put 
aside,’ due to factors such as the lightening of existence and the command 
not to lie becoming obsolete in the complex world of the society of mass 
communication, late-modernity, that God has been found to be a ‘lie’ 
himself. Heidegger’s work expresses the same meaning, in Vattimo’s eyes, 
through the notion of Ge-Stell, that the culmination of metaphysics was its 
dissolution in the total organisation of society. Vattimo’s nihilistic reading 
of Heidegger’s reflection upon the dissolution of Being after the so-called 
kehre in his thought places emphasis on his interest in the proliferation of 
images and specialisation of language in the society of mass communication 
(the latter notion being Vattimo’s own ‘twist’ on Heidegger), leading to a 
‘Babel-like pluralism of late-modern society’ which has ‘made the thought 
of a unified world order impossible to conceive’ (Vattimo 2002a: 15). The 
Babel-like irreducible plurality of images and voices in late-modernity, as 
an experience, coincides with the Nietzschean-Heideggerian announcement 
of the death of God/end of metaphysics, corroborating and making 
compelling this interpretation of the society in which, and horizon by, we 
live. 
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Nihilism of the kind described by Vattimo here is our ‘sole 
opportunity.’ This can be interpreted in many ways, but in the context of 
After Christianity, Vattimo refers to the possibility of a return to religion in 
light of the death of the moral God. The weakening of faith in 
foundationalism provides the opportunity for religious experience, to which 
Nietzsche refers as the ‘liberation of metaphor.’ Local and subjective 
narratives are liberated with the death of the ‘master narrative’ of the 
socially dominant way of speaking which had been validated through 
foundationalism, and the socially dominant way of speaking in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been a scientific positivism that 
had banished religion from the public sphere. The Babel-like situation of 
late-modernity takes away a centre and reduces languages, as with values, to 
exchange-value by removing a hierarchy, revealing any surviving 
hierarchical structures to be the result of ‘power’s unequal distribution’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 16). In theoretical work, Vattimo argues, the liberation of 
metaphor has been widespread, allowing ‘philosophers to speak of angels 
and redemption without providing an explicit justification for the use of 
these terms’ (Vattimo 2002a: 17). Vattimo’s point here allows him to 
counter critics who see a contradiction between his arguments against 
metaphysics, while sometimes writing as if God were a being.  
What the liberation of metaphor also does, in Vattimo’s eyes, is to 
‘liquidate’ the philosophical basis for atheism. Vattimo had argued along 
these lines in Beyond Interpretation, holding that hermeneutics as a koine 
prepares the way for a return of religion (Vattimo 1997a: 44-45). 
Nevertheless, this is not an argument that features in Belief, and even in 
Beyond Interpretation Vattimo does not make an explicit link to the death of 
God. Concurrent with the liberation of metaphor from a hierarchy of 
language is the sociological return to religion for demographical reasons, 
such as the end of colonialism and the beginnings of pluralistic societies in 
the West. Such pluralism itself ‘decentres’ views of reality and flattens 
hierarchies of values. The liberation of metaphor feeds into this sociological 
issue, for it removes any linguistic yardstick by which each culture in 
society is measured. However, while the rationalistic criteria are jettisoned, 
the return to religion has often been accompanied with a leap of faith to a 
transcendent divine being or beings beyond rationality, precluding 
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engagement with other religions and cultures which have been liberated 
from both rationalism and colonialism (Vattimo 2002a: 19). This is a 
‘paradox’ for Vattimo (Vattimo 2002a: 19), and one with some results 
which he sees as unfortunate, such as the legitimation of relativism and 
fundamentalism, that is, of religious and ethnic groups retreating into their 
belief systems and values. The death of God entails that one cannot but 
speak metaphorically, so although there is no rational yardstick by which 
cultures’ views should be measured, this also should not entail a retreat into 
fundamentalism. Concerning the latter problem, fundamentalism and 
extremism could occur if all there was happened to be thoroughgoing 
relativism, for groups would have neither an objective standard against 
which their beliefs and values could be judged, not any persuasive reason to 
listen to others. As a result, a thoroughgoing relativism might accommodate 
groups who retreat into factional identities and dogmas. Moreover, there is a 
problem if one steps back and looks at relativism, for its values of 
‘tolerance’ and ‘pluralism’ are themselves myths if considered at a meta-
level. In short, ‘The radical overcoming of metaphysics cannot be reduced 
to the pure and simple legitimisation of myth, ideology, and the Pascalian 
leap of faith’ (Vattimo 2002a: 21).  
The radical overcoming of metaphysics can be looked at from a 
different angle, though, and that is through the philosophy of Heidegger, 
specifically that Being is not to be identified with a stable foundation, but as 
an event, that our experience is only ever given within a horizon. Here the 
radical overcoming of metaphysics involves a leap, not of faith, but into 
tradition: ‘Heidegger believes that to think of Being as event means 
recollecting Being’s history: for him, Denken is andenken’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
22). The link with tradition which makes thinking possible is an engagement 
with traces of Being’s past that constitutes a weakening. This weakening is 
attributed by Vattimo to the Christian inheritance in the West, as we are 
‘heirs of a tradition that has absorbed ‘Christian’ values like brotherhood, 
charity and non-violence’ (Vattimo 2002a: 23-24). These Christian ideas at 
root come from the incarnation, God’s kenosis. Heidegger’s emphasis on the 
inescapability of tradition entails we should look back and see what has led 
to the history of the weakening of Being: ‘the history of Being as a destiny 
of weakening, cannot be separated from the tradition to which it belongs’ 
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(Vattimo 2002a: 24). Vattimo refers to a ‘family resemblance,’ not a logical 
one, but of one between the biblical message and a philosophy of weakening 
(Vattimo 2002a: 23-24). Therefore, Vattimo sees the history of Being as a 
weakening as ‘secularisation,’ that the ‘weakening of Being realises itself as 
the kenosis of God’ (Vattimo 2002a: 24). 
The function of the ‘death of God’ in Vattimo’s text here in Chapter 
One of After Christianity is to frame the situation of the return to religion in 
late-modernity to set it up as a cultural horizon of the liberation of metaphor 
and of the dissolution of the idea of objective, foundational truth. Vattimo 
makes clear that the God killed by the faithful (Vattimo 2002a: 26) is the 
‘moral-metaphysical’ God. For Vattimo this act leaves room for a return to 
religion. In Belief it is also clear that it is the ontotheological God who has 
been killed, although the link is made via Girard’s notion of the ‘natural 
sacred’ rather than through Nietzsche. In short, the death of God is the 
description of the hermeneutical nihilism of late-modernity. The link 
between the incarnation and the death of God occurs through the ‘family 
resemblance’ Vattimo writes about but does not define (Vattimo 2002a: 25), 
for the death of God takes on a normative quality when it is seen in this light 
(the Italian is ‘parentala,’ the same word as is used when the same phrase of 
Wittgenstein’s is translated into Italian). As it stands, the death of God in 
Nietzschean terms alone creates the problems expressed in the paradox of 
the liberation of metaphor, for it could lead only to a recognition of 
philosophy’s weakness, leaving the door open to the ‘Pascalian Wager’ 
arguments of philosophers such as Derrida and Levinas (at least as Vattimo 
interprets their philosophies). Again, Vattimo does not argue convincingly 
against these ‘negative’ philosophers, unless one sides with his 
interpretation of Heidegger as a nihilist, and that the death of God has its 
‘family resemblance’ in Heidegger’s notion of the history of Being as 
weakening. Vattimo brackets Derrida and Levinas with theologians such as 
Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, as well as ‘death of God’ theologians 
Altizer, Van Buren, Hamilton and Cox (Vattimo 2002a: 36-37). All of these 
thinkers, in Vattimo’s view, ignore the incarnation and have a transcendent, 
‘other’ God who is ‘the same old God of metaphysics’ (Vattimo 2002a: 38). 
Altizer does take the incarnation seriously (Harris 2011), and Vattimo does 
not distinguish between different types of transcendence; Levinas’ God is 
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not the same metaphysical God as that found in medieval ontotheology 
(Baird 2007). Nonetheless, Vattimo sees his ‘left Heideggerian’ approach as 
a transcription of the biblical message of weakening as preventing a retreat 
into Otherness which would be as violent as the strong authoritarian 
ecclesiastical structures he wishes to dissolve through the ethical principle 
of charity. Essentially what Vattimo is doing by unfolding the idea of the 
death of God in Nietzschean, Heideggerian, and biblical terms (liberation of 
metaphor, weakening of Being, and secularisation as kenosis) is explaining 
the need in his thought for the family resemblance, justifying his ‘historical’ 
approach over and against that of the negative philosophers. Here in the first 
chapter of After Christianity, Vattimo is drawing upon Nietzsche’s notion of 
the death of God to explain in more detail the backdrop to his thoughts in 
Belief. However, in explaining the ‘family resemblance,’ Vattimo is making 
a deeper philosophical link between the ideas of Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
the biblical message, which is a development not found in Belief, where the 
main link is between Heidegger’s notion of metaphysics as a history of 
weakening of Being and the biblical message.   
 
iii) Chapter Eight of After Christianity: The death of God on the cross 
and the subjective turn 
Two of the biggest differences between Belief and After Christianity are the 
link between Christianity and the subjective turn of the fabulisation of the 
world and the emphasis Vattimo places in Chapter Eight on the death, rather 
than just the incarnation, of Jesus Christ. Belief spoke of a simple message 
of friendship on God’s part after having humiliated himself by stepping 
down from his transcendence, but there is a more Nietzschean message of 
truth dissolving itself in After Christianity. A parallel is drawn between the 
death of God in Nietzsche’s thought and the death of Christ on the cross. 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of the moral-metaphysical God is a 
‘repetition’ of Christ’s death, for it is akin to Dostoyevsky’s choice for 
Christ at the price of truth (Vattimo 2002a: 104; see also Vattimo 2004: 46, 
50). The traditional interpretation of Jesus being ‘the way, the truth, and the 
life’ is to identify Christ with truth, and therefore loving truth more than 
Plato is loving Christ, with the latter allowing the identification of 
redemption with knowledge of unchanging foundational structures (Vattimo 
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2002a: 104-105). Dostoyevsky, in separating love of Christ from love of 
truth, is praised by Vattimo for overcoming this classical, traditional 
identification and therefore marks a change in interpretation, being in 
Vattimo’s eyes closer to the Gospel than thinkers before him. Nietzsche is 
even closer to the Gospel message than Dostoyevsky for Vattimo in that the 
death of God is the death of the moral-metaphysical God, the ultimate 
symbol of truth with a capital ‘T.’ Why and how Vattimo brings in Jesus 
Christ’s death and ‘sacrifice’ here is unclear, especially as elsewhere 
Vattimo writes against the logic of seeing his death as a sacrifice (Vattimo 
1999: 37).  
Vattimo goes on to make large leaps in logic, between ‘the death of 
Jesus narrated by the Gospels’ and ‘what Heidegger calls the end of 
metaphysics’ (Vattimo 2002a: 105). This nihilism ‘is the loss of credence in 
an objective truth in favour of a perspective that conceives truth as an effect 
of power in the manifold sense of this expressions…the active will of 
subjects’ (Vattimo 2002a: 105). This may not seem clear at present, but will 
be unpacked momentarily. Nonetheless, the key factor to consider in the 
history of weakening is that the message of Jesus (and Jesus’ message) is 
one of a turn inward that reduced external objectivist truth claims and ended 
up pushing subjective certainty to breaking point in the end of metaphysics. 
There is a link, then, between the death of Jesus Christ on the cross for his 
message of love and end of servitude in favour of friendship as an event in 
distant history on the one hand, and the realisation in the works of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger that objective truth is an expression of the subjective will 
leading to the dissolution of all objective truth claims in exchange value on 
the other. The death of God is the death of a belief in an objective world 
order, or ‘what Heidegger calls the end of metaphysics’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
105). This is done by realising that ‘there is no ‘objective,’ ontological truth 
that might be upheld as anything other than friendship, will to power, or 
subjective bond’ (Vattimo 2002a: 105). According to Vattimo,  
Christianity is the condition that paved the way for the dissolution of 
metaphysics and for its replacement by gnoseology—in Dilthey’s 
terms, by Kantianism. The principles that inspired Descartes and 
Kant—the emphasis on the subject, the foundation of knowledge on 
a self-certain interiority- are the same ones that hold sway in modern 
philosophy (Vattimo 2002a: 107). 
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In other words, Christianity was the driving force behind the 
subjective turn inward. This is linked to one of Vattimo’s favourite 
Nietzschean passages, ‘How the Real World Became a Fable’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 111; see also Vattimo 2004: 46). The Platonic realm had ideas 
outside space and time, which Christianity turns inward ‘putting at the 
centre the will rather than the intellect’ (Vattimo 2002a: 106). Over time, 
the Christian thread reappears in Kantianism, where the a priori synthetic 
judgements of the individual subject constitute reality. This lends itself, 
gradually, to be weakened into the form of perspectivism put forward by 
Nietzsche. This Nietzschean narrative of how the world became a fable can 
be found in Belief, too, although without a reference to Christianity’s role in 
the subjective turn (Vattimo 1999: 29-30). In short, Vattimo uses a 
combination of Dilthey and Nietzsche to indicate with greater precision than 
in Belief Christianity’s role in fabling the world. Dilthey argued that 
Christianity inaugurated an important moment in the history of metaphysics 
by contributing to the formation of the subject. By virtue of a message of 
brotherly love through faith, Christians turned inwards, away from concern 
with Messianic-inspired political hopes (for Jews) or the Platonic forms (for 
gentile converts) (Dilthey 1979: 229). The turn inwards, inspired by God’s 
message of unconditional love for all through friendship in the message of 
kenosis, became lost or downplayed due to the absorption of Christianity in 
the Roman Empire, with men such as Augustine doing all that was required 
to maintain civilisation in face of its collapse. Although Vattimo does not 
spell it out, there is the implication in his thought that the turn inward under 
Paul and Augustine feeds into the history of metaphysics as trace picked up 
on by Descartes, leading to the mastery of the world in the Ge-Stell and the 
first flashing up of Ereignis. 
 Where does kenosis come into the picture, for is this ‘subjective 
turn’ a new argument not found in Beyond Interpretation and Belief? A link 
is made implicitly when Vattimo states that, ‘The death of the moral God 
marks the impossibility of preferring truth to friendship, because the 
meaning of that death is that there is no ‘objective’ ontological truth that 
might be upheld as anything other than friendship’ (Vattimo 2002a: 104-
105), that is, the state of nihilism. The ‘truth’ and ‘friendship’ distinction is 
a long-standing play on Aristotle’s phrase that he would prefer truth to 
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being a friend of Plato’s. Nevertheless, the ‘friendship’ theme is reminiscent 
of the ‘kenotic’ biblical quotation from John 15:15, that one is now called to 
be friends of God, not his servants, a key argument more clearly stated in 
Belief. What Vattimo means here, then, is that Nietzsche’s death of God 
opens us up to a return to weakened religion, one without the violent 
metaphysical God of the natural sacred. Paradoxically, of course, Vattimo is 
also suggesting with his notion of the subjective turn inward that 
Christianity instigated the return through its slow corrosion of belief in an 
objective external truth as presence through emphasis on a shared 
brotherhood based on faith. Kenosis as a term, though, is not explicitly 
present in this argument. Indeed, in some later works of Vattimo’s this 
notion of the subjective turn inward is put forward as Vattimo’s main 
argument for the historical grounding of hermeneutical nihilism in 
Christianity, with kenosis as a term not mentioned at all, a point taken up 
and developed further in Part Two (Vattimo 2006). To find the kenotic link, 
one has to read between the lines. Nevertheless, ‘incarnation’ as a term is 
still present, as is the argument presented in a different way than in Belief, 
that the kernel of the gospel is preferring friendship to truth or, better, 
interpreting truth as being synonymous with friendship. In fact, what 
Vattimo does here in After Christianity is to fill in some of the ‘how’ of 
secularisation. The process of secularisation in Belief is recorded only 
piecemeal, not really as a process at all, drawing on concrete, discrete 
examples such as Weber on the Protestant work ethic, the transformation 
from ‘divinely sanctioned constitutional monarchy’ to representative 
democracies, Elias’ views on the secularisation of the subject (Vattimo 
1999: 41-42). Even Vattimo himself realises that ‘It might be remarked that 
the extension of the notion of secularization to phenomena that are so 
different borders on the arbitrary’ (Vattimo 1999: 42).  
By linking kenosis and secularisation to Nietzsche’s ‘how the world 
became a fable’ and Dilthey’s history of the turn to the subject, Vattimo 
makes his argument for secularisation as a process tighter, although 
conditional on convincing his readers that Christianity did effect such a 
subjective turn inward. In Chapter Eight of After Christianity, Vattimo 
outlines his interpretation of what Dilthey meant by the ‘subjective turn’ 
effected by Christianity. The central contrast is between pre-Christian 
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metaphysics, represented by Plato, and the change brought about in this by 
the Christian message. As is well known, very early on in the history of 
Christianity the gentile mission led to the message of the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus being clothed in the garments of Greek philosophy, 
especially Middle Platonism and Stoicism. Justin Martyr (c. 100-165 CE) 
heads a list of Apologists who were highly educated, willing and able to use 
philosophical terminology to explain and defend their new faith. Whereas 
Plato’s concept of Being, on Dilthey’s view, is an external ‘phenomenon’ 
(the ‘ideas’), ‘Christianity shifts the attention of thought inward, putting at 
the centre the will rather than the intellect’ (Vattimo 2002a: 106). Vattimo 
quotes from Dilthey’s Einleitung: ‘For the Greek mind, knowing was 
mirroring an objective thing in the intelligence. Now [i.e., in Christianity], 
experience becomes the focal point…With the enormous interest they 
generate, experiences of the will and of the heart swallow up every other 
object of knowledge’ (Vattimo 2002a: 106-107). Christianity for Dilthey 
inaugurates the turn away from the external world of knowledge to the inner 
experience of the will. 
Vattimo tends to rely heavily on particular scholars to shoulder 
significant elements of his interpretation of Christianity. Just as Vattimo 
depends upon Girard as an anthropologist not only for distinguishing 
Christianity from ‘violent’ natural religions, but also on for the notion of the 
natural sacred (Ten Kate 2002), Vattimo requires Dilthey’s contribution in 
order to explain why and how Christianity inaugurated a weakening of 
metaphysics. Of course, unlike with the case of Girard, Vattimo refers to 
many more philosophers than just Dilthey. Nevertheless, there is a sense 
that without Dilthey’s contribution, Vattimo would be left only with 
piecemeal examples of secularisation, such as the theories and examples of 
Weber and Elias, along with isolated and ambiguous Bible passages such as 
John 15:15 as ‘evidence’ of weakening. In other words, Dilthey is important 
to Vattimo, for without it he has little to support his ‘experimental’ theology 
when it comes for justifying his interpretation of Christianity as the message 
with secularisation as its essence, that it is the ‘Trojan horse’ to dissolve 
strong structures in metaphysics and religion. 
How strong is Dilthey’s argument, at least insofar as Vattimo 
interprets it? There is precious little on Dilthey’s understanding of 
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Christianity as creating an inward turn in his Introduction to the Human 
Sciences; as was mentioned above, there is a brief comment from Dilthey 
that Christianity made humans turn inwards due to the importance of 
brotherly love through faith, rather than some outward signifier such as race, 
nationality or social status (Dilthey 1979: 229). Despite the lack of 
development on Dilthey’s part of this idea, there are two ways of analysing 
the distinction Vattimo sees Dilthey making between Platonic and Christian 
metaphysics. Firstly, one can question the extent to which Platonic ideas are 
‘external’ to the subject. Secondly, one can assess how far it is accurate to 
state that Christianity effected a turn away from ‘knowledge’ of external 
things in favour of an inward turn towards the ‘will.’ On the issue of 
whether Platonic ideas are ‘external’ to the knowing subject, some scholars 
interpret Plato as holding that these ‘forms’ are objects of knowledge in the 
sense that they are literally transcendent things with an independent 
ontological status (Prior 1985). Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the 
forms in a very different way. ‘For the early Greeks,’ writes Waugh and 
Wilkinson, ‘language naturally maps what is real, and this mapping does not 
occur across the ontological and epistemological gulf posited by modern 
theories of representation. The logical space of reasons is not confined to 
thoughts and statements that represent objects in a world that neither thinks 
nor talks’ (Waugh and Wilkinson 2002: 222). Waugh and Wilkinson argue 
that the distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ is a modern one that 
is read back into ancient texts. This may well be Vattimo’s own approach, 
but it is to be expected as being a trait of his hermeneutical enterprise, 
reinterpreting traces of the past in the light of his current experience of 
living after the death of God in the irreducible plurality of the late modern.  
 
c) The status of kenosis 
The role of Dilthey in Vattimo’s work raises the question about the extent to 
which it is important whether kenosis ‘really happened,’ either as an 
historical event or as a linguistic tradition. Sometimes Vattimo seems to 
refer to kenosis in a way that implies he thinks of the event as a historical 
event, as Gewesen (having been) rather than Überlieferung (tradition), of 
the Son becoming ‘human in the bosom of Mary’ (Vattimo 2002a: 60). 
However, in After Christianity Vattimo clarifies how he understands the 
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ontological status of kenosis, drawing upon Gadamer’s notion of 
Wirkungsgeschichte (‘effective history’) (Vattimo 2002a: 112). Guarino 
elaborates on what this phrase means: ‘This term, popularized by Gadamer, 
reminds us that we exist, inescapably, within the horizons of the founding 
events and stories that define our culture’ (Guarino 2009: 99). The 
incarnation is not a historical event, but a symbol which exerts a tremendous 
influence over Western civilisation, ‘one of the major accounts which has 
established the horizon within which we exist’ (Guarino 2009: 99-100). 
Some commentators on Vattimo’s work have criticised this 
understanding of kenosis for not conforming to orthodoxy or to the biblical 
text. Frascati-Lochhead states, for instance, that Vattimo’s view of kenosis 
is flawed for not taking into account the ‘glory’ of God which the Son will 
inherit from God which Hebrews 1:1-2a indeed mentions (Frascati-
Lochhead 1998: 155). Similarly, with Philippians 2, Depoortere argues that 
‘Vattimo’s version of kenosis is a very poor one. He only reads half of the 
Christological hymn found in Philippians 2 and simply skips the part in 
which the exaltation of Christ is mentioned’ (Depoortere 2008a: 21). In 
other words, both of these commentators think that Vattimo has chosen to 
include in his interpretation of Scripture the aspects of it that will fit with his 
notion of Christianity as a stimulus for weakening. On the surface, these 
commentators could be understood as making a flat-footed complaint about 
orthodoxy of interpretation or trying to invoke metaphysical dogmas. 
However, if kenosis is ‘effective history,’ the resurrection of Jesus is as 
important as his incarnation and death. In fact, Girard argues that it is the 
resurrection that enabled the Gospels to be written at all, for before the 
Paraclete (the Spirit of the Lord acting as a ‘defence’ lawyer for the 
disciples) enabled the disciples to see the risen Christ, they were involved in 
scapegoating, too (Girard 2006: 104-105). Without taking the resurrection 
into account, Vattimo’s account of the effective history of Jesus Christ is 
one-sided.  
There are ways around this problem that are consistent with 
Vattimo’s reading of kenosis, although it would mean drawing upon Rudolf 
Bultmann, a theologian about whom Vattimo has mixed feelings. On the 
one hand, Bultmann had a lot to do with Heidegger. However, on the other 
hand not only was Bultmann caught up with Existentialism, but also he 
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bought into the modern myth of scientific progress. Bultmann is the most 
famous proponent of ‘demythologisation’ of the Bible, a fact Vattimo 
realises (Vattimo 1999: 54 n. 14). Bultmann wrote, ‘We cannot use electric 
lights and radios…and at the same time believe in the spirit and wonder 
world of the New Testament’ (Bultmann 1984: 4), and thought the ‘bizarre’ 
features of the Gospel which are not in keeping with the modern scientific 
worldview should be ‘demythologised’ to find the ‘kerygma’ (or ‘essence’) 
of the Gospel. The kerygma of the resurrection for Bultmann was not the 
literal rising of the body of Jesus from the dead, but the ‘rising’ of the 
Church. Bultmann’s emphasis on not reading certain elements of Scripture 
literally is in line with Vattimo’s programme, but most importantly this 
understanding of the resurrection allows Vattimo to make sense out of it as a 
piece of effective history without having to posit any metaphysical notions 
or supernatural entities. 
 
d) The importance of Joachim of Fiore for Vattimo’s notion of 
Christianity 
While Joachim appeared briefly in Beyond Interpretation, he did not figure 
in Belief. Nevertheless, there is a whole chapter devoted to his ideas in After 
Christianity. Joachim is used by Vattimo here to present another argument 
against negative/dialectical theology. In Beyond Interpretation, Joachim of 
Fiore was brought in by Vattimo to give evidence of resources within 
Christianity that looked to the future in which a ‘‘spiritual’ sense of the 
scriptures is increasingly in evidence, with charity taking the place of 
discipline’ (Vattimo 1997a: 49). However, Vattimo did not dwell long on 
his ideas, preferring instead to regard the task in hand as ‘a matter here of 
taking kenosis seriously’ (Vattimo 1997a: 49). In other words, at this point it 
is implied that Vattimo was trying to marshal a single argument for his 
insight, whereas the drift in After Christianity is towards a series of 
arguments to express his fundamental intuition that the horizon of late-
modernity is the result of the progression of the biblical message towards 
realising its essence as secularisation.  
What Joachim brings to the argument is his view of the Trinitarian 
historicity of revelation, something which Vattimo interprets as an 
expression of the eventual nature of Being. The eventual disclosure of late-
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modernity is the end of metaphysics and the rise of charity. In Joachim’s 
‘Trinitarian’ understanding of history, one cannot reduce the spirit to the 
letter and one should look for charitable, contemplative ways to weaken 
authoritarian attitudes and structures wherever one finds them. Vattimo 
traces the influence of Joachim in the centuries after he wrote, such as anti-
Protestantism in Novalis, and the analyses of Schleiermacher, Schelling and 
De Lubac. Secularisation, on this view, is the increasing spiritualisation of 
reading the Bible and of moving away from authoritarian literalism in 
religion. For Vattimo, this increasing spiritualisation is constitutive of 
modernity as the realisation of Christian history. The function of Joachim’s 
historical schema in Vattimo’s argument is to provide further justification 
for Vattimo eschewing negative theology, for the latter would (Vattimo 
names Barth, Derrida, Lévinas, Cox, Hamilton, Van Buren, and – 
curiously—Altizer, which I have shown elsewhere to be inaccurate—Harris 
2011), ‘go back to a theology of the first age, ignoring incarnation and 
consequently conceiving secularisation as the fall in which God’s 
transcendence as the wholly other can be revealed’ (Vattimo 2002a: 37). 
Vattimo is, therefore, working throughout After Christianity on semantic 
fields, grouping together notions such as ‘literalist,’ ‘metaphysical,’ 
‘violent,’ ‘Old Testament’ and ‘natural sacred’ on the one hand, and 
‘spiritual,’ ‘New Testament,’ ‘charity,’ ‘kenosis,’ ‘secularisation,’ and 
‘weakening’ on the other. Other critics have noted this, and it has led them 
to question whether Vattimo deliberately polarises the testaments, widening 
the breach between Judaism and Christianity, perhaps even making the latter 
supersede the former (Depoortere 2008a). It has been argued that anyone 
who introduces Joachim’s ideas runs the risk of supersessionism in the 
Trinity (Caputo 2007), and it is only a small step between identifying the 
‘Father’ with Judaism and the ‘Son’ and ‘Spirit’ with Christianity, 
something that will be looked at more closely later in Part One. 
 
e) History of Salvation, History of Interpretation 
So far I have shown how Vattimo has fleshed-out how kenosis as 
secularisation works for him by drawing more not only on Nietzsche, but 
also (more importantly) on Dilthey. In Chapter Four, Vattimo constructs 
another argument for the relationship between the incarnation, hermeneutics 
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and the history of salvation by focusing on the relationship between the 
history of salvation and the history of interpretation. Although he is 
reluctant to identify these two histories completely, of regarding one as 
merely another name for the other, he is aware that they are very closely 
linked. Starting with the incarnation, Vattimo reflects on the different ways 
in which ‘interpretation’ and ‘salvation’ are ‘joint’ in the Christian tradition 
(Vattimo 2002a: 59). At one level there is the ‘antithetical’ nature of Jesus’ 
sayings: “You heard it was said…, but I say…”. Although these are called 
‘Antitheses’ (Matthew Ch. 5), they are more to do with fulfilling the law 
through weakening, such as not loving only one’s neighbour, but also one’s 
enemy. Beyond the hermeneutical quality of Jesus’ sayings, that is, his self-
conscious interpretation of the Old Testament which, historically, was not 
unusual at all (rabbinical interpretation was common at the time, such as the 
schools of Hilel and Shammai), Vattimo argues that ‘the event of salvation 
(Jesus’ coming) is itself, deep down, a hermeneutical occurrence’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 59). However, Jesus can be claimed to be hermeneutical ‘only to a 
point.’ Jesus, as the Logos, is not only the ‘living interpretation’ of the 
Scriptures, but also their fulfilment. With this fulfilment goes a 
definitiveness, but yet also there awaits a further fulfilment. Here Vattimo 
gets closer to a reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, for he draws 
upon the notion of the Paraclete and the event of Pentecost. Indeed, ‘The 
Trinity is a hermeneutical structure par excellence, for the Son is the Logos 
of the Father and the Spirit is their relation, the hypostatising of their love-
understanding’ (Vattimo 2002a: 60).  
Reimagining traditional Christian doctrines in this way is interesting, 
but not without difficulties. For a start, the language of ‘hypostatising’ gets 
uncomfortably close to metaphysics, for it is not coincidental that patristic 
thought often conceived of the persons of the Trinity in terms of hypostases, 
concrete instantiations of an abstract essence. Secondly, Vattimo is keener 
on the Son and Spirit than the Father. In theological terms, is Vattimo’s 
Trinity supersessionist in its economy (unfolding of the Trinity)? Is the 
Father to be identified with the ‘natural sacred’ which is first broken down 
by the Son, that is, the weakening of sacral claims in the offer of friendship 
over servitude, to be spread by the Spirit as secularisation ever more clearly 
becomes a reality in modernity? It has already been shown that Vattimo 
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veers towards this understanding of the link between testaments in his 
reading of Joachim of Fiore, a concern that will be central in my analysis of 
Vattimo later when I address accusations that his understanding of 
Christianity is ‘supersessionist.’ Vattimo’s primary concern is showing how 
closely salvation is linked to the history of interpretation, all the while trying 
to secure the curiously, and typically, theological premise of the uniqueness 
and definitiveness of Jesus Christ: ‘It is true that the announcement of 
salvation is given once and for all—in Jesus and the prophets—but it is 
equally true that, having given itself, it needs interpretations that receive it, 
actualise it, and enrich it’ (Vattimo 2002a: 60). In other words, the Son is 
the message of kenotic caritas, that is, of friendship, of weakening—which 
requires further interpretations to realise itself, and it is the Spirit that 
enables this to occur. The Spirit is that of Pentecost, of many voices 
carrying the message. Salvation is a hermeneutical interface between the 
tradition which has as its kernel the kenotic message, and the creative 
interpretations of individuals of successive generations who heed its 
message of spiritualisation; a link to his concept of Verwindung is implicit. 
Vattimo is keen to stress it is not merely the ‘biological fact’ of new 
generations interpreting the kenotic message, but that this message sets off 
in a direction, and that is of spiritualisation, secularisation: ‘Jesus’ 
incarnation (the kenosis, the self-lowering of God), as an event both salvific 
and hermeneutical, is already indeed an archetypical occurrence of 
secularisation’ (Vattimo 2002a: 67). Ontological hermeneutics and ‘modern 
techno-science,’ in which metaphysics culminates, ‘spring from the action 
of the Christian message throughout the history of Western civilisation,’ that 
is, due to secularisation (Vattimo 2002a: 66-67). 
It is difficult to understand how, without appealing to supernatural or 
metaphysical arguments such as Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’ (where the 
Spirit seems to be going against its own purposes, in order to fulfil its 
purpose), one can guarantee this direction of weakening, this relationship 
between ‘Son’ and ‘Spirit’ without trivialising ‘weakening.’ Vattimo would 
point to the corrosive effect Christianity had on Greek metaphysics, as he 
did in Beyond Interpretation. However, this relationship between Greek 
thought and the Christian revelation could be read in other ways, as Savater 
mentions is carried out by John Gray in his book Straw Dogs (Savater 2007: 
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299). In a line of reasoning ‘opposite to Vattimo’s’ (Savater 2007: 299), 
Gray sees Christianity as introducing the value of truth into religion, 
whereas pagan polytheists had not been interested in metaphysics. Indeed, 
the Inquisition brought together the two forms of violence Vattimo conflates 
in his ‘family resemblance,’ the violence of metaphysics (closing debating, 
reducing Being to presence) and physical violence (of the natural sacred, of 
punishing people for heresy), and it is easier to see this as a result of the 
Christian message prioritising ‘truth’ over ‘friendship.’ Just as Vattimo has 
his favourite quotation from The Gospel of John in Chapter 15, verse 15, 
Gray could easily cherry-pick a quotation of Jesus’ and hang an 
interpretation of Christianity on it, such as Jesus saying that he is ‘the way 
and the truth and the life’ (John 14:6). The consistent use of the definite 
article in John 14:6 is inimical to the kind of hermeneutical plurality 
Vattimo seeks to express, explain, and reflect. Moreover, Rorty states that 
‘Vattimo turns away from the passages in the Epistle to the Romans that 
Karl Barth liked best, and reduces the Christian message to the passage in 
Paul that most other people like best: 1 Corinthians 13,’ that is, of the 
primacy of love (Rorty 2006: 35). The Epistle to the Romans contains 
phrases such as the ‘truth about God’ (Romans 1:25) which Barth 
interpreted in the strong sense. As for Barth, he wrote that ‘the Truth itself 
has proclaimed to us that Truth is Truth’ (Barth 1968: 298). The emphasis in 
Romans is more about truth than love, and Barth follows Paul’s lead 
wholeheartedly. The point is that one can select ‘love’ as the overriding 
message of the New Testament, but one can also emphasise ‘truth,’ too. 
Vattimo may respond that ‘truth’ is primarily ‘friendship.’ However, in John 
Chapter 1, in which ‘the Word became flesh’ (John 1:14), the Word is ‘full 
of grace and truth’ (John 1: 14) and is a ‘light’ so that people will ‘believe 
in’ him (John 1: 12). The emphasis in John 1 is not on truth as love or 
friendship, but on truth in relation to belief. Admittedly, truth here is not 
‘correspondence’ as adequatio between concept and thing in the sense 
identified by Heidegger as secondary in On the Essence of Truth, but of 
faith, which is akin Heidegger’s notion of truth as a mode of disclosure 
more fundamental than statements and their correspondence to reality. In his 
interpretation of Christianity, Vattimo is setting up an opposition between 
Christianity, subjectivity, and love on the one hand in which truth is 
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primarily friendship, and the objectivising metaphysics from Plato onwards 
in which truth is correspondence of language to objects external to thought. 
The third kind of truth he misses is the truth of faith, ironically of the value 
of ‘belief,’ the title of a book in which he says precious little about this 
concept. It is truth as belief, a faith in a transcendent God which has little or 
nothing to do with a correspondence theory of truth, which he neglects. 
What one finds, then, is that Vattimo creates Christianity in his image, 
something I will look at in more detail in the paragraphs on philosophy as 
autobiography near the end of Part Two. 
 
f) The West or Christianity: Andenken and radical historicity  
The chapters of After Christianity are quite unconnected apart from the 
broad thematic of dealing with Christianity. So far in Chapter Four, the 
main developments in Vattimo’s understanding of Christianity put forward 
in After Christianity have been outlined, such as his increased use of 
Nietzsche, the importance of Dilthey and Joachim in developing his notion 
of secularisation and his increasing willingness to identify the history of the 
West as the emergence of hermeneutics with the salvation history of 
Christianity. The remaining subsections of Chapter Four will look at other 
themes which come out of After Christianity, such as Vattimo’s view of the 
West and his views on violence, which will include some critical points in 
relation to this theme. 
In Chapter Five of After Christianity, ‘The West or Christianity,’ 
Vattimo argues that the experience of modernity ‘must be interpreted as the 
weakening of reality’s peremptoriness, and in a related sense, of 
authoritarianism in politics, of the strict hierarchical conception of the 
individual subject, and of direct violence’ (Vattimo 2002a: 82). This 
experience ‘must be considered in effect a Christian event…par 
excellence…, as attestation that the seed of the divine Word has borne fruit’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 82). Where Vattimo writes about the experience of 
modernity, though, he means for ‘us,’ that is, in the West: ‘not only is the 
West today only definable as a unified entity as secularised Christianity, but 
also, Christianity today rediscovers itself authentically only if it identifies 
itself as Western’ (Vattimo 2002a: 80). It is surprising not only how 
Eurocentric is Vattimo’s focus, but also how far he employs the language of 
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unity, necessity and teleology in his account. Even if one can accept his use 
of Joachim of Fiore, Vattimo still refers to the effective history of the 
incarnation as ‘a teleology in which every ontic structure is weakened in 
favour of ontological Being’ (Vattimo 2002a: 112).14  
The products of this Christian message, and by this Vattimo means 
the kenotic message, are not the Catechism of the Catholic Church, or 
Creationism, or anything else which seeks to ossify, dominate, or exclude. 
Instead, Vattimo sees Christianity in secularised notions such as 
‘communication, community, dialogue, consensus, democracy, etc.’—these 
are ‘conclusions’ of modern thought (Vattimo 2002a: 82). ‘To grasp and 
develop the meaning of these signs,’ Vattimo states, ‘is the task that today 
presents itself to those who profess to be openly Christian’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
82). Whether or not one is openly Christian, Vattimo likes to invoke 
Benedetto Croce’s phrase that we ‘cannot not call [our]selves Christians’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 82) in the West. Vattimo explicitly links the ‘West,’ 
‘Europe’ and ‘modernity, seeing them as synonymous (Vattimo 2002a: 73). 
At the root of the West, Europe, and modernity, Vattimo sees their 
constitutive character as ‘the civilisation of scientific, economic, and 
technological rationality’ (Vattimo 2002a: 75). Vattimo sees these traits as 
the secularised inheritance of monotheism and the Protestant work ethic, as 
well as drawing upon Colin Campbell’s research on the links between 
consumerism, the modern tendency towards fantasy, and the secularised 
inheritance of belief in other worlds. Along with the tendency of the modern 
towards democracy, Vattimo looks to interpret other phenomena, such as 
the ‘end of history’ and the breakdown of reality in the plurality of images 
as communicated by the mass media as examples of secularisation. At this 
point he cannot fully explain why and how this can be the case, even though 
he invokes the term ‘kenosis’ as a weakening of God in an attempt so show 
how the drift of Being as weakening has a Christian basis (Vattimo 2002a: 
80). That this link is not fully explained here in Chapter Five of After 
Christianity is to be expected, as the chapter was originally an essay from 
1993. From later works, though, such as Beyond Interpretation, Belief, and 
other chapters from After Christianity, we know that the message of kenotic 
caritas can lead to secularisation through its call to friendship and 
                                                 
14 This is a problem that shall be discussed later in Part One. 
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affirmation that God has spoken to his people in different ways, in other 
words to the reduction of value to exchange value and the archetype of 
hermeneutical plurality (respectively).  
Why can secularisation not be considered a ‘break’ with the 
Christian tradition? Surely it is possible to imagine that democracy, the 
society of mass communication, and increased dialogue are products of 
thought antithetical to Christianity, or at the very least seeing the latter as 
irrelevant? This is akin to the argument put forward by Hans Blumenberg, 
and it is rejected by Vattimo. In Chapter Five of After Christianity, Vattimo 
does not spend long explaining why Blumenberg is wrong, instead putting 
forward his own view of secularisation. Nevertheless, there is a hint 
concerning the reasoning behind Vattimo’s objection to Blumenberg which 
is given in the chapter that is developed more in his work elsewhere. 
Blumenberg’s view, in Vattimo’s opinion, ‘ignores the hermeneutic 
circularity into which every existence is de facto thrown’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
74). Vattimo invokes his favourite quotation of Croce’s, ‘We cannot but call 
ourselves Christians’ to this end. 
 
g) Christianity and violence 
Chapter Nine is an investigation of the link between Christianity and 
violence, picking up themes from his earlier work and expanding on them. 
Vattimo gets close to a definition of metaphysical violence, which is the 
main type of violence with which he is concerned (although he does slip 
between this kind of violence and physical violence, especially in his use of 
Girard’s ‘scapegoat mechanism’ in which a victim would be killed to 
appease the masses, with little acknowledgement of a change in direction). 
‘Metaphysical violence is,’ Vattimo writes, ‘all identification between law 
and nature, which has dominated the traditional teaching of the Church’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 114). Aquinas’ ‘Natural Moral Law’ is a case in point. 
Astutely, Vattimo declares that violence of this kind is permitted by all who 
ignore Hume’s Law, that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from a ‘is,’ that is, 
that one cannot formulate a normative ethical argument based on descriptive 
premises. Vattimo speculates on the origins of natural law, reasoning with a 
degree of probability that natural law, natural rights and other such notions 
were invented to prevent bloodshed in society, that is, natural law has its 
127 
 
origins in violence. The link between natural laws, theism and atheism, and 
the death of God becomes much clearer in later works which elaborate on 
themes found in After Christianity. In Christianity, Truth, and Weakening 
Faith: A Dialogue, Vattimo states that his ‘atheism’ is of disregarding the 
idolatrous link between God and the laws of nature (Vattimo 2006: 34). 
Laws of nature make it easy to do violence by imposing upon others 
‘natural’ modes of ethics, such as ethics pertaining to human relationships 
and bioethics, on all sorts of issues ranging from contraception to the role of 
women, abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering and more besides. Focus 
on natural laws takes on a more political aspect, implicitly at least, in that 
attributing supreme value to laws of nature is dangerous due to the fact that 
people will always claim to know them better than you (Vattimo 2006: 36), 
resulting in a broadly Platonic ‘philosopher king’ kind of technocracy 
(Vattimo 2011), a theme Vattimo has developed ever more in recent years 
and that will be picked up and critiqued in a later chapter. 
To analyse the complex link between Christianity and violence, 
Vattimo draws upon the twin figures of Dilthey and Girard. As was shown 
earlier, the former posited, like Vattimo, that Christianity was the 
‘beginning of the end of metaphysics’ (Vattimo 2002a: 115-116), but that 
metaphysics carried on long past the inauguration of the kenotic message 
due to cultural conditions because ‘the Church inherited the historical 
structures of antiquity, and in order to ensure its survival had to preserve 
that culture. Thus Saint Augustine is at once the philosopher of the 
Confessions and the bishop who exercises historical and political power’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 116). Vattimo consciously goes further than Dilthey by 
using Girard to ‘radicalise’ Dilthey’s thesis, using Girard here in a clearer 
and slightly different way than in earlier works. The ‘victim-based 
mechanism’ recurs in the history of Christianity which explains why 
violence comes to the surface at various points in time. Given his long-
standing linking of Girard with Heidegger, Vattimo sees the deep-rooted 
mimetic violence as equivalent to metaphysics in terms of being 
ineradicable and central to being human, that it can be weakened and 
twisted but not overcome completely (Vattimo 2002a: 116).  
Not only does Vattimo make it clear how violence remains in 
Christianity more than it should through ecclesiastical authoritarianism, but 
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also he attempts to account for how it entered Christianity. Vattimo sees 
multiple factors at work, from the example taken from Dilthey of Augustine 
as representative of the responsibility of Christianity had as the only 
remaining temporal power in late-antiquity, to the ‘classical identification’ 
between ‘Christian existence with the philosophical existence: the human 
being can realise humanity fully by rising to the knowledge of the first 
principles’ (Vattimo 2002a: 117). As Vattimo states, the latter notion has 
little to do with caritas: ‘What ultimately matters is knowledge of the truth’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 117). Natural law, Vattimo argues, belongs to this 
tradition, and is a ‘manifestation of hubris’ and a source of further violence 
‘through the imposition of the natural law against the will of men’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 118). So violence enters Christianity: a) because of its role in 
temporal power, b) because of its relation to philosophy. Does Vattimo 
therefore have to separate Christianity from philosophy? To an extent, yes, 
as he recognises a domain apart from philosophy called ‘Theology’ 
(Vattimo 1997a: x), and that Christianity is based on a message about a 
personal God which never claims to be subject to proof. Beyond the 
theoretical dimension of ‘Theology,’ moreover, Vattimo sees Christianity as 
putting together religious violence (Girard) and metaphysical violence 
(Heidegger’s history of metaphysics) (Vattimo 1999: 38-39). I believe that 
more could be made of this cross-contamination of disciplines and forms of 
life, that this exchange of methods and principles between disciplines opens-
up an alternative, albeit related, history of weakening which avoids some of 
the problems endemic to Vattimo’s style of thought. The latter’s problems 
will be explored later in this part and my solution will be presented in the 
Conclusion.  
Vattimo aims to rethink Christianity in relation to metaphysics and 
violence. It is not possible to overcome metaphysics, to be able, for 
instance, to think of metaphysics as something other than the application of 
first principles. In this regard, Vattimo is following Heidegger. Vattimo 
aims not at an overcoming, but a twisting, of metaphysics, which is 
something he relates to Girard. Vattimo sees ‘secularisation as the 
continuation of Christian revelation’s saving action’ (Vattimo 2002a: 119). 
Jesus’ sacrifice, for Vattimo, exposes the victim-based logic of the natural 
sacred. Whereas Girard the revelation of the sacrifice of Jesus as revealing 
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an anthropological fact, about the victimary mechanism, Vattimo sees it as a 
message that calls for redeeming and weakening (Vattimo 2006: 45). 
Victim-based logic, like metaphysics on Heidegger’s view, cannot be 
overcome, only verwunden. Therefore, it, and thus violence, has to be a part 
of the Christian message, even if it is twisted. If Jesus was priest and 
sacrifice, then he did not undergo violence at the hands of another, but ‘If 
the remission of sins requires sacrifice, it confirms the logic of the victim-
based mechanism, for the God who demands the satisfaction of ‘justice’ is 
still conceived of as the violent God of natural religions’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
120).  
Curiously, Vattimo states that ‘if Jesus’ free sacrifice was inspired 
by something other than the victim-based logic, then we must take seriously 
the idea that it demands to be understood as kenotic salvation’ whereby 
‘Kenosis is not a ransom but ransom itself’ (Vattimo 2002a: 120). This is 
very cryptic—what does ‘ransom itself’ really mean? What Vattimo is 
trying to do is unclear. If one introduces victim-based logic into kenosis one 
would, as Vattimo realises, be returning to Girard’s thesis after all. It would 
be clearer if Vattimo explained the parallel between the persistence and 
impossibility of overcoming victim-based logic and metaphysics through an 
analogy to Ge-Stell/Ereignis, that the victim-based mechanism had to reach 
its apex, through the murder of a person both innocent and divine, in order 
for its logic to break down. In a similar way that one cannot talk about 
Being and beings without metaphysical language leading one to twist and 
weaken rather than overcome, one cannot talk about the exposure of the 
mechanism without remembering victim-based logic. Vattimo explains the 
persistence of metaphysics (and therefore, if metaphysics is a transcription 
of the Girardian notion of violence, the victim-based mechanism) in a 
clearer way in his dialogue with Rorty and Zabala in The Future of Religion 
a few years later. Here Vattimo states that ‘Metaphysics has survived 
because (and together with) the ancient structure of ‘power’ has survived. 
So, for instance, the Christian church, being the head of the Roman Empire, 
could not abandon this structure of power and was not able to develop all 
the antimetaphysical implications of Christianity’ (Vattimo 2004: 62). As 
the Roman Church has survived and often resists change, therefore the 
antimetaphysical implications of the Gospel have still not been fully 
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developed within this institution, even if they are increasingly realised 
without it.  
 
Chapter Five: Vattimo, Gauchet and the Löwith-Blumenberg debate15 
 
a) Vattimo and the Löwith-Blumenberg debate 
Where does Vattimo’s ‘return to religion’ sit in relation to contemporary 
thought on secularisation and/or the postmodern in relation to the place of 
religion in cultural thought in the twentieth century? Despite his interest in 
secularisation and the history of ideas, Vattimo has not engaged with 
mainstream discourse on secularisation, the Löwith-Blumenberg debate, in 
his mature works on Christianity. The most sustained discussion of this 
debate in Vattimo’s work is in an essay entitled ‘L’Occident o la 
Christianità’ (‘The West or Christianity’) from 1993, predating his chapter 
on Christianity in Beyond Interpretation by a year. This essay appeared later 
as part of After Christianity. Although this essay predates Vattimo’s 
elaborate working-out of all the details of his understanding of Christianity, 
the bare bones are there as he has already included the terms ‘kenosis,’ 
‘charity’ and ‘secularisation’ (Vattimo 2002a: 72, 80, 82). Therefore, it is 
fair to say that this essay is representative of Vattimo’s views on the debate 
in relation to his marginally later work on Christianity, which was probably 
one reason why he selected the essay to appear alongside his Italian 
Academy Lectures in After Christianity. It is to these views of Vattimo’s on 
Blumenberg that we now turn. 
 In ‘The West or Christianity,’ Vattimo understands Blumenberg’s 
argument to entail that modernity has replaced ‘Copernican man’ with 
‘Ptolemaic man,’ i.e., the human who has thrown-off placed reason as the 
final authority in all matters. This is a human being who has jettisoned the 
eschatological legacy of their Judaeo-Christian heritage having cultivated a 
disposition ‘to organize reality in accordance with a rationality that is 
entirely independent from any utopia’ (Vattimo 2002a: 70-71). Describing 
this relationship between Christianity and the West as ‘insufficient and 
untenable,’ Vattimo sees Blumenberg’s interpretation as stemming from ‘an 
                                                 
15 This chapter is based on Matthew E. Harris, “Gianni Vattimo’s Theory of Secularisation 
in Relation to the Löwith-Blumenberg Debate,” The Heythrop Journal (2015a) Early view 
DOI: 10.1111/heyj.12309. 
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excessive dose of confidence in the possibility of the radically new and an 
overall emphasis on the creativity, originality, and absolute freedom of man’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 71). Vattimo identifies Blumenberg’s thesis with Catholic 
‘reactionary’ efforts to see modernity as something apart from, and even 
against, the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Both views make ‘panoramic’ 
claims, making judgements about modernity from ‘outside’ (that is, from 
beyond modernity), claiming to be immune from the ways of thinking of 
modernity (Vattimo 2002a: 72). Vattimo is critical of such an attempt, not 
least because he feels it is impossible to be completely free from the effects 
of any period of thinking in history, even if these traces of thought seem 
somewhat alien, mythological and ill-fitting. This thesis means ‘above all 
that secularization is not a radical abandonment or break, since this would 
imply the possibility of an absolutely new beginning, of the kind 
conceptualized by Blumenberg…This view, I argue, ignores the 
hermeneutic circularity into which every existence is de facto thrown’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 73-74). On Vattimian terms, this move makes sense, as we 
cannot escape the linguistic traditions into which we are thrown. If language 
is the house of Being and thinking is thinking of Being, then any attempt at 
a new foundation of thought cannot but have recourse to prior thinking, and 
this goes not only for the move to modernity, but also to postmodernity; 
Vattimo’s contribution to these two debates is to emphasise the necessity of 
continuity at the linguistic level, which for him is the only level there is. 
This is not to say that modernity did not alter the way we think, but on 
Vattimian lines it is wrong to think that any stage in the history of Being 
involves radical discontinuity with a previous stage. It is for this reason that 
Vattimo thinks the postmodern, too, is not a radical break with the modern, 
but a continuation which is also a distortion. This is why Vattimo is against 
other Neo-Marxist approaches to the postmodern condition, such as 
Gramsci’s ideas on ‘hegemony,’ which encourage a new set of values, a 
new beginning or utopian ideals. How, though, should one conceive of this 
continuity? To answer this question, it is to Vattimo’s views on Löwith’s 
work that we shall soon turn. 
 Before we turn to Vattimo’s views on Löwith, it is worth pointing 
out that Vattimo creates something of a straw person out of Blumenberg, or 
at the very least caricatures his position. This is because Blumenberg was 
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not naïve enough to believe in radical discontinuity. He thought that there 
was continuity in the ‘function’ of ideas based on human needs, even if the 
‘content’ of the ideas changes. Ideas can be ‘reoccupied’ by ideas that are 
even diametrically opposed in content if they somehow fulfil the same need 
(Wallace 1983: xxvi). For example, God used to be the guarantor of 
certainty, which then became replaced with Descartes’ Cogito (to run the 
risk of oversimplifying). Both ideas function in analogous ways with 
content which is nonetheless heterogeneous. Despite this added complexity, 
one which raises a number of questions about the nature, origins and 
veracity of the claims concerning these needs and functions, Vattimo would 
find reasons to disagree with Blumenberg. Primarily, and decisively for 
Vattimo, he would object to what he would perceive as the anthropological 
notion of ‘need’ underpinning ideas; he would see this as ‘factual,’ which is 
also where Vattimo parts ways with Girard (Vattimo 2010b: 86). Whereas 
Girard sees his own research as factual and precluding theorising history as 
one of secularisation, Vattimo interprets it as a reading of history. 
Blumenberg’s talk of ‘needs’ and ‘functions’ would appear to sociological-
anthropological and therefore as assuming a fixed human nature. In turn this 
objection raises the larger issue of whether Vattimo is correct in his 
hermeneutical nihilism, that there are ‘no facts, only interpretations.’ This 
question is too large a diversion for this paper as it gets to the heart of 
Vattimo’s entire philosophical style. Nevertheless, it is briefly worth 
considering Girard’s own reply to Vattimo. In the context of discussing 
Nietzsche’s aphorism, much used by Vattimo, that there are ‘no facts, only 
interpretations,’ Girard acknowledges its rhetorical importance against 
positivists but puts forward the view that this ‘cannot provide a functional 
theory of interpretation. To have nothing but interpretations is the same as 
having none’ (Girard 2010: 94). Girard does not spell out precisely why, but 
one can ponder his reasoning. For instance, hermeneutics might presume 
something like an intentional object: interpretation is ‘interpretation-of,’ and 
this cannot merely be another interpretation, for this would lead to an 
infinite regress of interpretations.  
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b) Vattimo and Löwith: A Meditation on Modernity 
Vattimo has written more on Löwith than he has on Blumenberg, which is 
not altogether surprising when one considers that Löwith’s was among the 
most important of the earlier interpretations of Nietzsche, one of Vattimo’s 
principal influences. I will not dwell on Vattimo’s reading of Löwith’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche except where it directly relates to Löwith’s views 
on secularisation. Vattimo was writing about Löwith before his ‘return to 
religion’ got underway. Nevertheless, his analysis of Löwith’s views on the 
‘legitimacy’ of the modern age help pave the way for his later return to 
religion. In his book Ethique de l’interprétation (1991), Vattimo writes ‘La 
modernité est l’époque de la legitimation métaphysico-historiciste; la post-
modernité est la mise en question explicite de ce mode de legitimation’ 
(Vattimo 1991: 17). In other words, post-modernity is the posing of a 
question of the legitimation of the modern age, and that the whole notion of 
legitimation loses its focus as a result of post-modernity. If the notion of 
legitimation is no longer to be taken into account, how else should Löwith’s 
thought on secularisation in relation to modernity be understood, or should 
it be ignored? 
The answer may come elsewhere, where Vattimo writes approvingly of 
Löwith’s views on history, but thinks he has not gone far enough, which for 
Vattimo means as far as Heidegger. Writes Vattimo, ‘for Löwith, as for 
Heidegger, Nietzsche stands at the end of the process of western thought, 
which Löwith characterizes as historicism, and the end leads to a sort of 
return, to the point of departure, to the experience of the pre-Socratics’ 
(Vattimo 2006b: 144). Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return of the same 
constitutes the existential crisis writ-large, of secularised Judaeo-Christian 
linearity running up against pre-Christian, Greek eternity. After this 
quotation, Vattimo goes on to mention that ‘Löwith does not, however, 
make the decisive leap that Heidegger makes, failing to see total 
technological dominion over the world as the very culmination of 
historicism and metaphysics… Löwith’s interpretations…remains 
profoundly linked to the spirit of existentialism’ (Vattimo 2006b: 144). 
Heidegger, through linking the end of history to technological domination, 
sees these phenomena jointly as disclosing ontologically the essence of 
technology as metaphysical and the latter as violent. For Vattimo, this gets 
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beyond the essentially humanistic (and therefore metaphysical) 
preoccupations of existentialism. What Vattimo appeals to the Heideggerian 
notion of Verwindung to show is that one cannot regard forms of historical 
continuity and discontinuity as ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate,’ but that one 
should think instead in terms of convalescence-distortion, a theme to which 
I shall return later (Vattimo 1991b: 18). 
 
c) The equivalence of Christianity with the West 
As Andreas Michel observes in a chapter in the volume Radical 
Secularization?, entitled ‘The Strength of Weakness: Vattimo and Gauchet 
on Secularization,’ Vattimo and Marcel Gauchet both offer alternatives not 
only to Löwith’s views, but also to Blumenberg’s on the matter of 
secularization in relation to modernity. Rather than having to see modernity 
as an illegitimate, secularised heir to Judaeo-Christian messianism (Löwith) 
or as radically new as a result of filling the void left by religious 
secularisation in ecclesiastical terms and from the complete transcendence 
of God in nominalism (Blumenberg), modernity for Vattimo and Gauchet 
follows a logic from within Christianity in the form of continuity. ‘This 
view,’ writes Michel, ‘locates the origin of secularization long before the 
rise of modernity’ (Michel 2015: 67). Michel emphasises how Marcel 
Gauchet’s views on secularisation are in some ways not too different from 
Vattimo’s own. For different reasons both thinkers regard the incarnation as 
being central to the history of the West and the inaugural point of 
secularisation. Gauchet, like Vattimo thought not only that the incarnation 
as central to the history of the West, but also that the world has been 
reduced to interpretation. Nevertheless, Gauchet considers transcendence to 
be a central category of Christian thought as the incarnation highlighted the 
irreducible otherness of the divine and the devaluing of the world. In the 
vacuum created by the absence of God and the gap created between the 
world and humans, humans are the creators of purpose and meaning. The 
world was an object to be studied and the human will was the source of 
purpose and meaning:  
As God withdrew, the world changed from something presented as 
unalterable to something to be constituted. God having become Other 
to the world, the world now became Other to humans, in two ways: 
by its objectivity at the level of representation, and by its ability to be 
transformed at the level of action (Gauchet 1997: 95). 
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The figure of the Messiah, built up in Jewish culture to be a powerful 
saviour figure such as Moses, was inverted through Christ, who combined 
divine favour and humanity in an everyday person far removed from power 
(Gauchet 1997: 119). This confused the world and pointed to divine 
otherness. By contrast, Vattimo argued that Christianity came to dissolve 
transcendence through kenosis. God moves ever closer to humans as their 
friend in what seems like an economic, modalistic Trinity in which the 
Father becomes the Son and then—in the ‘Age of Interpretation’—becomes 
the Spirit (Vattimo 2006a: 43). The Age of the Spirit/Interpretation is 
synonymous with the late-modern West, for Vattimo, as much as the Age of 
the Son was co-extensive with the rise of the Church up to the Reformation 
(at least). The Age of the Father, one assumes, was the pre-Christian age. 
For this Trinitarian historicism, Vattimo acknowledges a heavy debt to a 
(not particularly close) reading of Joachim of Fiore (Vattimo 2002a: 60). 
Against Blumenberg (and also analogous Catholic claims), Vattimo sees the 
West and Christianity as equivalent to one another, a view he puts forth in 
‘The West or Christianity.’ At this early stage of his meditations on the role 
of Christianity in the intellectual life of the West, Vattimo was putting 
forward a range of arguments to connect the two. Some of his arguments 
were not very convincing. For example, the recognition of the West’s 
Christian heritage is the only unifying factor for Europe after the fall of its 
enemy in Communism, or even the simple point of the religious ‘revival’ in 
the West is evidence of its unifying force (Vattimo 2002a: 74). Later on in 
time, in the essay ‘History of Salvation, History of Interpretation,’ Vattimo 
reiterates his earlier view. ‘The point is,’ Vattimo argues, ‘that the various 
processes of secularization occurring throughout modernity need not be seen 
as a leave-taking from the religious source—as is argued by Hans 
Blumenberg…Rather, these can be seen as processes of secularization, 
application, enrichment, and specification of that source’ (Vattimo 2002a: 
65). This insight of Vattimo’s epitomises the value of his contribution. As 
far back as Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo has emphasised not only that the 
result of secularisation is hermeneutics (which Vattimo at the time regarded 
as the koine of late-modernity), but also that secularisation has its origins in 
a hermeneutical event: the incarnation (Vattimo 1997a: 42). Arguably, 
Vattimo puts this complex idea best in Belief: ‘The interpretation given by 
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Jesus Christ of Old Testament prophecies, or (better) the interpretation 
which he himself is, reveals its true and only meaning: God’s love for his 
creatures’ (Vattimo 1999: 64). The message of Christ as the personification 
of God’s new revelation of his friendship (his love) for his creatures, as 
much or more than his message of caritas, is a hermeneutical event that sets 
off a change in humanity’s perception of the absolute through gradual 
weakening, historicising and making contingent. 
 
d) The Value of Vattimo’s Contribution: Getting Beyond the 
Metaphysics of Opposites 
What is the value of Vattimo’s contribution to the Löwith-Blumenberg 
debate? I would argue that not only does he, along with Gauchet, get past 
the central point of conflict of the debate, but also that his solution is more 
productive than Gauchet’s. Gauchet’s contribution indicates that the 
Christian message of the incarnation reversed the logic of the axial age 
through de-hierarchisation; the temporal order was subordinate to the 
spiritual until the logic of the incarnation, with its transformation of 
Messianism, came into view with the breakdown of the Medieval worldview 
in which the incarnation’s message was masked by external pressures 
associated with the aftermath of the decline of the Roman Empire (Gauchet 
1997: 153). The development of the temporal sphere as an objective space, a 
blank canvas for the human will, was only possible by creating a distance 
between God and humans and humans and the world. This was effected by 
the incarnation: ‘Only by reversing all possible mediation between heaven 
and earth, as Jesus did, could such a system of dual otherness crystallize, a 
system where God’s distance from the world corresponded symmetrically to 
humans’ distance from it’ (Gauchet 1997: 122). Jesus reversed the 
exclusiveness of the covenant, won a worldly victory to allow humans to 
benefit more in the next life than this one, was a mediator who was still yet 
other and would nonetheless trump any other human mediation (which was 
all the more poignant when papal claims grew ever more extravagant) and 
more besides. For thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Vattimo a 
mere reversal remains within the logic of metaphysics. In an essay entitled 
‘The Two Senses of Nihilism in Nietzsche,’ Vattimo writes: 
If active nihilism wishes to avoid reversing its polarity and becoming 
a new metaphysics that puts life, force, and the will to power in the 
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place of the Platonic ontos on, it will have to interpret itself in the 
end as a doctrine of the ‘vanishing’ of Being—of vanishing, 
weakening, and so on as the ‘essential’ character of Being itself. 
Nihilism is the process in the course of which…there is nothing left 
of Being as such (Vattimo 2006b: 140).  
Gauchet’s conceptual schema, above all transcendence and immanence, 
remains within the logic of metaphysics. The only alternative to the 
metaphysics of a new beginning (if it were at all possible) would be a 
gradual weakening to the point at which the traces of metaphysical tradition 
no longer hold their ‘essential character’ and therefore their violence. If 
hitherto the mediator between transcendence and immanence was located at 
the top of the social tree, it becomes not more liberating if it is at the 
bottom: while the ‘the last shall be first, and the first last’ (Matthew 8:12), 
there is still a first and last. Gauchet’s mediating messiah could merely be 
viewed as a Nietzschean subterranean slave revolt move. Moreover, this 
message is only one more among others, another interpretation amid the 
plurality of ways of conceiving the relation between transcendence and 
immanence in late antiquity. One requires a more compelling move to see 
how this inverted logic of the mediator becomes integral to the history of the 
West.  
 By contrast, Vattimo’s interpretation of the relationship between 
secularisation and modernity benefits for three main reasons. Firstly, the 
inaugural message of secularisation gets beyond the metaphysical logic of 
opposites (against Vattimo on the issue of transcendence, it is another 
question entirely about whether there is a possibility of anything beyond the 
tradition of linguistic messages into which we are thrown, and this is a topic 
for Part Two). Secondly, in the form of Vattimo’s mature work on 
Christianity the inner logic of secularisation intertwines with metaphysics as 
the history of Being to bring notions of ‘the West’ and ‘Christianity’ closer 
together. Thirdly, Vattimo’s use of the idea of Verwindung enables him to 
take a more nuanced approach to both ‘similarity’ and ‘difference’ to get 
beyond less subtle, contrasting approaches found in the works of Löwith 
and Gauchet in particular. The first and second of these benefits of 
Vattimo’s approach have been discussed already, but the remaining benefit 
will now be looked at in some detail. 
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e) Verwindung: Secularisation, Interiority and Distortion  
Distinctions such as ‘transcendence and immanence’ for Gauchet, 
‘legitimate and illegitimate’ for Löwith and ‘old and new’ for Blumenberg 
all belong to premodernity and/or modernity. However, key to Vattimo’s 
positive thesis of what kind of thinking is possible after the death of God is 
his distinction between modernity and postmodernity, a distinction that has 
been alluded to already and discussed in the Introduction. One cannot get rid 
of God until one has got rid of grammar, as Nietzsche said (Nietzsche 
1990a: 48), and Vattimo takes this to mean that the history of Being is one 
of interminable weakening, which challenges Blumenberg and Gauchet in 
their different views on how modernity took leave of sacrality; Vattimo 
would have modernity connected far more intimately to pre-modernity in a 
way which was uni-directional (Gauchet, by contrast, sees the temporal as a 
contingent development from strengthening of the sacred). The traces of 
tradition allow one to think, but one must reinterpret them to divest them of 
any remaining metaphysical, ‘strong’ content. With the transcendent out of 
bounds as a source of value because Vattimo regards it as metaphysical, all 
one can do is recollect the traces of Being (Andenken) in an endless, 
immanent hermeneutical game in which the Overman is now a ‘moderate’ 
thinker walking through the museums of history trying on different masks 
with playful irony (Vattimo 1992: 8). Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
‘urbanisation’ of Heidegger, particularly the notion that Being is only 
linguistic, Vattimo believes we inherit a textual tradition within a form of 
life that bounds our horizon (Vattimo 1988a: 120. 132). As Valgenti puts it, 
Verwindung collapses the distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ 
nihilism for even with the latter the Overman engages in a passive 
resignation to the tradition it has inherited (Valgenti 2011: 160). 
 Given the plurality of interpretations and developments in response 
to the postmodern and death of God, in the 1980s Vattimo believed 
hermeneutics was, and should be, the koiné of contemporary philosophy. 
Not only did he see philosophers such as himself, Gadamer, and Rorty 
doing hermeneutics (Vattimo 1997a: 1), but also he saw developments in 
other disciplines as following suit. For example, he saw in the philosophy of 
science figures such as Thomas Kuhn showing through his paradigm 
concept that science does not deal with objectivity, but is radically 
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interpretative. In response to the Ge-Stell, Vattimo thought that philosophy’s 
role was to weaken all forms of life through engaging with them in dialogue 
as he describes in ‘On the challenge of art to philosophy: Aesthetics at the 
end of epistemology’ (Vattimo 1993b: 13). As Snyder puts it, ‘The practice 
of ‘weak thought’ would consist in contaminating the rational languages of 
science and technology by insisting on their connection to, and unity with, 
the other languages of contemporary culture’ (Snyder 1988: liii). This can 
only occur if all values are reduced to ‘exchange value,’ with strong 
structure contaminated through Verwindung in the same way that ‘high art’ 
has been contaminated through popular idioms and mechanical reproduction 
(Vattimo 1988a: 54-55). From this Vattimo develops the notion of truth as 
‘rhetoric,’ of ‘persuasion through discourse’ (Vattimo 1988a: 135), drawing 
upon Gadamer’s view that language is primarily ethical rather than semiotic. 
Putting together Gadamer, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, Vattimo contends 
that language is discourse shared between a form of life that finds its 
‘densest’ point in works of art. Given that the event of the death of God has 
led to an aesthetising of experience, with truth appearing through tradition 
as monuments (Vattimo 1988a: 12), truth as rhetoric involves leading (or 
‘persuading’) the particular discourses (such as the sciences) back to the 
‘sensus communis’ to the larger unity of languages operating in the light of 
the nihilism of late-modernity (Vattimo 1988a: 140); if all languages have 
been released from a hierarchy imposed by metaphysical domination, even 
scientific discourse, arising from the ethos within a scientific form of life, is 
monumental, having ‘exchange value.’ This leads to a general 
contamination and weakening of the rational by the aesthetic. 
 The aesthetic has its ‘check’ in caritas, bringing together Vattimo’s 
weak thought and his more particular meditations on the notion of 
secularisation. Strong metaphysical structures become weakened through 
being ‘twisted,’ but secularisation describes the means by which this occurs, 
and this is by the coming to fruition of the Christian message of ‘friendship’ 
in which one listens to the other like one listens to oneself, which is 
Vattimo’s version of caritas. ‘if you turn toward your inner self, oughtn’t 
you also try to heed ‘the other as yourself’ (Vattimo 2011: 76)? This view of 
caritas is a reflection of kenosis, of God abandoning his transcendence to 
bring himself to the level of humanity; God heeded the other as himself 
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through the incarnation and the cross, establishing a kingdom which was not 
of this world. Faith in this kingdom created an interior life which has 
gradually dissolved even the notion of interiority into a proliferation of 
interpretations. Nevertheless, caritas remains for Vattimo the one thing 
incapable of secularisation as listening to others like you is the driving force 
of secularisation itself, of weakening (Vattimo 1999: 63). A weak ontology 
is a ‘long farewell to the strong structures of Being,’ a process without end. 
If the process were to end, then nihilism would be a state of nothingness, 
which paradoxically would be to return to the notion of presence. This is 
why Vattimo thinks one ‘can only conceive nihilism as history’ (Vattimo 
1999: 63). Vattimo sees a ‘Christian inspiration’ in nihilism, with the latter 
being a ‘transcription’ of the biblical message. ‘If one thinks of nihilism as 
an infinite history in terms of the religious ‘text’ that is its basis and 
interpretation,’ writes Vattimo, ‘it will speak of kenosis as guided, limited 
and endowed with meaning, by God’s love’ (Vattimo 1999: 64). Although 
Vattimo speaks of love (caritas) as the ‘limit’ of secularisation, it is also the 
power of the driving force behind it, the process of the message of kenosis 
working its way through history. At the heart of the New Testament 
message, in Vattimo’s eyes, is love, a view which is widely shared, not least 
by the biblical text itself, for love is declared by Jesus to be the ‘greatest 
commandment’ (Matthew 22; see also 1 Corinthians 13). Love is the 
criterion by which secularisation is ‘examined’ (Vattimo 1999: 64). This has 
the distinct advantage over Gauchet’s interpretation of the incarnation which 
emphasises the otherness (or ‘difference’) of God. If secularisation occurs 
due to the distance of God, this leaves open the possibility either of the 
distance closing again and/or God as ‘Other’ functioning in a way which is 
reminiscent of Levinas’ ‘Other,’ which Vattimo considers metaphysical 
(Vattimo 2002a: 37). For all Vattimo’s solution seems preferable over 
Gauchet’s, larger questions remain not only about the consistency of 
Vattimo’s return to religion (such as whether he rules out all forms of 
transcendence a priori), but also about the originality of his return in terms 
of his views concerning kenosis, secularisation and the death of God. It is to 
the latter topic to which we now turn. 
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Chapter Six: Vattimo and the Death of God Theologians 
a) Introduction 
Although Vattimo’s contribution helps move the discourse about 
secularisation on from the Löwith-Blumenberg debate, to what extent are its 
methods derivative in drawing on ‘Death of God Theology’? In this and the 
following chapters we shall look at other implications of Vattimo’s earlier 
work on the return to religion: whether Vattimo is repeating Death of God 
Theology (especially Thomas Altizer’s early work) in Chapter Six, if 
Vattimo is being inconsistent in constructing a ‘unilinear history’ in Chapter 
Seven, and whether he is guilty of a Marcionite attitude towards Judaism in 
Chapter Eight. Together these questions are important in addressing the 
extent to which Vattimo has created an interpretation of Christianity which 
is not only self-consistent, but also fit to engage with other traditions, such 
as Judaism, in a way which is ‘friendly’ and open towards them.16  
 
b) Vattimo and Altizer 
i. Comparisons made 
There have been a number of criticisms brought by theologians concerning 
Vattimo’s return to religion. Most of them are more appropriate for a 
directly theological study and so will only be dealt with briefly here. 
Frederiek Depoortere’s criticisms of Vattimo’s interpretation of Christianity 
are listed in the opening chapter of his book Christ in Postmodern 
Philosophy. ‘It is clear,’ Depoortere writes, ‘that [Vattimo’s] version of 
Christianity is a very reduced one’ for reasons such as his ‘limited’ use of 
Scripture (Depoortere cites John 15:15 and Philippians 2:7), ‘read 
completely isolated from any context,’ and that ‘Vattimo’s version of 
kenosis is a very poor one’ (Depoortere 2008: 21). On the latter point, 
Depoortere writes that Vattimo only reads half of the Christological hymn 
found in Philippians 2 and so simply skips the part in which the exaltation 
of Christ is mentioned’ (Depoortere 2008: 21), echoing a similar point made 
by Marta Frascati-Lochhead a decade earlier (Frascati-Lochhead 1998: 154-
155). Similarly, another theologian Frans Vosman has criticised Vattimo for 
reading John 15:15 out of context, too (Vosman 2000: 418). Depoortere also 
states that ‘the incarnation indeed plays a role in his philosophy, but without 
                                                 
16 This chapter borrows heavily from my article on Vattimo and Altizer from the 
journal Minerva (Harris 2011).  
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the cross and without the resurrection’ and that Vattimo’s Christianity is 
‘heterodox’ (Depoortere 2008: 21), concluding that his Christianity is 
‘philosophical’ and that there is no ‘interchange’ between philosophy and 
theology, a point also made by Thomas Guarino, who accuses Vattimo of 
filling up old wineskins with an ‘alien new vintage’ (Guarino 2009: 152). 
 These criticisms can be countered by considering what Vattimo is 
trying to do. In a less accusatory tone, Thomas Guarino has also stated that 
‘Vattimo has little interest…in ‘reconstructive’ hermeneutics, i.e., in the 
recovery of a stable textual meaning that endures over the course of time’ 
(Guarino 2009: 129). It would not matter to Vattimo to find parallel phrases 
in contemporary Greek texts for a phrase found in Philippians, for instance. 
Rather, as Guarino acknowledges, the relationship between the text and the 
reader is not for Vattimo one of passively receiving tradition, but creating a 
spiritually and socially liberating conversation between the traces of 
tradition and the hermeneutical situatedness of the reader. This in turn 
generates new Being by ‘twisting’ the tradition to relieve it of its 
metaphysical strength in an indefinite process of interpretation and 
reinterpretation. With this understanding of Vattimo’s intentions, it becomes 
clearer what traditional Christian terms mean for him. Although Depoortere 
thinks Vattimo does not deal with the resurrection, in his dialogue with 
Pierangelo Sequeri and Giovanni Ruggeri entitled Interrogazioni sul 
Cristianesimo, Vattimo makes clear that he believes Christ is resurrected 
because what Jesus said was so attractive he cannot not believe in him 
(Vattimo 2000: 49). In some ways this is the opposite of Alain Badiou’s 
position. For Badiou, like with St. Paul on the road to Damascus, an event 
has meaning because it is personally transformative in a way that cannot be 
reduced to a message. Similarly to Badiou, the event is transformative and 
inescapable, but for Vattimo the event is grounded on the strength in 
weakness of Jesus’ message of charity and the message of God’s kenosis in 
Jesus. Concerning Badiou, Depoortere has indicated he believes that 
‘anachronistic interpretations’ of Scripture ‘can shed fresh light on these all-
too-familiar texts’ and that ‘it is a basic insight of hermeneutics that the 
meaning of a text cannot be limited to the intention of its author or the way 
it was understood by its first readers…the new context can produce new and 
unheard-of meanings’ (Depoortere 2013: 163). Depoortere’s assessment of 
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the value of Badiou’s approach to ancient texts has merit, although there are 
parallels between Badiou’s and Vattimo’s treatment of Scripture as both are 
trying to form a conversation with the past in order to release us from 
violence in the present. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether Vattimo 
succeeds in removing violence, especially as his approach to interpretation 
can be arbitrary. For example, Erik Meganck notes that while Vattimo is 
fond of quoting John 15:15 in which Jesus announces that he is no longer 
the master of human beings, but their friend, Vattimo omits reference to the 
preceding verse in which Jesus links friendship to doing what he commands 
(Meganck 2014: 420). Meganck sees the arbitrariness in this approach the 
kind of metaphysics Vattimo is trying to avoid. Is arbitrariness 
metaphysical, and therefore violent? (Meganck 2014: 430 n.3). Or is 
arbitrariness a symptom of the ‘liberation of metaphor,’ and perhaps 
therefore a recognition that more traditional forms of exegesis and 
interpretative standards no longer apply? 
Vattimo’s arbitrariness is a theme picked up at an even deeper level 
of his thought—concerning the notion of the event—in Part Two. For now, 
though, I would like to concentrate on a particular accusation against 
Vattimo that his return to religion is derivative. I am dwelling on this charge 
first and foremost because it leads into the other, more serious objection that 
Vattimo’s return to religion is ‘supsersessionist,’ that is, it treats Christianity 
as superior to Judaism which is inconsistent with weak thought (where all 
Being is reduced to exchange value) and goes against his desire to derive an 
ethic of tolerance from history. Recent commentators on Vattimo’s thought 
(Sciglitano 2007; Depoortere 2008a) have remarked that Vattimo’s 
Christianity bears a striking resemblance to that of the influential American 
death of God theologian, Thomas J. J. Altizer (b. 1927), particularly his 
magnum opus, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (1967). Altizer has drawn 
heavily upon thinkers such as Nietzsche, Blake and Hegel for his nihilistic 
Christianity. Central to Altizer’s conception of Christianity is the emptying 
of God through history to make himself immanent; by eliminating the 
transcendent realm, believers would focus on the present, the here and now. 
In terms of comparing both Vattimo and Altizer, both thinkers have been 
influenced by Nietzsche, particularly his idea of the ‘death of God.’ 
Vattimo, like Altizer, sees history as the weakening of God, Vattimo and 
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Altizer drawing on the Pauline idea of the ‘emptying’/‘humiliation’ of God 
in the incarnation (the technical term for which is the kenosis of Philippians 
2:5-11), leading to the liberation of humans from the constricting violence 
of the transcendent. Vattimo admits that the death of God movement ‘is not 
something I’ve studied intensely’ (Vattimo 2007c: 91). This becomes 
apparent in his homogenising of its thought in After Christianity, for 
Vattimo suspects that the death of God theologians, including Altizer, have 
not ‘articulated an explicit theory of secularisation and of the death of God 
as the positive affirmation of divinity based on the idea of incarnation’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 37). In view of this, Vattimo thinks Altizer, and the other 
death of God theologians, follow Bonhoeffer and Barth in affirming the 
‘total ‘alterity’ of the biblical God’ (Vattimo 2002a: 36-37). As with his 
criticism of Derrida and Lévinas, he believes alterity leads back to ‘the same 
old God of metaphysics, conceived of as the ultimate inaccessible ground of 
religion’ (Vattimo 2002a: 38). Vattimo is wrong in his view of Altizer’s 
theology, for ‘there can be little doubt that Altizer did articulate an explicit 
theory of secularisation rooted in the ideas of kenosis, incarnation and 
divine death’ (Sciglitano 2007: 535-536). Indeed, Altizer opposed the idea 
of the ‘otherness’ of God due to transcendence being a distraction for 
believers away from the present. 
Regarding Vattimo’s thought as nothing more than a restatement of 
Altizer’s theology ignores his philosophical contributions and, in my 
opinion, overlooks the subtleties in both his methods and conclusions. 
Moreover, it is important to distance Vattimo from Altizer because Altizer’s 
thought was metaphysical and, therefore, according to Vattimo’s schema, 
violent; it would be contradictory for Vattimo’s return to religion to return 
to something he regards as ethically reprehensible. As a result, for 
consistency’s sake it is imperative to show how Vattimo and Altizer differ, 
and the question of history in relation to metaphysics is at the heart of this 
endeavour. I will deal with the main points of comparison between Altizer 
and Vattimo as put forward in Anthony C. Sciglitano’s article ‘Contesting 
the World and the Divine: Balthasar’s Trinitarian Response to Gianni 
Vattimo’s Secular Christianity’ (2007), and Frederiek Depoortere’s book 
Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, René Girard, Slavoj 
Žižek (2008a). My main argument will be that Altizer’s explicit Hegelianism 
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adds a metaphysical element to the development of history which is absent 
in Vattimo’s attempt to create a history of Christianity which allows for the 
reduction/twisting of metaphysical, ‘strong’ structures. Having dealt with 
these points, in the next chapter I will turn to the claim by Sciglitano (2007) 
that Vattimo’s thought is Hegelian, even if Vattimo does not fully realise the 
debt Sciglitano thinks he owes to Hegel.    
 
ii. Christianity and religiosity 
Vattimo and Altizer ‘share the Barthian idea that there is a clear distinction 
between Christianity on the one side and natural religiosity on the other’ 
(Depoortere 2008a: 25). Vattimo follows Girard in regarding Christianity as 
unmasking the violence inherent to the natural sacred of the religious. In 
Girardian anthropology (Vattimo and Girard 2010), very briefly summarised 
here, through mimetic desire each person covets what another has, ending 
up in an arms race. To protect the society, a ‘scapegoat’ is formed as a 
mechanism to dispense with the violence, the sacral power imputed onto it 
making it powerful enough to restore the social order. By cloaking 
Christianity in the mythological language of the kind pertaining to the 
scapegoat mechanism and the natural sacred, Christianity acts ‘like a Trojan 
horse’ (Antonello 2010: 8), for unlike other victims Christ was wholly 
innocent, a point which is made clear through his mythology as passed on 
through the New Testament and tradition. Vattimo links this insight from 
Girardian anthropology with Heidegger’s weakening of ‘Being.’ 
Concerning Heidegger’s notion of the weakening of ‘Being,’ Vattimo reads 
Heidegger’s philosophy as the conclusion of a conception of metaphysics 
which began with Plato’s forms. The latter, like the traditional Christian 
ideas concerning God and heaven, pertained to an ideal realm removed from 
immediate experience. When metaphysics, in more recent times, has been 
identified with science and technology, and pertains to humans, it makes 
being human unthinkable insofar as all spontaneity and openness is ruled 
out by the laws and objects of science (Vattimo 2002a: 12-13). For Vattimo, 
this means a rejection of the identification of Being with presence. Instead, 
Being should be seen as ‘event,’ such as the event of the late-modern, 
namely irreducible plurality and the end of metaphysics (Vattimo 2002a). 
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Altizer’s main claim for the uniqueness of Christianity is to see other 
religions as promoting a ‘backward’ movement away from history to 
Primordial Being, whereas the incarnation should be ‘conceived as a 
progressive movement of Spirit into flesh’ (Altizer 1967: 46) which accepts 
and redeems the secular/profane world. Vattimo, too, is wary of the urge to 
return to Primordial Oneness, for any God which is too ‘Other’ is 
‘inaccessible’ and ‘is the same old God of metaphysics,’ which he also 
identifies with the gods of natural religions in reference to Girard (Vattimo 
2002a: 37-39). The starting point for Altizer is dynamism in history, of 
forwards versus backwards movements, of progressive immanence of the 
spirit compared to Primordial Oneness; this is all reminiscent of Hegel, a 
point not lost on the Vattimian commentator Sciglitano (2007). Vattimo’s 
starting point, however, is his critique of metaphysics, whether it be in his 
quasi-anthropological appropriations from Girard, or in his incarnation-
centred repudiation of conceptualising the divine as ‘the Other,’ whether 
this be in accordance with Plato, Barth, the ‘death of God’ theologians, 
Lévinas, Derrida, or natural religions.  
 
iii. Transcendence and incarnation 
For ‘both Vattimo and Altizer, the core of Christianity is the event of the 
incarnation. Both authors interpret the incarnation as the end of God’s 
transcendence, as the death of the ‘God of beyond.’ They both use the term 
‘kenosis’ and consider the incarnation as the start of a process of 
desacralization and secularisation’ (Depoortere 2008a: 25). For Altizer there 
are two kenoses. One is a historical, actual death of God, as, for him, 
Theology must come to an understanding of the ‘inevitable correlation 
between God’s self-revelation and his self-negation or kenosis…history 
becomes not simply the arena of revelation but the very incarnate Body of 
God’ (Altizer 1967: 86). Again, Altizer here owes a debt to Hegel for this 
understanding of the death of God:  
Hegel’s dialectical method succeeds in effecting an inversion of the 
Western ontological tradition, for he does not simply negate the root 
idea of the aseity of Being, he reverses this idea by conceiving Being 
as a perpetual process of becoming its own other, a process that is 
known in myth or religious belief as the self-sacrifice of the divine 
Being (Altizer 1967: 63) 
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The second kenosis concerns the emptying of this event into common 
experience as atonement, an experience which is ‘a negative process of 
reversing every alien other…of every power confining life and energy’ 
(Altizer 1967: 114). After the epiphany of the cross, the event becomes 
ossified into ‘alien others’ such as creeds formulas, what Altizer refers to as 
‘Satan,’ all of which eventually become emptied (Altizer 1967: 112-113). 
The two are related due to the former effecting the latter by God 
relinquishing his transcendence in becoming immanent to complete himself.  
By contrast, for Vattimo, there is only one kenosis, and that is the 
long process of secularisation which is begun in the incarnation and is an 
on-going process which is never fully completed. Vattimo sees kenosis as 
the process of secularisation, a process which is indistinguishable from both 
interpretation and salvation; there is not a kenosis in Dasein mirroring that 
which occurred in Being, but rather the weakening of strong metaphysical 
structures allows Dasein greater freedom. Given Vattimo’s stance 
concerning metaphysics, arguably the best way to read what Vattimo has to 
say concerning kenosis is to interpret the event of kenosis as a message 
which is communicated and reinterpreted throughout history from the time 
of the New Testament onwards. Indeed, Vattimo states that salvation ‘is the 
announcement that God saves us through a historical process of education’ 
(Vattimo 2010b: 86; emphasis added), and that ‘Christianity is a stimulus, a 
message that sets in motion a tradition of thought that will eventually realise 
its freedom from metaphysics’ (Vattimo 2007d: 35; emphasis added). It is 
also questionable about the extent to which Altizer, unlike Vattimo, can be 
said to be a theologian of secularisation, for while he talks about God 
emptying himself into history, he maintains an at least formal distinction 
between the sacred and the profane, both being transformed through the 
process of kenosis as Ogletree mentions in his summary of Altizer’s thought 
(Ogletree 1966: 83). 
According to both Vattimo and Altizer, ‘the true meaning of the 
incarnation has only recently been exposed’ (Depoortere 2008a: 25). Altizer 
refers to ‘modern historical consciousness’ (Altizer 1967: 4), by which he 
means ‘for the first time historical events appeared as radically particular, as 
confined in their meaning and value to the actual but singular process in 
which they occur’ (Altizer 1967: 74). Backwards-reference to Primordial 
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Being had meant events and situations were defined in advance for 
humanity through the ‘givenness’ of the present and norms in relation to this 
Absolute. ‘The radical Christian knows that God has truly died in Jesus and 
that his death,’ Altizer thinks, ‘liberated humanity from the oppressive 
presence of primordial Being’ (Altizer 1967: 71). However, this ‘modern 
historical consciousness’ appears to be an effect, not a cause, of liberation. 
In Altizer’s eyes, though, in this instance cause and effect are the same 
thing, for, in Ogletree’s concise summary of Altizer, ‘The incarnate Word 
completes itself in a human community embodying in its own self-
consciousness the same ‘consciousness’ which was first manifest in Jesus’ 
(Ogletree 1966: 71). Through kenosis, the Word moves from the particular 
(Jesus) to the universal (‘modern historical consciousness’) to reverse 
human dependence on backward-looking (to Primordial Oneness) to 
interpret the particular (the present). Historically, this modern historical 
consciousness first became apparent, Altizer thinks, with nineteenth century 
figures such as Nietzsche. The latter’s nihilism not only ‘foresaw’ the ‘one 
clear portal to the twentieth century’ (Altizer 1967: 22), but also ‘disclosed 
God to be the very embodiment of an infinitude of man’s self-hatred and 
guilt’ (Altizer 1967: 22). 
Insofar as a connection is made between the kenosis of God realising 
itself in modern nihilism, Altizer is close to Vattimo. In Vattimo’s opinion 
(Vattimo 1999), his Catholic upbringing drew him to Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, who made him reflect back on history to the point of realising 
that nihilism and the end of metaphysics was a product of the message of 
the kenosis of God. That is, the possibility of hermeneutics is founded upon 
the message of kenosis. Differences between Altizer and Vattimo appear 
when one probes deeper into how the incarnation can take effect in the 
modern era. For Altizer it is part of the larger kenotic process, of Spirit 
becoming ‘incarnate in its opposite’ (Altizer 1967: 68), moving forward to 
its own self redemption, as ‘Spirit only becomes realised or historically 
actualised in self-consciousness while Spirit is in a state of alienation and 
estrangement from itself’ (Altizer 1967: 66). The second kenosis, then, of 
the movement of the Word into the universal consciousness of humanity is 
caused by the kenotic process of God emptying himself fully into Jesus in 
the first kenosis. For Vattimo this would seem to rely too much upon the 
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metaphysics of which he wishes to dispose when one recalls that for 
Vattimo it is the message of kenosis, the focus on interpretation, which is 
liberating and salvific.  
Vattimo does not want to prove his hermeneutics, for ‘proof’ would 
constitute a return to metaphysics which he wants to avoid; Vattimo is more 
interested in ‘plausibility’ and ‘persuasiveness’ (Vattimo 2002a: 50). 
Nevertheless, Vattimo wants to make his hermeneutics look the most 
plausible interpretation of the mind-set of the late-modern. In order to do so, 
he looks at how historical factors have mixed with the essence of the 
message of the Gospel in order to effect a gradual weakening of strong 
structures in the West down to the present day. The weakening essence of 
Christianity was hindered by the fall of the Roman Empire, Vattimo 
appealing to Wilhelm Dilthey’s view that figures such as Augustine were 
adopting Greco-Roman modes of thought and societal structures because 
they were solely responsible for the continuation of civilisation in any form 
(Vattimo 2002a: 116). Nevertheless, over time these structures were 
weakened by the essence of the Christian message, the Reformation being a 
distinctive event. Vattimo draws on the work of Max Weber (1958) and 
Colin Campbell (1987) to show how modern consumer-capitalist culture 
was based on the Protestant work ethic (Weber) and a tendency for fantasy 
left by a faith which had been weakened through the Reformation which 
found its outlet in consumerism (Campbell) (Vattimo 2002a: 76). Vattimo 
argues it was the objective world-order made possible by Christian 
monotheism which leant itself to the scientific-technological rationalism 
which made the gradual separation of faith and reason possible from the 
early modern period onwards in which reformed principles took shape 
(Vattimo 2002a: 75). In short, while Altizer and Vattimo see a prima facie 
circular relationship between modern historical consciousness of the death 
of God (and a feeling of its liberating effects) and the event of the 
incarnation, Altizer draws heavily on Hegelian metaphysics as an 
explanation of this apparent circularity, whereas Vattimo explains the 
relevance, and increasing presence, of the message of kenosis and the 
weakening of strong structures through a quasi-historical account of the 
journey of this message from the time of Jesus to the present day as the 
basis for the possibility of hermeneutics, a point to which we shall return 
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much later. Altizer talks about the ‘Christian and eschatological passage 
through the actuality of history and experience’ (Altizer 1967: 134) which is 
the ‘ever fuller movement of the Word or Spirit into history’ (Altizer 1967: 
108). The ‘Word’ comes across as something metaphysical which is ridding 
itself of its ‘givenness’ and transcendence by being transformed into a 
liberating experience in the present for Christians, that there is a real divine 
process for Altizer which is then mimicked by humans. For Vattimo, there 
is only a history of messages which have the meaning of kenosis for us 
today because we are living after the death of God; Vattimo only 
complicates matters when he hints that Christianity gave rise to the death of 
God, although how much he relies on this argument simply to ground 
hermeneutics historically in a quasi-pragmatic way is difficult to tell. 
On the issue of whether transcendence cannot but be ‘violent and 
oppressive’ (Depoortere 2008a: 26), there is indeed superficial similarity 
between Altizer and Vattimo. The former refers to the ‘bondage’ of ‘a 
transcendent, a sovereign, and an impassive God’ (Altizer 1967: 42). 
Indeed, redemption for Altizer can be characterised as ‘man’s release from 
an alien and distant ‘Other’ who in sovereign freedom dispenses the fate of 
men’ (Ogletree 1966: 73). The idea of the transcendent, ‘alien’ other here 
conjured up by Altizer is of a being removed from the world but who 
nevertheless decrees for it, setting up rules and commands for humans to 
follow. There is also the Hegelian element of Altizer’s thought which holds 
that a being is unfulfilled insofar as it remains wholly transcendent. By 
contrast, Vattimo thinks transcendence is violent because it is the perfect 
example of metaphysics. Violence is caused by metaphysics because it is an 
expression of the will to power in order to appropriate the other totally 
through defining them by pre-existing measurements and categories 
(Vattimo 1999: 30-32). Vattimo is not worried about transcendence for the 
reason that it could involve humans being on the receiving end of the 
arbitrary fiat of a being that has not experienced the world directly, for he 
thinks that this conception of God is flat-footed.  
  Depoortere thinks that for both Altizer and Vattimo, the death of 
God ‘is not a metaphor for a change in human experience, but part of the 
life of the Absolute itself’ (Depoortere 2008a: 26). While he is right in his 
judgement of Altizer, he is wrong in hastily applying it to Vattimo. It has 
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already been shown earlier that Vattimo did not want to construe God in 
terms of an ‘Absolute’ which has been weakened in ontic terms, that is, in 
terms of his nature. Rather, Vattimo was concerned with the message, the 
story of kenosis and its working-out in history as the process of 
secularisation, of weakening strong structures. A possible reason why 
Depoortere makes this judgement is because he himself is deeply influenced 
by more ‘traditional’ theology, as is evident from his book The Death of 
God (2008b) in which he states ‘Should it indeed not be argued, in contrast 
to the often-repeated common opinion, that the metaphysical God and the 
God of Christian faith have much more in common than is often supposed?’ 
(Depoortere 2008b: 4). Admittedly, sometimes Vattimo speaks as if he was 
referring to a change in the nature of God, such as, ‘Secularisation is the 
way in which kenosis, having begun with the incarnation of 
Christ…continues to realise itself more and more clearly’ (Vattimo 1999: 
48). Taken out of context, Vattimo would appear to be making a positive 
assertion about a state of affairs which ‘happened’ in the past. However, 
when one finishes the quotation one can understand what Vattimo is saying 
differently: ‘…by furthering the education of mankind concerning the 
overcoming of originary violence essential to the sacred and to social life 
itself’ (Vattimo 1999: 48). Again, the term ‘education’ implies that the 
importance of the incarnation concerns pedagogy, as a message which is 
passed on, taught, and reinterpreted in accordance with the signs of the 
times. It is wrong, then, to attribute to Vattimo, as it would not be with 
Altizer, a belief in the changing nature of God/the Absolute. How 
Depoortere can interpret Vattimo’s conception of history of the dissolution 
of Being on Heideggerian lines with ‘change…[in] the life of the Absolute 
itself’ (Depoortere 2008a: 26) is difficult to imagine, for language of the 
‘Absolute’ pertains far more readily to Hegelian, not Heideggerian, thought, 
which is therefore more appropriate to the theology of Altizer than the 
philosophy of Vattimo given the latter’s distaste for metaphysics. Moreover, 
kenosis refers to more than a ‘metaphor’ for Vattimo, for it is this message 
of weakening, of the revelation of the violence of the natural sacred. 
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iv. Jesus 
‘Like Vattimo,’ Sciglitano says, ‘Altizer is interested in neither Jesus nor in 
the Jesus of Church tradition, but in the incarnate Word as he will come to 
be known in the third epoch or Joachim’s Age of Spirit’ (Sciglitano 2007: 
536). This is because for ‘Altizer, Hegel, and Vattimo, if God is to be love, 
then God can no longer be essentially different from the world itself’ 
(Sciglitano 2007: 536). These two points of comparison made by Sciglitano 
are to be dealt with together, for one follows on from another. At first sight, 
Sciglitano seems to have misjudged Altizer on the issue of his neglect of the 
person of Jesus. Altizer goes to great lengths to show the importance of 
Jesus: ‘God is Jesus’ (Altizer 1967: 68; Altizer’s emphasis). However, when 
one looks at what Altizer means by Jesus it is clear that he is not interested 
in the man Jesus except insofar as he is representative of an opposite to 
Absolute Spirit, abstracted from the concrete: ‘God is Jesus, proclaims the 
radical Christian, and by this he means that the Incarnation is a total and all-
consuming act: as Spirit becomes the Word that empties the Speaker of 
himself, the whole reality of Spirit becomes incarnate in its opposite’ 
(Altizer 1967: 68). Therefore, Sciglitano is right in saying that Altizer does 
not have an interest in Jesus, a fortiori the Jesus of the dogmas of the 
Church.  
To an extent Sciglitano is right in stating that Vattimo follows 
Altizer. Vattimo’s main interest in the message of the New Testament is its 
message of kenosis. Nevertheless, Vattimo’s interest in Jesus does extend 
slightly more than just to kenosis, but also to its ethical corollary, Jesus’ 
message of caritas, charity. By caritas, though, it is questionable about the 
extent to which Vattimo’s understanding of the concept has anything to do 
with the one held by Jesus (insofar as it is possible to know what he meant 
by the term), or the Church’s. Vattimo distinguished between pensiero forte 
(strong thought) and pensiero debole (weak thought). To recap from the 
Introduction, the former refers to holding one’s beliefs, values and 
traditions—and therefore, one’s culture—as objective and absolute, 
reducing others’ cultures to one’s own, causing exclusionary violence to the 
‘other.’ The latter is a way of holding one’s views in accordance with the 
virtue of caritas, that is, ‘Charity,’ or ‘Love’ (Vattimo 2007d: 41). That 
which can be weakened through secularisation has no limit except caritas, 
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the ethical corollary of kenosis, which is, to recall, a formal principle in his 
eyes, akin to Kant’s categorical imperative (Depoortere 2008a: 14). 
Formally, one recognises the situatedness and provisional character of one’s 
own views and tolerates, and learns from, other cultures through one’s 
loving disposition. With nihilism, ‘The call is thus not for a society with no 
values but for a society without supreme and exclusive values. On this 
model, cultures are complex conversations among varying conceptions of 
the world. Such dialogue can, and must not, shift into a dogmatic clash 
between conflicting truths’ (Vattimo and Zabala 2002: 454). Caritas, then, 
is ‘an active commitment to diminishing violence in all its forms’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 51-52) on the recognition of one’s own provisionality. Vattimo’s 
understanding of Jesus’ message of caritas differs greatly from, for 
instance, the twentieth-century Lutheran’s thinker Anders Nygren’s view of 
caritas (Nygren 1932), which he sees as a later, Latinising distortion of 
agape, the latter meaning God’s love for humans dispensed through his 
grace, or from the modern Catholic view of the papal encyclical Deus 
Caritas Est (2006) which sees love coming from God and not only 
commanding, but uniting, humanity to love Him. Vattimo’s divine love is 
immanent, human in origin, and is devoted to weakening. Similarly, Altizer 
sees love as immanent, for ‘Christian love is an incarnate love, a self-giving 
to the fullness of the world, an immersion in the actuality of time and the 
flesh. Therefore, our Yes-saying must give us totally to the moment before 
us’ (Altizer 1967: 156). The immanent, incarnate love mentioned by Altizer 
is, though, the realisation in human consciousness and experience of the 
kenotic Word. Once again, there is metaphysics in the background of 
Altizer’s thought whereas there is none apparent in Vattimo’s. 
Sciglitano goes on to say ‘Like Vattimo, Altizer eliminates from 
Paul’s narrative of kenosis the exaltation of Jesus to the right hand of the 
Father, for such an exaltation would reinstate the ‘primordial Creator, an 
eternal and unchanging Lord.’’ (Sciglitano 2007: 536). A criticism of 
Vattimo and Altizer is that they focus on verses five to eight of Philippians 
chapter two, leaving out the rest of the Pauline hymn, verses nine to eleven, 
which emphasise the glory of God’s resurrection and exaltation through his 
resurrection. It is true that they both neglect to deal with this aspect of 
hymn, preferring to concentrate on the humiliation and emptying of God in 
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the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Altizer goes so far to state 
that ‘The radical Christian repudiates the Christian dogma of the 
resurrection of Christ and his ascension into a celestial and transcendent 
realm because radical faith revolves about a participation in the Christ who 
is fully and totally present to us’ (Altizer 1967: 120). Going further, Altizer 
even suggests reversing the resurrection and ascension by using the 
‘symbolic language of Christianity’ to ‘transpose the traditional vision of 
the resurrection into a contemporary vision of the descent into Hell’ of the 
crucifixion to express how Christ does not become resurrected after death, 
but ‘descends ever more fully into darkness and flesh’ (Altizer 1967: 120). 
In drawing upon the tradition of the ‘harrowing of hell’ developed out of 1 
Peter, Altizer twists the resources of the Christian tradition away from the 
hope of resurrection to his own ‘radical Christian’ conception of the kenosis 
of God in history. Unlike Altizer, Vattimo has far less to say about the 
resurrection. In his introduction to Vattimo’s book Belief (1999), Luca 
D’Isanto states that ‘Vattimo follows René Girard’s hypothesis that Christ’s 
death and resurrection eliminates the violence of all sacrificial religion 
through its very unmasking’ (D’Isanto 1999: 10). This is not strictly 
accurate, for Vattimo follows Joachim of Fiore, who saw history as 
comprised of ages representative of the Trinity (Father: Old Testament 
times; Son: New Testament times; Spirit: some time during or after the 
thirteenth century), in making the most out of the ‘now-not yet’ 
eschatological tension in the New Testament to the extent that he, like 
Joachim, does not believe in a closed canon: ‘although salvation is 
essentially ‘fulfilled’ in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus, it 
awaits further fulfilment. Thus the Paraclete…has been assigned the task of 
assisting them in this further hermeneutical project’ (Vattimo 2002a: 59-60). 
Reading between the lines, ‘salvation’ for Vattimo has little or nothing to do 
with traditional Christian beliefs in ‘grace’ and ‘bodily resurrection.’ 
Indeed, he follows Joachim in reading scripture ‘spiritually,’ eliminating 
such literalisms (Vattimo 2002a). Sciglitano is therefore right in seeing a 
similarity between Altizer and Vattimo on this issue of the resurrection and 
ascension. Nevertheless, whereas Altizer explicitly writes against the 
resurrection and ascension, not fitting into his largely Hegelian scheme of 
kenosis, Vattimo is not interested in this issue, at most ‘twisting’ 
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resurrection into a longer scheme of salvation-as-hermeneutics. Insofar as 
Sciglitano’s comparison of Altizer and Vattimo here is a criticism, it is wide 
of the mark. Altizer is a self-confessed ‘radical’ Christian, while Vattimo is 
primarily a philosopher. Neither are interested in returning to ‘traditional’ 
doctrines and beliefs. Indeed, Vattimo thought that the ‘return to religion’ in 
the West cannot be an uncritical flight back to tradition this is in large part 
due to the importance Vattimo places on the Spirit, that we are now living in 
the Age of Interpretation (or of the ‘Spirit,’ part of Vattimo’s Joachimite 
Trinitarian schema) (Vattimo 2006a), the topic of the next section. 
  
v. The Holy Spirit 
Sciglitano thinks that, ‘The strong pneumatological turn and the Trinitarian 
progressivism that springs from Joachim serves for Altizer and for Vattimo 
as a way to give theological movements a kind of contemporary authority 
over against the biblical canon, Church authorities, tradition, etc.’ 
(Sciglitano 2007: 536). Concerning Joachim, Altizer states that ‘The radical 
Christian…inherits both the ancient prophetic belief that revelation 
continues in history and the eschatological belief of the tradition following 
Joachim of Floris’ (Altizer 1967: 27), that ‘we are now living in the third 
and final age of the Spirit’ (Altizer 1967: 27). Kenosis involves the Spirit 
moving into flesh, transfiguring both (Altizer 1967: 47). Spirit exists for 
itself (für sich) when it exists as its own opposite or other (Altizer 1967: 64). 
Only when Spirit knows itself in its own otherness will it fulfil its destiny as 
Spirit, achieving self-redemption (Altizer 1967: 65). Altizer does think that 
the final Age of the Spirit ‘effects a negation and transcendence of the 
dogma of the Church’ (Altizer 1967: 64), for the Spirit liberates us from the 
memory of transcendence and from the ossifying quality of creeds and 
formulas, again linking back to the dual sense of kenosis in his theology. 
Vattimo has a similar understanding of Joachim to Altizer. However, 
he uses Joachim’s ideas differently in his philosophy. Although, like Altizer, 
he sees Joachim’s ‘third age’ prophecy, ‘emphasis[ing] the openness to the 
future implicit in the dogma of incarnation’ (Vattimo 2002a: 28) and that 
salvation history is still in progress and Trinitarian in character (Vattimo 
2002a: 29-32), Vattimo’s main interest in Joachim is in his reading of 
scripture in light of this third age, that is, not literally or analogically, but 
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spiritually. Vattimo is taken by Joachim’s idea of the ‘spiritual intelligence’ 
of Scripture (Vattimo 2002a: 28), of grasping events in the Bible as ‘figures’ 
of other historical events. For Vattimo, Joachim’s exegetical method, in 
light of the Age of the Spirit, ‘stresses not the letter but the spirit of 
revelation; no longer servants but friends; no longer awe or faith but charity’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 31). Joachim’s appeal is in the immanence of salvation 
allowing one to reinterpret Scripture in a spiritual way which sees salvation 
as an on-going process in progress. Vattimo is not interested in the 
literalistic aspects of Joachim’s prophecies (Vattimo 2002a: 28-39), for 
events cannot be symbols of another discrete historical event. Vattimo and 
Altizer both make use of Joachim, particularly the idea of the lack of a 
closed canon, Altizer construes ‘Spirit’ in more Hegelian terms, whereas 
Vattimo ties it in more closely to his hermeneutics. 
There are superficial similarities between Altizer and Vattimo. Both 
thinkers draw upon Nietzsche, particularly his sentiment that we are living 
in a nihilistic age encapsulated by the phrase the ‘death of God.’ Vattimo, 
like Altizer before him, also saw history as a gradual weakening of God, 
using the idea of kenosis to refer to this weakening in conceptual terms. 
Where the two thinkers differ fundamentally is how this weakening took 
place. In appealing explicitly to Hegel, Altizer draws upon his idea of spirit 
in such a way to suggest strongly that he posits that there has been a 
metaphysical weakening over time, that there was objectively some 
transcendent thing which has emptied itself into history which has led up to 
the nihilism of the present. By contrast, Vattimo sees the message of kenosis 
as being the cause of the weakening of strong structures in all forms since 
the time of Christ to the present day. Acknowledging hermeneutical 
plurality, this understanding of weakening is not even an objective, univocal 
construal of history, but an interpretation of a received, inescapable tradition 
from within the situatedness of being a citizen of the West in late-modernity 
(Vattimo 1999; Vattimo 2002a). 
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Chapter Seven: Vattimo and Hegel 
a) Vattimo, Altizer and Hegel 
All that has been said to distinguish Vattimo from Altizer could falter if 
Vattimo himself is a Hegelian thinker, but does it make him a metaphysician 
and, therefore, self-contradictory? This is what Sciglitano (2007) argues, 
and so he thinks, ‘if Hegel is his prime influence, then Vattimo’s position 
against metaphysical grounding or ontotheology becomes highly suspect, 
indeed impossible to maintain’ (Sciglitano 2007: 528). While I agree with 
Sciglitano that if Vattimo is Hegelian in a strong, metaphysical sense, then 
he would be guilty of inconsistency, but Vattimo—with his notion of 
Verwindung—might well be consistent if he was Hegelian in a ‘weakened’ 
sense. Before establishing what the latter means, it is important to see the 
extent to which Vattimo is Hegelian in the strong sense. Sciglitano mentions 
that Vattimo names Hegel as an influence (Sciglitano 2007: 537), specifying 
seven points which mark Vattimo out as a Hegelian in his eyes: 
(1) the Trinity is de-personalized; (2) the divine-world relation is 
given a modalistic and ultimately monistic reading; (3) Passibility is 
radical and history becomes constitutive, or stronger, determinative, 
of divine being; (4) Scriptural revelation is overcome by a ‘spiritual 
sense’ reading that envisions a reconciliation between divine being 
and the being of the world, thus asserting some form of identity; (5) 
Jesus’ historical existence becomes religiously insignificant; (6) 
Resurrection does not lead to exaltation and end kenosis, and does 
not apply to Jesus as an individual, but rather continues kenosis as a 
general diffusion of divine Being into the secular or as the secular; 
(7) Divine will, election, missions are excised from theological 
reflection (Sciglitano 2007: 538). 
Expanding on these points, concerning 1-3 the de-personalisation of the 
Trinity is Vattimo’s modalism due to the Joachimite dividing of history into 
ages (Sciglitano 2007: 538). Concerning the third point, Vattimo’s 
conception of history is not of ‘divine being,’ but the message of kenosis. 
This history is not of ‘strengthening,’ but of ‘weakening.’ Vattimo is not 
interested in making objective statements about the nature of the divine, but 
is talking about the nature of belief in different eras. Sciglitano is broadly 
right on points 5 and 7. For 5, Vattimo is interested in the message of 
kenosis, not whether an actual person named Jesus lived, died, and rose 
from the dead (Sciglitano 2007: 539). As for 7, divine will is a non-issue for 
Vattimo as he is not interested in a being. Concerning 6, although Sciglitano 
is right in holding that Vattimo does not regard the resurrection as exalting 
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the divine being, his analysis is hampered because he talks about ‘diffusion 
of divine Being,’ for once again, Vattimo is interested in the message of 
weakening, not of positing what has or has not happened to beings. I have 
not dealt with objection ‘4’ yet, and I will come back to this point in due 
course as Vattimo’s faith in the ‘spiritual’ sense of Scripture provides him 
with resources to overcome charges of supersessionism. 
 There are at least two more significant reasons to reject Sciglitano’s 
classification of Vattimo as a Hegelian in a strong sense. Firstly, many of 
his seven points are derived from categories of classical theology, a term he 
even uses himself (Sciglitano 2007: 538). Vattimo is not in any shape or 
form a ‘classical theologian.’ Indeed, Vattimo rejects what he sees as the 
dogmatism of classical theology. It is ironic and inappropriate to use these 
categories for assessing and categorising Vattimian thought, even if it is to 
compare him with another thinker. Superficial similarities of Vattimo’s 
thought to theological categories such as ‘modalism’ disappear when one 
considers that Vattimo is not trying to create a univocal, objective theology 
or philosophy of history. One of Vattimo’s premises in his own 
hermeneutics is interpretative plurality, extended even to history after events 
such as the two world wars and the end of colonialism shattered the West’s 
belief in a monolithic, univocal world history (Vattimo 1992: 4). Vattimo 
goes to great pains to show how personal his interpretation of both religion 
and history is to him (Vattimo 1999). The last thing he would intend to do is 
to smash idols of theology only to erect new ones in their place. He is keen 
on citing Nietzsche’s aphorism that ‘new gods’ will replace the old (Vattimo 
2002a: 16), but the term ‘gods’ is in the plural; we are living, Vattimo never 
tires of repeating, in a world of infinite plurality (Vattimo 2002a: 15). 
Where Vattimo thinks his particular interpretation of the current state of the 
world has its force is twofold, one because he thinks it matches a common 
experience of the West: plurality, a lack of interpretative centre, and the 
collapse of old, absolute values, as well as, secondly, an anchor in the 
tradition of the West—Christian tradition—even if it is twisted almost to the 
point of breaking; unlike many postmodern philosophers, Vattimo insists on 
the importance of history (Pireddu 2002: 302). Vattimo’s emphasis on the 
‘three ages’ appears to be an example of a univocal philosophy of history a 
la Hegel. However, at most, and here is the second reason to reject 
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Sciglitano’s classification of Vattimo, it is a ‘twisting’ Christianity, Hegel 
and even, perhaps, of Heidegger. Therefore, in Vattimo’s return to religion 
we see a twisted version of ‘kenosis,’ an ontological version of Hegel’s 
‘spirit of the age,’ and an atypical reading of Heidegger (respectively). 
Scratch the surface and one finds a lack of ‘monism’ because there is no 
‘objective,’ ‘metaphysical’ being (with a small ‘b’) which empties itself in 
Vattimo’s theology, unlike both Altizer and Hegel, and no univocal history, 
only an anchoring in tradition to make sense of how one interprets the 
present, and I will be going on to address the teleological dimension of 
Hegelian thought below. 
Although he underestimates the similarity of Altizer’s theology to 
his own thought, Vattimo’s conception of the importance of kenosis may 
differ from Altizer’s in at least one other significant respect, one which 
Vattimo does realise. Mentioning a number of theologians, including 
Altizer, he goes on to say ‘they could never have done this work without 
Luther or Nietzsche’ (Vattimo 2007c: 92). More than this, Vattimo states 
that ‘my use of the death of God depends very much on the history of Being 
as connected to the problem of ontotheology…my notion of weak thought 
can actually help the death of God theologies better understand their origins 
in Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophy’ (Vattimo 2007c: 92). In other 
words, it is Vattimo’s wedding of the idea of kenosis to postmodern 
hermeneutics and the death of metaphysics which constitutes his novelty. To 
what extent is Vattimo right in his estimation? Altizer has certainly 
acknowledged Nietzsche’s influence concerning the idea of the death of 
God in his early books, as a thinking whose nihilism has helped shape the 
modern historical consciousness, the explanation for which ultimately being 
the second kenosis to which Altizer referred. As for Heidegger’s influence 
on Altizer, Ward mentions in an introductory section to Altizer’s essay in a 
volume which he was editing, ‘Heidegger is mentioned briefly’ by Altizer, 
but not dealt with at length (Altizer 2005: 428). However, his essay entitled 
‘The Self-Saving of God,’ which appeared in the Blackwell Companion to 
Postmodern Theology under the ‘Heideggerian’ heading, constitutes 
arguably Altizer’s first concerted engagement with Heidegger’s thought. 
Nevertheless, while Altizer writes Vattimo-esque sentences such as 
‘Heidegger can know that the realization that ‘God is dead’ is not atheism 
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but rather ‘ontotheology,’ and an ontotheology in which both metaphysics 
and nihilism are fulfilled’ (Altizer 2005: 434), Altizer reads Heidegger 
through Hegel. The continuing influence of Hegel is clear when he talks 
about the ‘event’ (to draw on Heidegger’s terminology) of the self-saving of 
God through the transcendence of God becoming completely actualised in 
its immanence (Altizer 2005: 441). Altizer is not dealing with hermeneutics 
when considering the death of God, even after bringing Heidegger into the 
equation, whereas Vattimo is.  
 
b) A weakened Hegelianism and the spectre of unilinear history 
It could be argued that Vattimo is Hegelian in a different sense. In an earlier 
piece of work I had argued for Vattimo not being Hegelian at all (Harris 
2011), but I have revised this view. Vattimo is more in debt to Hegel than 
Kant, and he follows Rorty in believing all modern philosophy is dependent 
on one of these two authors for its basic structure, as Vattimo says in his 
essay ‘Philosophy, Metaphysics, Democracy’ (Vattimo 1997b: 7). The 
contrast Vattimo, following Rorty, is trying to bring out is between a 
philosophy that is ahistorical (Kant) and one that is historical (Hegel). 
Nevertheless, unlike Hegel he does not believe in an Absolute Spirit 
entering into history, nor does he believe in dialectical overcoming. 
Therefore, we are left with what I, to use a phrase of Giovanni Giorgio’s, 
would call a ‘weakened Hegelianism’ (Giorgio 2009: xvi). Vattimo and 
Paterlini use the term ‘watered-down’ Hegelians (Vattimo and Paterlini 
2009: 157). There is dialectical re-appropriation of past traces in Vattimo’s 
philosophy, as well as a reading of the ‘spirit of the age’ in Vattimo’s notion 
of the ‘ontology of actuality.’  
 How does Vattimo’s weakened Hegelianism relate to his return to 
religion? Here one can bring to bear Thomas Guarino’s observations 
concerning Vattimo’s use of Hegel. Guarino says Vattimo ‘distinguishes 
himself from the worst excesses of Hegel’ (Guarino 2009: 176 n. 205), 
although Guarino notes that ‘the frequently stated Vattimian position [is] 
that kenotic Christianity gives rise to weak thought’ (Guarino 2009: 176 n. 
205). In talking about the ‘Age of the Spirit,’ and Joachim, Guarino sees 
Vattimo drifting close to Hegel (Guarino 2009: 130-131). Indeed, in 
Sciglitano’s nine-point Hegelian profile, Vattimo is ‘guilty’ of number four: 
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‘Scriptural revelation is overcome by a ‘spiritual sense’ reading that 
envisions a reconciliation between divine being and the being of the world, 
thus asserting some form of identity’ (Sciglitano 2007: 538). In 
distinguishing between a ‘material’ and a ‘formal’ continuity with texts, 
Vattimo is interested in the latter, not the former, as formal continuity 
means community of interpreters engaged with a text in a tradition, not the 
content of the tradition (Guarino 2009: 139). According to this distinction, 
there is no ‘thing’ being incarnated in history, manifesting itself in the ‘Age 
of the Spirit.’ Instead, ‘a formal community of interpreters who, reflecting 
on the same text (the Bible), constantly offer new and productive 
understandings guided entirely by the living experience of the community’ 
(Guarino 2009: 139). The ‘ontology of actuality’ is what helps the 
community interpret the text according to the ‘spirit of the age.’ Vattimo’s 
ingenious suggestion is that the current spirit of the age has the biblical 
message of friendship at its root: the plurality of interpretations that have 
given rise to hermeneutics as the koine of late-modernity (and therefore of 
the requirement to recognise one’s own contingency) has come from the 
message of friendliness through interiority that arose from the Bible. Rorty 
made this comparison between Vattimo and Hegel: ‘Hegel too saw human 
history as constituting the Incarnation of the Spirit, and its slaughter-bench 
as the cross. But Hegel was unwilling to put aside truth in favour of love’ 
(Rorty 2006: 35). Is love, though, merely ‘consensus’ based on recognising 
the secularising drift of western thought towards nihilism, that is, as Dasein 
becoming aware of itself as Dasein, and therefore respecting and listening to 
the other in this capacity? If so, ‘love’ is nothing more than being aware of 
the ‘signs of the times,’ or, in Hegelian language, the ‘spirit of the age’ 
(Vattimo 2004: 87-88), or in Foucault’s language, ‘the ontology of 
actuality.’ Vattimo has even gone so far to state that the immediacy of 
reporting of events through information technology is the realisation of 
Hegel’s ‘absolute spirit’ (Vattimo 1988: 51; Vattimo 1992: 6). 
Vattimo’s debt to Hegel extends beyond the notion of the ‘spirit of 
the Age’ to his position that history has a direction in that it is oriented to 
weakening. As Zabala said in his introduction to Weakening Philosophy, 
‘When Vattimo now affirms that ‘emancipation’ is ‘weakening’ and that 
weakening is nothing else than transferring everything to the realm of 
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symbolism and simulacrum, he intends that ‘emancipation’ as a Hegelian 
spiritualization without the absolute Spirit’ (Zabala 2007: 9). One can see 
why Vattimo has admitted being Hegelian in method, although not in 
system, because of the idea of the gradual manifestation of an idea, in his 
case of friendship as weakening. Vattimo says the main difference between 
him and Hegel’s system is that he, unlike Hegel, does not believe in any 
kind of final consummation, for the death of God is, for Vattimo, an 
indefinitely ongoing process because meaning will never be completed so 
long as there are new generations of living, breathing interpreters with their 
own contingent thrownness (Vattimo 2000: 32). For all Vattimo does not 
believe that the death of God has a culminating point or an end, he does 
believe that ‘God is love,’ ‘From a Hegelian viewpoint, we may take this 
horizon to be that absolute spirit which never allows itself to be entirely set 
aside but becomes the final horizon of history that legitimates all our nearer-
term choices’ (Vattimo 2011: 140). This apparent contradiction can be 
explained, although not defended, with reference to Vattimo’s views on 
Heidegger. Vattimo wants to hold that, from our position within history, 
Being has a nihilistic vocation for weakening, the story of which is a 
transcription of the Christian belief in kenosis, of God’s friendship with us, 
which yielded an ethic of charity (our friendship with others) which 
constitutes the limit of weakening today (as it is itself a recognition of one’s 
hermeneutic contingency). Nevertheless, Vattimo also wishes to make an 
identification between Being and language, and secondly, as well as holding 
that modernity has ended (thus precluding anything ‘new’ in the 
foundational sense). Both in disavowing the possibility of new 
foundationalism in terms of metaphysics, as well as abjuring the notion that 
Being could dwell beyond language (including metaphysics), Vattimo sees 
himself as justified (in the weak sense) in regarding caritas as the final 
horizon that ‘legitimates all our nearer-term choices.’ What else could 
legitimate our ‘longer-term’ choices Vattimo does not explain, and it is far 
from clear what the difference ‘long’ and ‘near’ make to decision-making in 
his eyes. What is clear is that Vattimo has made a number of questionable 
assumptions with his watered-down Hegelianism, not least of which is his 
interpretation of Christianity. Vattimo’s watered-down Hegelianism is 
important because it enables his particular interpretation of modernity to 
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justify the quasi-ethical notion of caritas he thinks is the limit of 
interpretation today. Moreover, it is at the heart of what might be his 
‘supersessionist’ attitude towards the New Testament and Old Testament, a 
notion I will look in the next chapter. 
 
c) Which Christian tradition? 
Vattimo’s watered-down Hegelianism depends on being able to identify 
‘God is love’ as the kerygma of the Bible, especially if one can link it to the 
principle of interiority as a hidden strand within Christianity’s history which 
manifests itself slowly, almost imperceptibly through time. It is true that one 
can find a proto-Cogito in Augustine’s thought. In Book XI 26 of his City of 
God, he states that if he is mistaken, he is. If this contribution from 
Augustine is too philosophical, in the Middle Ages Thomas a Kempis’ book 
The Imitation of Christ puts significant emphasis on the interior life and 
withdrawal from the world. The Imitation of Christ is but a particularly 
popular example of a mystical tradition that runs through Christianity. 
Vattimo is not particularly interested in the truth or value of the claims of 
these mystics, but the implications for metaphysics of the turn inward of the 
Christian message exemplified in this tradition; it is clear from Vattimo’s 
work that he has little time for any kind of ‘leap of faith’ or any attempt to 
make God overly transcendent. The mystical tradition must, though, take its 
inspiration from somewhere. What is more fundamental in the Christian 
message is the biblical notion of the kingdom of heaven being within you 
(Luke 17:21). One may argue that there are parallel traditions running 
through the history of Christianity. Just as the mystics, with their emphasis 
on the interior life, have the ecclesiastical hierarchy for contrast, so the 
message of the kingdom of heaven within one has its external equivalents of 
importance in the biblical stories of the renewal of the earth, the bodily 
resurrection, and the importance of spreading the Word of God through the 
Church. In other words, there is no single Christian tradition (D’Arcais 
2007), no single Christian message, no reducible ‘essence’ of Christianity of 
which secularisation in late-modernity is a realisation. Vattimo is against 
strong thought that closes down debate and fails to admit interpretative 
plurality. In his estimation of Christianity, Vattimo surely cannot be 
insisting that there was a single narrative that has progressively realised 
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itself in history. Instead, his choice of Dilthey’s schematic distinction 
between pre and post Christian metaphysics is informed by his philosophy 
of weak thought. Vattimo’s decision to see the essence of Christianity as 
secularisation, and secularisation as the realisation of the Christian tendency 
towards moving towards the interior life, is indicative of a broader issue of 
the relationship between philosophy and theology in his thought, something 
that shall be discussed in Part 2.   
 
Chapter Eight: Vattimo and Judaism—the danger of supersessionism17 
a) Supersessionism 
While Vattimo’s weakened Hegelianism might suffer from some 
questionable assumptions, it also gives rise to the unwelcome interpretation, 
of Anthony Sciglitano’s, that Christianity has superseded Judaism because 
the ‘spirit of the Age’ today is the ‘Age of the Spirit,’ the result of the 
biblical messages of kenosis and caritas. Apart from the implication of anti-
Semitism, there are philosophical reasons why supersessionism would be 
unwelcome. Firstly, it implies objective criteria why one message is better 
than another, and secondly the spectre of Joachim of Fiore looms large over 
the historical schema Vattimo offers, indicating a unilinear history of 
progress from Old Testament, to New Testament to the Age of 
Interpretation. Although Vattimo would respond that the former problem 
could be got around by holding that criteria for ‘better’ or ‘worse’ 
interpretations do not have to be objective and could simply be responses to 
reading the ‘signs of the times,’ he finds it more difficult to answer the 
second objection because he seems to wish to hold somehow that the 
message of weakening (the kenotic event) somehow gave rise to a 
hermeneutical chain of interpretation which has resulted in the current 
situation of nihilism. 
Where Vattimo writes ‘biblical,’ he is primarily referring to a New 
Testament message, emphasising the kenosis of God in his revelation as the 
Son (not the Father of the Old Testament God) and the message of caritas 
giving rise to the Age of the Spirit (the secularisation of Christianity into the 
plurality of interpretations with an orientation towards friendship). 
Sciglitano initially put forward this criticism of Vattimo in an article for 
                                                 
17 This chapter borrows from my article on this topic (Harris 2014a). 
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Modern Theology entitled ‘Contesting the World and the Divine: 
Balthasar’s Trinitarian ‘Response’ to Gianni Vattimo’s Secular 
Christianity.’ One of his points was that Vattimo’s interpretation of 
Christianity was ‘a form of Marcionism’ (Sciglitano 2007: 546). Marcion of 
Pontus was an early Christian leader in Rome, commanding a large 
following in the middle of the second century CE. Taking Scripture literally, 
Marcion thought the God of the Old Testament created the physical world, 
had a covenant with the descendants of Abraham, and pointed forward to a 
saviour figure, the Messiah. However, as Stuart G. Hall explains:  
for Marcion such a God cannot be the God and Father of Jesus 
Christ, who is absolutely good. Jesus says that a good tree cannot 
produce evil fruit (Luke 6:43-44), and that people are not to judge, 
but to be merciful as their father is merciful (Luke 6:36). The 
behaviour of the Creator is incompatible with these principles (Hall 
1991: 37).  
According to Marcion, not the Creator of the Old Testament, but the 
Unknown God, sent Christ out of pity for a creation that was not his own in 
an extraordinary act of love. In Irenaeus’ summary of Marcion’s theology, 
the latter thought the Creator is ‘the author of evils, a lover of war, 
inconsistent in judgement, and contrary to himself’ (Stevenson 1987: 92). 
The notion of the Creator being an ‘author of evils’ is a subjective 
judgement and somewhat ambiguous. However, when it comes to the 
Creator proscribing murder in the Decalogue, then wiping out Sodom and 
Gomorrah, as well as the apparent lack of consistency over his commands to 
Abraham, then Marcion’s system has, Hall says, ‘strong pathetic appeal’ to 
allow one to resolve ‘the undoubted moral, literary and historical difficulties 
of the Old Testament’ (Hall 1991: 38). Vattimo might find Marcion’s 
exegesis flat-footed in its literal approach to Scripture, as, for Vattimo, ‘The 
language of God as father is so obviously an allegorical language’ (Vattimo 
2007d: 42). Marcion’s literalism would not have the same appeal for 
Vattimo as Joachim’s spiritual interpretation of Scripture, regardless of how 
well or badly Vattimo understands his thought. Moreover, Marcion’s 
exegesis does not sit well with Vattimo’s program of emancipation through 
weakening of strong structures, as salvation for Marcion involved escaping 
our embodied existence through a quasi-Platonic notion of redemption 
through correct knowledge of Marcion’s system (Stevenson 1987: 96). The 
whole idea of a literal God beyond God (and a world beyond a world) 
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would not appeal to Vattimo given the frequent use he makes of Nietzsche’s 
story from Twilight of the Idols of ‘How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a 
Myth.’ Therefore, any possible supersessionism in Vattimo’s thought would 
be nearer to a particular reading of Joachim of Fiore than to the theology of 
Marcion. However, Sciglitano’s criticism of Vattimo appears to take this 
into account. 
Sciglitano’s criticism of Vattimo as a Marcionite was a brief aside in 
his 2007 article, the main focus of which was showing how Vattimo was 
effectively a death of God theologian. However, this criticism is of central 
importance in his more recent chapter on Vattimo in a volume edited by 
Peter Frick, Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers (Sciglitano 2013). 
Sciglitano links Vattimo’s acceptance of Joachim’s historical schema with 
Marcionism. After Christianity is the principal text of Vattimo’s that 
Sciglitano identifies as having supersessionist undertones, in which through 
a ‘metanarrative formula’ Vattimo moves ‘from an externalist metaphysical 
law-giving God to the revelation of God as Love in the form of a particular 
person…to the diffusion of Spirit in the community’ (Sciglitano 2013: 131). 
‘In other words,’ writes Sciglitano, ‘Vattimo’s reading of salvation history 
not only marginalizes the sacramental structures of Christian life and 
practice, but also juxtaposes the Pauline kenotic God to the Jewish 
transcendent God in ways that suggest anti-Judaism and Marcionism’ 
(Sciglitano 2013: 133). It is easy to identify God the Father with the Jewish 
God of the covenant, the Son with the New Testament and rise of the 
Church, and the Spirit with the Spirit of the Age (the ontology of actuality). 
This is very important as Vattimo is meant to be putting forward an ethic of 
tolerance in the form of ‘caritas,’ generated out of a history of Being in 
which the latter has been reduced to ‘exchange-value’; if the ‘highest 
values’ have been devalued, how can one tradition be ‘better’ than another? 
If Vattimo argues that Christianity is more in line with the ‘signs of the 
times’ in terms of its methods of exegesis (spiritual, rather than literal), this 
argument has the appearance of rigging the game to make one tradition look 
better and another worse. Moreover, given his very public comments against 
Israel in recent years and accusations of anti-Semitism (Ashkenazy 2014), 
there is the lingering suspicion that Vattimo has constructed a philosophy of 
religion to buttress his own prejudices. I have no concrete evidence that 
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Vattimo was trying to do this, and so I want to be charitable to him. 
Moreover, having been rebuked by John D. Caputo in 2007 for adopting 
Joachimism in a way that Caputo regarded as supersessionist (Caputo 2007: 
79), Sciglitano believes Vattimo has consciously toned-down his use of 
Joachim (Sciglitano 2013: 132), something I will look at in Part Two. What 
Sciglitano does not consider is whether this downplaying is due to 
philosophical persuasion or prudence. If it were for philosophical reasons it 
might be because Vattimo has thought twice about how his weakened 
Hegelianism might be perceived as constructing a new metanarrative, which 
would be inconsistent with postmodernism. 
Sciglitano thinks Vattimo’s supersessionism is deeply embedded 
into his return to religion, even features of his theory which do not seem 
such. For instance, Vattimo mentions on more than one occasion that 
‘kenosis’ includes creation (Vattimo 1999: 66; Vattimo 2003: 35), an act 
primarily associated with the Old Testament. Nevertheless, Sciglitano has 
got an answer for this, that even the creative act is subsumed by a category 
(kenosis) that is bound to the New Testament dispensation, thus showing 
how redemption and kenosis have surpassed the Old Testament revelation 
(Sciglitano 2013: 137). Where Vattimo has run together ‘Judaeo-Christian’ 
(or anything of this kind), such as in After Christianity (Vattimo 2002a: 7), 
Sciglitano also sees this continuity as implying supersession as ‘Christian’ 
comes after ‘Jewish’ (Sciglitano 2013: 135 n.2). Therefore, in order to show 
that Vattimo is not supersessionist in any kind of anti-Semitic or 
metanarrative-based way (which would be repugnant or self-contradictory, 
respectively), it is necessary to delve further into Vattimo’s theoretical 
framework, specifically his use of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm concept to 
argue that different ways of thinking, past and present, are 
‘incommensurable.’ In the following part this notion of 
‘incommensurability’ will be linked to developments in Vattimo’s return to 
religion and a discussion of the extent to which Vattimo’s reliance on Kuhn 
accords well with his Heideggerianism. 
 
b) Vattimo on the past in relation to the present 
Sciglitano’s contention is that Vattimo juxtaposed not two gods, as Marcion 
did, but ‘stages of ‘revelation’’ (Sciglitano 2013: 137). This remained a 
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‘genuine temptation for Vattimo’ up to and possibly including his 2009 
book, A Farewell to Truth. Although Sciglitano does not explore the 
implications of Vattimo giving up his Marcionite interpretation of Joachim 
(if he did), it would raise questions about continuity (ontological or 
otherwise) and the uniqueness of the Christ-event. Nevertheless, as Luca 
Bagetto notes in his essay ‘Deciding to Bear Witness,’ for Vattimo, ‘The 
coming-before and the coming-after describe a procedure that is not 
peacefully continuous. They imply tension, a comparison of testimonies, the 
confrontation between an Old and a New Testament’ (Bagetto 2010: 191). 
In Vattimo’s thought, this tension is expressed through the notion of 
Verwindung. The traces of a previous eventual disclosure are received, yet 
show themselves in a different way, in light of a new opening. By using 
Heidegger’s language of resignation-convalescence-alteration, Vattimo 
gives the impression that thought from a previous eventual disclosure is 
worse than the Being that is produced in the present. In truth, Vattimo 
admits he, like Heidegger, has an ambivalent relationship with traces from 
the past. For instance, it would be wrong, Vattimo states, to regard the 
history of metaphysics as if it was a series of foolish or pernicious errors, let 
alone ‘evil’ in the apocalyptic sense in which Sciglitano would have him 
bracketed (Sciglitano 2013: 140). Rather, whereas in the past metaphysics 
acted as a way to make sense of a world in which change and diversity were 
regarded as confusing and threatening, from the situation in which we have 
been thrown we not only need, but also have to weaken metaphysics insofar 
as foundational first principles are extravagant, unnecessary, and restrictive 
upon the irreducible hermeneutical plurality of voices that constitute the 
ontology of actuality. 
To understand Vattimo’s notion of the event and its implications for 
the accusations of Marcionism levelled at his interpretation of Christianity 
better, it is important to look at some of Vattimo’s more recent work. 
Vattimo’s notion of the event has been criticised as empty and formalistic 
by Van Harvey (Vattimo and Girard 2010: 73). In his tiny pamphlet on 
Heidegger and in his Gifford Lectures, Vattimo responds to this criticism by 
elaborating on the event to make it more specific, in no small part by 
drawing on the work of the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn. A 
philosopher of science, Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
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(Kuhn 1996), first published in 1962, stated that advancement in science 
was not linear. Instead, progress can only be made within ‘paradigms.’ A 
paradigm refers to the model of science which is normative in a field (such 
as chemistry or physics) at any one time (usually based on a classic text, 
such as Newtonian Physics based on his Principia) held by a community of 
scientists who work according to the principles and assumptions of the 
model, which is called ‘normal science.’ After a long period of time, normal 
science will start to problematise the paradigm because anomalies will 
appear during the course of experimentation which cannot be explained in 
accordance with the rules of the paradigm. When these anomalies reach 
critical mass, a ‘scientific revolution’ (or ‘paradigm-shift’) will occur, and a 
new paradigm will be instituted. The new paradigm is not ‘better’ than the 
previous one, but explains the world in a different way to take the anomalies 
into account. This led Kuhn to describe paradigms as ‘incommensurable,’ 
which sounded to many ears as relativistic, a label he tried to reject 
subsequent to the publishing of the initial text. While Sciglitano is correct in 
identifying that Vattimo, following Heidegger, prioritises truth as opening to 
truth as correspondence, there is good reason for believing that Vattimo 
does not subscribe to any form of supersessionism. This is because 
increasingly Vattimo has drawn his understanding of Being as eventuality 
(or ‘opening’) towards Kuhn’s paradigm concept, and he is not the only 
Heidegger scholar to make this connection. Bret D. Davis has likened 
openings to Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, for instance (Davis 2010: 5).  
Vattimo has drawn his understanding of Being as eventuality (or 
‘opening’) towards Kuhn’s paradigm concept. It is fair to say that Vattimo 
has had an interest in Kuhn’s work for a long time, citing The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions as an indication that hermeneutics has penetrated even 
the realms of science as far back as the mid-1980s (Vattimo 1988: 90-91). 
In The End of Modernity, in a chapter called ‘The Structure of Artistic 
Revolutions,’ Vattimo sees art as having a privileged place outside of the 
western metaphysical concern for ‘truth’ and ‘validity.’ While there may be 
some concern for these notions within ‘models and canons,’ the 
transformation of these models and canons in artistic revolutions changes 
the criteria in a way which is more radical than in metaphysics where the 
importance of ‘certainty’ and ‘presence’ endure despite revolutions 
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(Vattimo 1988: 90). On Vattimo’s view, new paradigms emerge through 
‘persuasion,’ which can be linked to his notion of the rhetorical nature of 
truth (Vattimo 1988a: 92). However, Vattimo then in a discussion of Kant in 
relation to Kuhn picks up on the idea that the ‘particular historicity…of the 
genius,’ such as Newton, whose work is epoch-making and this is to be 
found not only in the sciences, but also in the arts (Vattimo 1988a: 94-95). 
This idea of Vattimo’s lay dormant but in more recent years he has 
developed it further in relation to the idea of the event in Heidegger’s work. 
After downplaying the link between Heidegger and Kuhn’s thought 
for a number of years, the latter’s influence upon Vattimo has come to the 
fore in recent times. It is difficult to tell how far Vattimo is using Kuhn’s 
terminology to clarify certain aspects of the notion of the event for a more 
general audience less acquainted with Heidegger’s works, or whether the 
connections he has been making between the two authors is indicative of 
Vattimo’s ‘left Heideggerian’ focus on history. In his short pamphlet on 
Heidegger, Vattimo likens the epochal nature of Being in its history to the 
paradigms of Kuhn: ‘Allora per Heidegger, se l’Essere non è Oggetività, ma 
ciò che si dà entro schemi storico-culturali, che lui chiama epoche (o 
paradigm, per dirla con Kuhn), la Storia di questi paradigm è ciò che lui 
chiama la Storia dell’Essere’ (Vattimo 2013: 33). Three years earlier, in his 
Gifford Lectures given in Glasgow and included in his 2012 work Della 
realtà, Vattimo elaborated on how the Kuhnian paradigm concept can act as 
a model to understand not only the founding of a historical, contingent, 
epochal ground, but also the relationship between truth as opening and truth 
as correspondence. Vattimo writes: ‘Verità come alétheia è il darsi storico 
del paradigm, che, non essendo struttura eterna di un Essere metafisico e 
parmenideo, va pensato come evento. Ma verità è anche la proposizione 
verificata secondo i criteri propri del paradigm, dunque la scienza normale 
nel senso di Kuhn’ (Vattimo 2012b: 125).  In other words, the opening is the 
revolution, the paradigm-shift, whereas the subsequent work completed 
within the historical opening is the normal science, the truth as 
correspondence that works itself out along routine lines in accordance with 
the norms and regulations founded by the horizons constituted by the truth 
as opening. This is not some whim of Vattimo’s, for elsewhere in his work 
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he identifies the horizon of possibility into which Dasein is thrown as a 
‘paradigm’ (Vattimo 2011: xxxii). 
 From where does the historical opening as paradigm-shift 
come about? Clearly here there is a significant link between Vattimo’s work 
and Gadamer’s, for the latter thought we are always bound within a 
linguistic horizon, more than one in fact (Gadamer 1989: 302). Vattimo 
locates the origin of paradigms (or epochal openings, events) with era-
defining texts. For Kuhn these were texts in the history of science such as 
Newton’s Principia (Kuhn 1996: 10), a ‘concrete scientific achievement’ 
around which people would build a living tradition (Kuhn 1996: 11). It is 
doubtful that Kuhn would have been comfortable completely reducing 
paradigms to classic texts, as he thought that paradigms emerge out of 
anomalies in older theories accumulating to the point of the collapse of the 
old theory (previous paradigm) (Kuhn 1996: 89). Nevertheless, Vattimo 
steers Kuhn closer to identifying the paradigm with the text. For Vattimo, 
classic texts are milestones in culture that, surprisingly, Vattimo identifies 
along national lines (at least in the examples he provides). In his pamphlet 
on Heidegger, Vattimo writes ‘Shakespeare per gli inglesi, Dante per gli 
italiani, Cervantes per gli spagnoli. Queste persone hanno modificato la 
lingua e hanno trasformato il nostro modo di vedere il mondo’ (Vattimo 
2013: 43).  Nevertheless, he also writes ‘Personalmente, dopo aver letto 
Dostoevskij non sono più lo stesso. E questo è l’inizio di un’epoca: ciò 
accade anche per popoli e lingue’ (Vattimo 2013: 43). Here Vattimo 
implies that although individual writers such as Shakespeare, Cervantes and 
Dante have made indelible, paradigmatic, era-defining impressions beyond 
the levels of the national character and culture, that is, ontologically, 
eventuality occurs at the level of the greatness of language from any 
situation, even nineteenth-century Russia, to effect a personal 
transformation. A comparison can be made between Vattimo and Heidegger 
here, for the importance the former places on classical works of European 
literature finds a parallel with the emphasis the latter gave to ‘great art’ in 
‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (Heidegger 1993:105). For Heidegger, ‘the 
artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a 
passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to 
emerge’ (Heidegger 1993: 105). The essence of art is the truth of beings 
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setting itself into work, and the historical happening of art opens up the 
Being of beings, between earth and world. The work comes into the world, 
sheltering the earth and through the work historical man grounds his 
dwelling in the world. The earth unfolds itself in inexhaustible shapes, 
letting earth jut through the world. The truth occurs in the simultaneous 
clearing and concealing, the opposition of world and earth. Great works of 
art, such as Van Gogh’s ‘A Pair of Shoes’ (1886), lead to a sense of 
realisation of the equipmentality of shoes and the whole form of life (or 
world) pertaining to them, beyond the level of merely treating the shoes as 
an object held over and against the subject. In other words, the work of art 
has a poetic mode of revealing. This is similar to the ontological founding 
role given to classic texts by Vattimo, although the latter is much more 
centred on the founding role of the text—of the written (or spoken) word as 
an art form—than Heidegger. While the latter of course gave importance to 
the role of classic texts, especially those of Hölderlin, Vattimo tends only to 
speak of classic texts and not paintings or other forms of visual art. This 
could be because of a combination of Gadamer’s influence on Vattimo and 
his own nihilism, and so could only find Being in language whilst seeing the 
interpretation as something linguistic which alone had being, rather than as 
an articulation of something (which could be visual). To allow there to be a 
something which one could articulate would leave the door open for 
something beyond hermeneutical nihilism, some kind of radical Other or 
substratum. 
The crucial benefit of drawing upon Kuhn’s paradigm concept when 
it comes to dealing with Sciglitano’s accusation of Marcionism is that 
paradigms are incommensurable and equal in value. Famously, Kuhn stated 
that ‘Copernicus’ theory was not more accurate than Ptolemy’s and did not 
lead directly to any improvement in the calendar’ (Kuhn 1996: 154). On this 
view, if epochs are paradigmatic then one eventual disclosure is no better 
than another: they are merely different. Sciglitano himself regards the 
kenosis of God as one such ‘event’ in the history of the withdrawal of Being 
for Vattimo (Sciglitano 2013: 119). If kenosis is one event, and the Old 
Testament revelation is another, and if the ‘Age of Interpretation’ is another 
such event, then on this Kuhnian reading of epochality they are neither 
better, nor worse than one another. Therefore, not only is Vattimo not 
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Marcionite with respect to believing in two separate gods (as Sciglitano 
admits), but also he is not Marcionite in viewing revelation in a 
supersessionist way (as Sciglitano maintains in both his articles on 
Vattimo). 
Where Vattimo runs into difficulties is in reconciling his 
paradigmatic conception of the event, a conception of disclosure that 
emphasises rupture, and the Hegelian thematic of secularisation/weakening 
of which Jesus’ message is the inaugurating event. It is almost as though 
Vattimo requires there to be a master event that nudges every other in the 
direction of weakening. The mixture of Hegel, Heidegger and Kuhn is an 
uncomfortable one. Nevertheless, without some kind of master event or 
golden thread that runs through these epochal paradigms, there would only 
be left some kind of empty relativism in which ‘anything goes.’ On the one 
hand Vattimo thinks absolutist claims leave us cold as strong thought is 
neither plausible, nor required. On the other hand, there is nothing 
preventing minority groups retreating into their own identities, shunning 
dialogue amid competing truth claims. Between these approaches to truth 
and Being in late-modernity, Vattimo realises he cannot have recourse to a 
vertically transcendent, ‘violent,’ principle (although some critics of 
Vattimo, such as Jonkers, have questioned whether all transcendence has to 
be violent; Jonkers 2000: 389). Equally redundant would be to impose some 
once-for-all ‘theory of communicative action’ or other Habermasian system 
that is too rigid and unfounded in what Vattimo sees as a necessity to 
engage with history. Here Vattimo is ingenious in appealing to how he 
experiences the Bible in his more recent writings on religion which will be 
the subject of the first sections of Part Two. 
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Part Two: Eventuality and Ethics 
 
Chapter Nine: After the Death of God and other later works 
a) A summary of these later works 
As Vattimo does not divide up his works himself into neat stages, it seems 
difficult and rather arbitrary to notice a shift in Vattimo’s thought during his 
‘return’ to religion at any one specific point. Nevertheless, after After 
Christianity, the term kenosis recedes from view, with caritas being 
reconfigured as ‘friendship’ in relation to other ideas such as ‘Logos,’ 
‘consensus’ and ‘dialogue.’ From The Future of Religion in particular 
Vattimo’s position seems to change, and the most interesting material comes 
from a dialogue between Vattimo, Zabala and Rorty on 16 December 2002. 
By discerning a separate way of arguing for the priority of the Bible for the 
West which downplays the Joachimist schema of his earlier work on 
religion, Vattimo is able to reconcile Christianity with Heidegger, Hegel and 
Kuhn, albeit not without difficulty.  
This part will begin by showing how Vattimo has changed from 
putting forward the view that kenosis was an event to the notion that the 
Bible was an epochal paradigm, creating an opening upon which we are 
dependent. I will then discuss where this leaves Vattimo in terms of how 
faithful he is to Heidegger, with reference not only to his Hölderlin lectures, 
but also to his work Contributions to Philosophy. I will argue that Vattimo’s 
reading of Heidegger is particular to the point of being subjective, and that 
recourse to the hermeneutic circle will not do enough to persuade others that 
his observations concerning late-modernity are a fair reading of the ‘signs of 
the times.’ Along with his partial reading of Heidegger and understanding of 
religion which would not be recognisable to most religious people due to its 
complete lack of vertical transcendence, the ethic Vattimo derives from his 
return to religion—caritas—also suffers from being applicable among 
fellow weak thinkers.   
 
b) Classic texts 
In an essay entitled ‘Toward a Nonreligious Christianity’ in his 
collaborative work After the Death of God, Vattimo argues that he is who he 
is due to inheriting a textual tradition: ‘Take away the Bible and I would not 
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be what I am’ (Vattimo 2007a: 36). Without the Bible he could not 
understand Dante or Shakespeare, even if he could read the Bible without 
needing to read these two authors. ‘If I reflect on my existence,’ Vattimo 
states, ‘I must realise that without the text of the Bible I would be bereft of 
the very instruments I have in order to think and talk’ (Vattimo 2007a: 36; 
see also Vattimo 2004: 53). Vattimo jumps from his own personal existence 
to Europe, invoking his favourite quotation of Croce’s, ‘We cannot but call 
ourselves Christians,’ a quotation Vattimo uses in Chapter Five of After 
Christianity in the context of talking about Europe/The West/Modernity. Is 
Vattimo, therefore, merely extrapolating from his own personal existence 
and generalising his reflections upon the importance of the Bible in his life 
to apply to everybody else in Europe? More than this, is he extending the 
importance of his reflections beyond geographical bounds, making his 
personal reflections epoch-defining insofar as he identifies an epoch 
(‘modernity’) with a place (Europe/The West), even if, as he does, Vattimo 
makes Europe conceptual (the place of the development of techno-scientific 
rationality and mass communication)? To a degree, yes, and the theme of 
‘philosophy as autobiography’ is one to which I shall return later in this 
part. Provisionally, in defence of Vattimo he may well be taking the 
approach of Heidegger’s in Being and Time in which in order to investigate 
Being one must interrogate Dasein. By interrogating himself, he is 
exploring his thrownness and the ontological structure which discloses the 
world to him. As such, he sees the religious history of the West (particularly 
Christianity) as being of central importance for this disclosure. 
To appreciate Vattimo’s point here one should consider his 
philosophy at a deeper level through drawing upon Gadamer’s view that the 
nature of Being is linguistic. Vattimo talks about the ‘text’ of the Bible 
which has permeated and shaped his existence. This language, written in the 
Bible and spoken in the conversations of his childhood, constitutes, on his 
understanding of Being as mediated through his reading of Heidegger and 
Gadamer, the horizon in which he is living just as much as the Homeric 
poems have done (Vattimo 2004: 53). Increasingly, Vattimo is emphasising 
the importance of the Bible as a trace, as a tradition without which he would 
not be able to exist, so much have the themes of the Bible shaped his life. 
How should one relate to this tradition: to appropriate it by reconstructing 
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its origins or to ‘piously remember’ it? The former action would be to return 
to presencing, to metaphysical thought. It is the latter option that Vattimo, 
following Heidegger, regards as the type of thought opposed to metaphysics 
that one should pursue: through Andenken (‘recollective thought’), by 
‘retracing the history of metaphysics as the forgetting of Being that Dasein 
decides for its own death and in this way founds itself as a hermeneutic 
totality whose foundation consists of a lack of foundation’ (Vattimo 1988a: 
119). Through Andenken, one finds liberation by ‘entrusting’ oneself to the 
traditions that are available to us. Relating Andenken to Vattimo’s return to 
religion, in The Future of Religion, Vattimo even talks about our ‘existential 
condition,’ that ‘we cannot place ourselves outside the tradition opened up 
by the proclamation of Christ’ (Vattimo 2004: 54). With tradition goes 
accepting certain distinctions: 
when I say “thanks to God I am an atheist” and I have become an 
atheist thanks to Jesus’ existence, “thanks to Jesus” implies that I 
accept that there is a sort of cutoff point in history: B.C. before and 
A.D. after. If I do not accept this radical historicity, I find myself 
again in the situation of having to admit a sort of basic, authentic, 
realistic, stable structure of reality that I discover at a certain point. 
That there is no metaphysical foundation is still a foundation. If I 
accept radically my historicity, I do not see any other possibility than 
to speak of religion (Vattimo 2004: 63). 
Going beyond Vattimo, but working within the spirit of his work, one could 
‘twist’ the text of Matthew 16:19, of ‘binding’ and ‘loosing’ of the Christian 
proclamation in relation to salvation, along the lines of the inescapability in 
the West of the Christian tradition, and the loosing of Dasein entrusting 
itself to ‘the liberating bond that positions it in the Über-lieferung 
(‘tradition’)’ (Vattimo 1988a: 119). Vattimo attributes radical historicism to 
a ‘transcendental dialogue’ between him, the history of foundations, and 
God, ‘otherwise everything would be a guide throughout history’ – so 
‘thanks to God that I am an atheist’ means ‘thanks to the history of the 
revelation, the salvation, the dissolution of Being that I’m an atheist and this 
history actually is my paradoxical foundation’ (Vattimo 2004: 63). 
Responding to Vattimo, Zabala quotes Nietzsche: ‘I fear that we shall be 
unable to get rid of God, since we still believe in grammar’ (Vattimo 2004: 
63-64). Language as transmission—such as the dating system A.D. and 
B.C.—indicates the paradoxical foundation of the religious background into 
which he is thrown. Salvation, the experience of the divine, is feeling 
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dependent on biblical tradition and accepting it in one’s radical historicity 
(Vattimo 2004: 77-78). The Bible underlies this tradition and acts as a 
paradigm, not kenosis as an event. The links between ‘texts,’ ‘paradigms,’ 
‘epochs’ and ‘events’ will be discussed shortly. What is worthy of note is 
that I believe Vattimo moved away from kenosis to avoid parallels being 
drawn between his thought and the likes of Altizer, to downplay the idea of 
a being (such as God) being incarnated in a person or in history itself, 
moving between events in a more strongly Hegelian way. This is not to say 
that Vattimo’s later thought is not ‘weakly’ Hegelian as I argued in Part 
One, but this is only in the sense that there is an idea manifesting itself in 
history. What Vattimo did by emphasising more his dependence on the 
Bible rather than kenosis is shifting the focus from theology to the text. By 
drawing attention to the latter, Vattimo is in much more obviously 
Gadamerian territory, as dependence is on tradition which is linguistic, and 
what book in the West has been more influential than the Bible? The key is 
then for Vattimo to show how the Bible gives rise to caritas as weakening, 
of showing ‘friendship’ in a way which is not the flipside of kenosis (or at 
least reconfiguring the latter concept to mean a friendship embedded within 
the text, as he did in A Farewell to Truth).  
Vattimo attempts to do this by drawing upon Matthew 18, that where 
two or more are gathered in his name, there God is (Vattimo 2004: 66). 
Dialogue, Vattimo thinks, creates Being, and ‘Being is an event of the 
Logos’ (Vattimo 2004: 66). Remembering tradition, speaking it and 
interpreting it through dialogue generates new Being. Vattimo even writes: 
even if there is no objective Logos of the nature of reality, every time 
we agree on something we actually give a sort of testimony, we 
realize a sort of continuity of the Logos, which is the only criterion 
we actually have. This is the reason why I insist on charity, because 
charity could be thought of as a metarule that obliges and pushes us 
to accept the different language games, the different rules of the 
language games (Vattimo 2004: 59). 
Logos is dialogue, and where dialogue forms consensus there is caritas; this 
is a creative reading of the notion of charity which has little to do with 
Davidson’s view of it except that it approaches interpretation through the 
medium of a formal principle, drawing on Gadamer through the notion of 
creating truth through consensus. Vattimo misses a trick by not explicitly 
rejecting the idea of kenosis in favour of the idea of the Word (Logos) being 
made flesh (John 1:14) in human interpretation, in the gathering of people 
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together in friendship (consensus). In yet more recent works, such as 
Hermeneutic Communism with his pupil Santiago Zabala, Vattimo has 
drawn more upon Rorty’s term ‘conversation,’ rather than dialogue, and 
charity (caritas) has receded from the picture somewhat. The core idea is 
that there is continuity, but no objective reality. Continuity and consensus 
involve firstly a dialogue (or conversation) between the interpreter (or 
‘subject’) and tradition, and secondly between two interpreters. Logos (or 
‘dialogue,’ or ‘reason’) is weakened because it is oriented towards its own 
decline. Matthew 18 comes into the picture when Vattimo puts forward the 
idea that if Being is Logos, and Logos the result of intersubjective dialogue, 
then the ontological worry is how to found Being (and the solution he 
suggests is tradition) (Vattimo 2004: 66). 
Here one can make a link between ‘Logos’ and the ‘spiritual’ 
exegesis of which Vattimo has been speaking. Interpretation, he argues, 
should not be imposed or accepted dogmatically, but created in consensus, 
and this involves taking power away from ecclesiastical authorities. Vattimo 
writes ‘Joachim’s text can still be our guide because of the general meaning 
of the age of spirit, which stresses not the letter, but the spirit of revelation; 
no longer servants but friends; no longer awe or faith but charity; and 
perhaps not action but contemplation’ (Vattimo 2002a: 31). This quotation 
from Vattimo’s earlier text, After Christianity brings all the pieces together. 
The Age of the Spirit (or ‘Interpretation,’ for Vattimo) is the current age, the 
epoch of nihilism in which his understanding of the revelation of the 
friendliness of God through Christ, has reached its secularising culmination. 
By ‘secularisation,’ Vattimo means the stripping away of the ‘violent’ 
naturally sacred features, such as authoritarianism in all its forms, with 
charity taking its place. The ‘spiritual interpretation’ of Scripture involves, 
Vattimo thinks, an overturning of superstition, and persecution of the clergy, 
and predicts that the ‘blind awe of the people toward the wise and its priests 
shall be no more’ (Vattimo 2002a: 33). With the decline of literalism, or the 
‘letter’ of the texts, ‘sacred texts will no longer be the exclusive heritage of 
priestly authority’ (Vattimo 2002a: 33), the kind of external authority that 
Paul associated with the ‘letter.’ One can think of examples today such as 
Catholic dogma against the ordination of women and against same sex 
couples. If Christ’s death was to reveal the violence of the natural sacred 
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and the naturally religious, his resurrection can be seen in the rising up of 
the spiritualisation of the world, which includes not only Scripture, but also 
any authoritarian, ‘strong’ structures that are dependent upon literalism to 
maintain their power. On this reading of Vattimo, he has a lot in common 
with Rudolf Bultmann, who tried to ‘demythologise’ the New Testament of 
the ‘bizarre’ features it had retained as a result of its New Testament 
worldview of angels, demons and spirits. For Bultmann, the kerygma of the 
New Testament involved the ‘rising up’ in faith of the disciples, rather than 
a literal body rising up out of the tomb. Bultmann, for all he was influenced 
by Heidegger, still believed in the programme of demythologisation. With 
his nihilistic style of weak thought, Vattimo, though, acknowledges the 
disenchantment even with the programme of disenchantment, and that even 
demythologisation is a myth (Vattimo 1992: 39). Nevertheless, like 
Bultmann he sees the danger in literalism and its tendency to give rise to 
authoritarianism. Rather than literalism, Vattimo would say that the ‘Age of 
the Spirit’ is one in which we are currently living, ‘An epoch in which our 
religiosity can finally develop into the form of charity no longer dependent 
on truth’ in which Plato is a greater friend than truth (Vattimo 2011: 59). 
Charity is ‘welcoming the other,’ based on a recognition of our own textual 
history which has Scripture as its historical foundation. We welcome the 
other because this is the message of Scripture, one which makes us look 
inside ourselves and outside at others like us (Vattimo 2011 75-76). 
 David Newheiser, in his article on Vattimo’s use of Joachim of 
Fiore, laments that Vattimo is ‘hostile’ to literal readings of Scripture, 
stating that if Vattimo was more open to other viewpoints and ways of 
reading texts then this would enrich his own hermeneutics (Newheiser 2011: 
10). Newheiser quotes Joachim himself remarking how ‘something 
happened’ to him after reading a particular text. Ironically, Vattimo’s own 
account of the effect of reading Dostoyevsky is remarkably similar (Vattimo 
2013: 43). The difference between the two thinkers, Joachim and Vattimo, 
takes the former’s value for the latter into account; Vattimo can have a 
personal transformation circumscribed within the bounds of the larger 
horizon of the ontology of actuality. Language has a transformative power 
based on the way in which individual classic texts have reconfigured the 
way in which we see ourselves. Nevertheless, there is the relationship 
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between the one and the many to take into consideration today. With an 
irreducibly plural interpretative world before us in the West, literalism 
closes down dialogue and seals one off from the other when both for 
practical reasons and out of respect for fellow interpreters similar and yet 
different from ourselves, isolation is not an option. This view of Joachim 
has nothing to do with supersession, but of how best to view our heritage in 
the light of the signs of the times, that is, of having a lighter, more spiritual 
approach to interpretation based upon the lack of concrete foundation or 
centre by virtue of the contemporary experience of ever-increasing plurality. 
Vattimo, like Joachim before him, has read the signs of the times and the 
way in which texts transform us occurs within a larger horizon. Vattimo’s 
ingenious insight comes from the recognition that this apparently irreducible 
plurality can in fact be reduced to a common historical origin in the text of 
the Bible. Behind Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes, Dostoyevsky and all other 
greats of European literature besides, of all epochs, is the Bible. One cannot 
understand these figures and their works without reference to the Bible 
(Vattimo 2007: 36). Today, from the situation into which we are thrown, we 
can see the Bible not as giving rise to the logic of the divine right of kings 
and the Inquisition, but to the turn to the subject and weakening based on 
charitable interpretation. Interpreting according to the spirit of the age 
means hermeneutical practise that accords with the Age of the Spirit (that is, 
for Vattimo, the ‘Age of Interpretation’), occupying the space between the 
event of personal transformation and the ontological landscape after the 
death of God. Again, this theme of how personal Vattimo’s interpretation of 
Christianity appears will be a significant one and shall be discussed later in 
Part Two. 
 
c) Vattimo’s intention 
In The Future of Religion there was an opportunity for Vattimo to identify 
caritas as the fruit of the Word (Logos) in order to make persuasive 
arguments for a gradual incarnation of the idea of weakening in history. He 
could even have used this argument to rebut counters made to him by 
Richard Rorty. On this issue Rorty replies to Vattimo that he sees not so 
much A.D. and B.C. as important, and the Christ event as definitive, but for 
him the French Revolution was the decisive moment in history. With this 
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event came new values, that ‘Christian charity changed into liberté, egalité, 
fraternité’ (Vattimo, Zabala, Rorty 2006: 65). Against Rorty’s point, 
Vattimo would trace the emancipatory value of these ideas back to the 
Bible, interpreting the French Revolution as the outcome of the gradual 
incarnation of the Logos in dialogue, even if ‘dialogue’ involved (sometimes 
extreme) conflict in physical terms. 
That Vattimo does not take this opportunity is instructive, and in 
these later works the tone and nature of Vattimo’s argument seems to shift. 
Vattimo drops the grand historical schema he appeared to have created in 
his earlier works on Christianity. Take the following example from ‘The 
Trace of the Trace’: ‘The philosophy that responds to the call for the 
overcoming of metaphysics comes from the Hebraic-Christian tradition, and 
the content of its overcoming of metaphysics simply amounts to the 
maturing awareness of this provenance’ (Vattimo 1998: 89). A short while 
later, in After Christianity, Vattimo writes that the Son is the Logos of the 
Father (Vattimo 2002a: 60), and the Son becomes human through Mary. 
These two passages together, in light of his conception of secularisation as 
weakening, could combine to enable Vattimo to draw the conclusion that 
the incarnation as kenosis works itself out as the Logos in a history of 
weakening in which, only now, we are becoming aware of the provenance 
of hermeneutical nihilism. Such is the proximity between this position and 
Death of God theologians that Thomas Guarino has said that ‘At times 
Vattimo speaks as if the Incarnation of the Eternal Word is an objective, 
historical reality’ (Guarino 2009: 98). Guarino notes that even in After 
Christianity Vattimo uses Gadamer’s term Wirkungsgeschichte (effective 
history) (Guarino 2009: 99) to indicate that the incarnation is not a ‘real’ 
event, but effective history. Nevertheless, where Vattimo makes this 
distinction (Vattimo 2002a: 112), he does mention that there is a ‘teleology’ 
in which the incarnation of the ‘Logos’ is the ontological Being that 
weakens ‘every ontic structure’ in being ‘shared’ as ‘Dialogue’ that 
‘constitutes us as historical beings.’ Elsewhere in the book this incarnation 
is referred to as the ‘kenosis’ of God that is the ‘archetypical occurrence’ of 
secularisation (Vattimo 2002a: 67). The Logos is ‘an opening, which is 
language’ (Vattimo 2002a: 66) that is a Logos insofar as it is a ‘continuity’ 
(Vattimo 2002a: 67). On this reading, even if one separates it from the 
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Joachimist schema in which it is entangled, kenosis appears to be causal, 
that is, an event in the world historical terms which sets into motion a train 
of weakening (De Lange 2002). In some way kenosis was an event which 
has culminated through a process of secularisation in the death of God, 
liberation of metaphor, end of metaphysics and return of religion. The 
‘effective history’ is the strength of the weakness in recollection of the 
incarnation in charitable dialogue. However, this raises the question about 
what the ‘archetypical occurrence’ was, and whether or not it was a ‘real’ 
incarnation of a thing (the eternal Logos) in the body of Christ, or whether it 
was the embodying of a message in a classic text (which would bring the 
earlier work by Vattimo on religion closer to the later). Is there is a 
teleology resulting from this embodiment (this ontological opening, which 
is essentially what Vattimo is conveying) that works itself out in history? I 
think for Vattimo what comes across in his philosophy of religion as a 
teleology (this awkward alliance between Heidegger, Hegel and Kuhn) 
appears as much because of our thrownness after the end of metaphysics in 
which the ontology of actuality is one with a tendency towards weakness. 
The nearest one can find in Vattimo’s later works to this more strident 
position from ‘The Trace of the Trace’ and After Christianity is from A 
Farewell to Truth (Vattimo 2011: 70) and After the Death of God (Vattimo 
2007: 35) in which Vattimo says that the message of Christianity is a 
‘stimulus’ for the liberation from metaphysics. However, by now, tempered 
by his more recent views on religion, the Logos is intersubjective dialogue, 
which appears to be the result of the process of secularisation in the earlier 
Vattimo writings on religion; Vattimo then reads it back into the Bible, as 
he did with Matthew 18 mentioned earlier. In the later works, such as After 
the Death of God and A Farewell to Truth, some of the explanations of 
secularisation are retained, such as invoking Dilthey. What is missing in the 
later works on religion by Vattimo is the notion of the incarnation and the 
language which gives a sense of teleology that goes with it. This is probably 
for the best for if the archetypal event drops out, this is more faithful to 
Vattimo’s Heideggerian style of weak thought, for the notion of an 
archetypal occurrence is too much of an ontic reading of the event by 
attributing weakening to the event of a person (Jesus Christ) or 
interpretations of his sayings by his evangelists. Moreover, jettisoning the 
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ontic reading of weakening in an ‘actual’ kenosis reduces the teleology 
associated with it, that is, of some ‘thing’ (or even, thinking ontologically, 
‘opening’) unfolding in history from the time of Christ to the present, thus 
reducing the opportunities for interpreting it in a ‘supersessionist’ way.  
It would be misleading to state that kenosis drops out of Vattimo’s 
thought entirely after late 2002. For instance, two pages are devoted to the 
term in A Farewell to Truth (Vattimo 2009: 54-55), in which he states that 
‘the incarnation understood as kenosis…is being realized more fully today,’ 
that he relates the term to the ‘destiny of metaphysics.’ However, in this text 
there is no intricate linking of the term kenosis to the Logos, or to teleology, 
or to the notion of ‘event.’ Nevertheless, in After the Death of God the term 
kenosis is conspicuous by its absence in Vattimo’s contributions to the 
volume. Anthony Sciglitano has mentioned that after this volume Vattimo 
downplays the role of Joachim of Fiore and the attendant metanarrative that 
goes with his thought. Sciglitano identifies this metanarrative with 
Vattimo’s use of the term kenosis (Sciglitano 2013: 130-131). Attributing 
Vattimo’s apparent change in approach to Christianity to his dialogue with 
John D. Caputo in After the Death of God, Sciglitano sees Vattimo’s 
understanding of Joachim’s thought in particular as downplayed in A 
Farewell to Truth. Caputo, Sciglitano thinks, ‘points out that death of God 
theology usually institutes a metanarrative in which supersession is a 
prominent feature…[which] consign[s] Judaism to a stage that is 
irretrievably in the past’ (Sciglitano 2013: 132). Caputo says that death of 
God theologies, to which he thinks Vattimo’s schema bears a significant 
similarity, set ‘a trap for Judaism’ (Caputo 2007: 149). Nevertheless, while 
Caputo’s contributions to After the Death of God may have influenced 
Vattimo’s subsequent direction after 2007, it would appear as though they 
would have influenced Vattimo’s contribution to After the Death of God. 
The dialogue took place in 2004. If (and here it is unclear) Vattimo heard it 
or heard of it, this would explain the absence of kenosis and downplaying of 
Joachim in his schema in his 2007 essay for the collection. What it would 
not explain is the almost complete absence of the term kenosis and the 
Joachimist metanarrative in The Future of Religion from 2004, let alone 
Interrogazioni sul Cristianesimo from 2000.  
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Interestingly, although After Christianity was published in both 
Italian and English in 2002, it was based on earlier chapters and an Italian 
Academy lecture series from around the time Vattimo was putting together 
Belief. In the original Italian edition of After Christianity, Dopo la 
cristianità, Vattimo states that the first three chapters (Part 1) were given as 
lectures in 1996 (Vattimo 2002b: 143). The latest essay was from 2001, 
concerning Heidegger’s views on Christianity, and this is the final essay, 
largely unconnected to the main arguments in the book. The other essays 
ranged from 1993-2000. Reasons will not be sought if they do not present 
themselves, but it would nonetheless appear as though Vattimo has 
gradually changed his position concerning the role of kenosis in his ‘return 
to religion.’ Vattimo even hints as much in a dialogue with Giovanni 
Giorgio and Carmelo Dotolo:  
Il punto é che io, forse sempre di più, da dopo Credere di credere, ho 
cominciato ad avere molto timore di fare delle affermazioni 
teologiche, nel senso proprio di affermazioni 'su Dio.' Certamente la 
kenosis mi permette di ascoltare il messaggio della rivelazione 
giudaico-cristiana, ma se la prendo troppo alla lettera, intendendola 
comme una 'descrizione' di come é Dio, la cosa comincia a turbarmi 
(Giorgio, Dotolo and Vattimo 2009: 4-5). 
In short, Vattimo became concerned by reaction to Belief that he was being 
interpreted theologically, as if he was making pronouncements concerning 
the life of God. While this did not prevent him from publishing After 
Christianity, which probably did nothing more than cement him as a ‘Death 
of God’ theologian in the minds of many of his newer readers unacquainted 
with his previous work, it would appear as though from the turn of the 
Millennium Vattimo has retreated from quasi-theological pronouncements 
to explaining how an hermeneutical ethic centred around charity can arise 
due to our connection through language with the Bible as the ‘master event’ 
that nudges all the other openings based around classic linguistic texts in the 
West.18 Vattimo goes further to suggest that kenosis can only be used in a 
practical way, as a way to critique the practical action of the Church today 
(Giorgio, Dotolo and Vattimo 2009: 6).  
 
                                                 
18 The nature and role of the Bible for Vattimo will be explored in Chapter Nine, 
section ‘a’ below.  
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Chapter Nine: paradigms, concealment and reductionism19 
a) Art, paradigms and monuments 
It has been shown how Vattimo’s more recent turn to Kuhn to elucidate 
Heidegger’s notion of the event could get around the problem of 
supersessionism, focusing on the importance of the Bible. In prioritising 
‘classic texts,’ Vattimo opens himself up to a number of objections. Is he 
too focused on the classic text as something ontic, reducing the ontological 
to ‘things’? It shall be shown that there is precedent within Heidegger’s 
thought for the importance of classic texts, particularly in his treatment of 
Hölderlin’s work. Having looked at the latter, I will show how Vattimo 
understands the founding and influence of a classic text as event, 
particularly in relation to the fourfold. ‘The fourfold,’ writes Andrew J. 
Mitchell, ‘is a thinking of things. The fourfold names the ‘gathering’ of 
earth, sky, mortals and divinities that comes to constitute the thing for 
Heidegger’ (Mitchell 2010: 208). More than in Being and Time, the fourfold 
in the post-war work of Heidegger is a ‘phenomenologically more robust’ 
working-out of the thing (Mitchell 2010: 208). Michael Wheeler also points 
out that along with Heidegger developing his understanding of the thing, the 
fourfold was also a way to reimagine the ‘world’ by thinking of it as 
something culturally structured by including some reference to nature (such 
as ‘earth’) (Wheeler 2011). The fourfold, however, along with his attempt to 
understand the history of the West in terms of weakening founded by the 
Bible as the paradigmatic European text, are read by Vattimo through his 
understanding of the event of appropriation (Ereignis) based on a 
combination of Heidegger’s texts Identity and Difference and ‘The Age of 
the World Picture;’ Contributions to Philosophy appeared in German in 
1989 and so could not influence Vattimo’s earlier work, but he has had 
twenty-seven years to incorporate it into his ‘return to religion,’ which he 
has not done. Drawing upon the work of Modesto Berciano and Reiner 
Schürmann I proceed to show the limitations of Vattimo’s understanding of 
Heidegger and the fatal implications of these for his return to religion. 
Arguably, Vattimo too easily identifies ‘openings’ with classic texts, 
such as the Bible and Shakespeare’s plays. By conflating ‘event’ with 
‘epoch,’ as well as ‘paradigm,’ Vattimo places Being too much into the 
                                                 
19 This chapter borrows from my article on Vattimo’s views on caritas, especially 
in subsection b (Harris 2014b). 
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hands of human artistry. It is as though Vattimo takes Heidegger’s ‘On the 
Origin of the Work of Art’ too seriously. Vattimo has admitted downplaying 
the semantic field of ‘conflict’ in Heidegger’s thought (Vattimo 2012b: 
126), and with that he has lost the tension between ‘earth’ and ‘world,’ and 
with it, also, the tension between the finitude of Dasein and what withdraws 
from thought. What withdraws, what is abyssal, is from history, and can 
therefore leave us with a simplified view of history. By ‘abyssal’ here I am 
referring to Heidegger’s distinction between beings, which have a ground, 
and that which withdraws—Being—which has no ground. As Heidegger 
writes in the Contributions, ‘The abyssal ground is the primessential 
clearing concealment, the essential occurrence of truth’ (Heidegger 2012: 
300). This quote draws attention to the ground as something which is 
simultaneously an eventual occurrence which clears and founds a world, as 
well as remaining concealed and not reducible to the ontic. However, 
through jettisoning the tension between earth and world, Vattimo reduces 
the ontological to the ontic by prioritising the classic text. Here, too, one can 
see the influence of Gadamer in Vattimo’s ‘left Heideggerianism’ (Vattimo 
2010b: 77).   
Perhaps part of the problem is in Vattimo’s oversimplification of 
Heidegger that caricatures the ‘right’ position as a form of onto-theology 
and positions the ‘left’ as far away as possible in a form of philosophy that 
is closer to Kuhn, with much of what is interesting about Heidegger situated 
in the middle. This may be why Vattimo does not often draw from 
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, which indicates that the Ereignis 
is ‘enowning,’ and that it is not to be identified with an artefact, person, 
event or human creation. Take the following quotation from the 
Contributions:  
Eventuating here and refusal and remaining absent, incursion and 
accident, restraint and transfiguration, freedom and compulsion. 
Such things eventuate, i.e., belong to the essential occurrence of the 
event itself. Every way of ordering, rearranging, and intermixing 
‘categories’ fails here, because the categories are said on the basis of 
beings and apply to beings and never name or know beyng itself 
(Heidegger 2012: 220). 
The opening is of time and space, and it concerns aspects of our Being such 
as ‘transfiguration’ and ‘compulsion.’ It is the event whereby being and man 
co-belong, and as such cannot be historically localised, and it depends 
necessarily on the finitude of both man and being, hence the exposure of the 
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abyss, nothingness, the inclusion of withdrawal and closure in the event of 
opening. As such, Heidegger did not think of Ereignis as being identifiable 
with a particular event in time or anything ontic, even if he seemed to move 
nearer this position in ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art.’ The event gives 
the formal structure of the event of disclosure, which opens history, and in 
and through which human existence and understanding is related to Being. 
So event as intended here is, in effect, the ontological dimension to ontic 
events, which make up history as ordinarily understood. 
It could be argued that Vattimo may be able to derive his desired 
position from the Contributions in order to avoid supersessionism, but at the 
cost of taking on more ontology than he would like. As Philip Tonner states, 
‘No one epoch in this history of the sending of Being to thought can be 
privileged’ (Tonner 2011: 120). Vattimo does distinguish between openings 
(aletheia) and Ereignis, even if he sometimes seems to use them 
interchangeably. When Vattimo does discuss the Ereignis, it is usually in 
the context of Identity and Difference (Berciano 1993: 18), linking it with 
the Ge-Stell: ‘The experience of Ge-Stell leads us to grasp Ereignis, and 
therefore above all to uncover the eventual nature of Being’ (Vattimo 
1993a: 176). Choosing the Identity and Difference understanding of 
Ereignis is important for Vattimo as it links technology both to liberation 
(through its pluralising effects) and violence (through its history in the 
development of metaphysics). This interpretation of Ereignis raises the 
question about the relationship between Ereignis and event (in the sense of 
an opening), for Vattimo still talks about the ‘eventuality of Being’ in 
different ‘epochs’ (Vattimo 1993a: 176). Is the Ereignis merely the sending 
of Being (an event) that brings to consciousness the other events, or, as 
Richard Polt speculates when discussing the Ereignis in the context of the 
Contributions, is it something ‘deeper than any event’ (Polt 1999: 77)?  
While the Ereignis ‘throws light retrospectively on the eventual nature of 
every epoch’ (Vattimo 1993a: 176), do these epochs get reduced to classic 
texts in paradigmatic fashion, something against which the Contributions 
cautioned? If not, then the importance of texts such as the Bible become 
secondary to the sendings (and this does not preclude a ‘right Heideggerian’ 
approach, something Vattimo would abjure). Whether they do or do not, 
why prioritise the Bible if it is the Ereignis, through the Ge-Stell, which 
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brings about the change of consciousness, a narrative that can make sense 
without recourse to Christianity? Vattimo wants an ethic, a limit to 
hermeneutics to prevent an ‘anything goes’ approach, and so looks to 
Christianity, with its ‘spiritualisation’ of texts to this end. However, if 
events cannot be reduced to the ontic (such as texts), but instead the texts 
are the result of listening and interpreting to sendings, why pay so much 
attention to a ‘master event’ such as kenosis as recorded in the Bible? Can 
Vattimo appeal to the Bible without presuming its importance in a way that 
is inconsistent with his broader Heideggerian schema of weak thought?  
 There are resources within Heidegger’s own work to justify 
Vattimo’s prioritising of classic texts, and these can be found above all in 
his lectures on Hölderlin. A crucial distinction need to be made between 
reducing the opening to the work as a thing which is an object of authorial 
intention (that is, something ontic, a representation of will to power), and a 
work which allows Beyng to come through. By the latter, Heidegger meant 
that recollective thought (Andenken). A work which is itself, or gives rise to, 
recollective thought allows Being to come through a thing ‘so that it is in 
the thing and as the thing that Being makes its appeal to us’ (Richardson 
1963: 574). A work which allows Beyng to come through is Heidegger’s 
position in the Hölderlin lectures. In his lectures on ‘Germania,’ Heidegger 
says that the poet harnesses the power of the gods and opens himself up to 
Beyng, which appropriates him through language: ‘It is not we who have 
language, rather language has us’ (Heidegger 1980: 23). The work of the 
poet is an event which is placed as a founding for his people, those who 
speak the same language, for the poet’s words ‘harnesses the lightning 
flashes of the god, compelling them into the word, and places this lightning-
charged word into the language of his people’ (Heidegger 1980: 30). 
‘Gods,’ here does not refer to deities in the straightforwardly religious 
sense, but more a looking forward to future possibilities, of a kind of 
thinking not ruled by the metaphysics of technoscience in which the 
receptivity of disclosure is dulled. The poet’s works, then, are places in 
which Dasein historically dwells, linguistically. 
 By drawing upon Vattimo’s book Art’s Claim to Truth, I can show 
how he has developed an understanding of how a work founds a world 
which is similar to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin in some ways, 
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albeit different in others. In this book, Vattimo writes ‘To dwell in the world 
founded by the work is to live in the light of it. The history of an epoch is, in 
the end, solely an exegesis of one or more artworks, wherein a certain 
‘epoch’ of being was instituted and opened’ (Vattimo 2008: 159). Heavily 
influenced by ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art,’ Vattimo interprets the 
founding of a world (the event of the opening of a clearing, or ‘lichtung,’ 
which gives the light of disclosure to Dasein) as instituted by a work which 
draws from the earth, the permanent reserve of meaning which is not 
identifiable with nature (Vattimo 2008: 157); the ‘gods’ (or divinities) do 
not have a large part to play in ‘On the Origin…’ Earth, world, divinities 
and mortals are part of Heidegger’s concept of the ‘Geviert’ (‘fourfold’) 
which frame the event in terms of what it means for Dasein. It was 
Heidegger’s opinion that man is appropriated by Beyng as the site of the 
event which works itself out as a conflict between world and earth, humans 
and gods. Admittedly, sometimes the fourfold (Geviert) is worked out in 
greater harmony, as earth, sky, mortals and divinities, such as on ‘Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking’ (Heidegger 1993: 246). For Heidegger, the fourfold 
work to explain the thrownness of interpretation in a way that links with 
nature (earth and sky) which nonetheless emphasises the centrality of 
human dwelling with others (mortals). Figures from the past illuminate the 
present and guide the future (divinities, similar to the ‘heroes’ from Being 
and Time). One is thrown into a linguistic tradition, and Being appropriates 
by happening through Dasein dwelling among the fourfold. However, in 
‘On the Origin of the Work of Art’ there is conflict between the earth and 
world, as one also finds in the Contributions, such as talk of ‘strife’ between 
earth and world (Heidegger 2012: 25).  
For Vattimo in Art’s Claim to Truth, ‘The earth…represents the 
permanent ontological reserve of meanings, which makes is [sic] so that the 
work cannot be exhausted by interpretation’ (Vattimo 2008: 157). The work 
opens worlds through an infinite plurality of interpretations which come 
from it, but there is a ‘permanent reserve of new interpretations’ in the work 
‘and for this reason Heidegger sees in it the presence of the earth, which is 
always given as that which withdraws and holds itself in reserve’ (Vattimo 
2008: 157). The importance of the work is because it ‘has a privileged link 
to Being in that it connects the world to the earth as permanent reserve of 
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meanings, and thus to Being itself in its originating force’ (Vattimo 2008: 
157). With regard to hermeneutics, ‘Interpretation…is always a linguistic 
event, which is made possible by the community of language shared 
between speaker and listener, presupposed as the basis of any conventional 
institution of meaning’ (Vattimo 2008: 148). Here is the influence of 
Gadamer in Vattimo’s argument: Being is through and through linguistic, 
and so interpretations are linguistic events. Now it can be seen how the 
work relates to linguistic conventions in Vattimo’s mind through the 
Kuhnian language of the paradigm shift (revolutionary science) being 
developed through normal science, the day-to-day linguistic exchanges. For 
instance, Vattimo writes that ‘A historical world…is always born through 
the institution of language…the establishment of linguistic conventions 
always comes after the birth of language’ (Vattimo 2008: 121). As with 
Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin, the work is the site of an opening of Being 
in language which acts as the founding of the world for a community which 
dwells in the truth of the work, which nonetheless conceals as it reveals. The 
main difference in Vattimo’s analysis is that he downplays the role of the 
gods. 
 Vattimo relates this ontological analysis of the role of the work to 
the Bible, and here one gets a hint at what he means by ‘community.’ 
Valgenti has stated that ‘Vattimo does not provide an explicit analysis of 
community’ (Valgenti 2015: 30), and he is right. Nevertheless, one can infer 
what Vattimo means by the term when he talks about ‘belonging’ through 
inheriting a linguistic tradition based on a work, and above all the 
foundational work in the West: The Bible. ‘The Word of God does not 
signify a preconstituted world; rather, it creates it’ (Vattimo 2008: 121). The 
Bible as a work ‘embodies a real prophetic character, instead of being a 
purely historical document of a past event…the unsaid that lies in its 
background is not something provisionally concealed but constitutive’ 
(Vattimo 2008: 119). By the ‘unsaid,’ Vattimo means ‘earth,’ the permanent 
possibility of new meaning from the text. As for the scope of new meaning, 
the importance of the Bible is primary for Vattimo when he says that, ‘In the 
case of the Bible, we stand before an entire civilization that constitutes and 
develops itself as the exegesis of a book. The history of the West is in its 
essential development the history of the interpretation of the Bible’ 
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(Vattimo 2008: 119). ‘To belong to this civilization,’ writes Vattimo, 
‘signifies belonging to that specific text, and in this sense we should 
conceive of the belonging of the reader/interpreter to the work in its fullest 
form’ (Vattimo 2008: 119). What one finds in his most recent philosophical 
work, Della realtà, is a link between the work considered ontologically as 
an opening, the conflict between ‘world’ and ‘earth,’ and the notion of 
‘belonging’ to a community conceived in terms of the normal science from 
Kuhn’s paradigm concept, all wedded to a hermeneutical nihilistic 
philosophical schema style based on the key Nietzsche-Heidegger axis. ‘Ciò 
a cui Heidegger sembra pensare è che,’ Vattimo writes, ‘siccome la verità 
di una proposizione qualunque si prova solo all’interno di un paradigma 
storico, il quale non è semplicemente l’articolarsi di una struttura 
eternale…ma accade, nasce, ha un’origine….la sede di questo accadere va 
cercata nell’opera d’arte’ (Vattimo 2012b: 224). Vattimo proceeds to give 
examples of paradigms: The Divine Comedy, Shakespeare’s works, Homer’s 
poems, and ‘anzitutto,’ the Bible (Vattimo 2012b: 224). These paradigms 
are horizons which create openings in which there is conflict between world 
and earth: ‘Quel che costituisce la base della forza inaugurale dell'opera 
d'arte, e questo mi sembra oggi più importante di quanto non mi apparisse 
in passato, è il fatto che essa mantiene aperto il conflitto tra mondo e terra’ 
(Vattimo 2012b: 225). The work (or ‘paradigm’) opens the world and lets us 
dwell there in its language: ‘il mondo, come l'orizzonte articolato, il 
paradigma, che l'opera inaugura e dentro cui ci fa abitare’ (Vattimo 2012b: 
225). The earth is the inexhaustible reserve of meaning from the paradigm: 
‘la terra, come quella riserva di sempre ulteriori significata che, lo dice il 
termine stesso’ (Vattimo 2012b: 225), which changes with each generation 
of interpreters, to the point where a revolution occurs which is never from 
dialogue, consensus or rationality (Vattimo 2012b: 225). Instead, changes 
are often due to imposed power, politically, by people such as George Bush 
(Vattimo 2012b: 226). 
Despite referring to it, Vattimo, in Della realtà, consciously admits 
to having downplayed the language of conflict in Heidegger’s work 
(Vattimo 2012b: 126). Where there is harmony, there is greater similarity to 
Vattimo’s interpretation of the fourfold, but what about strife? What is it 
that causes this ‘strife,’ and how does Vattimo deal with it? Vattimo 
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reinterprets ‘earth’ in the context of ‘setting into work of truth’ in the 
following way in The End of Modernity: ‘In the monument that is art as the 
occurrence of truth in the conflict between world and earth, there is no 
emergence and recognition of a deep and essential truth. In this sense, as 
well, essence is Wesen in its verbal aspect’ (Vattimo 1988: 87). Linking the 
priority of the poetic found in ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art,’ with the 
fourfold, as well as with the importance Gadamer placed on architecture as 
the foundation of art, Vattimo sees the poetic in the monumental as the 
setting-into-work of truth in providing openings for Dasein. Therefore, what 
is the monumental for Vattimo? Monument is a metaphor for Vattimo, and 
it is clear from his chapter ‘Postmodern Criticism: Postmodern Critique’ in 
the David Wood edited book, Writing the Future, that texts can be 
monuments, too (Vattimo 1990: 64). Enduring and capable of endless 
interpretation by each generation (and here is an uncharacteristically literal 
reference to ‘mortals’), monuments bring together both earth and world. 
There can sometimes be conflict in the way in which different generations, 
or even individual Dasein of the same generation from different thrown 
projects, interpret the same monument. The monument may fade into the 
background of experience, but it is still there. Here we can make sense of 
Vattimo’s metaphor of dwelling in a ‘library of Babel’ in Beyond 
Interpretation (Vattimo 1997a: 90), clearly not only echoing, but also 
developing Heidegger’s dictum that ‘language is the house of Being’ from 
his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (Heidegger 1993: 161). Even as far back as his 
early book on Heidegger, Introduzione a Heidegger (1971), Vattimo makes 
it clear that the place of dwelling is not time and space (seemingly at odds 
with Heidegger’s views in Contributions to Philosophy), but poetic 
language: ‘la cosa é davvero cosa solo in quanto fa dimorare presso di se 
terra e cielo, mortali e divini; ma ciò essa fa non in quanto presenza spazio-
temporale, ma nella parola poetica’ (Vattimo 1971: 128). We can also 
make a link between the final chapter of Della realtà and The End of 
Modernity: the classic texts such as the works of Shakespeare, Dante, as 
well as scientists including Newton and prophets such as the Bible, are 
monuments, which are also paradigms and poetic openings where Being 
eventuates. The works of Shakespeare, Dante and—possibly—Newton as 
well would also have been considered ‘monuments’ by Nietzsche, who used 
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the term ‘monumental history’ to refer to one of the types of history outlined 
in his second Untimely Meditation, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life.’ With ‘the monumentalistic conception of the past,’ writes 
Nietzsche, one ‘learns from it that the greatness that once existed was in any 
event once possible and may thus be possible again’ (Nietzsche 1997: 69). 
Like the ‘earth’ in Heidegger’s work, monuments are a reserve of meaning 
for Nietzsche, but they are more ontic and subjective in the sense that the 
monuments are meant to be inspirational rather than era-defining, and what 
could be inspirational for one person may not have any influence over 
another. Therefore, the twin language of Gadamerian ‘monuments’ and 
Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ allows Vattimo to bring out the ontology of the ‘same’ 
(monument, that which endures) and difference (the paradigm shifts), which 
both have their root in the paradigmatic nature of the work itself providing 
an opening and a linguistic community based around the work. Nietzsche’s 
understanding of monuments is similar, but betrays a more individualistic 
approach. 
Before I move on to problematise Vattimo’s interpretation of ‘earth,’ 
it is worth dealing with a couple of standard objections to Vattimo’s 
understanding of the Bible. Firstly, it may be objected that he is wrong in 
prioritising the Bible, that behind all the other classic textual openings 
(Dante, Shakespeare and so on) there is the Bible. In reply I could imagine 
that Vattimo would be on very safe ground in saying that the language, 
themes and idioms used in these works are incomprehensible without at 
least a pre-understanding of the Bible. Dante’s Inferno, for instance, cannot 
be understood without the biblical themes of ‘weeping and gnashing of 
teeth’ in hell. Another criticism given against Vattimo by D’Arcais is that 
people understand the Bible differently: Do we inherit the meek, loving 
Jesus or the Christ of the Crusades (D’Arcais 2007: 259)? Therefore, how 
could it be a ‘monument’ or a ‘paradigm,’ for the former implies sameness 
and the latter homogeneity? Two things could be said here. Monuments can 
be interpreted differently. For example, the Taj Mahal is sometimes 
interpreted as the epitome of beauty, whereas other people see it as the 
epitome of cruelty concerning how the building was constructed using 
slaves who were killed during its construction. Moreover, in the second 
edition of Kuhn’s text he put forward the notion of a paradigm as a 
194 
 
‘disciplinary matrix’ (Kuhn 1996: 184), where there are fundamentals upon 
which interpreters agree (and in Christianity this may be something like a 
linear conception of time, God as creator, Jesus’ teaching, death and 
resurrection), and then these fundamentals can be interpreted in opposing 
ways (fundamentalist see Jesus’ resurrection as literally bodily, Bultmann 
saw it was the rising up of the church to faith). Vattimo would have no 
problem with different interpretations of the Bible; in fact, he would 
encourage it. These would be successive generations’ ‘Andenken,’ of their 
thought commemorating the monument of the Bible, or the ‘normal science’ 
of working within current paradigms understanding the older one. Vattimo 
does the exact same thing. For Vattimo is working out the paradigm of the 
Ge-Stell/Ereignis, trying then to gather up the traces of paradigms prior—
such as the Bible—by historicising them, reading them in the signs of the 
times. The hermeneutic circle into which Vattimo is thrown means he then 
has to understand this paradigm, this destining of the end of metaphysics 
and death of God historically in order to prevent the thinking proper to it—
hermeneutics—from appearing as relativism. Here he returns to the Bible to 
historicise hermeneutical nihilism, to see it as the consequence of a chain of 
messages from a monument of the Word which have been interpreted and 
reinterpreted by successive generations, where the key message has been the 
nihilistic drift of kenosis (of God coming to earth to announce his 
friendship) and caritas (which is friendship itself). The former’s message of 
friendship, of internal brotherhood, wound up as the will to power and the 
age of the world pictures, whereas the latter is the way to orient ourselves 
today with regards to adjudicating between interpretations, that is, taking the 
other into account by recognising that they—like I—are Dasein, a 
historically-thrown being who shares a linguistic tradition that has its origin 
in weakening. 
 
b) Vattimo and the Contributions to Philosophy: appropriation 
versus transpropriation 
The term ‘earth’ appears most notably in ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art’ 
and in the Contributions to Philosophy. While Vattimo quotes extensively 
from the former, as Modesto Berciano points out, in his article ‘Heidegger, 
Vattimo y la Deconstrucción,’ he says Vattimo does not tend to refer to the 
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Contributions. Instead, he draws heavily upon Identity and Difference for 
his interpretation of the all-important notion of the event in Heidegger’s 
philosophy (Berciano 1993: 26-27). This is significant because the 
understanding of Being is explained differently in Contributions than in 
Identity and Difference, particularly the notions of the direction of 
‘appropriation’ and the conflict between ‘world’ and ‘earth.’ This will 
become important when I look at whether Vattimo understands the Bible in 
a way which a priori rules out other forms of coming to presence, which not 
only conflicts with the general message of tolerance coming from his style 
of thought, but also would not ‘persuade’ other European thinkers who, too, 
have been brought up with the Bible within their linguistic tradition. 
Berciano argues it is a shame that Vattimo uses limited sources on the 
Ereignis (and the link between Ge-Stell and Ereignis), privileging Identity 
and Difference for Vattimo seems to understand this link only from the 
perspective of the relationship between man and the technical (Berciano 
1993: 20). Berciano reminds Vattimo that Heidegger thought there are other 
ways to the Ereignis as well, not just through technology (Berciano 1993: 
27-28). This is slightly unfair on Vattimo as we have seen that he believes 
there are openings beyond the technical, albeit Vattimo draws on classic 
texts as forms of ‘art’ in which truth is disclosed; indeed, it seems to be the 
other way around, with the technical being the exception in Vattimo’s 
thought to the notion of classic texts constituting openings. Before I mention 
what Berciano has to say about the Contributions, it is worth trying to 
unpack what Vattimo really believes about the relationship between 
Geschick and event. Concerning these notions, he writes ‘The eventuality of 
Being is not separable from its aspect as Geschick’ (Vattimo 1988a: 155), 
and that concerning Being, ‘we can do nothing except re-think—from the 
point of view of the Ge-Schick—the same history of metaphysical errancy 
that constitutes us and that ‘constitutes’ Being as Überlieferung’ (Vattimo 
1988a: 175). These traditions (Überlieferung) come from openings, which 
Vattimo variously refers to as ‘event,’ ‘aletheia,’ ‘aperture’ and ‘paradigm.’ 
In Nihilism and Emancipation, Vattimo writes that ‘Since the aperture does 
not confer stability on the object…Being should be thought of as ‘event’’ 
(Vattimo 2004: 6). In A Farewell to Truth, Vattimo writes that for 
Heidegger ‘truth [is] aletheia as the opening of a horizon (or paradigm)’ 
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(Vattimo 2011: xxx). Vattimo brings all of these disparate terms together in 
a passage from Della realtà which exemplifies the link he makes between 
‘the event,’ ‘paradigm’ and ‘opening’ being the following: ‘Verità come 
alétheia è il darsi storico del paradigma, che, non essendo struttura eterna 
di un essere metafisico e parmenideo, va pensato come evento. Ma verità è 
anche la proposizione verificata secondo i criteri propri del paradigma, 
dunque la scienza normale nel senso di Kuhn’ (Vattimo 2012b: 125). It is 
ambiguous, however, where destining fits in. In Dialogue with Nietzsche, 
Vattimo says that ‘the historico-destinate apertures in which things come to 
Being are epochal’ (Vattimo 2006: 189), so here again there is a link 
between ‘apertures’ and ‘destining.’ From Art’s Claim to Truth, we can get 
closer to identifying these classic texts, such as the Bible, with destining. If 
Being is eventual, and events are paradigmatic apertures based on classic 
works, and if these apertures are ‘epochal’ and ‘destining,’ Vattimo always 
refers to the ‘‘epochal” character of the artwork,’ acting as a ‘model’ (in his 
later works, paradigm) for a ‘determinate historical epoch,’ ‘founding’ it 
(Vattimo 2008: 119). It should be clear that ‘destining’ and ‘founding’ are 
inextricably linked for Vattimo, which explains his aforementioned 
comment that ‘The eventuality of Being is not separable from its aspect as 
Geschick’ (Vattimo 1988a: 155). 
 This leaves us with a quandary. For while Vattimo expresses his 
surprise at Heidegger restricting himself to ‘the aperture that takes place in 
poetry’ (Vattimo 2004: 13), this is essentially what Vattimo himself does. 
He makes an exception for the reading of the Ge-Stell, of an opening 
coming to us through technology, pouncing on Heidegger’s account of the 
relationship between the Ge-Stell and Ereignis in Identity and Difference, 
relating it closely to another of his essays ‘The Age of the World Picture’ 
(Vattimo 2004 15-16). By going to ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ the term 
bild (‘picture’) means ‘structured image,’ but as a copy or imitation of the 
world but setting it in place (‘stellen’) as Dasein getting in the picture, or 
becoming acquainted with it as an object of representation (Heidegger 1977: 
129). Here there are clear links with the Ge-Stell. This would enable 
Vattimo to make the move he wishes to make in interpreting the Ereignis as 
the outcome of the Ge-Stell as the culmination of the history of Being, the 
end of metaphysics. However, there are other ways of reading ‘image’ that 
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do not automatically bring it back primarily to ‘representation.’ Take what 
Heidegger says about ‘images’ elsewhere. In his lectures on Nietzsche, 
Heidegger states how the meaning of ‘image’ changes with different epochs 
in the history of Being. While earlier in medieval thought, image meant 
referential correspondence in the order of creation and in modern times it 
means ‘representational object’ (Heidegger III, 1991: 29-30), originally, in 
the works of the Greeks, it meant physis (coming to presence); this will be 
discussed more below in the context of the work of Reiner Schürmann. 
Vattimo has posited Ge-Stell/Ereignis as the destining of the later-modern 
epoch, one of nihilism as the end of metaphysics. Whilst Heidegger would 
admit that ‘getting in the picture’ is a setting-into-place representationally of 
the world by a modern subiectum which is linguistic in nature, the opening 
does not come from a classic text; could openings come from elsewhere, 
reducing the importance of the Bible as the ‘master event’ (particularly its 
messages of kenosis and caritas). We shall reconsider this possibility 
shortly. 
 Vattimo might well reply that it is the Ge-Stell/Ereignis which then, 
in accordance with the destining of nihilism into which he was thrown, has 
enabled him to go back and see the history of Being as one of the 
transmission of messages which began with the Greek, with a crucial 
intervention from the Bible. However, why prioritise the reading of the 
Ereignis from Identity and Difference? Here we return to Berciano, who 
mentions the very different reading of the conflict between ‘earth’ and 
‘world’ found in Heidegger’s Contributions. Concerning Beyng and the 
conflict between ‘earth’ and ‘world,’ a passage from the Contributions 
reads:  
Beyng is the conflictual appropriation which originarily gathers that 
which is appropriated in it (the Da-sein of the human being) and that 
which is refused in it (god) into the abyss of its ‘between.’ In the 
clearing of the ‘between’ world and earth contest the belonging of 
their essence to the field of time-space wherein what is true comes to 
be preserved. What is true, as a ‘being,’ finds itself brought in such 
preservation to the simplicity of its essence in beyng (in the event) 
(Heidegger 2012: 382). 
Whereas Vattimo emphasises the transpropriation and humans and Being in 
the Ge-Stell in accordance with Heidegger’s position in Identity and 
Difference, Berciano draws attention to the view of ‘event’ put forward by 
Heidegger in the Contributions, that ‘Beyng un-settles by appropriating Da-
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sein’ (Heidegger 2012: 380). The opening is of time and space, and it 
concerns aspects of our Being such as ‘transfiguration’ and ‘compulsion.’ It 
is the event whereby being and man co-belong, and as such cannot be 
historically localised, and it depends necessarily on the finitude of both man 
and being, hence the exposure of the abyss, nothingness, the inclusion of 
withdrawal and closure in the event of opening. The opening takes place 
through and in Dasein, and it changes the way in which Dasein interacts 
with the world. Therefore, there is not a single event of appropriation as 
transpropriation which highlights the case that Being is eventual, as in the 
case of Vattimo’s reading from Identity and Difference. By limiting his 
interpretation of Heidegger on Ereignis largely to Identity and Difference, 
Vattimo sees it as the culmination of a history of metaphysics that looks 
almost unilinear, starting from the Greeks and the Bible, and working up to 
the Ge-Stell via Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche. By rejecting the unilinear 
notion of Ereignis Vattimo acquired by concentrating on Identity and 
Difference, Berciano reads the notion of Geschick in the Contributions as 
indicating that there is more than one sending in modernity (Berciano 1993: 
28), even though Vattimo seems to have followed Heidegger in Identity and 
Difference in holding that the Ereignis was unique (Heidegger 1969: 36). If 
Berciano’s criticism of Vattimo is right, then it has important implications 
for Vattimo’s view of nihilism, which in turn have significant consequences 
for his understanding of Christianity.  
Berciano points out that in Identity and Difference, the event of 
appropriation, this unique event, is portrayed by Heidegger as being prior to 
the constellation man-Being, something one does not find in the 
Contributions (Berciano 1993: 28). Indeed, in Identity and Difference, 
Heidegger writes: ‘The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within 
itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, 
achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics 
has endowed them’ (Heidegger 1969: 37). Thinking can apply itself to this 
realm insofar as it gives itself over to language. Nevertheless, that the realm 
appears to be prior to man and Being seems more likely when Heidegger 
writes: ‘The appropriation appropriates man and Being to their essential 
togetherness’ (Heidegger 1969: 38), similar to how Heidegger later, with 
Time and Being (1968), referred to Being as ‘it gives.’ It is ironic that 
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Vattimo draws upon Identity and Difference as much as he does, for the text 
seems to support the notion that although Being ‘is not,’ but ‘happens,’ 
there are happenings beyond language which raise the possibility for a 
‘return’ of Being or some other parallel or new history of Being which could 
occur outside the tradition of transmissions from metaphysics as a history of 
Being. This is a possibility which finds expression in the Contributions 
where the Ereignis is where Being appropriates humans; it is an 
appropriation, not a transpropriation (especially one in which the Ereignis is 
somehow prior to the Being-human constellation). In the Contributions, the 
Ereignis is considered as opening (Da), is regarded by Heidegger here as the 
foundation of everything. About this, Daniela Vallega-Neu writes: ‘Letting 
be and building (or taking care and creating) are the two fundamental modes 
of what Heidegger calls the ‘sheltering’ of truth in beings, which means that 
things are necessary to provide in their being a historical site for the truth of 
be-ing. Beings (words, works of art, deeds, things) are necessary in order to 
let be-ing occur in its original abysmality’ (Vallega-Neu 2003: 256). Being 
finds a site in all manner of beings to come open up as world and yet also 
simultaneously conceal itself as earth; Being happens in the strife between 
world and earth. Linking back to ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art,’ 
Vallega-Neu alludes to the Greek Temple, the form of which opened up 
onto and into the culture of the time, yet not only the stone, but also the 
plants and animals conceal the self-secluding earth lets appear (Vallega-Neu 
2003: 257-258). The work is a site which shelters Being as it brings it out of 
unconcealment into the clearing. Nevertheless, in the Contributions, Being 
appropriates humans differently at different times, enabling them to 
conceive of things anew, such as the case of the term ‘image’ being 
understood in contrasting ways between the Greeks, medieval thinkers and 
moderns. Here it is not difficult to see how and why Vattimo conceived of 
‘openings’ as paradigm shifts. Nevertheless, the issue is whether Being 
appears as language or through language. Vattimo, with his Gadamerian 
influence, reduces the latter to the former. However, works such as a Greek 
Temple can reveal beings whilst also concealing; what other ‘sites’ can 
there be for beings to come to presence? If the Ge-Stell is not the primary 
way of destining in the late-modern epoch, then not only will there be other 
destinings in the late modern which are not necessarily nihilistic (and 
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therefore do not require an ontology of weakening), but also reveal other 
things. Here we are back to the problem of ‘earth’ and ‘world’ which 
deserves one more mention before moving on. 
Key to the Ereignis in the Contributions is the fourfold developed 
there. It is tempting to regard the ‘earth’ as something natural, but arguably 
it simply represents how whenever Being appropriates Dasein in one 
linguistic disclosure of meaning (through tradition), in doing so it leaves out 
other ways of understanding the world linguistically. The former is the 
‘world,’ the latter is the ‘earth,’ and the ‘conflict’ between them is 
unconcealing (world) and concealing (earth). This means interpreting the 
fourfold poetically. Vattimo sees the conflict of ‘earth’ with ‘world’ as the 
former disappearing over time into concealment due to the passing of 
generations. However, on the model of the Contributions, earth is a conflict 
worked out synchronically, at any given time with the ‘mystery’ 
surrounding concealing/earth being due to our thrownness where other 
linguistic traditions are concealed. Vattimo would then argue in reply that 
these concatenations of openings and different interpretations based upon 
varying inheritances all point to an ontology of weakening, to the 
‘specialisation of languages.’ However, Vattimo’s reply is based on his 
reading of the Ereignis as the result of the Ge-Stell, in which both man and 
being have lost their metaphysical epithets. Instead, we are simply left with 
people interpreting differently based on thrownness and the way in which 
Being appropriates through works which one will interpret based on their 
inherited linguistic tradition. What about destining, especially when in ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’ Heidegger writes that the Ge-Stell 
‘drives out every other possibility of revealing’ (Heidegger 1977: 27)? 
However, also in the same text he states that destiny is not a ‘fate that 
compels’ (Heidegger 1977: 25), as where there is danger there also grows 
what saves; only the gods can save us now. By gods he seems to have meant 
a cultural template, linguistic-cultural models with significance to a group of 
people, or something like a disclosure of Being based on a heroic figure for 
a group of people (Young 2002: 98). Relating this to Christianity, Jesus may 
well have functioned in this way, and his messages concerning the 
resurrection, Parousia and judgement all constitute the linguistic parameters 
of the horizon for this group of people. They would not recognise Vattimo’s 
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interpretation of Christianity, and they would not regard themselves as being 
‘destined’ by technology. In short, if Identity and Difference is put to the 
forefront, then Vattimo has a case to support his weak thought, where one 
responds to the destining of an era at the end of metaphysics. However, if 
the Contributions is prioritised, then his weak thought is not persuasive as it 
stands. As for ‘destining’ for the Contributions, this seems much more about 
strife in relation to Dasein, of how the latter relates to the coming to 
presence of Beyng in unconcealment which is also concealment: ‘What 
propels human around is their thrownness into beings, a thrownness that 
destines humans to be projectors of being (of the truth of beyng)’ 
(Heidegger 2012: 37). In short, if the Ge-Stell is not the destiny of (late) 
modernity, then there is no ontology of actuality in the sense of weakening 
as the defining way of thinking in our age as Vattimo wishes. If so, 
hermeneutics is not necessarily the koine of late modernity and it neither 
needs a historical grounding to escape relativism, nor does it need an ethic 
to adjudicate between interpretations. For these reasons, Vattimo’s 
Christianity is left theoretically redundant if one does not accept his reading 
of Heidegger’s key concept of the Ereignis.  
 Making a different, but related, point to Berciano is Reiner 
Schürmann who distinguished between three stages in Heidegger’s 
development. The first, approximately of Being and Time, involves 
Heidegger being concerned with the meaning of Being, rather than the truth 
of Being, in which ecstatic temporality comes across as being almost neo-
Kantian (Schürmann 2007: 125). After this stage, Schürmann sees 
Heidegger as developing the notion of the epoch, adding a greater sense of 
history to the way in which things open for Dasein beyond ecstatic 
temporality. The final stage Schürmann sees in Heidegger’s development is 
that of event understood in terms of physis (coming to presence of nature): 
‘Heidegger’s understanding of ‘event’ as presencing is topological 
inasmuch as the topoi where presencing occurs are many: not only 
diachronically but also synchronically. Ereignis designates the originary 
phenomenon, which is the condition for historical, as well as ecstatic, time’ 
(Schürmann 2007: 125). ‘Physis,’ Schürmann writes, ‘as an event-like 
measure is irreducible to dialectics, since it implies no reappropriation of 
past historical effects’ (Schürmann 2007: 125). In other words, Schürmann 
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points out that this concept of physis implies that there is another 
understanding of the notion of the event in Heidegger’s writing that Vattimo 
ignores. Significantly, this understanding of the event is one in which 
history and tradition do not have roles to play. Rather than appropriating 
traces of past linguistic events, emphasis is instead placed on nature 
emerging into presence. In the essay ‘Science and Reflection,’ Heidegger 
writes that nature is only one way in which what presences has been named 
physis (Heidegger 1977: 174).  It is not as though Being is identified with 
the natural order, as this would be too simplistic. Rather, nature coming to 
presence constitutes an opening for Dasein. Whilst Dasein standing within 
this opening will interpret nature, doubtless through linguistic categories, 
the coming to presence is not an ontological trace of a past opening in 
linguistic terms, but ‘the simple appearance of a phenomenon, any 
phenomenon, here and now’ (Schürmann 2007: 125). To an extent 
Schürmann is right here in that we do distinguish nature from history, as 
Heidegger did, too. Nevertheless, Heidegger realised that both ‘nature’ and 
‘history’ have the same root in the sense that they both are (Heidegger 
1976: 241). What we need to distinguish, Heidegger thought in his lecture 
‘On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1’ is 
between, as the title indicates, the essence and concept of physis. This 
distinction is explained by Günter Figal in the following way: ‘only the 
‘concept’ of physis ties us to a particular realm of beings, that is, natural 
beings, whereas the original ‘essence’ or physis is supposedly emergence 
and self-showing without restriction’ (Figal 2010: 38-39). Figal recounts 
how Heidegger struggled to show how physis could be grasped ‘on its own,’ 
as Figal puts it, ‘without restriction,’ for focus on beings is not only the 
‘sole realization’ of physis, as Figal notes, but also historically conditioned. 
This is why, Figal points out, Heidegger returned ‘to his early guiding 
concept of aletheia’ (Figal 2010: 39). Nevertheless, with physis in principle 
Heidegger has identified a way of coming to presence which, as Schurmann 
put forward, ‘implies no reappropriation of past historical effects’ 
(Schürmann 2007: 125). Schürmann’s point, taken seriously, undermines 
Vattimo’s Gadamerian reading of Heidegger as now there is more to Being 
than language which, combined with the idea of ‘earth’ as a concealing of 
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meaning from someone which is open to another Dasein, leaves the door 
open for a different understanding of religion.  
 
c) The question of transcendence 
i. The possibility of transcendence  
It is now expedient to summarise the previous section and relate it more 
directly to the issue of Vattimo’s return to religion. So far in this chapter we 
have looked at the problem of Vattimo reducing the ontological to the ontic 
in his appeal to the Bible as a paradigmatic text/opening which has central 
to the West, which is recognised as such after the Ge-Stell/Ereignis have 
allowed those who read the ‘signs of the times’ to understand that Being is 
not, but happens and that remembrance (Andenken) is commemorative 
recollection of the linguistic traditions into which we are thrown as Dasein. 
I appealed to the importance Heidegger himself gave to classic texts in his 
reading of Hölderlin to support Vattimo. Nevertheless, in Vattimo’s own 
development of Heidegger’s position on this the question of the fourfold 
comes about in the ‘birth’ of a language through the conflict between earth 
and world. The ‘conflict’ is taken by Vattimo as being the leaving behind of 
interpretations by generations, and the Bible has influenced successive 
generations in the West and has been the constant reserve of meaning 
behind other openings, such as the works of Dante, Shakespeare and 
Dostoyevsky. Here, though, there is conflict between the importance 
Vattimo places on texts and the technical in the Ge-Stell. Vattimo reduces 
the latter to the increased specialisation of languages revealed in the society 
of generalised communication, with talk of a proliferation of ‘world images’ 
being related to the will to power in Nietzsche’s sense of 
representation/value-thinking. Nevertheless, why prioritise the Ge-Stell at 
all? I drew upon Berciano’s thinking to highlight the lack of attention 
Vattimo has paid to other readings of the Ge-Stell in Heidegger’s thought, 
especially in the Contributions. Here terms such as ‘earth,’ ‘world’ and 
‘Ereignis’ mean different things, leaving open the possibility that there is 
more than one ‘sending’ in modernity. The Ereignis is not a transpropriation 
in which ‘Being’ and ‘man’ lose their metaphysical epithets, but an 
appropriation of man by Being in which man is transformed and Being finds 
not only a clearing, but also a sheltering, which can occur in any being.  
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Whilst Being is understood as language, it is not necessarily 
disclosed through language, leaving open more sites of Being than Vattimo 
would wish to limit in the import he gives to classical texts, downplaying 
the role of the Bible. Even if one argued that Heidegger would still place 
importance of the Ge-Stell as heralding the Ereignis, the latter could be 
understood as the event of appropriation rather than transpropriation, 
whereby the former epithet refers to ways in which Being takes hold of 
Dasein and allows it to rethink earlier, perhaps lost, traces of Being, 
including sites which are not primarily linguistic; it is here, thinking of 
Schürmann, that Heidegger might imagine thought returning to physis, or 
even a way of reclaiming poesis from the technical. The net result is that 
Vattimo’s interpretation of the Ereignis resulting from the Ge-Stell is 
reduced, which opens the possibility of a plurality of destinings in 
modernity as well as the plurality of sites of Being indicating that there are 
other ways of reading classic texts and language games in which ideas such 
as ‘faith’ and ‘transcendence’ could be interpreted differently. Most 
importantly, if Vattimo’s interpretation of the Ge-Stell is not seen as 
‘destining’ modernity in the unilinear sense of a transpropriation which 
leads to hermeneutical nihilism, then there is less reason a) to think we are 
in an age of nihilism, b) to see nihilism as our sole opportunity and c) to 
understand our sending as resulting in nothing more than a play of 
interpretations. Without this ‘ontology of actuality’ (viz. weakening), there 
is less need to seek out historical foundations for hermeneutics and to derive 
from this history an ethic of charity. Moreover, if one takes what 
Schürmann says seriously of the idea that, through physis, things could 
come to presence simply in appearance in an extra-linguistic way (even if it 
then dwells in language), there opens the possibility of transcendence, of 
being able to consider ‘faith’ and ‘religion’ in a way which is not reduced to 
a ‘left’-Heideggerian reading. It is this latter possibility and its implications 
for Vattimo’s thought which shall be explored in the following section. 
 Vattimo has been criticised for leaving out the possibility of 
transcendence with regard to his return to religion, with numerous 
commentators on Vattimo’s work reacting negatively to this blind-spot in 
his thinking (Antiseri 1996; Depoortere 2008; Roldán 2007; Sciglitano 
2010; Ten Kate 2002; Zimmerman 2009). Antiseri was prominent among 
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the early commentators on Vattimo’s return to religion in criticising 
Vattimo for the lack of vertical transcendence in his thought. Antiseri was 
right for the wrong reasons, for he is correct in his assertion that Vattimo is 
too quick to dismiss transcendence, as shall be shown in the course of this 
dissertation, but Antiseri argues for transcendence along existentialist lines, 
particularly those of Kierkegaard and Pareyson. Antiseri thinks that that 
‘The choice between the existence and non-existence of God is an 
existential act of acceptance and repudiation’ (Antiseri 1997: 121). Vattimo, 
who sticks closely to his interpretation of Heidegger, thinks that the latter 
repudiated the existentialist notion of choice after the kehre (‘turn’) in his 
thought, downplaying the notion of authenticity and instead holding that 
‘choice’ is circumscribed within a historical destining (Vattimo 1993a: 50). 
Moreover, Vattimo, again following Heidegger, sees existentialism as a 
form of metaphysics in which the human being is central in a continuation 
of the anthropocentric Enlightenment project. As regards Kierkegaard, in 
broad brush-strokes Vattimo sees his theology as an example of 
‘apocalyptic faith,’ of a nostalgia for Being and ignoring the nihilism that 
has come from the event of the death of God (Vattimo 2004: 139-141), or as 
‘tragic’ Christianity, which adds up to the same thing (Vattimo 1999: 94-
95): ‘submission’ to something ‘beyond’ is nostalgia for certain foundations 
which have disappeared after the death of God and the end of metaphysics. 
In putting kenosis at the forefront of his return, Vattimo sets out his stall 
with respect to transcendence in that the latter could not be vertical, but 
fully divested into history in the form of messages. It is not as though 
Vattimo thought that kenosis is a weakening of the second person of the 
Trinity which could then be reversed, for kenosis does not necessarily entail 
a weakening of God (Hart 2010), but weakening in God itself for his Trinity 
is economic (Sciglitano 2010), with the age of the Father giving way to that 
of the Son (Vattimo 2014: 20-21). With kenosis Vattimo’s God is emptied 
wholly not into history, but into transmission. Indeed, it is wrong to think 
that there is a being—God—who is emptied. Rather, kenosis is the giving-
way of the idea of transcendence in favour of emphasising immanence, 
friendship. This approach is made more clear in Vattimo’s more recent 
writings on religion where he emphasises Matthew 18 (where two or three 
are gathered in Christ’s name, that is where he will be) and the Logos in the 
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Bible and the latter as the paradigmatic text of the West. Mancini has stated 
that Vattimo is wrong to identify the sacred with transcendence (Repolschi 
2010: 47), and it is this identification of transcendence with metaphysics in 
philosophy and the sacred in religion (and therefore, through the ‘family 
resemblance’ he sees between Girard and Heidegger, also metaphysics as it 
is onto-theological) that makes Vattimo rule-out a priori any form of 
transcendence as ‘violent.’ I will go on to argue in the latter section of Part 
Two that this, ironically, leads to ‘violence’ being done against religion 
through Vattimo’s own thought, an opinion shared by Klun (Klun 2014: 52).  
With respect to the possibility of transcendence, the problem with 
Vattimo’s Heideggerianism is that he does not take ‘physis’ seriously. 
Schürmann said that Vattimo remains ‘stuck’ in the second development of 
Heidegger’s thinking, in which the ‘historical-cultural epoch…determines 
every possible occurrence…It transcends [Dasein], but more like a system 
of transcendental conditions than like a transcendent model’ (Schürmann 
2007: 124). Whereas Heidegger ‘move[d] beyond what Vattimo describes 
as his historicism,’ with ‘physis,’ Vattimo has not, and instead—due to his 
reliance on Gadamer—reduced the transcendental to aletheia, historico-
cultural openings (or ‘paradigms’). In short, Vattimo is against any form of 
transcendent except horizontal transcendence (Giorgio 2009: xvi), which is 
a transcendental based not on the a priori synthetic, but a historical aperture 
which recognises ontological difference between Being which comes to 
presence within an opening, and Dasein for whom the opening founds a 
world. This is in large part due to biographical reasons. It could be argued 
that although Heidegger thought physis could happen in a way not restricted 
by concepts, it can only be understood through concepts which are 
historically embedded and, therefore, linguistic (Figal 2010: 39). However, 
just because Being can only be understood as language, who is to say that 
all Being has to be understood? Vattimo’s particular reading of Gadamer 
brings together ‘Being’ and ‘understood’ in the sense that there can be no 
Being which is not understood, and no understanding which is not linguistic. 
However, there remains the possibility with physis that Vattimo is wrong on 
this point, and this can leave room open for Being which is not understood 
in terms of nature and (as, and/or in addition) the divine, which links back to 
the tradition in many religions in which the divine is a mystery. 
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In The Responsibility of the Philosopher, Vattimo cites his 
‘proletarian roots’ (Vattimo 2010a: 105), for the interest he has taken in 
‘emancipation.’ His father was a policeman who died before his time, 
leaving his mother widowed and needing to move across Italy. As a result, 
Vattimo felt like an outsider in the North, having lived in the South of Italy. 
This experience, along with having lived through the social upheaval of the 
1960s and the student revolutions of 1968, may have drawn him to Marx 
and Mao. In conjunction with his Catholic upbringing, it is easy to see how 
emancipation dovetailed with theology, but in a context very different from 
Latin America. In a profession surrounded by middle class university 
lecturers and politicians, the oppressor was not holding a machine gun, but a 
copy of Aristotle’s Metaphysics or the Catechism of the Catholic Church. 
Shortly after, on the following page of The Responsibility of the 
Philosopher, Vattimo says ‘In a sense I was born philosophically within that 
outlook—which from the religious point of view had its defects, like being 
moralistic rather than mystical, for example’ (Vattimo 2010a: 106). By ‘that 
outlook’ Vattimo means seeing himself based on his proletarian roots, being 
‘involved in an undertaking of historical and emancipatory scope’ (Vattimo 
2010a: 106). His proletarian and Marxist roots influenced him to be 
suspicious of vertical transcendence. Vattimo’s interest in comradeship in a 
Marxist-Maoist sense leads him to posit a universal brotherhood of all 
people as friends, even with God who has lowered himself to this level. The 
manifestation of the idea of caritas in history is the growing idea of 
historical embeddedness, much like the growing emancipation of a 
communist struggle; even with the apparent defeat of caritas under 
Augustine and the Middle Ages afterwards, this is like the cunning of 
reason, again displaying Vattimo’s interest in history even in a Hegelian 
sense. As D’Isanto puts it, Vattimo has an awareness of belonging to a chain 
of messages (D’Isanto 1999: 8), but Vattimo sees this chain as all there is, 
and that he is adding to this chain by entering into conversation with these 
messages. As Borradori realises, Vattimo’s interest in Christianity is neither 
as an object to be studied or appropriated by him, nor as a whim, but both as 
a Geschich and an opening based on his interests in the Heideggerian and 
Gadamerian senses of these terms (respectively) (Borradori 2010: 144). 
Vattimo is not interested in apologetics, but ‘belongs to his life story and his 
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heritage’ (Borradori 2010: 144). ‘Vattimo’s writing personalises itself,’ 
writes Repolschi, as ‘to talk about faith is possible in your own name’ 
(Repolschi 2010: 47).  
This autobiographical attitude extends to how he reads the Bible. 
Due to being born into an Italian post-war Catholic family, he finds that 
when he reads the Bible the history of the Jews ‘has nothing to do with me’ 
(Vattimo 2014: 20). More than this, Vattimo has said that he suspects ‘the 
God of Israel who was believed to be the father of Jesus Christ is instead 
only and properly the God of the hosts of nomadic people’ (Vattimo 2014: 
20). Here, in the text ‘How to Become an Anti-Zionist,’ Vattimo explains 
that this attitude is autobiographical (Vattimo 2014: 19) and is based upon 
his growing realisation that Israel has been acting unlawfully in its treatment 
of Palestine. This is not the place to expand upon Vattimo’s anti-Zionism or 
to analyse the significant controversy it has created, although it is worth 
noting that he has made pronouncements sufficiently inflammatory to be 
referred to as an ‘inveterate anti-Semite’ in the online magazine, The 
European (Ashkenazy 2014). What is important to recognise is that anti-
Zionism seems to have affected his perception of transcendence of even a 
personal god. Vattimo sees all transcendence as being violent because he 
sees how claims over land vouchsafed by a transcendent being have been a 
source of exclusionary, and physical, violence, citing Zionist beliefs about a 
chosen people and a promised land based on the covenant. That Vattimo 
identifies this God of the covenant with God the Father is interesting, and it 
is more explicit in this very recent text than in previous works, otherwise it 
would have informed my article on the subject (Harris 2013a). In light of 
this, kenosis is the emptying of transcendence and the authoritarian ‘father’ 
characteristics of the Old Testament God. This is perhaps why Vattimo 
points out the ‘Old Testament’ is the ‘Hebrew Bible’ (Vattimo 2014: 21). Of 
course, this position of Vattimo’s is supersessionist and modalist, but I have 
already shown that there are resources within his thought to help circumvent 
this problem, albeit raising other issues. Like Vattimo’s views on the Ge-
Stell, if one does not interpret the covenant as exclusive (which was the 
whole point of the work of St. Paul), one will not regard it as violent. As a 
result, transcendence would not have to be considered as violent and the 
whole Bible could be read together. The point I am trying to make is that 
209 
 
Vattimo has styled not only a philosophy, but also a religion based on his 
own preferences and as a result they have little direct relevance to others 
beside himself. 
 What are the implications of Vattimo’s views on transcendence for 
religion? Vattimo has been heavily criticised by numerous commentators on 
his work for neglecting the dimension of transcendence (or ‘vertical’ 
transcendence to distinguish it from aletheia as a horizontal aperture). There 
are two main reasons why this is a problem for Vattimo: i) neglecting the 
religious experience of people who are ‘full’ believers (compared to his own 
status as a self-confessed, ‘half believer’ (Vattimo 1999: 77)); ii) internal 
inconsistencies with Vattimo’s own arguments, both ethically and 
hermeneutically. Klun points out the lack of vertical transcendence in 
Vattimo’s Christianity, that ‘transforming’ religion into a story does 
violence to a believer’s religious experience, and that in his emphasis on 
spiritualisation Vattimo removes the lasting role of incarnation in terms of 
the flesh, particularly the importance of the resurrection (Klun 2014: 52). 
Again, whilst one may agree with Vattimo in his view that Being can be 
understood as language, it does not have to come to presence through 
language, in classic textual works alone. Focusing on Klun’s objection, it is 
important to note the significance he placed on the ‘flesh’ of Jesus. While 
Klun accented the resurrection, Jesus’ flesh is at the heart of Christianity 
and is inseparable from the messages of kenosis and caritas. In turn, this 
flesh is inextricably linked to transcendence. Kenosis is linked to an 
emptying which then returns to fullness through the resurrection (the 
parabola from transcendence, and back), while caritas is linked to 
obedience to a transcendent source of authority, as shall be shown later in 
the section on caritas. Of course, the notion of ‘flesh’ is linked to the 
Eucharist, and this is more a topic to be discussed in the Conclusion.  
Arguably, Jesus’ flesh was a site in which Being came to presence in 
terms of physis, dwelling in the language of kenosis, caritas, Eucharist and 
so on, whilst also hiding much of who he was, how he related to the 
historical world of Judaism and the world at large, and—importantly—
being capable of infinite interpretability. In his dialogue with Vattimo, 
Dotolo notes that Christianity is critical of transcendence without a name, 
and so transcendence becomes historical (Dotolo 2009: 30). Although 
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transcendence becomes historical in Dotolo’s understanding of Christianity, 
it does not dissolve into a play of horizons—it cannot be exhausted in 
immanence (Roldán 2007: 92). Rather, the incarnation for Dotolo acts as a 
question-mark towards authoritarian, scientistic understandings of what it 
means to be human. The Chalcedonian definition—Jesus as God and human 
unmixed and combined— brings together transcendence and immanence in 
a way in which the truth of Christianity is a meeting with Jesus, who is 
inexhaustible insofar as he is divine (Dotolo 2009: 56-57). The meeting is 
an opening, one which is a dialogue between the interpreter and Jesus 
(Dotolo 2009: 56). While this could be understood in a Gadamerian sense of 
transcendence as an event which harbours the potential for an infinity of 
meanings, I would prefer to see it in terms of the conflict of the fourfold. 
The body of Christ was an event which came to presence and dwelt in 
language (the Logos: the Word made flesh, John 1:14). The inexhaustible 
nature of the divinity placed in relation to humanity, as Dotolo puts it, opens 
up a world but closes it off as it is a notion which is incapable of ever being 
fully understood. Nevertheless, for mortals Jesus was a god (in the 
Heideggerian sense) in that he provided a cultural model normative for 
future thinking. Crucially, though, the ‘divinity’ requires the possibility of 
vertical transcendence, not only of there being a ‘divine’ that emptied 
himself into history (kenosis), but also one which has a relation to its Father. 
This does not entail the flat-footed move of identifying God with Being; far 
from it. Instead, if, as I have shown, there are sufficient resources in 
Heidegger’s thought to think of ontological difference without 
understanding the Ereignis as being nihilistic by reducing it to a 
Nietzschean-Gadamerian interpretation of an event of transpropriation 
arising from the Ge-Stell, one does not have to eliminate the possibility of 
transcendence coming to presence in experience, subsequently articulated in 
language through religious ideas. This is not Being irrupting from the 
‘outside’ such as in the work of Mendieta, but of a connection with a 
beyond which takes place in a work which is simultaneously articulated in 
language. 
Before moving on it would be worth mentioning that vertical 
transcendence does not equate to metaphysics or violence. Baird questions 
this assumption, as does Jonkers (Jonkers 2000: 389). Baird’s work on the 
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subject is particularly interesting as he compares Vattimo’s views on 
kenosis with those of Levinas. The latter’s distinction between the 
absolutely transcendent Yahweh and the less remote (but still vertically 
transcendent) Elohim is important, for kenosis pertains to the latter in its 
humility and inability to interact with the world it has created without 
ethical input from humans (Baird 2007: 424). Along similar lines, ironically, 
other commentators have noticed exclusionary violence in Vattimo’s own 
account of religion, particularly in his obliteration of the vertically 
transcendent dimension of religion in his reduction of the religious into a 
story, at odds with the experience of some religious believers, not allowing 
religious believers to conceive of their belief as anything more than the 
reception of a message, or even as a story (Klun 2014: 52). This approach of 
Vattimo’s seems to be at odds with his notion of caritas, an idea that needs 
to be pursued more in the following sections. 
 
ii. Transcendence and caritas 
‘By attempting to reduce the transcendent to the immanent,’ writes Phillip 
Blond, ‘Vattimo forgets that there is no peace without reference to a 
transcendent order in respect of which the immanent is similarly so ordered’ 
(Blond 2002: 285). It is unlikely that Vattimo ‘forgets’ this point, but 
disagrees with it. A more difficult question for Vattimo is whether, as Erik 
Meganck has emphasised, Vattimo’s principle of caritas can be thought 
without transcendence, emphasising that John 15:15, a passage which 
Vattimo cites as promoting ‘friendship’ between God and humans, is 
preceded in the previous verse by Jesus giving a disciple a command to love 
another. Nevertheless, what Meganck does not draw attention to are the 
verses preceding number 14 in which Christ refers to the Father 
commanding him: ‘As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you. Now 
remain in my love. If you keep my commands, you will remain in my love, 
just as I have kept my Father’s commands and remain in his love’ (John 
15:9-10). I would be prepared to say that caritas could be interpreted to 
mean concern for the other, no-matter who they are. This involves a 
reaching-out to them, just as God reached out to humans in friendship 
through Christ, who followed his Father’s commands by emptying himself 
to the point of death. Transcendence here can be seen in the relationship 
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between the Father and the Son. In the Conclusion will go on to develop this 
line of argument in my re-imagining of Vattimo’s notion of secularisation.  
If caritas is relational (between the Father and Son, and between the 
Son and humans), then some of the criticism Vattimo has received for it 
being ‘something absolute, something transcendent’ (Depoortere 2008: 20) 
is unfair. Anticipating such criticism, Vattimo writes in Belief that ‘Perhaps 
the reason why nihilism is an infinite, never-ending process lies in the fact 
that love, as the ‘ultimate’ meaning of revelation, is not truly ultimate’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 65). Caritas, then, is not a moral absolute or transcendent 
principle, but it is the only limit of secularisation. Secularisation is the 
nihilistic process of weakening strong structures. It would appear that 
caritas is the self-limiting of secularisation, with its tendency for weakening 
as its limiting factor. If caritas is to be treated as a kind of ethic, what would 
it be and how would it be related to nihilism as a process? Cryptically, 
Vattimo writes in Belief that ‘love…is a ‘formal’ commandment, not unlike 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which does not command something specific 
once and for all, but rather applications that must be ‘invented’ in dialogue’ 
(Vattimo 1999: 66). Elsewhere, in an essay called ‘Ethics without 
Transcendence,’ Vattimo elaborates a little more on how he sees caritas 
functioning both historically and formally: ‘It should not be forgotten that 
the categorical imperative of Kant in its most memorable formulations does 
little more than express in secular terms that Christian imperative of caritas’ 
(Vattimo and Zabala 2003: 403). Through traces of both Kant and the 
Christian principle of love, Vattimo aims to derive a limit of secularisation 
that is both ethical and hermeneutical. If Vattimo can successfully create a 
post-Kantian ethic which takes into account not only the death of God as an 
ontological event, but also retain the sense of duty and ethical structure from 
Kant’s work, then he would have made an important contribution to post-
Kantian thought. This is especially so as Kantian thinkers in the Anglo-
American tradition such as David Wiggins have expressed scepticism 
concerning the possibility of post-Kantian universalism in ethics, only 
seeing some sort of preference utilitarianism with an ‘impartial spectator’ as 
a live possibility (Wiggins 1991). While Vattimo did not want to retain the 
strong notion of an objective, universal moral law, he did want to ‘twist’ this 
Kantian structural feature to retain a universally available (in the normative 
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sense) criterion for adjudicating between interpretations based on a respect 
for others, the latter feature being picked out by Kant scholars such as 
Jerome Schneewind as an integral feature of Kant’s work (Schneewind 
1992: 309-341). 
It was with later works, such as After Christianity (2002a), The 
Future of Religion (2004) and After the Death of God (2007) that Vattimo 
developed his historicised understanding of the Categorical Imperative 
further. Vattimo’s method is to trace the Kantian concerns with interiority 
and universality that underlie the Categorical Imperative not only back to 
the Christian revelation, but also forward to the collapse of compelling 
reasons for their ‘rationalist’ interpretation. For the former part of his 
method Vattimo appeals to the German hermeneutic philosophy of Wilhelm 
Dilthey (d. 1911), who thought the most significant consequence of the 
Christian revelation was that it involved people turning inwards to discover 
the truth. As mentioned in Part One, in his Introduction to the Human 
Sciences Dilthey argued that Jesus Christ unified people through faith, an 
inner truth (Dilthey 1979: 229). This focus on the inner life, which Vattimo 
refers to as the ‘principle of interiority,’ constitutes a universality in the 
sense that the Christian faith is for all people, regardless of race, nationality, 
class, or gender. Corresponding approximately to Nietzsche’s story of how 
the world became a fable, it is with Christianity that the absolute became 
interiorised, historicised, and universalised in terms of faith. Vattimo notes 
in After Christianity, the book of his that most discussed Dilthey’s ideas that 
‘the new principle of subjectivity introduced by Christianity did not 
immediately succeed’ (Vattimo 2002a: 107). Nevertheless, Vattimo points 
to thinkers such as Augustine in whom the tension between ‘the novelty of 
Christian interiority and the hegemony of Greek aesthetic or ‘visual’ 
objectivism’ was embodied (Vattimo 2002a: 107). 
‘A struggle between Christianity’s offering of a new possibility to 
thought and metaphysics’ endurance,’ writes Vattimo in After Christianity, 
‘goes on up to Kant, who draws the anti-metaphysical implications of the 
inaugural move of the Christian message.’ On the one hand, the Greek 
aestheticist idealist objectivism stipulated that absolute truth was located 
exterior to the intellect in the forms. On the other hand, Christianity 
emphasised ‘inwardness, will, certitude of the cogito’ that had been 
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recollected by Descartes (Vattimo 2002a: 108), and from whose thought 
Kant was drawing further conclusions. The turn inward, begun with Christ, 
moving slowly through Augustine, Descartes and Kant, weakened the 
dominant Platonic-Aristotelian notion of truth as correspondence, that is, of 
objectivity. If truth is found within one, then one need not match statements 
to external things. Of course, as Vattimo realises, with Descartes and Kant’s 
thought there occurred merely a relocation of metaphysics; the metaphysical 
needs did not disappear, but simply moved to the subject, such as Descartes’ 
requirement for ‘clear and distinct’ ideas and his foundationalism. Kant, 
similarly, thought that a universal, absolute moral law could be established 
on the subject’s rational will. The death of God undermined faith in this 
rational will, however, through the various insights of Marx, Freud, 
Nietzsche, among others, through various hermeneutics of suspicion, the 
death of God and the end of metaphysics in the Ge-Stell/Ereignis. 
 
iii. A postmodern Categorical Imperative?20  
It was said above that Vattimo’s method also involved moving forward to 
the way in which we can ‘piously remember’ the linguistic traces of 
tradition, in this case of the Categorical Imperative. The latter already had 
the character of a secularised, weakened Christian universalism, which in 
turn is a historicised Platonism, ‘for the people,’ as Nietzsche said in 
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 1990b: 32). Nevertheless, since Kant 
there has been the world-historical event of the death of God, liberating all 
traditions from being placed in a metaphysically ordered hierarchy. With the 
culmination of metaphysics goes a need to reconfigure notions such as 
rationality, universality, and objectivity. Vattimo’s starting point in twisting 
these traces of Enlightenment rationality is the present situation in which 
objectivity is not possible or plausible due to the decentred hermeneutical 
plurality that is the defining feature of late-modernity (or ‘postmodernity’), 
and that this nihilism is the result of recognising our finitude through 
secularisation inaugurated by Christianity’s principle of interiority. Vattimo 
states in The Future of Religion that with caritas he is developing ‘a 
metarule that obliges and pushes us to accept the different language games’ 
                                                 
20 This subsection owes a lot to my article on ‘otherness’ in Vattimo’s thought for 
Otherness: Essays and Studies (Harris 2013b), as well as to my article on Kant’s 
postmodern categorical imperative for Kritike (Harris 2014b). 
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that have been liberated by the event of the death of God (Vattimo, Rorty 
and Zabala 2005: 59). In A Farewell to Truth, Vattimo responds to 
Augustine’s precept, ‘look within yourself,’ which Vattimo regards as ‘an 
advance on the truth of the object,’ with the question, ‘if you turn toward 
your inner self, oughtn’t you also try to heed ‘the other as yourself’?’ 
(Vattimo 2011: 76). 
Vattimo’s logic here is reminiscent of Kant’s. For Kant, if one 
recognises that one is a rational self-legislator and is willing to obey one’s 
own laws, then one should be able to see this capacity for self-legislation in 
others, giving them the same moral value you would give to yourself. 
Vattimo’s appropriation of Augustine’s ‘look within yourself,’ in turn based 
upon a universal brotherhood of faith according to Dilthey’s understanding 
of Christianity’s appeal, is far less defined. Augustine’s turn inward had 
value on the assumption that it was possible for the human being to have an 
inner connection with God. As Vattimo has no need for, or belief in, an 
objectively existing metaphysical God, then this justification for turning 
inward has no purpose; here, again, the lack of transcendence in Vattimo’s 
return to religion is problematic. All we are left with, in fact, is an inward-
gazing, with no adequately reason for it; our subjectivism is nihilistic and 
empty. Nevertheless, we still do in fact turn inwards. If we do turn inwards, 
surely we should look to others who just so happen to do the same to find a 
way to establish ethical norms. Indeed, in finding no objective truths within 
or without, all we can do is to turn to one-another to fuse one’s limited 
horizons in dialogue. 
To whom should one turn in caritas, and how should one conduct 
oneself in this turning? Moreover, what would be the result of this action? 
The answers to these questions will reveal Vattimo’s postmodern 
Categorical Imperative. In After the Death of God, Vattimo writes ‘once you 
turn inward you must also try to listen to others like you’ (Vattimo 2007: 
42). What does Vattimo mean by others ‘like you’? Clearly he cannot mean 
anything like a Platonic universal of humanity or a Kantian rational subject. 
In Vattimo’s book The End of Modernity, he calls for the need for a ‘crash 
diet’ for the subject (Vattimo 1988a: 47), of a reduced subjectivity, even if 
he does not flesh out the details. It would appear that Vattimo would prefer 
to follow Heidegger in conceiving of the individual more in terms of 
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Dasein’s relation to Being than as an autonomous subject who moves out of 
herself to have relationships with other people and relations to other things. 
Vattimo believes people should interpret late-modernity accordingly as the 
nihilistic epoch of Being. Writing in Nihilism and Emancipation, this 
becomes clear as Vattimo states: 
The situation to which we really belong before all else, and toward 
which we are responsible in our ethical choices, is that of the 
dissolution of principles, of nihilism. If we choose instead to find our 
ultimate points of reference in the most specific kinds of attachment 
(to race, ethnic group, family, or class), then we limit our perspective 
right at the outset (Vattimo 2004: 41).   
As this quotation makes clear, ‘like you’ does not mean attachment to racial, 
national or class groups, but a shared awareness of one’s own provisional, 
contingent thrownness. With a ‘dissolution of principles,’ there is no centre, 
no objectivity and no absolute against which anything can be measured in 
terms of its truth value. This situation has liberated a plurality of 
interpretations, which is why Vattimo believes his hermeneutical nihilism is 
the koiné of late-modernity. Accordingly, ethics should take the form of 
‘discourse-dialogue between defenders of finite positions who recognize 
that this is what they are and who shun the temptation to impose their 
position on others’ (Vattimo 2004: 46). This form of ethics ‘will certainly 
retain…some aspects of Kantism (especially the formulation of the 
categorical imperative in terms of respect for the other…stripped of any 
dogmatic residue)’ (Vattimo 2004: 46). Vattimo’s crash-diet subject is, then, 
one who has piously recollected Being in its current nihilistic sending; 
recognising her own finitude by turning inward and finding no divine spark 
or foundational rationality there, she will turn to others like her. 
 What will these postmodern, weakened subjects do? Vattimo has 
implied that they will engage in dialogue, but for what end? Vattimo writes 
in A Farewell to Truth that ‘we don’t reach agreement when we have 
discovered the truth, we say we have discovered the truth when we reach 
agreement. In other words, charity takes the place of truth’ (Vattimo 2011: 
77). Elsewhere, in Christianity, Truth and Weakening Faith, Vattimo puts 
his position more clearly by stating that ‘It is still possible to speak of 
truth…but only because we have realized caritas through agreement. 
Caritas with respect to opinion, with respect to choices about values, will 
become the truth when it is shared’ (Vattimo 2005: 51). The ‘universal,’ 
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writes Vattimo in Nihilism and Emancipation, is only regarded ‘by passing 
through dialogue, through consent, if you like through caritas…truth is born 
in consent and from consent’ (Vattimo 2004: xxvi). In fact, Vattimo 
priorities ‘listening’ over talking, for Christian charity, in its secularised 
universal mission, involves acknowledging that others might be right so that 
‘universality’ should give rise to charitable hospitality, as Vattimo writes in 
After Christianity (Vattimo 2002a: 101-102). Listening to others will further 
weaken one’s own position, as well as gathering in multiple interpretations 
in order to fuse horizons to create more syncretistic, less logically coherent 
positions. This is how caritas is the stimulus to weakening, the nihilistic 
force behind secularisation. Vattimo’s postmodern Categorical Imperative, 
then, is forming truth as dialogue. This dialogue is the coming together of 
‘weak’ subjects fusing their horizons as a result of recognising their finitude 
as a consequence of turning inward and reading the ‘signs of the times’ 
(Vattimo 1998: 91-92), that we are living in the epoch of the consummation 
of the nihilistic vocation of Being.  
Through the relation of caritas to nihilism, Vattimo seems to 
introduce the conditional into the Categorical Imperative: if others are like 
you, then listen to them. Can you have a conditional Categorical 
Imperative? Unsurprisingly, the answer is “No,” for it would be a 
contradiction in terms. A conditional imperative is a hypothetical 
imperative, such as ‘If you want to go to the cinema, then you have to buy a 
ticket.’ This is instrumental reasoning, based on an individual or a 
community deciding a goal and then deducing what would be the rational 
course of action required in order to achieve this goal. In the case of 
Vattimo, this goal-setting and instrumental rationality occurs at a different 
point in the ethical decision-making process than in Kant’s ethics. For 
Vattimo, the goal-setting occurs through the dialogue, but the decision to 
enter into dialogue is based on whether the other party is willing to engage. 
‘Strong’ thinkers would not be dialogue partners, for they presume the 
‘correctness’ of their views at the outset, precluding dialogue and, therefore, 
truth. In recent years, in collaboration with his pupil Santiago Zabala in the 
work Hermeneutic Communism, Vattimo has preferred to use the term 
‘conversation’ rather than dialogue, for the latter term is reminiscent of 
Platonic dialogues in which truth is presupposed at the outset (Vattimo and 
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Zabala 2011: 25-26, 79). Truth for Vattimo and Zabala is identical with 
‘friendship,’ and the latter is forged in the fusion of horizons that constitutes 
weakening of Being in accordance with the secularising power of caritas, 
that is, its nihilistic vocation as a process in history.  
It has been written elsewhere that the separation of people into 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ thinkers is regrettable not only because it retains a 
metaphysical dualism, but also because the semantic field of ‘friendship,’ 
‘truth,’ and ‘charity’ indicates that those who are not prepared to engage in 
dialogue can be ignored and not listened to (Harris 2013b: 1-21). Moreover, 
the value judgement behind Vattimo’s assessment of ‘strong’ thinkers 
reveals the inconsistencies in Vattimo’s philosophy. ‘The unconditional is 
violent’ is ironically an unconditional assessment. One can liken this 
inconsistency to Bernard Williams’ criticisms of subjectivism in his book 
Morality: if a subjectivist says someone ‘has no right’ to criticise another’s 
opinion, then this idea of ‘no right’ takes one beyond a merely subjectivist 
ethic; it is some sort of metaethic or transcendental, pre-content schema in 
which ethical opinions are separated out and managed (Williams 1973: 41). 
If Vattimo criticises strong thought on the basis of it being ‘violent,’ and if 
Vattimo backs out of a genuinely Categorical Imperative of universal 
respect for others based on an ‘inner turn’ primarily on the basis that some 
people are strong thinkers, then he is just like Williams’ subjectivist holding 
that people have ‘no right’ to condemn someone else’s beliefs. In other 
words, Vattimo’s view that ‘violence is wrong’ is his implicit moral 
absolute, just in the same way the subjectivist still conceives of a ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ when it comes to judging peoples’ opinions. Of course, Vattimo 
would not even consider himself a relativist, let alone a subjectivist. Vattimo 
would argue that he is appealing to history to ground a criterion for 
interpretation that takes him beyond relativism and subjectivism. Vattimo’s 
problem is in trying to create a criterion for interpretation out of 
hermeneutical nihilism. ‘For this problem,’ writes Wolfgang Welsch in 
Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ‘[that is] of 
the multiplicity of competing interpretations and the absence of a 
noninterpretative metacriterion—Vattimo has no solution’ (Welsch 2007: 
100). Welsch does not think that a ‘noninterpretative metacriterion’ is 
possible after the death of God. Vattimo may argue that we should try to 
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recollect traces of Being to weaken them to reduce violence. Being has 
weakened itself despite ‘strong’ thinkers from the time of Late-Antiquity up 
to the present; indeed, as Vattimo pointed out, the ‘principle of interiority’ 
took its time to develop between Augustine and Descartes, but it did. 
Therefore, if we are ‘thrown’ into the world as Dasein, and if Being is 
inescapably linguistic, surely it is impossible to fail to recollect it in some 
way, and it takes further, strong reasons to argue for weak thinking and the 
reduction of violence? If one argues that we should all be weak thinkers 
(and therefore conversation partners), that we should interpret the traces of 
Being charitably, then sooner or later one runs into an ethical absolute. 
Vattimo would reply that he is reading the signs of the times and that the 
‘ontology of actuality’ shows Being orienting itself towards weakening. 
However, as I have shown earlier this depends upon his selective reading of 
the Ereignis arising from the Ge-Stell. Without the latter, Vattimo is left 
merely with hermeneutical plurality. The latter alone is capable of many 
readings; it could be that one sees the plurality as widespread error in light 
of one’s own certainty (which is what one sees with fundamentalism in its 
many stripes). It is only in light of Vattimo’s partial Heideggerianism that 
one finds kenosis as the inaugural message of a secularisation which gives 
rise to the hermeneutical nihilism, and caritas is the ethical flipside of the 
kenotic coin.  
 It was mentioned earlier that others ‘like you’ does not refer to 
nationality, race or class, and it is likely that Vattimo considers those ‘like 
you’ only as those people interested in listening to the sending of Being as 
‘weakening.’ In addition to the circularity of deriving caritas from kenosis, 
which is in turn derived from an unpersuasive reading of the signs of the 
times in terms of an ontology of actuality which as ‘weakening,’ there are 
more practical problems in the sense that I think caritas is preaching to the 
converted, neglecting ‘strong’ thinkers. ‘Like you’ means only those people 
who realise both they and their beliefs are contingent and historically 
situated; in other words, that one should only listen to other people who 
have put friendship before objective truth. Put yet another way, one should 
listen to those who are not prepared to fuse horizons and agree. Taking the 
case of Vattimo’s views on Islam, he tacitly agrees with Richard Rorty 
when the latter stated that ‘dialogue with Islam is pointless’ (Vattimo, 
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Rorty, and Zabala: 2005: 72). In this exchange with Rorty, recorded in the 
book The Future of Religion, Vattimo notes that the West is ‘refused’ by 
‘some parts of the Islamic world’ (Vattimo, Rorty, and Zabala 2005: 72). 
Elsewhere, Vattimo’s reasoning behind such an opinion is clarified, for in 
an article for La Stampa (17 February 1989) called ‘Our Savage Brother,’ 
Vattimo noted that Islam has ‘strong values’ (quoted in Antiseri 1996: 69). 
Later, in lectures published as After Christianity, Vattimo stated practices 
based on a ‘strong identity’ (indicating Vattimo identifying approaches to 
knowledge with personhood), such as women wearing the chador, should be 
outlawed (Vattimo 2002a: 101). ‘Strong values’ and ‘strong identity’ are 
examples of ‘strong thought.’ ‘Strong thought’ (pensiero forte) is not a term 
outlined and elaborated on much by Vattimo, but it is the logical antonym of 
weak thought (pensiero debole). In ‘Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,’ 
he describes strong thought as ‘deductive cogency, which fears letting the 
initial move escape, the move after which everything falls into place’ 
(Vattimo 2012a: 39). The ‘initial move’ mentioned in this quotation is the 
‘first principle,’ religious (‘God’) or philosophical (‘substance’), against 
which everything is measured and to which everything is reduced. With the 
example of the chador, there is the suspicion that in Vattimo’s society, 
‘strong thinkers’ are not to be considered others ‘like you’ but others ‘unlike 
you’ who need to be banished to the margins. There is a paradox in 
Vattimo’s thought in the sense that for all Vattimo is interested in going to 
the margins to bring the other back in from exclusion (Vattimo and Zabala 
2011: 50-51), these others would have embraced weak thought as a way of 
combating the metanarratives and strong values of metaphysics and the 
natural sacred, such as homosexuals who have been marginalised by Natural 
Moral Law. Vattimo himself is an example, of somebody who sought out 
Nietzsche and Heidegger and turned his back on the Thomism with which 
he was brought up because it made him an ‘other,’ ‘not like’ other 
heterosexual Catholics (Vattimo and Paterlini 2009: 13). Neo-Thomists, 
however, will be banished to the margins should a form of weak thought 
become normative as they are ‘strong’ thinkers with ethical naturalism as 
their cognitivist metaethical standpoint. Ironically, Vattimo’s thought is a 
repeat, and inversion, of the Enlightenment in which religion was banished 
from public respectability and debate. A similar observation has been made 
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by Thomas Guarino. ‘The contrast between the crucifix and the chador is 
revelatory,’ writes Guarino, ‘because it indicates that, for Vattimo, no one 
with strong beliefs can truly participate in the public sphere’ (Guarino 2009: 
71). Guarino worries that the cognitive content of religious belief will be 
emptied if it were to participate in a public sphere organised along 
Vattimian lines (although it could just be that the public sphere will not be 
constructed on strong foundations). Another worry not mentioned by 
Guarino is what about those who neither know, nor care, about weak 
thought; will there simply be no effort to go to the ‘margins’ to engage with 
‘strong’ thinkers? Will ‘charity’ be extended to these people? When 
considering ‘friendship’ (another way of Vattimo’s for referring to charity, 
normally used by him when not discussing religion) below, this theme will 
be taken up once more.  
 
iv. Conclusion 
There is a distinct sense that Vattimo’s approach to Christianity is not 
satisfactory to religious people and by standards of internal consistency. 
Concerning the former, Vattimo is filling up old wineskins with an alien 
vintage to the point of rupture, a point made by Thomas Guarino about 
Vattimo’s approach to Christianity in general (Guarino 2009: 152). Guarino 
points out Vattimo’s Christianity is a one-way street in which there is no 
exchange of ideas. Christianity has to conform to weak thought, which 
involves no vertical transcendence and a principle of charity which is 
wedded to hermeneutics. What Vattimo has done is to create a vision of 
Christianity based on his own preferences for Heidegger and Nietzsche, 
primarily, but also based on Gadamer, Dilthey and Marx. Vattimo has 
created God in his own image, based on his view that all there is happens to 
be the plane of history in which texts constitute how Being is disclosed. As 
someone who has faced discrimination over his sexuality and Marxism, 
Vattimo is against authoritarianism, such as in Catholic dogma. Seeing the 
possibility for liberation from dogmatism through interpreting 
hermeneutical plurality as oriented towards weakening, Vattimo has tied in 
the development of information and communications technology to the 
history of Being. While the latter takes a positive turn in Vattimo’s thought 
through its identification with our sole possibility of liberation, it is a one-
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sided reading not only of this technology, but also of the history of Being, 
one which neglects other readings of Heidegger. This partiality grounds 
Vattimo’s reading of Christianity, for kenosis is required to reduce 
transcendence to immanence, weakening and the turn inwards, a message 
which—through secularisation—reached its culmination in the death of 
God. While the hermeneutic circle is to be expected, the sheer subjectivity 
of Vattimo’s return to religion means it will have little purchase beyond 
himself, for even though Vattimo appeals to the ‘signs of the times’ these 
are not unambiguous and are read through Vattimo’s philosophical lens. As 
Jonkers puts it, ‘the limiting of secularisation by the commandment of love 
is nothing but an arbitrary decision on the part of Vattimo as an individual’ 
(Jonkers 2000: 386). It is not as though there are no good reasons for 
accepting one view over another except for strong, objective reasons (the 
very thing Vattimo disavows), but that a persuasive case needs to be made. 
Taking Vattimo’s approach to Christianity into account, for example, 
Vattimo needed to make a persuasive case if he wanted other people to 
adopt his interpretation of Christianity. One way of making a persuasive 
case is to move within the ‘language game’ of the topic at hand, in this case 
the religion and theology of Christianity. Vattimo himself recognises that 
truth is constructed in dialogue (or, better, ‘conversation’) within language 
games (Rorty, Vattimo, Zabala 2006: 59), so he would accept what I am 
writing about here with regard to persuasion. That Vattimo has not 
adequately entered into the language game of Christianity is evident from 
the numerous criticisms that have been made, especially as Vattimo has left 
omitted much of the language (and rules) of the game, such as the ‘cross,’ 
‘resurrection’ and ‘transcendence (Depoortere 2008a: 17-22). This is not to 
say that Vattimo has to submit to rigid preconceived rules, like in chess, but 
that he had a chance to cross-pollinate the language game of theology with 
that of another game, postmodernism, thereby weakening the claims of 
‘strong’ theologians who might have entered into dialogue with him.21 
However, instead he created a god so particular and subjective that it did not 
fully engage the language game of theology, only choosing a select few 
words and then filling these old wineskins with an ‘alien and new vintage’ 
(Guarino 2009: 152). 
                                                 
21 If they would have done at all; ‘dialogue’ among with thinkers is preaching to 
the converted. 
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 More than being subjective and autobiographical, Vattimo’s 
interpretation of Christianity is, however, unsuccessful in yielding an ethic 
in the form of the ‘limit’ of secularisation (by which one can read the 
process of nihilism). By restricting caritas to other weak thinkers, Vattimo 
has not created a universal principle but is preaching to the converted, by 
which I mean other weak thinkers. Worse than this, by dismissing the 
possibility of vertical transcendence a priori, Vattimo has done violence, as 
Klun would put it to any person or group who believes in this possibility 
(Klun 2014: 52). As Antiseri has said (Antiseri 1996: 123), Vattimo has 
created a prison out of history, I would argue to the point where he has 
developed a metaphysics of the Logos. ‘So when Vattimo speaks of 
supplanting strong ontology by weak,’ writes Phillip Blond, ‘he is merely 
repeating rather than overcoming the grammar of modernity…the idea of 
weakening is just the decline of strong objectivity into its dialectical 
opposite’ (Blond 2002: 283-284). The absolutes from modernity (such as 
the Cartesian ego and Kantian a priori) are dissolved into Vattimian 
weakness, but in forms and for reasons that are ‘capricious’ (Blond 2002: 
284). Blond sees this as repeating the logic of modernity, which always had 
the absolute and arbitrary working in tandem (such as the Kantian 
‘noumenal’ as the arbitrary backdrop to the a priori to which knowledge 
corresponded). While Vattimo thinks he is being more peaceful with his 
weakened structures, ‘the arbitrary is just as violent as any objective 
metaphysical structure’ (Blond 2002: 284). It would be far more consistent 
with Vattimo’s style of thought to leave the vertically transcendent open as 
a possibility, but one which he personally does not entertain. For reasons 
which shall be discussed more at the beginning of the main conclusion, 
appeals made by groups to found strong thought on anything—including the 
vertically transcendent—are likely to fail to persuade.  
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Conclusion: A weakened Vattimo? 
If Vattimo’s return to religion needs modifying heavily to the extent that 
vertical transcendence must be allowed and that nihilism should no longer 
be seen as ‘destining’ the West, is there anything left of his position? What 
benefits could there be to Vattimo’s position, or should we stop talking 
about an ‘ontology of actuality’? Here it is prudent to distinguish between 
Vattimo’s position and the benefits of it. While I have shown that it is little 
more than Vattimo’s own interpretation of the ‘signs of the times’ that we 
are living after the death of God and the end of metaphysics, his insights 
into ‘postmodernity’ are actually persuasive. Considering the latter, we are 
living in a decentred, infinitely plural time for the reasons he has provided: 
modern information and communications technology—especially the 
internet—have shrunk the world, giving minorities a voice and have sewn 
confusion on beliefs, values and traditions. Vattimo conflates sociology with 
ontology by moving from plurality to a lack of Truth, which he extends 
beyond the latter to all forms of vertical transcendence altogether in his 
hermeneutical nihilism. This is because he reads the sociological 
phenomenon through the lens of his particular reading of the Ge-
Stell/Ereignis. Nevertheless, I have shown the pitfalls of this reading of 
Heidegger in this way. However, for all it’s worth, Vattimo’s reasons for 
nihilism are unpersuasive, neither Heidegger nor the contemporary 
sociological situation lend themselves to supporting ‘strong’ truth claims, 
even in the field of ethics. Heidegger, whether we conceived of truth as 
aletheia or physis, would have guarded against truth in an absolute sense as 
the former openings or presencings are historical and contingent. As for the 
sociological phenomenon of plurality, there is the epistemological problem 
of knowing what is True or Right, and the rhetorical issue of persuading 
somebody else equally sure of their opinions as you that you are right and 
they are wrong. Essentially the paradigmatic case of this problem today can 
be seen in the West and Isis clashing over endless moral, political and 
cultural issues, from women’s rights to the treatment of homosexuals and 
beyond.  
Although Vattimo’s reasoning is unpersuasive, there are benefits to 
Vattimo’s approach, especially the ethic of weakening he tried to derive 
historically. For example, Aguirre thinks that ‘A ‘nihilistic hermeneutic,’ 
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like Vattimo’s, which speaks out of its own contingency, wishes to keep 
open the space for dialogue and tolerance of the other’ (Aguirre 2010: 114). 
Elsewhere, Frascati-Lochhead used Vattimo’s approach to argue that 
minority voices should not retreat into ‘reactive nihilism,’ that it is 
important to recognise not only that one has an interpretation, but also that it 
is nothing but an interpretation:  
The experience of emancipation, as Vattimo describes it, does not 
make it possible to absolutise a given historical situation, even as a 
minority position. For the experience of Being is not the 
contemplation of self-fulfilling plenitude, of presence completely 
enfleshed, of wholeness; it is the awareness of how risky, opaque, 
and precarious our interpretations are (Frascati-Lochhead 1998: 177). 
As a result, there are incentives to derive a weak ontology after all, since 
Vattimo’s basic intuition that strong thought is violent happens to be a good 
one. His appeal to Christianity as the inheritance of the West provides 
resources for restructuring his argument to provide a persuasive case for the 
notion that Being is directed towards weakening. At the end of Part Two I 
made a case for the centrality of the person of Jesus as a ‘god’ in the 
Heideggerian sense, of the possibility of vertical transcendence, drawing on 
Dotolo’s notion of the endless reinterpretability of the person of Jesus, 
linking this to Klun’s point about the centrality of ‘flesh’ in relation to the 
significance of Jesus. In turn, this was linked to vertical transcendence 
which does not have to be understood as metaphysical and therefore violent; 
this has the benefit of being more authentic and persuasive for the 
religiously-minded as it accords more with their faith and religious 
experience. At no point, though, was this transcendence identified with 
Being. What I want to put forward is a ‘horizontal’ link between the endless 
reinterpretability of Christ and his last command in order to explain this 
weakening which Vattimo perceives in the history of western thought, 
which should also yield an ethic which is appropriate to our current 
pluralistic times. In other words, I propose to link the body of the incarnate 
Christ (the Logos made flesh—see John 1:14) which Dotolo sees as 
functioning somewhat as ‘earth’ in Heidegger’s fourfold, with how and why 
it has been constantly reinterpreted. While Dotolo himself emphasises the 
Chalcedonian Definition as the source of his interpretability, I would put it 
down more to the hermeneutical nature of Christianity as an evangelical 
religion which has foreshadowed the current situation of postmodern 
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plurality by always adapting itself to other cultures. I would argue that, 
intentionally or otherwise, Christianity acted as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for 
religion, to use Pierpaolo Antonello’s phrase (Antonello 2010: 8). By this I 
mean that the message of Christ (and Christ’s message) entered the milieu 
between religion and philosophy through its encounter with both, 
irrevocably changing how both would be understood through a process of 
secularisation. 
This reworking of secularisation in Vattimo’s thought that has been 
developed in part by Carmelo Dotolo (Dotolo 1999) and by me elsewhere 
(Harris 2013c; Harris 2014c), and is being extended further in this present 
study. Dotolo argues that the Christian message brought about a de-
Hellenising in philosophy and a reduction of onto-theology in the content of 
philosophy. For philosophy, Dotolo interprets Vattimo as stating that 
philosophy was weakened based on its encounter with the Hebrew-Judaic 
temporally linear eschatological horizon, replacing the eternal view of time 
found in Greek philosophy. Ontotheological religious claims were then 
weakened later, in Dotolo’s eyes, by being recovered in the late-modern 
environment in which transcendence no longer has any purchase (Dotolo 
1999: 406). I interpret the workings of secularisation slightly differently, 
such that the evangelical message of friendliness brought together both 
philosophy and religion, weakening both as Christianity was in essence 
neither, even if this has taken a long time to show. My own position will be 
developed here more explicitly in the missionary context of Christianity in 
which friendliness has entailed spreading the ‘good news’ to all nations, 
thus explaining why Christianity took philosophy into itself in order to 
weaken it. 
The risen Christ told his disciples before he ascended to heaven to 
make disciples of ‘all the nations’ (Matthew 28:18-20), the ‘Great 
Commission’ as it is known. Greek philosophy was part of the cultural 
milieu of the Near East of the first century, and on St Paul’s mission to the 
Gentiles he encountered the philosophers of Athens. Most were 
unimpressed with his scandal of the cross; it was ‘foolishness’ to the 
Gentiles who believed in the eternal soul, not the resurrection of the body (1 
Cor. 1:23). Nevertheless, a handful were receptive, especially Dionysius the 
Areopagite (Acts 17:34). By the second century, however, Christianity had 
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found an impressively educated, albeit small, Gentile audience, including 
the philosophers Athenagoras, Theophilus, and most notably Justin Martyr. 
The theme in ecclesiastical history that Christianity became ‘Hellenised’ as 
a result of this early encounter with the Greeks is an old and contentious 
one, famously put forward by Adolf von Harnack (Harnack 1902). More 
interesting is the claim by the contemporary British philosopher John Gray 
that Christianity did not abolish strong structures, but actually introduced 
the value of ‘truth’ into religion through its appropriation of philosophy 
(Gray 2002). Fernando Savater places Gray’s reading in opposition to 
Vattimo’s (Savater 2007: 299), but one could actually use it to extend 
Antonello’s analysis of the function of Christianity as a ‘Trojan Horse.’ 
Christianity has posed variously as a religion and a philosophically justified 
faith, taking in the concepts of both philosophy and religion to weaken them 
in an indefinite process.  
It is possible to indicate how Christianity has functioned as a ‘Trojan 
Horse’ in the weakening of metaphysics. Karl Löwith has said that 
philosophies of history are ideological and are not interested in ‘what 
actually happens’ (Löwith 1949: 3-4). Nevertheless, if secularisation is to be 
a plausible philosophy of history, rather than the kind of teleological 
unilinear history about which Löwith was writing, it should at least be 
persuasive. To this end, examples can be found of Christianity weakening 
metaphysics in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. In the controversies 
concerning the Trinity and Incarnation in Late Antiquity there were frequent 
arguments over how metaphysical terms should be used. There was 
confusion, for instance, over how the Greek term ‘hypostases’ should 
translate into Latin; was ‘personae’ good enough? If so, it made the Trinity 
three separate beings, but according to Gregory of Nyssa they were not, for 
they shared a common ‘ousia’ (essence), just as Peter, Andrew, John and 
James shared the common essence of humanity as four different hypostases 
of the ousia. Insistence on the use of these terms did no good for 
metaphysics, for it was making the normal conform to the exceptional, the 
immanent and human conform to the transcendent and divine, all due to the 
scandal of the particular: the incarnation of Christ. For although through the 
notion of ousia Peter, Andrew, John and James share a common human 
nature it would have been normal to regard them as separate human beings, 
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Gregory of Nyssa would have had one think otherwise. Moreover, the use of 
ousia as ‘essence’ rather than ‘substance’ confused matters further, with the 
differences between ousia and hypostasis unclear even among the Church 
Fathers (Peters 1993: 195 n. 19-21).  
The recovery of Aristotle in the West during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries only made matters worse for metaphysics. Aquinas 
‘twisted’ Aristotle in various ways, forcing his eternal view of the universe 
into a Hebrew-Christian linear temporality, thus making his Prime Mover a 
first mover of creation, rather than acting as something akin to an eternal 
magnet as final cause for everything else in the universe. Therefore, 
Aquinas made problems for issues such as mutability, potentiality, actuality, 
and causation by using Aristotelian terms outside of their context and 
conventional usage. Even more problematically, Aquinas used Aristotelian 
terms such as ‘substance’ and ‘accidents’ for his explanation of the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist through transubstantiation, but, in the 
words of P. J. Fitzpatrick, ‘abuses them to the point of nonsense’ 
(Fitzpatrick 1993: 11). This is because Aquinas thought ‘free floating’ 
accidents of the bread and wine remained once the host had been 
consecrated: ‘it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament ‘by way 
of substance,’ and not by way of [the accident of] quantity’ (Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 76, a.1). Aristotle did not think it was 
possible for there to be free-floating accidents not qualifying a substance. 
Therefore, the absolute importance of a contingent event—the Incarnation 
of Christ—meant a philosophical system had to bend to the point of 
breaking in order to explain articles of faith. That this philosophy had to be 
brought to bear at all comes down firstly to the Great Commission, the 
evangelical imperative of the risen Christ’s, and to the insistence on truth 
which came from the philosophy the evangelists brought into Christianity. 
This latter point is explicit in the work of the second century Apologists and 
is traceable even to early second century canonical works such as the 
Gospel of John, which betrays strong Stoic influences particularly in the 
opening ‘Logos Hymn’ (John 1). 
Another example of how Christianity made philosophy contingent is 
the ‘God of the philosophers.’ This issue of ‘ontotheology’ links to 
weakening in at least two respects: the problem of ‘freedom’ and the 
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problem of ‘evil.’ Concerning the former, one can take the example of 
Boethius’ attempt to explain how an omnipotent, omniscient and eternal 
God can nonetheless allow for human freedom (Boethius 1999); if God 
knows everything, then he would predestine all humans by knowing both 
their future choices and actions. Boethius responded to this by stating that 
God is outside of time and comprehends everything in a single glance, a 
‘flash of simultaneity’ in which he sees the choices we freely make. 
Whereas God knows necessarily what a tree will be doing for its existence 
because of his knowledge of the nature of the thing as a tree, God knows 
what a human will be doing of necessity (because God is omniscient) but on 
the condition that the human being chooses to do something by its own 
volition. As God is outside of time he sees the freely made, conditional 
choices of humans from the beginning of time to its end. Boethius’ solution 
is elegant, but not without problems. One problem is that the God of Israel 
interacted with his people, and unless he willed this interaction ‘from 
eternity’ his responses should have been affected by gaining knowledge of 
what people would say. Moreover, God would also have known ‘from 
eternity’ that humans would sin and why did he not do enough to stop it, 
unless he requires human freedom in some way in order that they freely 
choose to love him, which would then mean that God is not self-sufficient 
(aseity)? If the latter were the case, it would mean that, unlike Plato’s forms 
and the Prime Mover, God really is not ultimate in the traditional, 
philosophical sense; theology and religion have contaminated philosophy 
and have distorted the traditional, Greek sense of the ultimate, with the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition weakening with philosophical principles after 
having mixed due to the Great Commission.22 Even more fundamentally, 
how could an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God create and/or 
permit evil and suffering in the world? The classic formulation of this 
problem comes from David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion: ‘Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered. Is [God] willing to 
prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? 
Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?’ 
(Hume 1993: 100). Of course, this issue has been debated and argued about 
considerably, and the point is not to re-tread such a worn path but to show 
                                                 
22 Admittedly, some Jewish thinkers prior to Jesus were mixing their beliefs with 
philosophy, notably Philo of Alexandria, but these were unique figures. 
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how problems for both philosophy and religion have arisen from bringing 
them both together in the God of Christianity. Problems for philosophy have 
occurred for being placed under greater scrutiny as a result of particular 
issues arising due to ontotheology. For example, in the case of the problem 
of evil, Christian responses to the problem have included analysing the 
doctrine of omnipotence. Whereas the idea of ‘perfection’ or an ‘intrinsic 
maximum’ made sense, or were at least not questioned, in Platonism, their 
place within theology put these notions under scrutiny. Aquinas, for 
instance, thought that ‘omnipotence’ did not really mean omnipotence in the 
sense that ‘all-powerful’ pertained to the type of being associated with 
power. So that, unlike Descartes later who thought that God could square a 
circle (Descartes 1978), Aquinas stated that it was proper for God not to be 
able to do certain things, such as sin or climb a tree, as it was not proper for 
an omnibenevolent and incorporeal being to do these things (Aquinas 1989). 
Although unintended, the net result of this kind of reasoning has been to 
undermine the ‘universal’ by adding conditions to it, and these conditions 
come from the particular, the religious. Matters are complicated further 
when one considers that Christ lived in time, that he had a body and that he 
sometimes did things which one might not consider good, such as get angry 
in the Temple and prioritise himself because the disciples would always 
have the poor with them (Matthew 26:11).  
If Christianity supplied a fatal dose of contingency to philosophy, 
‘contaminating’ it as Vattimo himself says (Vattimo 1997a: 47), apart from 
introducing the notions of atemporality and an intrinsic maximum, how did 
philosophy weaken religion through its Christian guise? As has been 
mentioned, Savater reads Gray’s theory of secularisation as holding that 
Christianity introduced ‘Truth’ with a capital ‘T’ into religion: ‘Atheism is a 
late bloom of a Christian passion for truth’ (Gray 2002: 127), strongly 
reminiscent of Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals, ‘atheism…its will 
to truth…is not the antithesis of the ideal which it appears to be; it is rather 
only one of the last phases of its development’ (Nietzsche 1996: 134). 
Christianity posed as a religion in the way Girard described, in taking on the 
appearance of a religion through the scapegoat mechanism, except in Jesus’ 
case he was fully innocent and revealed the natural sacred for what it really 
was, highlighting the brutal truth of the scapegoat mechanism. As Girard 
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has described this aspect of religion so well (and I recounted his ideas in 
Part One), I will not dwell on it further. Here one can depart from Savater, 
Gray and Girard to take a far more familiarly Nietzschean-Vattimian line. 
The Hebrew-Judaic God was part of a linear view of salvation history based 
on a covenant, not on God being representative of the Absolute Truth. 
Nevertheless, monotheism leant itself to being read through the lens of 
philosophical first principles. Therefore, once the missionary element of 
Christianity necessitated that Gentile Apologists place a Hellenistic gloss 
over the Christian kerygma, the identification of God with the Truth was 
destined. However, a religion based on ‘Truth’ and ‘truthfulness’ will 
collapse when it is discovered to be a ‘lie’ (Vattimo 1997a: 7). Of course, 
neither Nietzsche nor Vattimo have held that this discovery revealed God as 
a lie in a flat-footed literal sense. Rather, this ‘lie’ has been interpreted 
variously, including such that God as the guarantor of the security of society 
is no longer required given the advances in science and technology that 
were permitted by monotheism (and here one can relate this history to the 
Heideggerian Ge-Stell and Ereignis), or that the value of truth and its 
concomitant, knowledge, led to the subjective turn inward and therefore 
down the road to the fabling of the world as narrated by Nietzsche (through 
Descartes, Kant, positivism, and its unmasking as a play of forces and 
situatedness). One could even interpret the ‘lie’ as pertaining to the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ effect in particular, such that it has been found out, through Girard’s 
work, that the value of Christ was not as a sacrificial victim, but as an 
unmasker of the natural sacred. 
If these examples suffice to indicate how Christianity weakened not 
only religion, but also philosophy, what lay behind the success of 
missionary endeavours beyond accommodating the kerygma to local belief-
systems and means of expression? In other words, if Christianity became 
cloaked by, and interwoven with, Hellenistic terminology (for example), 
why did the Gentiles take it on board to begin with? Here I can connect this 
question with the significant motivation for Vattimo in recovering 
Christianity, to find an ethic to adjudicate the irreducible hermeneutic 
plurality of late-modernity. Vattimo thought he found it in ‘caritas.’ His 
own account of caritas was flawed, but how will Christianity as a Trojan 
Horse yield an ethic of charity? Here an answer can again be found along 
232 
 
Vattimian lines. If using philosophy as a handmaiden for theology occurred 
on the grounds of serving the servant, the kenotic Word, then essentially 
weakening took place in the name of friendship. Aristotle’s metaphysics 
was weakened in the name of fellowship (communion) and due to a history 
of salvation based on a contingent event, the Incarnation. Now, if the 
Incarnation functioned as an unmasking of the natural sacred due to a 
message of friendship (God lowering himself and announcing he was no 
longer master, but friend), then this message itself is the historical and 
historic announcement that is the guiding, normative thread for weakening 
interpretations that persists to the present day and is not capable of being 
secularised. Here one can draw upon Vattimo’s use of Dilthey’s 
understanding of Christianity; the latter effected an inwards-turning based 
on brotherhood, a turn to the subject based on shared faith. The Marxist 
historian G.E.M. de Ste. Croix has also seen this reason as an influential 
factor with respect to the success of early Christianity in spreading to 
diverse groups, that slave, free, Jew, Gentile, male and female were not one 
externally, but ‘in Christ’ (Ste Croix 1981: 418-425; see Galatians 3:28). 
Returning to Vattimo’s reading of Dilthey, friendship towards one-another 
based on an inner faith, rather than socio-political or economic factors, 
helped spread Christianity, backed-up by the idea that God, too, is a friend 
as is shown through Christ, which is a link to Vattimo’s understanding of 
kenosis. Therefore, Vattimo has a principle of friendship based on the 
hermeneutical occurrence of the Incarnation and Jesus Christ’s own 
interpretative of action, of lightening the burden, of lessening enmity in his 
Antitheses (‘love your enemy’), and his calling of everyone to friendship: 
‘all the nations’ and a renewal of all creation (Matthew 19:28).  
Textual justification for this reading of Vattimo on friendship comes 
in the form of what he has written about ‘truth.’ In The Responsibility of the 
Philosopher, Vattimo writes that ‘I can no longer keep the notion of truth 
and evangelical charity apart’ (Vattimo 2008: 97). Charity in this context, 
for Vattimo, is ‘a life of heeding others and responding to others in 
dialogue’ (Vattimo 2008: 97); in short, ‘friendship’ (Vattimo 2008: 98). It is 
interesting that Vattimo should qualify ‘charity’ with ‘evangelical.’ This 
term has two main meanings in the context of Christianity. On the one hand, 
it is a synonym for ‘good news,’ and thus simply the Gospel message, and 
233 
 
this may well be the way in which Vattimo wishes to use the term. 
Nevertheless, ‘evangelical’ can also mean spreading this good news, and 
this is where the nihilistic missionary vocation of Christianity comes in. 
Truth is made, for Vattimo, in consensus in which the primary value is the 
dialogue itself, only secondly the consensus that is made out of ‘interpreting 
our common situation along certain lines and from shared assumptions’ 
(Vattimo 2008: 69). Traditionally, evangelism in the missionary sense 
meant conversion through reduction. However, dialogue itself would 
presume weakening, for absolute positions preclude genuine dialogue. 
Indeed, to reach out to others in the first place means there is a desire to 
listen to others. In this Verwindung of the evangelical, the good news is that 
of weakening, abasement, and, above all, charity, friendship. In an ironic 
distortion of the Great Commission, the good news is that of spreading the 
good news, of seeking the other through dialogue. For this reason, Vattimo 
refers to the missionary vocation of Christianity after the end of metaphysics 
as moving ‘from universality to hospitality’ (Vattimo 2002a: 100), 
deliberately invoking Derrida’s work on hospitality. The latter term means 
placing ‘oneself in the hands of one’s guest, that is, an entrustment of 
oneself to him’ (Vattimo 2002a: 101). In dialogue, ‘this signifies 
acknowledging that the other might be right,’ and that in the spirit of charity 
the Christian ‘must limit [himself] almost entirely to listening’ (Vattimo 
2002a: 101). On these grounds, one can reach out even to those ‘strong’ 
interpreters, for the primary action of this ‘twisted’ missionary activity is 
listening, not trying to convince the other. The very weakening that occurred 
in the setting-up of Christianity as the Trojan Horse for both religion and 
philosophy can be regarded as the archetype for such a relationship to the 
other. The Christian gospel of weakness spread out and quickly found a 
Hellenistic Gentile culture to which it listened, adopting principles from its 
philosophy, Stoicism in particular. Later it listened to, and adopted, from 
other cultures, such as Roman governance after the conversion of 
Constantine, through the recovery of Aristotle all the way up to listening to 
Marxism and the struggle of people in countries that developed liberation 
theologies. As such, one can see why Vattimo thinks that in caritas (the 
driving force of secularisation due, on this reading, to its ‘weak evangelism’ 
based on friendship and hospitality) he finds ‘the original ‘text’ of which 
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weak ontology is the transcription’ (Vattimo 1999: 70). Caritas and weak 
ontology weaken strong structures by finding the other based on the 
announcement that God—representative of absolutist strong thought—has 
been weakened (kenosis). Indeed, as Vattimo realises, it is due to this 
secularisation that the death of God occurred and the philosophy of ‘weak 
ontology’ is possible at all. 
The missionary focus of the Christian announcement led to the 
spread of Christianity to the Gentile world. Whereas Christianity was a 
Trojan Horse for religion in the sense that Girard describes, this became the 
exemplar for the notion of Truth in philosophy; in both cases, Christianity 
successfully posed as something it was not in order to weaken it to the point 
of breaking. Jesus’ calling to friendship and his death on the cross unmasked 
the ‘natural sacred,’ but the power of this memory as a trace, a tradition, 
made philosophies such as Stoicism, Platonism in its various forms, and 
Aristotelianism all break under the weight of having to accommodate the 
exceptional and contingently historical. This re-reading of Vattimo’s theory 
of secularisation can still yield the results he wants, that is, to ground 
hermeneutics historically and yield an ethic of weakening, in other words, 
one of secularisation. The ethic in question remains one of caritas, but 
disparate elements of Vattimo’s return to Christianity have been brought 
together to show that there are a lot of resources within his work with which 
to construct a philosophy of dialogue based on charity understood in terms 
of friendship and hospitality. These two notions involve seeking out the 
other and listening to them, which was commanded by the risen Christ’s 
‘Great Commission.’ This found its archetypal form very quickly in the 
mission to the Gentiles which yielded the Trojan Horse effect of the 
message of the weakening of God (kenosis) meeting philosophy. 
There is another consequence of the turn inward based on charity 
which underlay the Great Commission which has relevance to the idea of 
weakening, and that is nominalism. Nominalism is the view that things, 
such as tables, only share their name in common; there is no ‘essence’ to a 
table in reality. Links have been made between weak thought and 
nominalism, particularly in the work of Jean Grondin, who sees in 
nominalism the logic of modernity: 
According to Gadamer, the Nietzschean and postmodernist 
destruction of truth secretly rests on the nominalism of modernity, 
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according to which there is no meaning in the ‘world itself,’ which is 
nothing but senseless matter. In this perspective, sense comes out 
only through the act of the understanding subject, who ‘injects’ 
meaning into the world ‘out there’ (Grondin 2007: 209). 
Although Grondin sees in nominalism the logic of modernity, it has its roots 
in the Later Middle Ages, particularly the work of Ockham (c.1285-1349), 
who was sceptical with respect to the reality of universals: ‘we have to say 
that every universal is one singular thing. Therefore, nothing is universal 
except by signification by being a sign of several things’ (Ockham 1957: 
33). Grondin sees the equation between ‘Being’ and ‘language’ in 
postmodern thought (rather than in Gadamer’s, who thought interpretation 
was of something) as ‘the contemporary form of nominalism’ as ‘one can 
never overcome the realm of historical and linguistic interpretations, and 
from this perspective arise the ‘nihilistic’ consequences of modernity’s 
insistence on subjectivity (or human language)’ (Grondin 2007: 209). If 
‘reality’ is based on the subject—through ‘faith’ in the Medieval worldview, 
and through Cartesian certainty which gave way to science after the first 
nominalist controversy with Ockham, as nominalism ‘corresponds to the 
prevailing scientific view of the world’ (Grondin 2007: 209)—then doubt is 
cast on external essences (which then self-consumes with respect to the 
subject as an idea, based ironically on the scientific method). Whether 
Medieval (Ockham), modern (the scientific outlook on the world) or 
postmodern (Vattimo’s weak thought), nominalism gives rise to weakening 
of the ontos on, of metaphysical structures. As Zimmerman writes,  
Vattimo’s equation of transcendence with metaphysics and 
metaphysics with Christianity is theologically and historically 
inaccurate. Nor is his interpretation of secularization as the anti-
metaphysical substance of Christianity convincing. Indeed, a good 
case has been made that beginning with nominalism in the thirteenth 
century, secularism as the disintegration of theology is responsible 
for the rise of scientific objectivism (Zimmerman 2009: 316). 
Equally, Blond says that recent scholarship shows that ‘‘modern’ nihilism 
extends no further back that [sic] the end of the thirteenth and beginning of 
the fourteenth century’ through the work of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus 
and William of Ockham who ‘constructed a truly modern autonomous 
secular metaphysics…that divided faith from reason’ to create dogmatic 
theology and rationalist atheism (Blond 2002: 285). What Zimmerman and 
Blond do not consider is that Vattimo’s understanding of Christianity can 
lend itself to explaining how nominalism came about in the history of ideas, 
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through my idea of tying it in with the idea of the Trojan Horse through 
Vattimo’s use of Dilthey. Guarino mentions that Louis Dupré, too, has 
linked nominalism to the loss of the ontos on, to the passage to modernity 
and a world constituted by a subject (Guarino 2009: 169 n. 131). However, 
in Dilthey’s thought the original appeal of Christianity was from the inner 
brotherhood of believers, which again links to my emphasis on the 
missionary, evangelical dimension of the Christian notion of caritas picked 
out by Vattimo; nominalism in Ockham’s thought could be seen as an 
expression of the key Christian message and function, of the inward turn. 
Modernity developed Ockham’s insight further, but the stimulus for this 
development can be perceived in the original Christian message. Here one 
can link ‘interiority’ and ‘truth’ to ‘the Spirit of truth. The world cannot 
accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, 
for he lives with you and will be in you’ (John 14:17). This quotation also 
links truth and interiority to the ‘spirit,’ which is Vattimo’s description of 
the current age of hermeneutics—‘the Age of the Spirit’—which is based 
around dialogue and forging truth out of consensus. Chiurazzi also thinks 
that Vattimo’s interpretation of Gadamer, as entailing that Being can be 
identified with language, is effectively nominalism, something Gadamer 
himself rejected (Chiurazzi 2014: 185).  
In agreement with Vattimo, it has been argued that kenosis is the 
message given in Christ of the weakening of God from master to friend. 
However, differently from Vattimo, it has been suggested that one should 
pay more attention to the missionary tendency within Christianity, of 
organising the hermeneutical principle around seeking the other in terms of 
seeking them out and listening to them no-matter who they are (caritas). 
The Great Commission was founded on a notion of universal brotherhood 
through faith, which is compatible with Vattimo’s use of Dilthey’s argument 
concerning the subjective turn. When in the early fruit of a charitable 
exchange of ideas the covenant-based historical religious ‘Jesus Movement’ 
met Gentiles, a fusion of horizons took place that weakened both philosophy 
and religion. This fusion has played itself out in history in the form of 
secularisation, reinterpreted here as making the religious worldlier through 
its gradual unmasking at the hand of the ideal of truth incorporated from 
philosophy. Furthermore, the importance of the contingent was taken into 
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philosophy through religion and has proved fatal to metaphysical 
philosophy. A process of weakening strong religious and metaphysics 
structures (secularisation) has thus taken place as a result of the weakening 
of God through kenosis and its hermeneutical principle of caritas involving 
both the cross-contamination of religion and philosophy in addition to 
nominalism arising out of the notion of the subject which has its root in the 
inward turn established by universal brotherhood based on faith. 
Nominalism reduced belief in universal essences and weakened the idea of 
the ontos on. Here, then, we can have Vattimo’s desire to create an ethical 
principle of weakening for hermeneutics without supersessionism or—
crucially—without having to rule out vertical transcendence completely; the 
door is left open for it, but that it does not explicitly figure in creating an 
ethic. Moreover, it is a position that does not make any claims that all 
transcendence is violent. Metaphysics is still posited as violent, but it is not 
equated with all forms of transcendence. This prevents this modified version 
of weak thought from being reductionist and, ironically, ‘strong’ in 
approach after all. 
   One avenue for further research would be to find a way to link 
Vattimo more closely to Levinas as a way of addressing the ‘blind spot’ in 
Vattimo’s philosophy, namely vertical transcendence. Levinas’ philosophy 
of alterity (the Other) offers resources to address this lacuna in Vattimo’s 
thought. In conversation the Other is to be regarded as something personal 
rather than as a thing, and awaiting a response from the Other is evidence of 
this difference. The unknown—a reason why one is entering into 
conversation with the Other to begin with—means that one cannot reduce 
the interlocutor to presence and to categories of thought under which they 
can be subsumed in the way an object can. Links can be made here with 
Vattimo’s concern with caritas and the weakened ‘missionary’ element of 
his thought I have outlined. In turn, the ‘postmodern’ dimension of 
Vattimo’s thought and his concern with technology could be used to add 
other dimensions to Levinas’ work if a genuine conversation could be 
effected by me between my interpretation of Vattimo and the work of 
Levinas.  
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